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Printed

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES
INTO THE U.S.S.R.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

UNDER AUTHORITY OF

H. Res. 346

PART 1

NOVEMBER 30, DECEMBER 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, AND 11, 1953

Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Investigate the
Incorporation of the Baltic States Into the U. S. S. R.



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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1954

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE INCORPORATION OF THE
BALTIC STATES INTO THE U. S. S. R.

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PREFACE

This first interim report consists of all the testimony given in public hearings at Washington, New York, Detroit, and Chicago before the House Baltic Committee. The witnesses provide a graphic picture of Communist methods before and after the forced incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. From the outset it becomes clear that the Soviet Union is a cunning aggressor unscrupulous in its methods. The final report of the committee will endeavor to analyze those methods and trace their pattern not only in the incorporation of the Baltic States but in other Communist-controlled territories as well.

The witnesses presented in this volume illustrate many of the various phases of the Soviet incorporation in its historical, legal, and purely human aspects.

First, the Honorable John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, stressed once more the unswerving opposition of the United States Government to the "incorporation." On that occasion he enunciated an important principle of American foreign policy, which is not to be based on practical, pragmatic considerations, but must rest on recognition of moral values. He said:

Some may say that it is unrealistic and impractical not to recognize the enforced "incorporation" of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. We believe, however, that a despotism of the Soviet type cannot indefinitely perpetrate its rule over hundreds of million of people who love God, who love country, and who have a sense of personal dignity.

He added:

Let me also assure of this: We do not look upon the conference table as a place where we surrender our principles, but rather, as a place for making our principles prevail.

The significance of this was to achieve full flower only a few months later, at the meeting between the Secretary of State and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at Berlin.

Now, after the Berlin Conference is over, we know that the moral position which Mr. Dulles enunciated at the first public hearing of this committee, and as the first witness, was fully maintained without compromise at Berlin. And we have seen how, at Berlin, the Secretary of State was able to use the example of Communist "elections" in the Baltic States, the fraudulent manipulations of which were so convincingly exposed by the Baltic Committee, as an efficient argument against Molotov's proposal of free "elections" in "united" Germany.

He was followed on the witness stand by the diplomatic representatives of these three countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), still fully accredited to the United States Government, and other former government officials gave an exhaustive résumé of the events which led to the incorporation, beginning with the negotiations of the so-

called Mutual Assistance Pacts, signed *under duress* by the Baltic governments, and ending with the fraudulent Communist "elections" in the Baltic States and the request by the "puppet Parliaments" for their incorporation into the U. S. S. R.

Another distinguished witness testifying about the conditions in the Baltic States prior to their forced incorporation was the former President of the United States, Herbert Hoover. His testimony, contrasted with the picture given by witnesses who lived in the Baltic States after the "incorporation," conveyed vividly the immense difference between their previous existence as independent sovereign states and their present unnatural existence as Soviet Republics. Similar testimony as to the high standard of living and general prosperity of those countries prior to their incorporation was offered by Mr. Thomas J. Watson, chairman of the board, International Business Machines, who visited the Baltic States in 1938 in his capacity as president of the International Chamber of Commerce.

The committee then proceeded to gather evidence from Baltic nationals who testified as to the effect of the Communist control on political and social institutions and life in general in that area.

Witnesses who came to the committee offering their testimony were of every walk of life. Alfred Berzins, only living member of the last free Latvian Government, denied that his country had ever voluntarily sought admission to the Soviet Union. He described Andrei Y. Vishinsky, chief of the U. S. S. R. delegation to the United Nations, who, the evidence clearly shows, had presided over the liquidation of Latvia, as a "liar" and the "greatest murderer of the Latvian nation." The committee's invitation to Mr. Vishinsky to appear before it and reply to these charges went unanswered. Other witnesses were ordinary people, farmers, priests, workers, schoolboys, teachers, housewives, some of whom testified in masks and from behind screens, lest their stories of brutal beatings, torture, mass killings, and inhuman mass deportations in which families were torn asunder and sent their separate ways into the vast reaches of Siberia, bring severe reprisals against relatives still behind the Iron Curtain.

Pictures which were smuggled out of Latvia by Alberts Jekste, who once headed Riga Film Corp., were introduced into the evidence of the hearings and graphically tell the story of how these gallant little Republics were strangled and forcibly incorporated into the U. S. S. R.

It becomes clear from the testimony that one of the first aims of the Communist-controlled regime was to undermine and gradually destroy religion. Clergymen of various faiths corroborated each other in describing before the committee the methods employed against their faiths, ranging from the use of open terror to the systematic and determined efforts to turn the younger generations in an antireligious direction.

It is very instructive to read the order issued secretly by the Communist government in Lithuania prohibiting the teaching of religion in schools, and requiring all clergymen to sign an individual pledge to refrain from such teaching. The Catholic bishop of Lithuania, Bishop Brizgys, submitted the original as well as an English translation of that order to the committee. He also submitted documents revealing the Communist Party attempts to prevent celebration of religious holidays, especially Christmas. A Latvian Protestant

clergyman, the Dean Kullitis, corroborated fully Bishop Brizgys' story and added some very significant observations of his own. He pointed out how the Communists are interpreting the doctrine of separation of church and state, which system was from the very beginning part of Latvian constitutional structure. He said:

Under the Communists this separation was applied in a different way. In a Soviet-controlled country the state fights the church and aims at the destroying of the latter.

He gave several examples of the detail with which the plan of church destruction was prepared and executed. In all printed matters the word "God" had to be spelled with small letters. Teaching on scripture and Christian ethics were replaced by antireligious propaganda. Sunday, the Sabbath, was replaced with "nonworking" day, and all Christian holidays were abolished. "Voluntary" work and Communist meetings on Sundays in factories and schools, combined with endless lectures on Marxist ideology, were of course designed to make participation in religious services impossible. The Christmas story was explained as superstition in the Communist-controlled newspapers, which at that time carried an increased number of anti-religious articles. The Lutheran pastor, Rev. Kiviranna, from predominantly Protestant Estonia, told an identical story about the Communist attitude toward religion in his homeland.

The schools were also high on the list of institutions to be remodeled after the typical Communist pattern. The youth of a nation is obviously the most pliable and in that sense "hopeful" material, which can be remolded according to the Communist blueprints.

In addition to the testimony from all the clergymen as to the exclusion of teaching of religion from schools, the testimony of teachers and students showed exhaustive evidence as to the efforts of the Communist regime to influence pupils in a direct way through changes in curriculum, replacing of patriotic teachers, etc. Extensive courses on Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism were introduced, pictures of Lenin and Stalin were ordered hung up in classrooms, crucifixes and other religious objects were removed. Mr. Banionis, who was an 18-year-old student in 1939, described the elaborate system of spying and thought control the Communists introduced into schools in Lithuania. In each school they set up a network of informers recruited mostly through duress from among the students, who were required to report on anti-Communist attitudes of their fellow students and teachers, and also on relatives and friends. This technique was used on children as young as 12 and 14 years of age.

Throughout the Communist Empire itself, every schoolchild knows the story of Pavlik Morosov, a member of the Pioneers, a Communist youth organization. He became a Communist hero by denouncing his father before a Soviet court. He testified that his father hid grain contrary to the rules established by the Communist Party and the Government. This denunciation for a "crime" of "hiding" grain, which in reality was the father's property, was glorified throughout the Soviet Union, and a statue was erected in the boy's honor in Moscow. Similar methods of corrupting youth are being employed in an area inhabited by 800 million people under Communist control.

Adults can be strongly influenced through the media of communication (press, radio, theater, etc.). The committee heard witnesses

describing the first 10 steps the Communists took after the seizure of power in the Baltic States. Among these were the immediate occupation of radio stations in all three Baltic nations, which from that very moment began to broadcast Communist propaganda under the direct supervision of trained officials. All newspapers were also taken over and used from that time on exclusively for Communist propaganda. The fields of entertainment and culture were also fully utilized and programs in theaters and movie houses were selected by Communists for that purpose.

All these methods, of course, are applied in combination with the scientific use of terror, as it is obvious from all testimony and also from exhibits of captured NKVD documents (political police orders, warrants, etc.) submitted by witnesses.

An interesting comparative perspective on Communist methods was obtained by the committee when it called as a witness a sergeant of the United States Air Force who had been subjected to "brain washing" as a prisoner of war in North Korea. He was accompanied on the stand by a witness, formerly a resident of Estonia, who gave testimony of Communist "brain washing" methods in 1940. The parallel thus afforded provided a significant identity between Communist techniques a decade, in time, and half a world, in distance, apart.

The economic aspect of the Communist doctrine caused tremendous repercussions in all three Baltic nations. Gradual socialization of industry and business through "nationalization" decrees, reaching down to small enterprises with hired manpower, lead to complete impoverishment. The farmers, after a short period of relative calm, soon experienced the growing pressure of the Communist state authorities in the form of heavy taxation and a steady campaign of intimidation and "persuasion" aimed to "induce" them to join the "cooperatives." The significant of these economic changes was vividly demonstrated in testimony before the committee.

An observer is struck by the uniformity of the measures which the puppet governments took to implement their plans for socialization. These plans were obviously prepared by the authorities of the U. S. S. R. and enforced in all three Baltic nations, with the help of local Communists and fellow travelers, who were put in control of the puppet governments.

Two main trends can be distinguished in this process: the nationalization of all life and the consequent lowering of living standards. A businessman from Estonia, Mr. Kutt, described the impact of nationalization measures on the population. He first lost his job as executive vice chairman of a large agricultural association after a slander campaign against him in the Communist-controlled newspapers. Other businesses in which he had an interest were nationalized. So was his home. He then found it necessary to sell his personal belongings in order to live. He was fortunate finally to get out of Estonia via the underground.

The lowering of living standards was achieved, according to his testimony, by manipulating the previously stable Estonian currency, the crown, and by raising the price level of industrial goods as much as 10 to 15 times. Prices of foodstuffs went up 3 to 4 times. At the same time wages were increased only $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 times. As a consequence the wages of the workingman lost about 35 percent of their purchas-

ing power. All bank savings were frozen and savings account owners were allowed to draw a maximum of \$30 a month. This measure had the additional effect of forcing elderly retired people to seek employment, since they could not exist on their pensions or savings. The results of this artificially created "inflation" was the lowering of the living standard by about two-thirds. This same method was used in Latvia and Lithuania with similar consequences.

The nationalization (i. e., confiscation of property without reimbursement of any kind) began with the banks, mines, transport enterprises and large-scale industry. In the end even tools in small shops (cobblers' tools, sewing machines, barbers' instruments) were nationalized and assigned to a collective group. The former owner was required to become a member of this group in order to exist.

Dr. Trimakas of Lithuania fully corroborated Mr. Kutt's testimony about the impact of nationalization on the economic life of the country, including the collectivization of agriculture. He estimated that at the present time 97 percent of all farmsteads in Lithuania have been collectivised. This, according to Dr. Trimakas, has resulted in a drastic decline of agricultural production and in food shortages throughout the country.

Dr. Trimakas also pointed out how the Communist regime was changing the social and economic structure of the controlled territories. The building of heavy industry, he said, which is taking place throughout the areas of the Baltic nations serve the armament purposes of the U. S. S. R., at the expense of agriculture and the consumer-goods industry.

This is being done with complete disregard for the needs and well-being of the population. The working class, theoretically the ruling group in a country under a "dictatorship of the proletariat", is strictly regimented and any breach of the discipline imposed by the Communist Party is severely punished.

It is obvious from all the testimony before the committee that the Baltic nations underwent drastic and tragic changes as a consequence of their forced incorporation into the U. S. S. R. Witnesses, without exception, described one element of life under Communist rule as being ever present. This element is the Red terror, the unlimited use of violence by the Communist regimes everywhere. The real purpose behind this Red terror is illustrated in the following excerpt from the testimony:

Mr. KERSTEN (Wisconsin). In order to create this new Soviet man that you spoke about, they have got to get all of these older elements out of the way; is that it?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes; to destroy the old generation.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is what was done in Lithuania and you have a conviction that that is being done for the United States (i. e., preparation of list of people slated for liquidation).

Dr. TRIMAKAS. There is no doubt about it. They have to destroy, according to Marx, the whole element that is against their conception, their ideology, and to educate a new one along their own lines.

This quote is, in a condensed form, a description of what is going on in nations under Communist rule. Behind it is the stark reality of the horrible sufferings by untold millions of victims of the Communist experiment.

The pattern of Communist aggression in the Baltic States, so well demonstrated in testimony before the committee, has been extended to other once free and sovereign nations of the world. The value of expanding the committee's investigation to include these areas is best cited in the following memorandum from the Department of State to Chairman Charles J. Kersten:

FEBRUARY 8, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR HON. CHARLES J. KERSTEN, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The following are the Department's views regarding the work of the House Baltic Committee and your proposal to broaden the scope of the committee's inquiry, as set forth in the draft resolution enclosed with your letter of January 17, 1954, to Secretary Dulles:

1. The Department considers that the work of the House committee has been wisely planned and effectively conducted. It is apparent that the hearings held to date have made a valuable contribution to United States objectives in disseminating impressive evidence of Soviet disrespect for the rights and sovereignty of small nations.

2. The Department believes that it will be beneficial to broaden the scope of the committee's work to provide for inquiry into similar cases where communism has extended its domination over free peoples. Careful, well-documented investigation of such cases would be valuable (a) to assure the captive peoples behind the Iron Curtain that they are not forgotten and that the United States does not endorse their captivity; and (b) to educate public opinion in the free world regarding Communist techniques in seizing power and the terrible realities of life under Communist rule.

/s/ WALTER B. SMITH.

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIC COMMITTEE,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in room 346, House Office Building, Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Busbey, Bentley, Bonin, Madden, Machrowicz, and Dodd.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order.

The purpose of this hearing is to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of seizure and forceful "incorporation" of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the treatment of the said Baltic peoples during and following said seizure and incorporation. These small and defenseless nations were among the first to have imposed upon them the same system and way of life as those experienced in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, and in certain other vast areas.

What happened in the Baltics is a kind of a blueprint or pattern as to what happened elsewhere.

The facts concerning the almost forgotten tragedy of how the 6 million Baltic peoples lost their freedom has a very current significance, because the same forces that overcame their freedom have engulfed the freedom of additional millions and presently threaten the freedom of many more.

We Americans are concerned with the freedom of individuals and with the basic freedom of nations because slavery anywhere under modern conditions affects the freedom of all.

This committee is fortunate in having among its members Congressmen Fred E. Busbey, Alvin M. Bentley, Edward J. Bonin, Ray J. Madden, Thaddeus M. Machrowicz, and Thomas J. Dodd, all of whom have had experience in dealing with communism and Soviet tactics before.

I believe that this committee, united as it is, is truly bipartisan in its motives.

I wish to make mention of the method by which the committee will operate. We have divided our work into two phases: On the one hand, a careful and thorough and exhaustive study is now being made by a competent staff to document the evidence, agreements, pacts, and history of the Baltic nations since they proclaimed their independence from Russia in 1918. This study is going forward and will constitute a major part of the record. We hope that it will be suffi-

ciently detailed to be used, if the Congress decides, to present the cause of the Baltic nations before the United Nations or elsewhere.

These hearings which we are now opening constitute the second phase of our investigation—a phase in which eye witnesses will attest to the authenticity of the documents, pacts, and agreements and the grave events affecting these enslaved peoples.

I might add that the committee is not concerned with any of the territorial questions which may exist among the Baltic nations and other captive nations, nor will the inquiry in any way seek to affect the territorial status quo in eastern Europe as recognized by the United States prior to the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939.

We are very fortunate to have with us this morning the Honorable Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles.

We realize, Mr. Dulles, the grave events with which you are concerned, and we are very happy to have you with us this morning. We will not detain you with any questions, because of the urgency of your schedule. We shall ask you, however, for such statement as you wish to make concerning this inquiry.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. DULLES. Thank you, Chairman Kersten.

I am very happy to have this opportunity to talk to you and the members of your committee about the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

If I may, I will divide my talk into three parts, one dealing with the past, another dealing with the present, and a third dealing with the future. Each of these three phases is full of meaning for us all.

First is the past. The Baltic peoples proclaimed their independence of Russia in 1918, and in 1920 Soviet Russia made peace treaties with them. By these treaties Soviet Russia recognized, without reservation, the independence and sovereignty of the three Baltic States. It declared in these treaties that it voluntarily and forever renounced all sovereign rights over the Baltic peoples and the territories of the Baltic States. United States recognition was extended on July 28, 1922. We extended that recognition in accordance with our traditional concepts in these matters. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had shown by 4 years of existence as independent states that their independence actually had a solid reality. The three states had successfully maintained internal stability, both political and economic. They had conducted themselves internationally in accordance with good practice. Therefore, they became entitled to our recognition. Indeed, their independence fulfilled the kind of hope for all peoples which our Nation has entertained since its own beginning.

For two decades these Baltic Republics showed the good fruits of freedom. Their creative accomplishments were impressive. Although their natural resources were meager, the peoples were skilled in agriculture and by their hard work they achieved a good measure of economic well-being. National arts and crafts flourished. They established a high standard of social justice and won worldwide respect as exemplary members of the family of nations. Their spiritual and their moral strength, their love of liberty, their energy and their self-discipline showed that they possessed those qualities which, more than mere numbers, area, or wealth, make for national worth.

The Baltic Republics during this period gave the whole world an ever-needed demonstration of the creative power of self-disciplined freedom.

I turn now to the present.

The present dark period began in 1939. It was begun by the ostensibly friendly embrace of the Soviet Union, which pressed so-called pacts of mutual assistance upon these three Baltic countries.

The Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs carefully explained to the world the innocent and protective nature of these pacts. In a major address which he made on October 31, 1939, I quote his words as being of interest:

The Soviet Union has concluded pacts of mutual assistance with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which are of major political importance. * * * The special character of these mutual-assistance pacts in no way implies any interference on the part of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, as some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. On the contrary, all these pacts of mutual assistance strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of the signatory states and the principle of noninterference in each other's affairs.* * * We declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.

So spoke the Soviet Foreign Minister on October 31, 1939. Scarcely had these passionate and authoritative words been uttered when the "Sovietization" which he explained got underway. The concluding acts occurred about 8 months later when the Soviet Union marched its Red armies into the Baltic territory, set up puppet governments, and caused them to apply for admission into the Soviet Union, an admission that was graciously granted. Thus, the "nonsensical talk" of the "foreign newspapers" became a bleak reality.

The free nations of the world were shocked by this aggression. The United States promptly made its position known. On July 23, 1940, our Government described and denounced the "devious processes whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors."

Unhappily, the devious processes which were exhibited in this case, have been going on until today more than 15 once-independent nations, representing much of the human race, have been "Sovietized."

Today, the Soviet leaders still ask the free peoples to accept and to rely upon Soviet mutual-security pacts. We should know by now that when the Soviet rulers use the word "security," what they mean is an opportunity for the Soviet Union to secure new victims.

What of the future? First of all, let us never lose hope that there is a future.

I recall—I was looking in my Bible yesterday—some of the earliest history recorded in the books of the Old Testament. The nations there mentioned are such as Israel, Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon. How many times have these nations of many thousands of years ago been submerged, to rise again?

The Baltic peoples, in the face of every imposition, retain their will to be free and maintain their steadfast opposition to Soviet despotism. Terrorism has been prolonged, now, for 13 years. Many of their courageous and noble representatives have been executed, deported, or driven into exile. But their martyrdom keeps patriotism alive.

The United States, for its part, maintains the diplomatic recognition which it extended in 1922 to the three Baltic nations. We continue to deal with their diplomatic and consular representatives who served the last independent governments of these states.

Some may say that it is unrealistic and impractical not to recognize the enforced incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. We believe, however, that a despotism of the Soviet type cannot indefinitely perpetuate its rule over hundreds of millions of people who love God, who love country, and who have a sense of personal dignity.

The Soviet system which seeks to expunge the distinctive characteristics of nation, creed, and individuality must itself change or be doomed ultimately to collapse. The time of collapse depends largely on whether the peoples who remain free produce spiritual, intellectual, and material richness, and whether we have a faith which can penetrate any Iron Curtain; and we must be sure that the captive peoples know that they are not forgotten, that we are not reconciled to their fate, and, above all, that we are not prepared to seek illusory safety for ourselves by a bargain with their masters which would confirm their captivity.

These, Mr. Chairman, I can say to you, are our purposes. We have not forgotten the Atlantic Charter and its proclamation of "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." We still share the wish expressed in that charter, "to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have forcibly been deprived of them."

This is an hour when it is particularly important that our Nation's dedication to these principles should be made manifest. We approach a possible meeting with the representatives of the Soviet Union. I can assure you that we welcome opportunities to settle specific disputes between us to end, if possible, the race in armament, particularly atomic armament, and to reduce the risks of war.

Let me also assure this: We do not look upon the conference table as a place where we surrender our principles, but rather as a place for making our principles prevail. That is our resolve—a resolve which I am confident is backed by the Congress and by the people of the United States.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the members of the committee, we are grateful to you for your appearance here this morning. We are thankful to you for this statement of a manifesto of faith in human freedom—in these peoples and all peoples.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you very much, sir.

May I be excused?

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes; you may be excused, Mr. Secretary.

At this point we would like to introduce into the record a copy of the text of House Resolution 346.

(The resolution referred to is as follows:)

[H. Res. 346, 83d Cong., 1st sess., Rept. No. 903]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the Government of the United States of America maintains diplomatic relations with the Governments of the Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and consistently has refused to recognize their seizure and forced

"incorporation" into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That there is hereby created a select committee to be composed of seven Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker, one of whom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the committee shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

The committee is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of said seizure and forced "incorporation" of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the treatment of the said Baltic peoples during and following said seizure and "incorporation".

The committee shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) as soon as practicable during the present Congress the results of its investigation and study, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the committee, or any subcommittee thereof authorized by the committee to hold hearings, is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places within the United States, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary. Subpoenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any member of the committee designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or member.

MR. KERSTEN. I would like also at this point to read into the record a letter dated May 27, 1953, the White House, Washington, addressed as follows: "Dear Congressman." It is addressed to me.

Thank you for your kindness in making available to me the copies of House Resolution 231 enclosed with your letter of May 15.

I recall the March 26 visit of the Lithuanian American Council and our discussion of a possible congressional investigation along the lines envisaged in your resolution. I believe that a useful purpose might be served by bringing before the American people a factual record of what actually took place in the "incorporation" of the Baltic States, which has never been recognized by this Government. Should the House establish a select committee to inquire into the matter, I will follow the work of that committee with close interest.

With kind regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

House Resolution 231 was amended and is presently in the form of that which has been introduced into the record.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 1." See p. 473.)

MR. KERSTEN. Is Mr. Zadeikis, the Lithuanian Minister, here?

STATEMENT OF HON. POVILAS ZADEIKIS, ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF LITHUANIA

MR. KERSTEN. Mr. Zadeikis, will you identify yourself by giving us your full name and your position?

MR. ZADEIKIS. I am Povilas Zadeikis, Minister of Lithuania to the United States.

MR. KERSTEN. Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Zadeikis?

MR. ZADEIKIS. Yes, I have a statement, and I would like to read it.

MR. KERSTEN. Would you read it for us?

MR. ZADEIKIS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am deeply grateful for the opportunity accorded me to present my views concerning the occupation and enslavement of my country to this dis-

tinguished committee. In the name of the Lithuanian people, I thank the President of the United States, His Excellency Dwight D. Eisenhower, for his benevolent attitude toward Lithuania, and the Secretary of State, the Honorable John Foster Dulles, for his moral support. I wish to express heartfelt gratitude to the United States Congress for the unanimous vote which brought this committee into being, and to the chairman of this committee, the Honorable Charles J. Kersten.

May I substitute someone else to read my statement, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes; I think that would be perfectly satisfactory, Mr. Zadeikis. Before you turn the balance of your statement over to the gentleman on your right, will you state for us how long you have been the Lithuanian Minister here in Washington?

Mr. ZADEIKIS. I have been here since 1935.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been in the diplomatic service of Lithuania?

Mr. ZADEIKIS. In the consular service since 1923, and in the diplomatic service since 1935.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you tell us your age, Mr. Zadeikis?

Mr. ZADEIKIS. I am 66.

STATEMENT OF HON. JUOZAS KAJECKAS, COUNSELOR OF THE LITHUANIAN LEGATION

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, will you kindly identify yourself?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Juozas Kajeckas, counselor of the Lithuanian Legation.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are currently at the Lithuanian Legation, of which Mr. Zadeikis is the Minister?

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been attached to that Legation?

Mr. KAJECKAS. I have been attached to the Lithuanian Legation in Washington since the autumn of 1940.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where is the location of your Legation here in Washington?

Mr. KAJECKAS. 2622 16th Street NW.

Mr. KERSTEN. It has been continuously there for the past several years?

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. For how many years?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Since my arrival, at least.

Mr. KERSTEN. And prior to that?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Yes; actually since 1923.

Mr. KERSTEN. And up to the present time?

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. The flag of the once independent country of Lithuania still flies over that Legation?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Yes; and it has been flying since the United States recognition of Lithuania in 1922.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you continue with the statement of Mr. Zadeikis?

Mr. KAJECKAS (reading):

Lithuania became a unified state 700 years ago, when Mindaugas, one of Lithuania's medieval princes, embraced Christianity and was crowned as the first King. Two hundred years later the peak of Lithuania's power was reached when

her borders extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The westward advance of the Tartars was checked by the Lithuanians in the region of the Black Sea. The Teutonic Knights were defeated at Tannenberg in 1410 by the united Lithuanian-Polish forces led by the Lithuanian Grand Duke, Vytautas the Great, thus stemming for about 500 years the "Drang nach Osten."

In 1569, at Lublin, as a means of self-protection against the pressure and growing might of the Russians and the Teutons, Lithuania entered into a union with Poland. In this commonwealth both states retained their separate Governments, arms, treasury, and law courts. At the end of the 18th century the commonwealth was divided, and the greater part of Lithuania fell into Russian hands. Lithuania's subjection to Russia lasted from 1795 until her occupation by the Germans in 1915. Never during that period did she reconcile herself to the loss of her independence.

There were 5 uprisings against Czarist Russia: In 1794, 1812, 1831, 1863-1864, and in 1904-1905. The first revolt was led by a valiant fighter for freedom, well known to Americans, General Kosciuszko, who claimed to be of Lithuanian origin. For the revolt of 1863-64, in particular, the Russian Czars punished the Lithuanians more severely than they did any other Russian-subjugated people. Russification was intensified, and Catholicism was persecuted. A striking example is the massacre of Kraziai. Lithuanian schools were closed, and the press banned for a period of 40 years. The possession of even a prayer book in the Lithuanian language was punishable by lifelong exile to Siberia.

Despite this oppression, at the first opportunity Lithuania proclaimed her independence in her historic capital, Vilnius, on February 16, 1918, during the German occupation. One of the factors which led to this step was the encouragement offered by President Wilson's principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, she had to defend her independence against overwhelming odds on three battlefronts.

Lithuania is proud of her people's achievements. In independent Lithuania primary education was compulsory and illiteracy was practically eliminated. Outstanding progress was made in culture, in the press, and in social welfare. The budget was balanced, the currency was stabilized; communications were extended and improved; foreign trade was expanded. An agrarian reform, based on remuneration to the former owners, was inaugurated. In this way more than 45,000 new farms were created. The number of agricultural cooperative societies and dairies increased and the number of livestock rose enormously. Indebtedness was comparatively insignificant; unemployment was practically nonexistent. The standard of living was appreciably raised and the nation was well on the way to prosperity.

The Honorable Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, noted in his famous statement of July 23, 1940: " * * * the people of the United States have watched their (the Baltic States) admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest." And the last British Minister to Lithuania, the Honorable Thomas Preston, writes: "During my long years of residence at Kaunas I was to witness an extraordinary transformation in the economic and cultural development of the country."

Lithuania took an active part in international relations. She was a loyal member of the League of Nations. She made various and numerous agreements with foreign countries, including Russia. No country was better protected against aggression by solemn international pledges of the Soviet Union than was Lithuania. Let us look briefly at that record.

By the peace treaty of July 12, 1920, Soviet Russia recognized Lithuania as a sovereign and independent state.

" * * * Russia recognizes without any reserve the sovereignty and independence of the State of Lithuania with all juridical consequences resulting from such recognition, and voluntarily and forever renounces all sovereign right possessed by Russia over the Lithuanian people and territory" (article 1).

By the nonaggression pact of September 28, 1926, once again Soviet Russia reaffirmed the validity of the peace treaty and pledged "to respect in all circumstances each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability."

By the Convention for the Definition of Aggression of July 5, 1933, which strengthened the nonaggression pact, the signatories, including Lithuania and the Soviet Union, agreed to recognize as aggressor in a conflict that state which is the first to commit one of the following acts: declaration of war; invasion by its armed forces. "No consideration of political, military, economic or any other nature may serve as an excuse or justification for aggression."

The Soviet Union and Lithuania, as signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact—Pact of Paris—had repudiated war as their national policy.

Lithuania strove to maintain good relations with all states, especially with neighboring states, including the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in 1939 when the Soviet Union began a reorientation of its policy, relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union became strained. In a speech delivered at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party, Stalin stated that under the existing political circumstances the time was ripe "for reappraisal of existing international pledges and agreements." (*Sovietskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 2, 1939, p. 6.) That same year a map appeared, published by the Russian general staff, showing Lithuanian territory as a component part of the territory of the Soviet Union. In addition to its military significance, this map shows that the attack on Lithuania by the Soviet Union was premeditated.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you pardon an interruption. To get the dates straight, as I understand it the map of Soviet Lithuania was prepared before the actual incorporation.

Mr. KAJECKAS. Yes, even before the actual occupation of Lithuania. [Continuing.]

In view of the developing international conflict, Moscow anticipated the idea of eventual victory of the Communist revolution by means of a Second World War. Naturally with such prospects in mind, the Soviet Union was not interested in maintaining the status quo in the Baltic; quite to the contrary, it was interested in conducting matters so that such a conflict should take place in order that it would be possible to carry out Stalin's oath given at the grave of Lenin: "We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will not spare our lives in the strengthening and the extension of the union of the toilers of the earth, the Communist International." (*History of the Communist Party in the U. S. S. R.*, 1928.)

To further these ends, Moscow opened the gates for aggression in Europe by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed on August 23, 1939. According to Molotov, the actual initiator of the pact "had been Stalin who—through his speech of March of this year (1939) which had been well understood in Germany—had brought about the reversal in political relations." (*Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*, p. 76.) By this pact the Soviet Union received eastern Poland, Latvia, and Estonia, while Lithuania was assigned to Germany, and only later, on September 28, 1949, through an additional protocol, did Lithuania fall to the Soviet Union.

At this point it is necessary to note that neither in its negotiations with England and France on the forming of a mutual-assistance agreement nor in its parallel negotiations with Germany did the Soviet Union consider Lithuanian territory in its sphere of vital interests.

With the outbreak of World War II, Lithuania proclaimed her neutrality. She did not succumb to any of the German proposals to enter the war against Poland. Quite to the contrary, Lithuania gave protection and every assistance to Polish refugees. The enticing Soviet offer to return to Lithuania her historic capital, Vilnius, did not deceive the President of the Republic. Lithuania made every effort to avoid the signing of a mutual-assistance pact, the terms of which included the garrisoning of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil. However, on October 10, 1939, she was forced to sign this pact. With the establishment of military bases, Lithuania was impressed into the political orbit of the Soviet Union and we deprived of her neutrality and independent policy. Yet, even this did not satisfy the Soviet Union, imbued with the idea of self-aggrandizement and communistic imperialism.

Lithuania was stunned when at midnight of June 14-15, 1940, an ultimatum was delivered to Kaunas demanding the access of an unlimited number of Soviet troops into Lithuanian territory and the formation of a government subservient to Moscow. Well aware that Soviet bases were already established at strategic points in Lithuania and that before June 15 many divisions of the Red army were massed along the frontiers, the majority of the Cabinet members favored accepting the ultimatum and at the same time expressing a protest to the Kremlin. President Smetona refused to consider this brutal Moscow demand and decided to go abroad.

All political power was openly taken over by the representatives of the Soviet Union. The composition of the new cabinet was dictated by Dekauozov, the Soviet emissary. The terms of her constitution having been violated, Lithuania became a passive pawn in the hands of the Soviet tyrant. Moreover, it was important to the Soviet Union that the annexation of Lithuania should not proceed through its own specific acts but through the so-called liberation

acts of Lithuania herself, inspired and dictated by the Soviet Union. Important, too, was the deceitful presentation of this process, at which the Soviets are experienced masters: Communist propaganda always transforms acts of violence and aggression into impressive acts of liberation. For this reason came the announcement of elections to the People's Diet with a single list of candidates, containing the exact number of candidates to be elected. The Communist Party having been declared the only legal party in Lithuania, the list of candidates was made up from its ranks and confirmed by the emissaries of the Soviet Union. The Diet thus elected had to eradicate permanently the last shreds of Lithuania national power, to introduce the Soviet order, and petition for admission into the Soviet Union.

On August 3, 1940, Lithuania was declared to be a part of the Soviet Union. The Soviets attempted to justify the annexation by attributing it to the free will of the Lithuanian Nation. That the Lithuanian people had nothing to do with it, is shown in the following passages of a resolution passed by that same People's Diet:

"Now the people helped by the mighty Red Army * * * established in their own country the Soviet Government * * *. If the people have been able to establish in their own country the only just order—the Soviet order—it is all due to the Soviet Union."

And with that the curtain fell on this Soviet-presented farce.

As soon as Lithuania was occupied, the destruction of her cultural and economic life began. Since that time, the Soviet Union is unceasingly carrying on the inhuman crime of genocide by the arrest, murder, and deportation of the Lithuanian people to Siberia and to the Arctic. The present position of the Soviet Union represents not only the annihilation of Lithuania, but also the flagrant violation of the Atlantic and United Nations Charters. The desperate struggle of the resistance, the thousands of slain and the hundreds of thousands of deported, bear witness to this appalling process which violates international law, world peace, and human decency.

The Soviet Union, by entering into agreements with Germany on the division of zones of influence, and by occupying and incorporating Lithuania, became an aggressor and accomplice of aggression. So it was not sovereign rights but the vision of Communist victory that dictated these Soviet steps. It should be noted here that the annexation of Austria by Germany was termed by the Nurnberg tribunal as an act of aggression.

When the true nature of the Soviet fraud becomes evident, Lithuania's diplomatic representatives, the only remaining spokesmen for the Lithuanian people, immediately protested against the violation of treaties and the falsification of the will of the nation. I am happy to be able to state that the United States were the first to denounce openly and emphatically this violence and injustice, and that they still hold to this position.

Mr. ZADEIKIS. The Congress of the United States, having decided to conduct a full and complete investigation of the seizure, forced incorporation, and treatment of the Baltic peoples during and following said seizure and incorporation, I urge all my fellow Lithuanians living in the free world, especially those in America, to testify before the Baltic Committee, House of Representatives, concerning all you have seen and experienced. I feel certain that the truth, to which you are living witnesses, will contribute to the unmasking of the deceit and violence used by the Soviet Union in Lithuania.

The uprising in 1941 and the tireless efforts of the resistance movement in Lithuania, as well as those of numerous patriotic organizations in the free world, attest to the unshakeable will of the Lithuanian people to be free and independent. Firmly convinced that liberty is indivisible, we believe that the efforts of the free world will result in the triumph of freedom which must lead to the restoration of Lithuania's sovereignty.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mr. Zadeikis.

Will the counselor please come forward again?

Are there any questions of members of the committee? **Mr. Busbey?**

Mr. BUSBEY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Counselor, do you of your own knowledge have any information that you could present to the committee regarding the extent of mass transportation of Lithuanian people to prison camps, or work-labor camps, into either Russia or Siberia?

Mr. KAJECKAS. I think there exists considerable information on that point, and I am sure the committee will be having that information, or maybe even has it.

Mr. MADDEN. Have you personally witnessed any of this?

Mr. KAJECKAS. No; I did not. I was abroad at that time.

Mr. MADDEN. You did not witness any of this mass transportation to prison camps?

Mr. KAJECKAS. No. I was stationed abroad at the time that was taking place.

Mr. MADDEN. You were in the United States?

Mr. KAJECKAS. I was abroad. I was not in Lithuania at that time.

Mr. MADDEN. And the only knowledge you would have of that would be reports which you had received?

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Madden, we have evidence we shall introduce along those lines as the hearings proceed.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. You have been here since 1940?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Since the end of September of 1940.

Mr. BENTLEY. Where were you stationed then; at the Legation in Berlin?

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is where I was when the actual occupation took place.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you tell the committee what other countries or governments, if any, still extend Lithuania diplomatic recognition, besides the United States?

Mr. KAJECKAS. To my knowledge Brazil, Uruguay, the Holy See, Great Britain, France, Canada, and Colombia.

Mr. BENTLEY. You still have representation in those countries?

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is right, sir; representation exists in various degrees.

Mr. BENTLEY. When did the official connections between the Legation here in Washington and the Government of Lithuania—when were they severed?

Mr. KAJECKAS. I am sorry, sir, I didn't hear that question.

Mr. BENTLEY. When were the official connections between the Legation in Washington and the Government in Lithuania severed? When did they cease? When did you cease to have any relations with the Government in Kaunas?

Mr. KAJECKAS. I wasn't here when that actually happened. I was in Berlin.

Mr. BENTLEY. From June 15, 1940?

Mr. ZADEIKIS. Yes; from that day of occupation this Legation refused to carry out orders from the puppet government in Lithuania.

Mr. BENTLEY. Could you tell what the status of Lithuania is today, briefly, within the Soviet Union?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Well, I think that the situation and the conditions of the people over there must be terrible.

Mr. BENTLEY. No; I mean officially.

Mr. KAJECKAS. Officially, as you know, it is considered, according to the act of that puppet Diet, as incorporated into the Soviet Union. And those so-called elections took place against the will of the people. Since that time, of course, there has been some resistance still going on, or did go on.

Mr. BENTLEY. I understand that, but officially it is regarded by the Soviets as another Soviet Socialist Republic. That is what I wanted to bring out.

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. Could you also tell us, historically, during what parts of history, what parts of the past, that Russia occupied Lithuanian territory?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Russia annexed Lithuanian territory at the time of the 3 divisions of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth, the last of which was in 1795. That was Czarist Russia. There was also an invasion of part of the territory of Lithuania by the Soviet Union after World War I, prior to the Lithuanian-Soviet Peace Treaty of 1920.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, during the time that the Germans were in control of Lithuania, what was the status of Lithuania then?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Do you mean during the First World War?

Mr. BENTLEY. No, during the Second World War.

Mr. KAJECKAS. Well, during the Second World War—at the very beginning, at the first or second day of the German-Soviet War, there was an insurrection that arose in Lithuania and the Provisional Lithuanian Government was established. That was later swept away by the Nazi Government.

Mr. BENTLEY. During the Second World War, your Legation here had no official contact with any authority in Lithuania?

Mr. KAJECKAS. No, it did not.

Mr. BENTLEY. I have one more question: Can you tell the committee if at any time since the Soviets occupied Lithuania, was there any Soviet pressure to take over any property or assets belonging to the Government of Lithuania in this country?

Mr. KAJECKAS. They tried, with regard to the Lithuanian funds. That was before my arrival here.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was there an attempt to take over your Legation?

Mr. KAJECKAS. No, there was no attempt made.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Machrowicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You alluded to the incorporation of Austria by Germany, in your statement. Is that correct?

Mr. ZADEIKIS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. It was also intimated that the tribunal at Nuremberg had officially proclaimed that incorporation of Austria by Germany as an actual act of aggression; is that right?

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And the facts and circumstances concerning the enforced incorporation of Austria by Germany were identical to those of the incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by Soviet Russia? Am I right?

Mr. ZADEIKIS. More or less.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And in the determination of that act of aggression by Germany, Soviet Russia participated, did it not, at the Nuremberg tribunal?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Yes, sir; that is right.

MR. MACHROWICZ. So, in one instance, the German act, very similar to the one it committed itself, was considered an act of aggression?

MR. KAJECKAS. That is right.

MR. BONIN. Who was the Soviet Foreign Minister on October 31, 1939?

MR. KAJECKAS. It was Molotov.

MR. BONIN. On that date he proclaimed, "The Soviet Union has concluded pacts of mutual assistance with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are of major political importance," would you say that the complete subjugation of those nations was a mutual pact of assistance?

MR. KAJECKAS. I didn't quite get that question.

MR. BONIN. Would you say that mutual pact of assistance entered into on October 10, 1939, actually subjugating those nations, helped those countries in any way, actually?

MR. KAJECKAS. No, it did not. I think that to the contrary, the October 10, 1939, pact was just a means of furthering their political occupation of foreign countries. I mean, that pact didn't actually protect Lithuania because they took it over.

MR. BONIN. Actually, there was no assistance; it was a subterfuge to take over those three nations.

MR. KAJECKAS. That is right.

MR. DODD. Do I understand correctly that the decision to destroy the sovereignty of Lithuania was made at the time of the nonaggression pact between the Soviet and Germany in August 1939?

MR. KAJECKAS. That is right. Especially, the Ribbentrop-Molotov secret protocol of September 1939.

MR. KERSTEN. That pact involved the loss of independence and sovereignty of other nations also; did it not?

MR. KAJECKAS. That is right.

MR. MADDEN. Of your own knowledge, could you state whether, at the present time, and during the last few years, there has been and is an organized resistance within Lithuania against the present Communist government.

MR. KAJECKAS. There was quite some information about that resistance going on. We don't hear much about it, now. However, that doesn't necessarily mean that it doesn't exist. Passive resistance is actually in existence.

MR. MADDEN. You would say that the vast majority of the Lithuanian population maintains a passive resistance to the present Soviet Government?

MR. KAJECKAS. That is right.

MR. KERSTEN. From your experience and information as to the conditions in Lithuania, if the people of Lithuania could exert their will as to whether or not the present Government would stay in power, what would that will be?

MR. KAJECKAS. If the present Government would continue staying in power, that would mean a liquidation of the whole nation. If that lasts for too long.

MR. KERSTEN. The liquidation of the Lithuanian people.

And if the people still remain and have their own way, their own will, what would their will be?

MR. KAJECKAS. At the first opportunity, they would shake off the chains of slavery. They would proclaim their independence.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you.

Mr. MADDEN. Has the Lithuanian population diminished to any extent since the Russian occupation of Lithuania?

Mr. KAJECKAS. Yes, it did diminish to a certain extent because there were several waves of deportations, but there is no definite information on how many people were deported. The statistics in this regard vary. It could have been approximately 300,000.

Mr. MADDEN. Has there been much infiltration into Lithuania by Russia?

Mr. KAJECKAS. That is right; especially into the cities.

Mr. MADDEN. And that is going on at the present time?

Mr. ZADEIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KAJECKAS. It is still going on at the present time.

I have here the following photostatic copies of the Lithuanian-Soviet treaties: Peace treaty between Lithuania and the U. S. S. R., July 12, 1920.

Mr. McTIGUE. That document will be marked "Exhibit 2-A."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2-A." See p. 473.)

Mr. KAJECKAS. Second, I have the treaty of nonaggression between Lithuania and the U. S. S. R., of September 28, 1926.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 2-B."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2-B." See p. 481.)

Mr. KAJECKAS. Third, protocol renewing the treaty of nonaggression of May 6, 1931.

Mr. McTIGUE. That agreement will be marked "Exhibit 2-C."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2-C." See p. 485.)

Mr. KAJECKAS. Fourth, convention for the definition of aggression and annexation of July 5, 1933.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 2-D."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2-D." See p. 486.)

Mr. KAJECKAS. And finally, the treaty on the transfer of the city of Vilno and Vilno Province to the Lithuanian Republic, and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania on October 10, 1939.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 2-E."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2-E." See p. 488.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify the source where you obtained the photostatic copies?

Mr. KAJECKAS. The source of those was the League of Nations Treaties Series, with the exception of the last one, the treaty of the transfer of the city of Vilno and the Mutual Assistance Pact, which is from the State Department Bulletin of December 16, 1939.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are there any further questions?

Thank you very much, Mr. Counselor, and Mr. Zadeikis.

Dr. Dinbergs, in charge of the Latvian Legation.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANATOL DINBERGS, CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, LATVIAN LEGATION

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state your full name, please?

Mr. DINBERGS. My name is Anatele Dinbergs.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is your official title?

Mr. DINBERGS. I am chargé d'affaires of Latvia in the United States.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where is the Latvian Legation located?

Mr. DINBERGS. The address is 4325 17th Street NW.

Mr. KERSTEN. Has that Legation been in Washington continuously for some years?

Mr. DINBERGS. Not at that address. We have changed it several times.

Mr. KERSTEN. But in Washington, has the legation been located at various places continuously?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. For how long?

Mr. DINBERGS. Since 1923, with an interruption.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the flag of Latvia still flies over that legation?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have succeeded the previous Latvian representative who recently died?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state the facts of that?

Mr. DINBERGS. Minister Feldmans, who was here since June 1949, died just last August, and I assumed the charge of the Latvian Legation, as the ranking diplomatic representative of Latvia, pending the appointment of the new chargé d'affaires.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the United States Government has afforded diplomatic recognition in your case?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have you a prepared statement?

Mr. DINBERGS. I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you proceed with it?

Mr. DINBERGS. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I wish to thank you for this opportunity to meet here with you, and on behalf of the Latvian Nation, to acquaint you with the events that brought about Latvia's loss of independence and made her one of the first victims of Soviet imperialistic aggression.

Latvia is one of the oldest nations in Europe. Its written history dates back to 1207, when it was proclaimed a principality of the Holy Roman Empire. In the course of its history, Latvia has been subject to many an invasion and foreign domination.

In the 18th century, during the imperialistic expansion period of Czarist Russia, Latvia was gradually annexed by the Russian Empire, the eastern part in 1721 by the Treaty of Nystad, the western part, the independent Duchy of Curland, in 1795. However, the Latvian people were never entirely submitted to the Russian rule.

In spite of Russian attempts to absorb and Russify the people, they maintained their national consciousness, preserved their cultural heritage and language, and finally, at the close of the First World War, emerged as a free and democratic nation and proclaimed Latvia's independence on November 18, 1918. The first 2 years of independence were spent in an almost continuous struggle against Soviet invasion and also in repelling aggression of adventurous German military formations. Only after the military liberation of their country and the consolidation of their independence by conclusion of a peace treaty with Soviet Russia could the Latvian people at last devote their energy to create a solid foundation for cultural, economic, and social life.

On February 15, 1922, the Latvian Assembly adopted a democratic constitution upon which its political life was based. Previously, on

September 16, 1920, the constituent assembly had passed a sweeping agrarian reform. Vast tracts of manorial estates, formerly owned by small, Baltic-German landlords, were divided into moderate farming plots. These were allocated to more than 100,000 new farmers. Since Latvia was predominantly agricultural, this reform caused a considerable increase in Latvia's agricultural production. In the short period of its independent existence, Latvia achieved remarkable economic progress.

Latvia's international position was consolidated through recognition of her national sovereignty by the major European powers on January 26, 1921, and her admission to the League of Nations on September 22, 1921. Recognition by the United States—July 28, 1922—and other nations of the civilized world followed in swift succession.

Formal relations between the independent Latvian Republic and Soviet Russia were based on the treaty of peace signed between the two countries at Riga on August 11, 1920. Pursuant to article II of this treaty:

Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence, self-subsistency, and sovereignty of the Latvian state and voluntarily and forever renounces all sovereign rights over the Latvian people and territory.

On February 9, 1929, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and Rumania signed with the Soviet Union a protocol providing for immediate enactment of the Treaty of Paris of August 27, 1929, regarding renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, better known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

In addition, Latvia signed on February 5, 1932, a treaty of non-aggression with the Soviet Union. Article I of this treaty provided:

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to refrain from any act of aggression directed against the other and also from any acts of violence directed against the territorial integrity and inviolability or the political independence of the other contracting party, regardless of whether such aggression or such acts are committed separately or together with other powers, with or without a declaration of war.

The above treaty was on April 4, 1934, extended until December 31, 1945.

A convention relating to conciliation procedure between Latvia and the Soviet Union was signed at Riga on June 18, 1932. Article I of this convention provided:

The high contracting parties mutually undertake to submit for amicable settlement in the Conciliation Commission, in accordance with the provisions of the present convention, disputes of all kinds which may arise between them on account of circumstances occurring after the coming into force of the treaty concluded at Riga on February 5, 1932, between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which cannot be settled through the diplomatic channel within a reasonable time.

Latvia and the Soviet Union were cosigners of the "convention for the definition of aggression," signed at London July 3, 1933.

Finally, after the start of World War II, and under menacing Soviet armed pressure, Latvia concluded on October 5, 1939, a so-called pact of mutual assistance with Moscow for a period of 10 years, granting the Soviet Union military, naval, and air bases on its terri-

tory. In return, the Kremlin, according to article V of the pact, agreed that:

The carrying into effect of the present pact must in no way affect the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their political structure, their economic and social system, and their military measures.

By signing the above agreement in good faith, even though under duress, Latvia had underwritten the door of her liberty, unaware of the fact at that time that the fate of the Baltic Republics had already been sealed in the Stalin-Hitler agreement of friendship and non-aggression of August 23, 1939. This secret protocol stated:

In the event of a territorial and political rearmament in the areas belonging to the Baltic States, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. S. R.

Shortly afterward, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia concluded a supplementary secret agreement by which Lithuania also was delivered to the sphere of Soviet seizures.

While the secret Nazi-Soviet bargaining about the division of the spoils was in progress, Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov, on October 31, 1939, declared before the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that:

The pacts with the Baltic States in no way imply the intrusion of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as some foreign interests are trying to have it believed.

As far as the exact and honest fulfillment of the mutual agreement on the part of the Baltic States was concerned, as Molotov had stated, he was quite right.

However, on June 17, 1940, only 7 months later, without the slightest provocation on the part of Latvia, the armed forces of the Soviet Union crossed the Latvian frontier and occupied the country in breach of the above-mentioned treaties, conventions, and solemn promises of the Soviet leaders, thus destroying the sovereignty of the Latvian Republic.

It must be emphasized that Latvia was then a member of the League of Nations, in good standing, while the Soviet Union had been expelled from that body for her unprovoked attack on Finland.

The illegal Soviet invasion was preceded by an ultimatum dated June 16, in which the Kremlin put forth the following "absolutely indispensable and urgent" demands:

1. Immediate establishment in Latvia of a government capable of and ready to insure the honest execution of the Latvian-Soviet pact of mutual assistance;
2. To insure without delay the free entry of Soviet troops into Latvian territory, to be placed in the most important centers of Latvia, in such numbers as to secure the realization of the Latvian-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, and to prevent provocateur agents against Soviet garrisons in Latvia.

The above ultimatum was based on charges that Latvia had failed to cancel a treaty of alliance with Estonia; that she had entered in alliance with both Estonia and Lithuania; and that the Latvian Government had tolerated the issuance of a magazine in Tallin, the *Revue Baltique*, published by the Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian collaboration.

The charges of the Moscow ultimatum were not only unsubstantiated, but advanced, obviously, for the sole purpose of justifying Soviet aggressive designs in the Baltic in the absence of more con-

vincing evidence. The Latvian-Estonian alliance had been concluded as early as 1923 for purely defensive purposes, and had been duly registered the same year with the League of Nations.

The Soviet Union had been aware of this defensive alliance for 17 years and had never before raised any objections against it.

The so-called Baltic entente concluded between Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in 1934 was a pacific, cultural agreement without any military complications, equally well-known and not objected to by the Soviet Union for years.

The *Revue Baltique* was a private publication, the first issue of which had appeared in February 1940, mainly devoted to advocating Baltic cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union.

The charges of the Molotov ultimatum reveal, in themselves, the crude design of aggressiveness behind them. Indeed, a few weeks after the Red Army had occupied Latvia, Soviet-style elections were held with only one slate of candidates, hand-picked by Moscow. The results thus obtained were exploited to absorb Latvia into the Soviet Union.

If the Kremlin had expected the West to enforce its fraudulent presumption of the Baltic countries having joined the U. S. S. R. voluntarily, such expectations were shattered by the United States declaration of July 23, 1940, which emphatically censured Moscow's seizure of the Baltic Republics. On this declaration is based, up to the present day, the continuous independence of Latvia in the sense and spirit of international law and justice.

The refusal of the United States Government to recognize the Soviet annexation of Latvia has greatly bolstered the hope of the Latvian people for ultimate liberation, and their will of resistance against Soviet ideological encroachment and material enslavement.

There was, however, a time when it seemed that the fate of the Soviet-enslaved Baltic nations might be sealed by indifference and forgetfulness on the part of the more fortunate peoples of the free world. This danger seems now eliminated through the initiative of the United States Congress in creating this Select House Committee for Investigation of the Seizure and Annexation of the Baltic Republics by the Soviet Union.

Being privileged to represent the people of Latvia in the United States, I avail myself of this congressional investigation to accuse the Soviet regime of flagrant aggression against Latvia, the unwarranted annihilation of her independence, continuous illegal occupation of her territory, and perpetration of criminal acts of genocide by having deported and annihilated countless thousands of Latvian citizens.

I am convinced that the congressional Baltic Committee, having gathered ample documentary evidence, and being prepared to question numerous eyewitnesses from the Baltic countries, now residing in the free world, will find my accusations against the Soviet Union well substantiated.

I am confident that the investigation will not only bring to light Soviet acts of aggression and of criminal violence of the Baltic Republics, but will also contribute to making the American and other free people conscious and alert of Soviet conspiracy, aimed at world domination, which makes it imperative for all freedom-loving people to meet the Communist menace by determined united action.

Thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Counsel, do you have any documents you want to introduce at this time in connection with Latvia?

Mr. McTIGUE. In connection with your testimony, you referred to the Mutual Assistance Pact and other treaties.

Mr. DINBERGS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you happen to have in your possession, now, copies of same?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes. I would like to submit photostatic copies of the treaties I mentioned, which were violated by Soviet aggression in 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify those, please, so that we can mark them for identification and enter them as exhibits?

Mr. DINBERGS. I have, first, the Treaty of Peace between Latvia and Russia, done at Moscow, completed and signed at Riga, August 11, 1920.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 3-A."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3-A." See p. 490.)

Mr. DINBERGS. Then, there is Treaty of Non-Aggression between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Riga February 5, 1932.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 3-B."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3-B." See p. 499.)

Mr. DINBERGS. The next is the convention relating to conciliation procedures between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Riga, June 18, 1932.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 3-C."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3-C." See p. 501.)

Mr. DINBERGS. Next is Economic Agreement between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow, December 4, 1933.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 3-D."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3-D." See p. 505.)

Mr. DINBERGS. The next is Pact of Mutual Assistance between Republic of Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow October 5, 1939.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 3-E."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3-E." See p. 506.)

Mr. DINBERGS. There is the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, signed at London July 3, 1933.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 3-F."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3-F." See p. 508.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Before you leave the stand, Dr. Dinbergs, will you identify the source of your documents, please?

Mr. DINBERGS. I think we will have to go back, because they come in chronological sequence.

First, is the Treaty of Peace between Latvia and Russia done at Moscow, completed and signed at Riga, August 11, 1920. That will be the first document.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is the source?

Mr. DINBERGS. Those photostats were taken from the League of Nations treaty series, and also all subsequently submitted copies.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be sufficient identification for the source of all the documents. They have been photostats taken from the League of Nations series.

Mr. KERSTEN. However, the documents pertaining to Latvia are identified by proper marks.

Mr. McTIGUE. You will pick up Dr. Dinbergs' pact that he put in, Mr. Reporter, in sequence form, after we identified the Lithuanian documents.

Mr. BUSBEY. Dr. Dinbergs, would you agree with me that the rape of the Baltic countries follows a definite pattern for the rape of other countries, as well as the Baltic countries of the Red Marxist-Facists of Soviet Russia?

Mr. DINBERGS. I quite agree with you, sir. Since the Baltic States were the first victims of the Soviet aggression—at least in Western Europe—they established this pattern.

First of all, it can be clearly seen in connection with the acts in the three respective Baltic countries in themselves. They followed exactly the same pattern.

Of course subsequent Soviet aggression in Europe very clearly showed also the same trends and patterns.

Mr. BUSBEY. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. MADDEN. Have you any knowledge as to approximately the number of people from Latvia who were taken from the country and deported to labor camps or prisons?

Mr. DINBERGS. We have quite precise information for the period of first Soviet occupation of Latvia, which lasted for 1 year, namely, from June 1940 to July 1941, and during that time we have lost close to 35,000 people, of which in one single night 15,000 were deported. That was shortly before the Soviet-German War started.

Mr. MADDEN. Have you any knowledge where they were deported to?

Mr. DINBERGS. We have documents showing various destinations in remote parts of Russia, but we do not have definite confirmation in details, although those labor camps are known.

Mr. MADDEN. Were those mostly prisoners of the intelligentsia, or political prisoners, so to speak? Leaders?

Mr. DINBERGS. In the beginning this trend was noticeable. However, the deportations hit all walks of life of our population and nobody could be saved.

For instance, there were cases where elderly people over 80 years old were deported, where newly-born children were taken with their mothers, separated from them, and deported to various places of destination.

Mr. MADDEN. Did any of the Russian Communist officials infiltrate into Latvia and supervise local officials and local units of government in Latvia?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes: from the very beginning. The next day after the Soviet invasion—that is on the 18th of June, 1940—Mr. Vishinsky arrived in Latvia, in Riga, and from the Soviet Legation he directed all the work regarding putting into force the new puppet government, and all other acts.

Mr. MADDEN. Was the policy of genocide inaugurated in Latvia by the Soviets—that is, separating families, the wives from husbands, and the children from the parents, and these people sent into various different localities, away from the family unit?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes. That was the established pattern, to separate families.

Mr. MADDEN. And that pattern is continuing, now? That same pattern? Is that process continuing by the Soviet leaders?

Mr. DINBERGS. I am sure it is continuing to a certain extent also now. We do not have more detailed information as far as the present situation is concerned, but there are continuous deportations being carried out, now.

Mr. MADDEN. And is it the purpose of that policy of genocide to eventually eliminate the Latvian people as a nationality and gradually have them disappear as a nationality?

Mr. DINBERGS. That would appear to be their intent.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Dinbergs, you have been chargé d'affaires with the Latvian Legation since 1949?

Mr. DINBERGS. No, since August 1953.

Mr. BENTLEY. Since last August?

Mr. DINBERGS. I also was in charge in 1948-49, when our minister died and Minister Feldmans arrived here. Almost a year.

Mr. BENTLEY. How long have you been connected with the Latvian Legation in the United States?

Mr. DINBERGS. I came to the United States, first to New York, and in 1941 I came to Washington.

Mr. BENTLEY. When did you come to New York?

Mr. DINBERGS. In 1937.

Mr. BENTLEY. You have not been in Latvia since that time?

Mr. DINBERGS. No, I haven't.

Mr. BENTLEY. You have been connected with the Latvian consulate and legation in this country, then, since 1937?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Can you tell the committee what other countries besides the United States extend diplomatic recognition to Latvia?

Mr. DINBERGS. The majority of countries do.

Mr. BENTLEY. The majority still extend recognition?

Mr. DINBERGS. We did not have diplomatic relations for our Legations established in all countries, not in such a number as you have it here in the United States.

Mr. BENTLEY. When did the official connections between your Legation here, or your representatives here, and the government of Latvia, cease?

Mr. DINBERGS. I couldn't give you the exact date. However, the exact date our Legation repudiated this new puppet regime was before the elections, on July 13, 1940, and also before that it was difficult for us to make a clear statement, as we didn't receive any information from Latvia from shortly after the invasion.

Mr. BENTLEY. Since that time you have had no official connection with the Government of Latvia, either during Russian or German occupation?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Today, the official status of Latvia is also that of a Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union, am I correct?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is what the Soviet Union claims it to be.

Mr. BENTLEY. Have there been any attempts on the part of the

Soviets to take over assets or property belonging to the Latvian Government in this country?

Mr. DINBERGS. There were numerous attempts to do that and there were properties involved regarding Latvian ships that were in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet representatives in the United States claimed, in the United States court, ownership of those ships.

Mr. BENTLEY. What was the time or the date the Soviet military forces first entered Latvia?

Mr. DINBERGS. June 17, 1940.

Mr. BENTLEY. There were no forces before then in Latvia under the terms of the treaty?

Mr. DINBERGS. There were under the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, October 1939.

Mr. BENTLEY. There were Soviet forces in Latvia long before June 1940?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You stated that the United States Government and most of the free governments, with a few exceptions, still recognize the Embassies of Latvia, the prewar Embassies of Latvia; is that right?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is there in existence a so-called free government in exile, of Latvia?

Mr. DINBERGS. Technically speaking, we do not have government in exile. However, the last Latvian Government, prior to the Soviet invasion, issued emergency powers, state powers, to our Minister in London, who has the right to act for the Latvian Government in defending the interests of Latvia, and he is also in charge of all our diplomatic representations abroad.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But there is no central body in exile that dictates a form of government?

Mr. DINBERGS. No, sir.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is the Latvian nation represented in the United Nations?

Mr. DINBERGS. No, sir; it is not.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is despite the fact that most of the free countries still recognize your embassies?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes. We have not been accepted in the United Nations.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just one other question concerning Mr. Busbey's question: As a matter of fact, isn't it true that the subjugation of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, actually stems from the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just as the subjugation of these other countries, like Poland, also stem from that same agreement?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So these other countries, their subjugation is commenced with the same agreements under which your own nation became subjugated?

Mr. DINBERGS. I would say so; yes.

Mr. BONIN. Doctor, in the past experience of your nation, do you believe other free nations can rely on the solemn agreements of Communist Russia?

Mr. DINBERGS. I must say emphatically; no, sir.

Mr. DODD. Was there any Communist Party in Latvia prior to the annexation by Soviet Russia?

Mr. DINBERGS. There was. I do not recall the year, but it was prohibited in Latvia on the grounds that it tends to overthrow by violent means the existing Government of Latvia.

Mr. DODD. It wasn't a recognized political party, then?

Mr. DINBERGS. It wasn't a recognized political party.

Mr. DODD. Was it in the nature of an underground political organization?

Mr. DINBERGS. It wasn't marked, at least, and the numbers must have been rather small.

Mr. DODD. There seems to be a pattern, as has been suggested, here, of taking over these countries. And I have also understood that one feature of the pattern was infiltration by the Communists within the government and political harassment of the government by the Communists within the country.

Did you have that situation in Latvia?

Mr. DINBERGS. To a certain extent, yes, because the Latvian people are not communistically inclined by their mentality and nature, and therefore the Communist activities in Latvia prior to the invasion were rather the work of Soviet agents, I would say.

Mr. DODD. Did they move behind some front, other than the Communist Party itself, in Latvia?

Mr. DINBERGS. It is difficult to give you a precise answer, sir, because they were in various Government agencies, as we later discovered.

Mr. DODD. You didn't know it at the time?

Mr. DINBERGS. No, we didn't.

Mr. DODD. You made reference to a charge by the Soviets that some magazine had been suppressed, did you not, in your direct statement?

Mr. DINBERGS. Well, it wasn't suppressed, but that was one of their excuses or reasons for the ultimatum presented to Latvia. It was a publication for purely social and cultural understanding between the three countries—between Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—and it was not a military publication as they alleged it to be.

Mr. DODD. Besides the underground and infiltration of the Government agencies, then, you were subject to what is now known as the traditional pattern, military and political threats by the Foreign Minister of the annexing power.

Was there anything else which took place in Latvia, other than these elements which we have suggested? Do you understand me?

As I understand it, these countries which have been taken over have been usually taken over under this formula: Infiltration by the Communists in the Government itself, political harassment of the government itself—that is the government to be annexed by military threats and political pressures on the part of the annexing power.

Were there any other elements in the Latvian situation?

Mr. DINBERGS. Those are the main elements, and of course this infiltration mainly started with the execution of those mutual-assistance pacts by which some 30,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Latvia, and also some administrative personnel, and their families that were taken along.

Mr. DODD. That is all I have.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I was rather interested in your answer to Mr. Bonin's question and I would like to pursue that a little further: You say that you can see no reason to give any faith or credence to any agreement that Soviet Russia assigns. Is that correct?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you see, then, any useful purpose that could be served by this country negotiating for an agreement with Soviet Russia?

Mr. DINBERGS. I don't think it is within my competence to answer that question.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you see any hope for the liberation of your people, by agreement with Soviet Russia?

Mr. DINBERGS. It is very hard to answer in principles because it depends upon circumstances under which it is done.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You said no faith or credence can be given to any agreement signed by Soviet Russia. Wouldn't it then follow that there is no hope for your people by means of an agreement with Soviet Russia?

Mr. DINBERGS. If there is a possibility of securing the Soviet Union's keeping their agreement——

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you think that is possible?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is a matter of force, I think.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You think, in other words, the only way the question of liberation of your people can be solved is by force?

Mr. DINBERGS. Not by force, but by enforcing the Soviet Union to keep their agreements.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How could it be enforced? Do you know of any other way than actual warfare?

Mr. DINBERGS. That would depend on the Soviet Union.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, what you said in response to Mr. Bonin's question, and I believe pretty much the same to Mr. Machrowicz's, is that nobody can rely upon any agreements reached by the Communists. That has been your experience, has it not?

Mr. DINBERGS. That has been our experience for the last 22 years.

Mr. BENTLEY. The original agreements between the Soviet Union and Latvia were signed when?

Mr. DINBERGS. The peace treaty was signed August 11, 1920.

Mr. BENTLEY. And until 1939 that agreement was pretty well kept on the part of the Soviet Union?

Mr. DINBERGS. It was, yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. For the obvious reason that Soviet Russia didn't feel itself in a position to move against Latvia during that time, is that right?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. In other words, the conclusion to be drawn is that the Soviet Union keeps its agreements when it is forced to do so. Would you accept that?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is my understanding.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Vishinsky was the man in charge of the Latvian takeover, is that correct?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is the same Vishinsky who is now the Soviet representative in the United Nations, is that correct?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was he personally in Latvia to help take over Latvia?

Mr. DINBERGS. He was.

Mr. KERSTEN. He appeared there in the capital, did he, and took charge of the affairs of the takeover of this defenseless nation?

Mr. DINBERGS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. And following the Soviet takeover, and the Communist occupation, it was then over a period of time—weeks, months, and some years—that the population proceeded to be Sovietized; is that correct?

Mr. DINBERGS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

The hearings will now adjourn until 1:30, at which time we will have an executive session until about 2 o'clock, at which time we will resume public hearings. The next witness will be the Estonian Minister.

The hearings are now adjourned until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:15 p. m.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Is Dr. Kaiv, the Estonian representative, here?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHANNES KAIV, ACTING CONSUL GENERAL IN CHARGE OF THE LEGATION OF ESTONIA

Mr. KERSTEN. Doctor, will you identify yourself? Give us your full name and your title.

Mr. KAIV. My name is Johannes Kaiv. My official title in this country is Acting Consul General in charge of the Legation of Estonia.

Mr. KERSTEN. What does Estonia maintain in Washington here, now?

Mr. KAIV. The Estonian Legation is supposed to exist legally in Washington, but actually all the functions of the Legation are performed by the Consulate General in New York.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you tell us this, Mr. Kaiv: Will you tell us for how long a time the Estonian Government has continuously maintained diplomatic representation in the United States?

Mr. KAIV. Since 1922.

Mr. KERSTEN. Shortly after the proclamation of the independence and the recognition by the United States?

Mr. KAIV. Since United States gave recognition of Estonia.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the country of Estonia has maintained that representation in the United States from that time continuously until now; is that correct?

Mr. KAIV. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the flag of free Estonia still flies in this country, is that correct?

Mr. KAIV. Exactly.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. KAIV. Yes, I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you give us such statement as you desire to make?

Mr. KAIV. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in giving here a short summary of acts and facts pertaining to the relations between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I would make the following introductory remarks:

The Estonians do not have anything in common either racially, linguistically, or culturally with the Russians. The Estonian people have lived as an independent nation on their present territory since time immemorial.

Because of its geographical location between West and East, Estonia has been repeatedly invaded by foreign nations, mostly by Russians. But the Russians have never succeeded in subjugating the Estonians. In the 13th century, after a struggle lasting about 20 years, the Estonians were conquered by the Teutonic Order and the Danish king. In the 17th century Estonia fell under Swedish rule. As a result of lost wars, Sweden ceded Estonia to Russia by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721.

Estonians never have voluntarily accepted any Russian rule.

Longing for the reestablishment of their rights, the Estonians saw such a possibility in the downfall of the czarist regime in Russia. The Estonians in a unanimous appeal urged the Provisional Government of Russia to grant Estonia an autonomous self-government. Under forceful petitions from Estonian organizations, and after an impressive manifestation of Estonians in front of the seat of the Provisional Government, in which manifestation also Estonian military units, composed of Estonians in the Russian Army, participated, the Russian Provisional Government yielded.

On March 30, 1917, the Russian Provisional Government, being the sole legislative and chief executive authority in Russia, confirmed a decree proposed by Estonian representatives, by virtue of which an autonomous Estonia was established and an autonomous representative body and executive organs formed. This representative body—Maanoukogu—duly elected on democratic principles by the entire population of Estonia, decided to separate from Russia and proclaimed the independent Republic of Estonia, taking as basis the Soviet decree of November 1917, which declared the right of self-determination of nations, including separation from Russia. This decision was later reconfirmed by the Constituent Assembly of Estonia.

Regardless of the proclaimed right of self-determination, Soviet armed forces attacked Estonia in November 1918. They were repulsed from the Estonian territory by the Estonian armed forces, and after 15 months of battles a peace treaty between Estonia and Soviet Russia was signed on February 2, 1920. By this treaty, Soviet Russia unconditionally recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Estonian Republic and renounced forever all sovereignty and other rights which Russia had had over the Estonian people and their land.

A peaceful period of 20 years followed. Recognized *de jure* by all other countries Estonia established a democratic form of government based on the individual liberties of the people. This peaceful period was interrupted only by an unsuccessful Communist uprising

on December 1, 1924, organized and armed by the Soviet Union in violation of the treaty of peace.

Estonian international policy was based on neutrality, rigid fulfillment of treaties, and cooperation with other nations, especially with neighboring countries, including the Soviet Union, as one can see from a list of treaties registered with the League of Nations, of which Estonia was a member.

The unconditional recognition of Estonia's independence and integrity found further confirmation in the Pact of Nonaggression and Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts signed between Estonia and the USSR on May 4, 1932, and prolonged in 1934 until December 31, 1945. For the elaboration of this pact, the Convention of Conciliation was concluded on June 16, 1932, and on July 3, 1933, the Convention for Definition of Aggression was signed.

On September 28, 1939, a Pact of Mutual Assistance was signed for 10 years. The conclusion of this pact took place in very particular circumstances. After handing, in the Kremlin, to the Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs a prepared draft of the pact, he was given to understand that the Soviets would use force if the Estonians would not agree to such an agreement. The Soviet Army had been concentrated in fighting order at the border of Estonia, the Soviet Navy was demonstrating in front of Tallinn, the Estonian capital, and Soviet war planes were circling over Estonian territory, et cetera.

By virtue of this pact, Soviet Russia acquired the right to establish on Estonian territory in fixed localities, on lease terms, its naval and air bases and to maintain on such sites a strictly limited number of forces. Even here the USSR reaffirmed again that the treaties mentioned continue to be the firm foundation for the mutual relations.

During the first months of this pact period, the Soviets behaved according to the pact stipulations, but later they grossly violated the agreement by bringing into Estonia armed forces in excess of the stipulated number and placing them in localities not agreed upon, and using air bases in Estonia for bombardment of Finland.

The Estonian Government kept strictly to the provisions of the pact. This fact was officially and publicly conceded by the representatives of the Soviet Government as late as March 12, 1940, expressing full satisfaction and reaffirming amicable relations between the two countries. No charges were made by the Soviet Government to the Estonian Government about the fulfillment of the said pact.

At the time of the conclusion of the pact, the Estonians were not aware of the existence of the secret protocol to the Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the USSR of August 23, 1939, according to which Estonia and other Baltic States were included into the sphere of influence of the USSR. In the light of this secret Nazi-Soviet agreement, the forcing of the so-called Mutual Assistance Pact upon Estonia was just an implementation of the said agreement of aggression.

On June 16, 1940, the USSR presented suddenly an ultimatum to Estonia, accusing Estonia of (a) military alliance with Latvia directed against the Soviet Union, (b) expanding this alliance, and (c) establishing a special publication, "Revue Baltique" for this purpose. This ultimatum demanded the formation of a new government and the admission of an unspecified number of Soviet troops into Estonia.

These accusations were without any foundation. The Soviet Government has never taken even the trouble to prove them.

It has been established that at the time of the presentment of the ultimatum, Soviet army units had been concentrated at the Estonian-Soviet border and that Soviet army units at their bases on Estonian territory had been alerted and put in combat readiness.

On June 17, 1940, Soviet armed forces invaded Estonia and the Estonian constitutional government had to resign.

The presentation of the ultimatum itself was a violation of the Mutual Assistance Pact and the Treaty of Nonaggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of May 1932.

The invasion by armed forces of an internationally recognized country in violation of existing treaties is an act of aggression.

The Soviet Army occupied all vital centers in Estonia. A puppet government was set up of people selected by Moscow emissaries. The Estonian parliament—the National Assembly—was dissolved. Heads of governmental departments and agencies of any importance were dismissed and replaced by obscure personalities. In some departments, as the police, the discharge embraced close to 100 percent of the personnel. The same fate of dismissal befell also the elected heads of the municipal and rural administrations, as mayors, county and commune elders. The puppet government amended the electoral law in violation of the constitution. Elections of a new Chamber of Deputies were proclaimed on July 5 and held already on July 14 and 15, 1940, so no time was left for a proper election campaign. Only one list of candidates was permitted, that of the newly founded Communist League of Toiling People, and the list was composed of obscure personalities unknown in Estonian political life, with the exception of a few leftist liberals. The control of impartial courts was abolished. The freedom of organization, of public assembly and of the press was suspended. The government took over all newspapers, printing establishments, and the broadcasting systems. Manifestations were organized against the constitutional Estonian regime under the direction of a special Soviet representative, A. Zdanov. These manifestations were accompanied by Soviet tank units. No campaign against the Communist candidates was allowed. The elections were carried through with the active participation of Soviet soldiers and imported Soviet workers. When this illegally elected Chamber of Deputies convened on July 21, 1940, there was submitted to it by the puppet government, on instructions from the Kremlin, a resolution to join the Soviet Union. At the time of the "elections," there was no mention of such a joining. On July 22 the resolution was passed, and on August 6, 1940, the Supreme Soviet Council in Moscow "incorporated" Estonia into the Soviet Union.

According to the Estonian constitution, Estonia is an independent and sovereign republic. Consequently, the union with any other country could be accomplished only by an amendment of the constitution. Such amendments can be carried through in the way provided in the constitution itself. All amendments have to be passed by the National Assembly, consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the National Council, and have to be reconfirmed by a newly elected National Assembly and then promulgated by the President of the Republic.

As shown before, the body concocted by Moscow emissaries and being elected in usurpation of the constitution and electoral law cannot be considered a chamber of deputies. The National Council had not been formed at all. Neither was there a new National Assembly convoked, nor any presidential promulgation as provided by the constitution.

There was no plebiscite in Estonia for joining the Soviet Union.

There were in Estonia no conditions which might have been considered as a justification for the application even of the principle of the so-called law of revolution. In Estonia there was a democratic system of government, civil liberties were guaranteed, the nation was prospering economically and culturally. There was no unemployment, there was no discontent with the regime, with the exception of a few hundred underground Communists.

There was no revolution in Estonia.

The decisions passed on July 22 and August 6 are void, and the invasion and occupation of Estonia on the part of the USSR remains a flagrant act of aggression.

The U. S. S. R. introduced into Estonia a Soviet administration and established a regime of lawlessness and terror. Thousands of Estonians were imprisoned, sent to forced labor in Russia, over 60,000 people were deported to Siberia and other remote and wild parts of the U. S. S. R., over 2,000 murdered, et cetera.

In 1941, the German armies, attacking Soviet forces, invaded and occupied Estonia. The Germans established there a Nazi administration. As Estonia was not a belligerent country, but had declared its neutrality, the German occupation of Estonia could not change the legal status of Estonia as a sovereign and independent country.

In 1944, in the course of war, the forces of the U. S. S. R. again penetrated Estonia, forcing out the German army and administration.

Contrary to its international commitments and pledges, as the Atlantic Charter, declaration by the United Nations, January 1, 1942, declaration on liberated Europe made at Yalta, February 4-11, 1945, and the Charter of the United Nations, the U. S. S. R. has not withdrawn from Estonia after the cessation of hostilities of World War II.

The same order of lawlessness and terror as during the previous Soviet occupation has been reintroduced. The U. S. S. R. has suspended all constitutional and other Estonian national institutions and replaced them by a Soviet Russian administration. All civil liberties, as inviolability of person and home, freedom of speech and press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and choice of employment, freedom of education, et cetera, have been abolished.

Mass deportations have taken place on a larger scale than during the first Soviet occupation. Deportations still continue. Besides mass deportations, genocidal acts are disguised as sending Estonians to serve their sentences to forced labor in Russia by the Soviet tribunals, recruitments of "voluntary" labor in Russia, forcible sending of talented Estonian pupils to "further education" in Russia, forcible sending of graduates of so-called labor reserve schools to Russia for compulsory work—that means that 2 youths per 100 inhabitants are compulsorily, without consulting parents, inducted into these schools. The U. S. S. R. is drafting Estonians into the Soviet Army on the same basis as Soviet citizens. They are educating Estonians into godless Soviet Russian citizens through Communist indoctrination and by

"Russification." The U. S. S. R. is systematically exploiting Estonian natural resources and labor to the benefit of Soviet imperialism.

Besides the general act of aggression against the Estonian Nation, the representatives of the U. S. S. R. have committed and are committing at present other innumerable crimes against my people. It is impossible to enumerate in the present statement all Soviet crimes. Taking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, as a code of principles governing the civilized world, I can state on the basis of available evidence that there is not a single article in the said declaration which has not been grossly violated by the Soviet Government. There is no crime which they have not committed repeatedly for which the Nazi War criminals were sentenced in Nuremburg on the basis of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal to which the U. S. S. R. also gave its signature.

The occupation of Estonia is a flagrant act of aggression, accompanied by innumerable crimes against the liberty, lives, and property of Estonians.

While occupying Estonia, the U. S. S. R. is using Estonian territory for the preparation for further aggression. The Soviets have emptied Estonian islands of the Estonian population and are building there air and naval bases. Military experts assert that Estonia has not had nor has any strategic value for the defense of Russia. The sole reason of such bases can be only the preparation for further Soviet penetration to the west.

According to the available statistical data, in Soviet-occupied Estonia about 70 percent of the national production goes for strengthening the Soviet military might.

Ample evidence to substantiate this statement is available and will be submitted when required.

Mr. KERSTEN. It will be accepted when submitted.

Mr. KAIIV. I thank the committee for listening to my report and giving me the opportunity to appear here.

Mr. McTIGUE. You refer to certain pacts. Do you have those in your possession this morning?

Mr. KAIIV. Yes.

I have some basic treaties between Estonia and the Soviet Union.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify them, please, and also give the source?

Mr. KAIIV. These documents I am submitting, they are photostatic copies. They are from the League of Nations treaty series publication. The same treaties are published in the Estonia Official Gazette, which is in my office.

The first of these is a treaty of peace between Russia and Estonia, signed at Tartu, on February 2, 1920.

Mr. McTIGUE. The document will be marked "Exhibit 4-A."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 4-A." See p. 510.)

Mr. KAIIV. The second is a treaty of commerce between Estonia and the U. S. S. R., May 17, 1929.

Mr. McTIGUE. That agreement will be marked "Exhibit 4-B."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 4-B." See p. 519.)

Mr. KAIIV. Next, a treaty of nonaggression of May 4, 1932.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked as "Exhibit 4-C."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 4-C." See p. 528.)

Mr. KAIV. Then, Conciliation Convention, June 16, 1932.

Mr. MCTIGUE. The convention will be marked "Exhibit 4-D."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 4-D." See p. 530.)

Mr. KAIV. Then, the protocol renewing treaty of nonaggression, April 4, 1934.

Mr. MCTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 4-E."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 4-E." See p. 531.)

Mr. KAIV. And the pact of mutual assistance, September 28, 1939.

Mr. MCTIGUE. That pact will be marked "Exhibit 4-F."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 4-F." See p. 532.)

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In what language are those documents?

Mr. KAIV. They are in Estonian and Russian. Some are in Estonian and French.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Chairman, I suggest whenever those documents are introduced as evidence, they be accompanied by translation.

Mr. KAIV. The English translations are already made by the League of Nations.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are the English translations attached to the Estonian?

Mr. KAIV. They are attached to the French.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are introducing the English translations in connection with the documents?

Mr. KAIV. Yes. The English translations are provided.

Mr. MADDEN. What percentage of the population of Estonia has been placed in jeopardy, or in jail, or in prison camps or slave-labor camps, if you know? Could you give us a rough estimate?

Mr. KAIV. There are no exact estimates.

Mr. MADDEN. If you don't know the percentage, give us the estimated number.

Mr. KAIV. I would say the number of deportees may be from 120,000 up to 150,000.

Mr. MADDEN. Between 120,000 and 150,000?

Mr. KAIV. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. You testified regarding murders and massacres. To what extent were they committed against the Estonian people?

Mr. KAIV. That is shown in my report. There were 2,000 murdered in the year 1940.

Mr. MADDEN. Were those in the form of mass murders or massacres, or just individual killings, separate murders?

Mr. KAIV. That is all combined. There were mass massacres, and there were individual killings.

Mr. MADDEN. How did they carry out these murders, or massacres; by hanging, or shooting, or how? Torture?

Mr. KAIV. Well, in the township of Tartu, I don't know exactly the number, but they murdered about 200. They were just thrown into wells.

Mr. MADDEN. Were they shot first, or just thrown in alive?

Mr. KAIV. Some were tortured, some were shot, and some were just thrown in.

Mr. MADDEN. Do you know of any communications that have been received by the relatives of the prisoners who were taken away, by the people back in Estonia? Any letters or information as to where they were sent?

Mr. KAIV. Very rarely, but there have been certain communications between the deported and the relatives outside, but very few. They are exceptions.

Mr. MADDEN. A certain percentage of these prisoners were Estonians coming from the intelligentsia, or the leaders, or were they Estonians in the laboring class?

Mr. KAIV. During the first occupation, there was a list composed of professions, according to which deportations took place. But later, there was no difference made among the different classes.

Mr. MADDEN. What was the estimated population of Estonia in 1940?

Mr. KAIV. 1,135,000.

Mr. MADDEN. At the present time are there many Russian Communists in Estonia, in official positions, or are they Estonians who have embraced communism who are in official positions?

Mr. KAIV. To my best knowledge, a great majority of the higher officials are Russians, in Estonia.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Kaiv, I would like to ask you a few questions that I asked some of your diplomatic colleagues this morning. How long have you been attached to the Estonian consulate here in the United States?

Mr. KAIV. Since April 1, 1939.

Mr. BENTLEY. Could you tell us what other countries—is it true that the majority of western countries still recognize Estonia diplomatically?

Mr. KAIV. With a few exceptions; yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. When were the connections between the Estonian legation, or the Estonian consulate general, as the case may be, the Estonian Government, when were those relations ceased?

Mr. KAIV. Do you mean in 1940?

Mr. BENTLEY. Is that the time?

Mr. KAIV. It is impossible to say the exact date, but I did not consider the newly appointed government an Estonian Government any more and I took no instruction from it.

Mr. BENTLEY. Since that time, you have had no connection either with your Government, either during the Soviet or during the German occupation?

Mr. KAIV. With one exception. When the elections were going to take place, I sent to get some documentation. I called to our Minister for Foreign Affairs in the capital and said that, according to the American press, elections were to take place on the question of joining the Soviet Union. I asked on what basis the elections were being conducted. I asked whether it was correct that we were joining with the Soviet Union.

Just before the Red Chamber of Deputies convened, I got a reply from the Minister for Foreign Affairs—the puppet minister—that:

Elections are taking place on the basis of the constitution and electoral law. Rumors about joining the Soviet Union, groundless.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Kaiv, do you by any chance have in your files a copy of that communication?

Mr. KAIV. I do not have it here, but it could be submitted.

Mr. BENTLEY. It could be submitted?

Mr. KAIV. Oh, yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Since that time, has there been pressure by the Soviets to take over assets or property of the Estonian Government in this country?

Mr. KAIV. Oh, yes. I have had to fight for years against their attempts.

In the first place, there is the so-called Gosbank, the bank of the Soviet Union in Moscow. They send an order to all American banks here to transfer all Estonian funds to the Gosbank in Moscow. This order was not followed, and the transfer was later prevented by the Presidential order blocking the Baltic funds in this country.

Then they tried to seize Estonian vessels, here. I, myself, had about 20 court cases. So far they lost in their attempts.

Mr. BENTLEY. I want to ask you 1 or 2 questions about your statement. As I recall, you said originally the Russian Provisional Government acknowledged Estonian independence in 1917.

Mr. KAIV. They granted us autonomous self-government.

Mr. BENTLEY. That was the Kerensky government?

Mr. KAIV. That is correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. That action was confirmed by the Soviet Communist government following their military defeat?

Mr. KAIV. That was reaffirmed in a peace decree. There was this decree of self-determination of nations. That was published in their official gazette. Later, the self-government was recognized by a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Estonia.

Mr. BENTLEY. You mentioned that on March 29, 1940, the Soviets expressed their satisfaction with the mutual assistance pact.

Mr. KAIV. That was Molotov's speech on March 29, 1940.

Mr. BENTLEY. And he referred to Estonia, or all the Baltic countries?

Mr. KAIV. Full satisfaction was expressed.

Mr. BENTLEY. With just Estonia, or all the Baltic countries?

Mr. KAIV. Just Estonia.

Mr. BENTLEY. You say there was no plebiscite in Estonia with respect to joining the Soviet Union?

Mr. KAIV. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Not even a normal one?

Mr. KAIV. No plebiscite in any case.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In the documents presented by you, there is the treaty of nonaggression dated May 4, 1932. That was for a 3-year period; was it?

Mr. KAIV. Yes; that was renewed.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That was renewed subsequent to June 1945?

Mr. KAIV. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Article I of that agreement, as presented by you in evidence, states as follows:

Each of the high contracting parties guarantees to the other party the inviolability of the existing frontiers between them as defined by the peace treaty signed February 2, 1920.

Those were the then existing boundaries; were they not?

Mr. KAIV. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ (reading):

And undertakes to refrain from any acts of aggression or any violent measures directed at the integrity or inviolability of the territory or against the political independence of the other contracting party, whether such acts of aggression

or such violent methods are taken separately or in conjunction with the other powers with or without declaration of war.

They say each party has a right to withdraw from this agreement on 6 months' notice.

Have the Soviets ever given such notice of withdrawal?

Mr. KAIV. Just the opposite. In the pact of mutual assistance they are referring to this same agreement.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They provide in there that either party shall have the right to denounce the treaty by notifying the other of its intention 6 months before the expiration.

Mr. KAIV. No such notification was ever given.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I believe you said in your statement that when the Communists took over they removed from the Parliament all of the members with the exception of a few so-called left-wing liberals.

Mr. KAIV. There was one list printed as permitted and this list was made up of unknown, obscure people with the exception of a few left-wing liberals.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was the reason they left the left-wing liberals in, to give it the appearance of a unity government?

Mr. KAIV. That is my opinion.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know what happened to the so-called left-wing liberals who were not Communists?

Mr. KAIV. They were purged.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The reason I asked you that is that that seems to be the general pattern of Communists. That happened in Poland. They include a few left-wing liberals, but as soon as they became safe they immediately purged those left-wing liberals, leaving only Communists in the government.

Mr. KAIV. It would appear the same pattern was followed in Estonia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That pattern is followed usually by the Communists, to give that impression of unity, which didn't last very long. That is all.

Mr. BONIN. Doctor, do you believe there is a plan to completely exterminate the Estonian people?

Mr. KAIV. I am sure of that. It is according to Communist doctrine. According to their doctrine, there must be one Communist mass—no nationalities, no classes. They are in principle already against any nation or any national move. They have already annihilated some nationalist groups; they have done it to some Germans and the Republic in the Crimea, and so on.

Mr. BONIN. Did you say there was an uprising in 1934?

Mr. KAIV. It was in 1924.

Mr. BONIN. Do you know whether or not it was sponsored by Russian agents and in cooperation with the Russian Government?

Mr. KAIV. A very thorough investigation took place and there is no doubt but what that was prepared by the Soviet Government. Even uniforms were brought into Estonia from Russia.

Mr. BONIN. That was established by the existing Estonian Government after that occurred?

Mr. KAIV. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Referring back to your statement concerning the Mutual Assistance Pact, did I understand you correctly that they had vio-

lated that pact and brought in additional troops and stationed them in places other than had been mentioned in the agreement?

Mr. KAIV. Yes. That is a fact.

Mr. BONIN. Now, in reference to the Mutual Assistance Pact, the Russian Government accused the officials of your government of violating that Mutual Assistance Pact because you allegedly had an agreement with Lithuania and Latvia? Is that correct?

Mr. KAIV. They accused us of having such an alliance with Latvia and later of expanding that alliance to Lithuania and Finland. There was no such pact in existence. The pact that we had before, that was an alliance, but it was a cultural alliance.

This pact with Latvia mentions that during the negotiations of the Mutual Assistance Pact—and it was said by a Russian representative, Molotov or Stalin: "That doesn't come into consideration; that doesn't hurt this agreement."

Mr. BONIN. Were there any hearings similar to this to establish the fact that there had been a violation of any form of agreement?

Mr. KAIV. They never accused the Estonian Government before the ultimatum. They were our best friends and fulfilling the agreements on the best terms. Then they came right in and submitted an ultimatum.

Mr. BONIN. They seized your government, and are still in control of it?

Mr. KAIV. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Do you know whether or not any of the underground Communists in your country have become officials of the Estonian Government, or did they after the seizure by Russia?

Mr. KAIV. Oh, yes.

Mr. BONIN. They did?

Mr. KAIV. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Were any of those officials who were placed in power, in jail?

Mr. KAIV. Most of them have disappeared. The names of the Communist officials which arose after the invasion in Estonia, their names have disappeared already. They are not mentioned any more. It means they are liquidated, or what happened, we don't know.

Mr. BONIN. That is all.

Mr. DODD. I think you said there was an order issued, preventing the Soviet Government from taking over the funds of the Estonian Government in this country.

When was that order issued?

Mr. KAIV. I don't remember the exact date, but it was in July 1940. It was a general blocking order of a political sense in this order.

Mr. DODD. What was that?

Mr. KAIV. It was a general order.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the date of the outbreak of war between Russia and Finland?

Mr. KAIV. I don't know exactly.

Mr. McTIGUE. You said in your prepared statement that the Russians used bases in Estonia to bomb Finland.

Mr. KAIV. That was the so-called winter war, between Russia and Finland.

Mr. McTIGUE. Bases were already established in Estonia as a result of the Mutual Assistance Pact; is that right?

Mr. KAIV. They used them in violation of our pact, to attack Finland.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is the point I am trying to make.

Now, when they violated the pact by using the bases in Estonia to bomb Finland, did the Government of Estonia protest?

Mr. KAIV. There were protests by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the result of the protests?

Mr. KAIV. It resulted in no results.

Mr. McTIGUE. When they moved in more troops than you and the Soviet had agreed to under the Mutual Assistance Pact, did you also protest that to the Soviet Government?

Mr. KAIV. There were oral protests made, but there was no escape, and Estonia had to just keep quiet and let them bring in more troops.

Mr. McTIGUE. You made an official protest, and there was never any answer of any kind?

Mr. KAIV. There were no results.

Mr. KERSTEN. If the Soviets continue to occupy Estonia as they have been in the past, for some considerable time in the future, what will happen to what remains of the Estonian people, in your opinion?

Mr. KAIV. It depends on the tradition. In my opinion, their ultimate aim is to destroy Estonia, as a nation. When they have had sufficient time, a sufficient number of years, they will accomplish this.

Mr. KERSTEN. You refer to the Mutual Assistance Pact of 1939. It is dated September 28, 1939.

Now, it was in June of the following year that the Soviet troops broke out of the area of their bases and occupied the entire country; is that not right?

Mr. KAIV. New troops came from Russia.

Mr. KERSTEN. When was it they broke out of their bases and occupied the entire country?

Mr. KAIV. The Russian troops on the bases in Estonia, they were alerted and they were already in fighting readiness. However, at the same time new troops were brought in over the border.

Mr. KERSTEN. When was that?

Mr. KAIV. It was June 17, 1940.

Mr. KERSTEN. So, the period of September 1939 until June of the following year, 1940, there was only that short period of time existing before they grossly violated the so-called Mutual Assistance Pact?

Mr. KAIV. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, the complete takeover of Estonia took place just a few months after they entered into this pact which guaranteed independence and political freedom, and gave all these other assurances to Estonia?

Mr. KAIV. It was an interval of about 7 months.

Mr. KERSTEN. And there had been these previous assurances and agreements of political independence and complete freedom of Estonia? All of that just before the complete takeover; is that right?

Mr. KAIV. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Estonia's experience with pacts and negotiations with the Soviets has been a very sad experience, hasn't it?

Mr. KAIV. It would appear so.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you feel there is any freedom or chance for the freedom of your people through negotiations with Soviet Russia?

Mr. KAIV. It is difficult to reply, but it depends upon what is in the

negotiations. When you negotiate a treaty with them, according to Estonia, there is no reason—I myself don't know of any international agreement to which Soviet Russia is a party, which they have not violated.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So you wouldn't give much faith and credence to such an agreement, if there was such an agreement, would you?

Mr. KAIV. According to our experience, we cannot give it much weight.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is all, and thank you, Mr. Kaiv.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before you leave, Mr. Kaiv, you are going to supply two exhibits for the record, in answer to Congressman Bentley's question: First, Molotov's speech on March 29, 1940, the Soviet approval of the Mutual Assistance Pact of Estonia; and second, the reply of the Estonian Foreign Minister to you, denying annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union.

You will supply those two documents for our record?

Mr. KAIV. I will send them tomorrow.

(The two documents referred to will be marked "Exhibits 4-G and 4-H." See p. 535.)

Mr. KERSTEN. With regard to the use of Estonian bases for further aggression, specifically when you said that what did you refer to, Mr. Kaiv?

Mr. KAIV. They emptied the Estonian islands of Estonians and brought in a Russian Army. They have enclosed these islands and they are building their bases, naval and air bases. That is more or less common knowledge. Even in the European press appear items about the fortifications in the Baltic.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is it your information that this has been taking place for some time, and is presently taking place?

Mr. KAIV. It is continuously taking place.

Mr. KERSTEN. The preparation of these islands, is that what you refer to?

Mr. KAIV. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would they be just north of Estonia, in the Baltic Sea?

Mr. KAIV. There are two larger islands, and there are numerous smaller islands. The smaller islands are all emptied of Estonians, and it is a restricted area. Even fishermen can't go there.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have you some fairly recent information as to the occupation of those islands?

Mr. KAIV. That is not so recent anymore. It has been 2 or 3 years ago.

I can submit this information, what I have.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked "Exhibit 4-I."

(The information referred to was marked "Exhibit 4-I." See p. 536.)

Mr. KERSTEN. General Musteikis?

**STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. KAZYS MUSTEIKIS, DEFENSE MINISTER
IN MERKY'S CABINET, THROUGH INTERPRETER CONSTANTINE
R. JURGELA**

MR. KERSTEN. Mr. Jurgela, I understand you will assist in the translation.

For the purposes of the translation, I think it will probably be proper to swear the translator, that you will well and truly translate the statements given by General Musteikis.

Do you solemnly swear that you will well and duly translate from Lithuanian into English the statements made by General Musteikis, our witness who is before us here, so help you God?

MR. JURGELA. I do.

MR. KERSTEN. Give us your full name?

MR. JURGELA. Constantine R. Jurgela.

MR. KERSTEN. You thoroughly understand the language?

MR. JURGELA. I do. I am in charge of Lithuanian service for the Voice of America.

MR. MCTIGUE. Before proceeding with the general's testimony, I would like to read into the record an article from a Moscow weekly, published in Moscow, entitled "New Times," dated August 12, 1953.

I am reading from page 15, under the title of "International Notes." This publication, incidentally, is published in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Polish, Czech, and Swedish, and has a wide circulation.

Here is the article and it is entitled "Wasted Money":

The House of Representatives, it is reported from Washington, has approved \$30,000 to cover the expenses of a special committee under Congressman Kersten (Republican, Wisconsin) to "conduct an investigation and study of the seizure (!) of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the Soviet Union."

One does not know what to be surprised at most—the abysmal ignorance of the Congressmen or their penchant for provocation.

All the world knows that there was no seizure of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the Soviet Union. For 13 years now these 3 Soviet Baltic Republics have been an integral part of the multinational Soviet State. They joined it voluntarily; the decision to do so was adopted by their parliaments and wholeheartedly approved by their people back in 1940. Since then Soviet Lithuania, Soviet Latvia, and Soviet Estonia have, with the assistance of the other fraternal republics, made immense progress in economic and cultural development.

These are generally known facts, known probably even to Wisconsin school-boys. But the Congressman from that State and his colleagues in the House of Representatives pretend that they need thousands of dollars in public money to "study" this absolutely clear question.

The ignorance of American Congressmen has become a byword, but this time it is more a matter of provocation than of ignorance, as is indicated by the fact that it was Kersten who was appointed to head the committee. He is the author of the celebrated "amendment" allocating \$100 million for subversive activities against the People's Democracies and the Soviet Union and has had a hand in many another sordid undertaking.

The reactionaries in Congress do not relish the prospect of a lessening of international tension and are thinking up new tricks to poison the atmosphere. In allocating \$30,000 for this latest "investigation" the House of Representatives evidently wants to start a new campaign of provocation.

Nothing will come of it; the Kersten dollars are just so much money wasted.

That is the end of the article. It is obvious that the Communists have a very low regard for you and the committee.

MR. KERSTEN. Apparently. Proceed, please.

Mr. McTIGUE. General Musteikis, will you identify yourself, please? General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I am Kazys Musteikis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born, please?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I was born in Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you acquire your military education?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The first military education I have gained in Russia was in 1916. Having returned to Lithuania, I have been sent by the Government to the military academy in Belgium, from which I graduated in 1931.

Mr. McTIGUE. What has been your experience in the Lithuanian Army?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I began with the lowest grade and rose to brigadier generalship.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your position in the last legitimate Lithuanian Government?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Since December 1938 until June 14, 1940, I have been Minister of National Defense.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were present here when the Lithuanian Minister testified this morning that Lithuania was stunned when the ultimatum was issued to the Cabinet on June 14?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes. I was very much stunned.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were Defense Minister in that Government when the ultimatum was issued.

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us what happened in the Cabinet meeting at the time the ultimatum was received from Moscow?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes; I can.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, please, in your own way to describe the events?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I received the first intimation of the ultimatum by Prime Minister Merkys on June 14 at 11:30 p. m. He told me that very bad news had been received from Moscow and that a session of the Council of Ministers is being convoked at the President's office. I came there at 1 o'clock at night on June 15. The session was opened at 1:30 at night on June 15.

The President of the Republic, Mr. Smetona, had presided over the session of the Cabinet. All of the members of the Cabinet had taken part in the session, with the exception of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was in Moscow, and with the exception of Finance Minister Galvanauskas, who was at that time on official duty at Klaipeda.

The session was also attended by Commander in Chief of the Army General Vitkauskas, and Chief of Staff General Pundzevicius, and Secretary General of the Council of Ministers Masalaitis.

This session may be divided into two parts. I will relate now the first part, the President's thesis, what the President had said: The President said that he is agreeable to consider only the second point of the ultimatum.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I interrupt for a moment, please? What 3 or 4—whatever the case is—points were contained in the ultimatum which the Cabinet now has under discussion.

General MUSTEIKIS (through an interpreter). Initially, the Council was aware of only two points of the ultimatum. That was decoded and while the session was taking place, the final third point of the

ultimatum had been deciphered or decoded, so that the ultimatum had three points.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you now name the three points before proceeding any further?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The first point of the ultimatum was that the Minister of Interior Skucas and Security Department Chief Povilaitis must be prosecuted.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was point No. 2?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The second point of the ultimatum was that a new government should be formed which would be acceptable to Moscow.

The third point of the ultimatum was that unlimited numbers of Soviet troops should be admitted to all of the localities in Lithuania.

The time for the acceptance of the ultimatum was fixed at 10 a. m. that day.

Mr. McTIGUE. How much time did that give the Cabinet for discussion and decision, from the time the ultimatum was received?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The session since the reception—10 hours.

Mr. McTIGUE. Going back to point No. 1 for a moment, which I understand was the arrest and trial of the Ministers of the Interior and Security Police, why did they want the Minister of the Interior and Security Police Chief tried? What was their crime?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The Russians had accused us that our security organs had kidnaped Soviet soldiers for the purpose of inducing them to spy for Lithuania. The security organs of the government were under charge of the Minister of the Interior.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was there any effort by the Lithuanian Government to investigate these incidents with a view to disproving or further investigating incidents?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes; some steps were undertaken.

Mr. McTIGUE. Briefly, what were those steps? Was an effort made to contact the Soviet representative with a view to determining whether the charges had any validity?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The Lithuanian Government had been aware that there had been no such kidnappings in fact, and specifically that no such kidnappings have been executed by security organs.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Lithuanian Government communicate that fact to the Soviets?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). May I continue, first?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes.

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The Lithuanian Government had admitted a possibility that some incidents of some type of violence might have happened where there had been uncertain elements during the period of the war. Or probably that Red army men had deserted from the Russian Army, were in hiding among the civilians, and not finding any support for themselves, they would return back to their units and in self-justification they might have concocted such stories.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Soviets agree to sit down with any officials or representatives of the Lithuanian Government, with a view to determining the truth or falsity of the charges?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). No. We had appointed for that purpose a special commission, under the chairmanship of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, Brazinskas, and members were the legal adviser of the Ministry of Interior, Jakobas, and military court member, Lieutenant Colonel Korla. Our minister in Moscow, Dr. Natkevicius, had notified Molotov and requested him to enable this committee to interrogate the soldiers involved. There was no reply to that request. Nevertheless this committee formed by us requested through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian representative in Kaunas, Pozdniakov, that he should create conditions enabling our commission to interrogate those soldiers. And the commanding officer of the garrison in Vilnius, Cernius, approached the staff of the Russian garrison, also requesting a permission for members of the commission to interrogate the soldiers involved.

The Russians told General Cernius that the soldiers are in such state after the ordeal that they are in a hospital and are in no shape to give testimony.

Then we requested that they themselves should interrogate, but they have never done that, and regardless of our repeated requests, they gave no reply.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is as much satisfaction as you could get as far as point No. 1 of the ultimatum was concerned?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before we go to point No. 2, what action did the Lithuanian Cabinet take on point 1? Point No. 1 was the arrest and trial of the Minister of Interior and the Security Police Chief, which we have just developed. What was the action that the Lithuanian Cabinet took with reference to point 1?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). While our Prime Minister was in Moscow, Molotov repeatedly complained to him why Skucas and Povilaitis are not detained for such a long time, and Prime Minister Merkys promised Molotov to have that done after he should return to Kaunas, that he would replace Minister of the Interior Skucas. Merkys had returned June 12 at 1:30 p. m., from the airfield, and he proceeded directly to the President, and the Minister of the Interior had been summoned there, and he was dismissed from office, right there. Duties of the Minister of the Interior had been assumed by Prime Minister Merkys himself, and the President told Skucas and Povilaitis that they should leave Kaunas for some safer place.

Mr. McTIGUE. The fact is that the Minister and the Security Police Chief were removed from office but not arrested and tried, as the ultimatum requested that they be tried?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). They were not.

Mr. McTIGUE. Moving on to point 2, which was the formation of a new Cabinet agreeable to the Soviet Union.

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Of the three points contained in the ultimatum the President has agreed to consider only point 2 of the ultimatum. He said that there are occasions when a great state pressures a small state to change a government. He agreed to form a new government, but not a government which would be ac-

ceptable to Moscow but rather a government which would be acceptable to Lithuania, herself.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did he designate a new Prime Minister and a new Cabinet, and send the names on to Moscow?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I said earlier that the session of the Cabinet could be divided into two parts. So that when the President agreed only to form a new government—at 4 a. m. a recess was taken, in order to summon the new candidate for the Prime Minister's office, General Rastikis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was General Rastikis approved then as the new Prime Minister?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). General Rastikis arrived around 4 a. m., and when he was asked by the President whether he would agree to form a new government, General Rastikis said yes, he would.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did he form a new government?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). He approved the formation but could not do so.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). When the session ended at 6:30 a. m., Moscow was informed that the new government was in the process of formation and that the new Prime Minister would be General Rastikis. Rastikis was still contacting and speaking to different people and then shortly after 10 a. m., on June 15, reply had been received from Moscow that the candidacy of General Rastikis was not acceptable to Moscow.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did Moscow submit any candidate who was acceptable?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). They did not suggest any. Then, around 11 or 12 o'clock that day, information was received from Moscow that Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Dekanozov was proceeding to Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before you go on from there, Dekanozov played the same role in Lithuania that Vishinsky did in Latvia?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes, it was the same role played by Vishinsky in Latvia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then what happened, so far as the formation of a new Cabinet was concerned?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). A new government had not been formed, and consequently the former government continued in office.

Mr. McTIGUE. Moving to point 3, now, the entry of the Soviet Army.

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). As I said before, the President refused, in principle, to consider items 1 and 3 of the ultimatum.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was the Cabinet divided on this issue or were they unanimous in supporting it?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Two members of the Cabinet supported the President's opinion, and the others were in favor of acceding to the ultimatum, except Prime Minister Merkys, who said that this point 1 and 2 should be accepted, and that the new Prime Minister should proceed to Moscow to negotiate regarding item 3.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened thereafter to the President when it was agreed that the new Prime Minister would go to Moscow? What happened to the then President of Lithuania?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Moscow notified us that this new Prime Minister was not acceptable to Moscow. The President said as long as he was powerless to form even a new government, that he should retire from Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did he retire?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). He did, but only for a vacation. He did not resign from office, but he went abroad for a rest.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to you, General?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I had to return to Lithuania in 1942, on May 31.

Mr. McTIGUE. When the Cabinet was discussing the ultimatum were the Soviet troops on the march across the border?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). They had not crossed the border yet. The session was over by 6:30 o'clock in the morning, and the Russian Armies from the bases and from abroad, from Russia, began to march after 10 o'clock or around 11.

Mr. McTIGUE. The Cabinet meeting was over at 6:30 and the Soviet was on the march at 10?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. BUSBEY. General, why did you return to Lithuania in May 1942?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I was a Lithuanian. Lithuania had already been purged of the Russians, and I thought that after a period of very hard conditions of life in Germany I would be more useful among Lithuanians in my own country.

Mr. BUSBEY. How long did you stay in Lithuania, and what was the reason for your departure?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I stayed in Lithuania until August 1, 1944, and as a great many people were escaping, so did I.

Mr. BUSBEY. How long have you been in the United States, General?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I arrived in the United States on May 14, 1949.

Mr. BUSBEY. That is all.

Mr. MADDEN. When you were called to the meeting, who was present there representing the Soviets?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Absolutely no one. That was the Government of Independent Lithuania in session.

Mr. MADDEN. Who prompted or urged that meeting at 1 a. m.? What was the purpose of calling it at 1 a. m.?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The ultimatum had been received in Moscow. Molotov handed it to Mr. Urbsys on June 14 at 11:30 at night, Moscow time. Urbsys immediately telephoned to the Prime Minister in Kaunas. There is 1 hour difference between Moscow time and Lithuanian time.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, no responsible official connected with the free Lithuania was responsible for calling that meeting that night at 1 o'clock?

Mr. JURGELA. He said the President had called the meeting.

Mr. MADDEN. But he was urged to call it by Moscow?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The Minister of Foreign Affairs had telephoned the Prime Minister to the effect that an ultimatum had been received.

Mr. MADDEN. I want to get that in the record, that it was an ultimatum from Moscow that was responsible for that meeting at 1 o'clock in the morning.

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. So there was no justification, judging from the reason why this meeting was called at 1 a. m., for the Kremlin to come out and state that Lithuania, free Lithuania, wanted to join with the Soviet Union?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Absolutely no.

Mr. BENTLEY. General, while you were in the cabinet, did your defense plans contain anything with regard to offense or defense against the Soviet Union—military plans?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). After the Soviet garrisons had entered Lithuania, we had made plans that in the event of any further Russian encroachment we should defend ourselves, so we did have such a plan, internally.

Mr. BENTLEY. I meant before the mutual assistance pact, prior to October 1939?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, during the period of Soviet occupation—that is the period of time the Soviets had military bases, there, between October 1939 and June 1940—were there any incidents or clashes between Lithuanian troops which the Soviets might have termed as provocation?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). No.

Mr. BENTLEY. None at all?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). None at all.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Soviet bases which they occupied, were they turned over by the Lithuanian Army, or were they new bases that the Soviets built?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Some bases were old. While at Gaizimiai it was only wooden barracks—proving grounds.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, this ultimatum which we have been discussing, was this ultimatum written, and, if so, did you see it, or was it read to you and other members of the cabinet?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). It was being transmitted by phone from Moscow in cipher.

Mr. BENTLEY. By telephone, in cipher?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes. It was then decoded in Kaunas and then submitted to the cabinet.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was it read to you, or did you see it? Was it read to the members of the cabinet, or was it passed around for them to see?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). It was read.

Mr. BENTLEY. This second reply from Moscow, dated June 15, which claimed that the new Prime Minister, General Rastikis, would not be acceptable to the Government, how was that communicated? Was that in writing? Was that read, or how?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). By phone.

Mr. BENTLEY. That was not in writing, at all?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). No.

Mr. BENTLEY. At any time in this period, was there any suggestion which came from Moscow as to who should be in the new government?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). No. Only the notification after 10 a. m. that Dekanozov was proceeding to Kaunas to assist in forming a new government.

Mr. BENTLEY. Before this midnight meeting that we have been discussing, what other evidence, if any, of direct Soviet interference in Lithuanian internal affairs would you be in a position to testify on?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Bolshevik propaganda was being pushed at all times, especially since the arrival of the garrisons.

Mr. BENTLEY. What form did this propaganda take?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). For instance, their army would need food. We offered the suggestion that they get food from the warehouses of our army. They refused and they said that they themselves would purchase the food from the civilians, and when the new barracks were being under construction at Gaiziunai Proving Ground—so we suggested to them that they submit the plans to the superintendent of construction, but they should do the construction themselves. However, they refused and said it was a military secret and that they would do the construction. Under guise of construction, they employed among the natives local Bolshevik agents and through them they sent out propaganda. These workers engaged in strikes and, of course, charged that we were guilty of it.

Mr. BENTLEY. This is personally known to you?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you have a copy of that ultimatum that was handed to the Lithuanian Government at that time?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I only have it in a booklet, which is printed. It is not the original.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you identify it as being a true copy of the original?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I could.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I ask then, Mr. Chairman, that that copy be placed in the record at this point in the evidence.

Mr. MCTIGUE. May I request that the general forward to the committee any photostatic copies of Lithuanian newspapers which printed the ultimatum, including translations thereof. When received, this material will be marked as exhibits.

(The documents referred to, when received, were marked "Exhibits 5-B, 5-C, and 5-D." See pp. 537-540.)

(Exhibit 5-A, Lithuanian newspaper, found in file of committee.)

Mr. BONIN. You stated that you returned to Lithuania in 1942?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). May 31; yes.

Mr. BONIN. After your return to Lithuania, did you observe any indication of atrocities, mass murders, deportation, slavery, and concentration camps as a result of the Russian occupation?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes, I have seen very much.

Mr. BONIN. Could you give us some of the instances that you observed a mass movement of Lithuanian people out of Lithuania?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I personally have not seen those deportations because they have proceeded in my absence, in 1941. When I returned to Lithuania in 1942, I could not find a

great many acquaintances of myself, a great many relatives, both in the cities and villages.

Mr. BONIN. Were you able to speak to anybody who knew that people had been killed by the Russians?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Were you able to speak to people who knew that families had been separated and taken to Siberia?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). When I returned myself, I could not find a great many relatives who had been moved to Siberia.

Mr. BONIN. As one of the principal Government officials of Lithuania, and from past experience, do you believe the free nations can rely on any of the agreements that are entered into by Communist Russia?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Absolutely none. We have had a number of treaties with the Soviet Union. However, they signed with one hand, and they would send subversive agents to engage in activities against us to destroy our independence.

Mr. BONIN. General, do you know whether or not at the present time in Lithuania, there are Lithuanian citizens who are running your Government, or whether or not they are Russians in disguise as Lithuanians, conducting the affairs of the Lithuanian Nation?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Only the Russians rule. Only for deception purposes, some Lithuanians are placed in office.

Mr. DODD. When you left Lithuania the first time, where did you go?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). There was only one way westward. That means to Germany.

Mr. DODD. And you stayed in Germany until 1942?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). May 31, 1942.

Mr. DODD. Were you a prisoner?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). I had been interned until the end of October 1940. When I ran out of money to pay for food and quarters, then I was allowed to proceed to Berlin. I had to report to the police. I had to register there during a period of 2 months, and then I was free.

Mr. DODD. When you returned to Lithuania, did you return with the permission of the Germans?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). With the consent of Germans, but this consent had taken me almost a year to procure.

Mr. DODD. I will tell you why I am asking this: I think there are a lot of people who are aware that the Nazis carried on about the same kind of activities that you have told us about the Russians. Is that not so?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Similarly. They are two evils, except the color is different.

However, the Bolsheviks have been considerably more cruel. For instance, when Smetona, the president, was fleeing to Germany, he was interned for some time and at last he was allowed to proceed abroad, even to America. Had he stayed in Lithuania, then it is quite clear what his fate would have been.

Mr. DODD. It is important to get on the record the fact that there is really no distinction between these two types of tyranny.

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). One is a little more humane.

Mr. DODD. Is that your opinion?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). It is my opinion. He who has been bolshevism and the effects of bolshevism, would agree that bolshevism is considerably more, more cruel.

Mr. DODD. That is your personal experience?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. DODD. My point is that the difference which you speak of is only a difference in degree, and not in kind? You are aware, are you not, of mass deportations of Lithuanians by the Nazis on a very large scale?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes; I know very well.

Mr. DODD. And massacres and murders?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). There was at one place. I know there was a massacre.

Mr. DODD. That is all

Mr. KERSTEN. The fact is that they were tyrannies, both the Communists and the Nazis.

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Two tyrannies, very evil.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mentioned, General, that upon your return to Lithuania in 1942, I believe, you went back to your hometown, is that right?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What town was that?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Utena County, in the eastern part of Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. Without going into great detail, can you very briefly give us something specific with regard to acquaintances or friends or people whom you notice were missing when you went back?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). In my hometown there were only farmers, and there were a great many of these farmers who had been deported.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there other farmers who had replaced them on the land, or were the farms just lying idle, or what?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). No; not at that time. The homesteads were left vacant.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were some of your relatives deported?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have you ever heard from any of those relatives?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Absolutely never. I have no information.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have you any idea as to where they were deported?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). The people, the neighbors, said they had been transported to Siberia.

Mr. KERSTEN. This village you came from, was this near Kaunas, the capital?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). It is 100 kilometers from Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you get to Kaunas when you went back in 1942?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Had you known people in Kaunas before you left that you knew were missing when you got there, also?

General MUSTEIKIS (through interpreter). In the first place, I missed the people who had been in the Council of Ministers. Among the members of the cabinet, all had been deported, with one exception. I had also served in the army and among the armed forces a

great many upper grade and lower grade officers and privates had been deported.

MR. KERSTEN. So far as you know, is it true that the great mass of all of those people who have been deported, who were deported, practically no information was ever thereafter received from them?

General MUSTEKIS (through interpreter). I don't know. I haven't any information.

MR. KERSTEN. I believe that is all. Thank you, General.

I have one further question: These military bases and the occupation of Lithuania by Soviet troops, to you as a military man what would be the ability of the Lithuanian Army, or the Lithuanian people, to in any way resist the Soviets, once they had these military bases?

General MUSTEKIS (through interpreter). Any effort had been paralyzed. It was impossible to conduct mobilization or communications.

MR. KERSTEN. With these military bases and occupation they had an absolute stranglehold on the entire nation of people, is that right?

General MUSTEKIS (through interpreter). Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. That is all. Thank you.

Mr. Klesment, will you identify yourself? Give us your full name.

STATEMENT OF JOHANNES KLESMENT, MEMBER, COMMITTEE FOR ESTONIA

MR. KLESMENT. Johannes Klesment.

MR. KERSTEN. Where do you live, now?

MR. KLESMENT. I am living, now, in Teaneck, N. J.

MR. KERSTEN. What is your present position?

MR. KLESMENT. I am a member of the Committee for Estonia.

MR. McTIGUE. What was your official capacity?

MR. KLESMENT. I was counselor of the Government. In this capacity I attended the cabinet meetings.

MR. McTIGUE. Were you such during the occupation by the Soviets?

MR. KLESMENT. I was at the time of independence, and I remained in my position during the occupation time, too, as the other officials did.

MR. McTIGUE. Can you speak up a little louder, please? Can you bring that mike up a little closer and speak a little more loudly? It is difficult for us to hear up here.

While the committee appreciates that you, in your capacity as counselor for the Estonian Government, took part in a great many of the negotiations which have been touched upon here today, such as the Mutual Assistance Pact, and other agreements, we would like to have you confine your testimony to what took place as far as the so-called free elections in Estonia were concerned. Later on during the course of these hearings, we hope to be able to go back and pick up your testimony on those other very vital points, but at the moment we would appreciate it if you would confine your testimony.

Now, will you please tell us, following the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet, what word concerning elections you received as counselor for the Government.

MR. KLESMENT. Estonia and the other Baltic countries were occupied by the Soviet on June 17. The Soviet Government absorbed the

country and said everything developed according to the constitution and other Estonian laws, to give the outside world the impression that the Estonian Government had decided to accept the Soviet system.

On June 19, at 8 o'clock, arrived in the capital of Estonia the Soviet special representative, Andrej Alesandrovich Zhdanov, in an armored car. He went to see President Constantin Pats and he dictated to him a list of new Cabinet members headed by Prime Minister Johannes Vares.

He said to the President that the Estonian constitution would remain in force and that the President of the Republic, Constantin Pats, was to appoint the government.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you speak up a little louder, please?

Mr. KLESMENT. A very interesting point to emphasize: All the action was done by Moscow so that they took place at the same day and the same hour in the three Baltic countries.

The President was compelled to appoint the Cabinet according to demands of Zhdanov. He himself remained on his post, and had to design all the acts proposed by this so-called puppet government. This puppet government, itself, had no independence at all, but he had to make all its decisions by order of the Soviet Legation, and Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, after having done the first job, Mr. Zhdanov went back to Moscow and he returned about July 1.

I remember it very well. On July 3 I was called by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Maksim Unt, the gentleman who has a very important position in the puppet government—he has been already a long time an underground member of the Communist Party—and he said to me—he told me that Zhdanov had ordered him to arrange new elections of Parliament; that the elections must be carried as soon as possible.

He asked me how it is possible to do it and so I answered that according to our laws, the election can take place after 35 days after the decision of the President.

He said that Zhdanov demands that the elections must be arranged much earlier and asked how to do it. I answered that it was impossible to do, because the Government and the President cannot change the provisions of the constitution and the electoral law, and it was only possible to call the Parliament and submit a new law to the Parliament.

He said it is impossible, because according to Zhdanov, the Parliament consists only of the enemies of the people, and Zhdanov will never agree to submit some law to this Parliament.

We discussed this question and he said:

You see, it is very difficult to speak with Russians, and they say all the time that all must be done according to the constitution and according to Estonian laws, but now they demand such things as are not possible to do according to law.

So Mr. Unt was called to the Soviet Legation and I went home. On the next day, he sent to me his assistant, Mr. Vihalem, and Mr. Vihalem has a little piece of paper in hand and he gave it to me. I remember it very well. There was written in the Russian language with green ink that the elections must take place on the 14th and 15th of July. It was after 10 days instead of 35 days, as it is demanded by law.

I discussed this matter with him. He himself was an assistant professor in the university. I asked how he thinks we can do it. He said there was nothing to be done.

I asked who had written on this paper with green ink in the Russian language. He did not know.

The next day the President was called from his summer residence, which is about 100 miles from Tallinn. He was called back to Tallinn to a meeting of the Cabinet.

According to our constitution, the President has the right to be in every meeting of the Cabinet and preside over them. He did it very often, but it was the first time he came to the meeting of this puppet government.

Then, Mr. Vares, the Prime Minister of the puppet government, said to the President, on the last evening that he was ordered by the Soviet special representative, Zhanov, that the new election of the Parliament will be arranged and that these elections will be carried out after 10 days.

He asked the President to make some changes in the election law. The President looked at me. I was a counselor of the Government. He looked at me and said, "Mr. Klesment, can I do it?"

I said, "Mr. President, it is impossible. The President cannot change the laws, the electoral law, because according to the Constitution, the electoral law is changed only by the Parliament, and by presidential decrees it cannot be changed."

He smiled again and looked at the Prime Minister and said, "Mr. Prime Minister, how can I do it? You hear what the counselor of the Government has said."

Well, Dr. Vares was very unhappy. He said he had told Mr. Zhadanov last evening it was impossible to arrange the elections so quickly. The President said to him it may be that Mr. Zhadanov is stubborn and he demands we arrange an election. We can do it according to laws. Later on, Mr. Vares proposed that the Government, itself, change the electoral law. Then the other members of the puppet government—one of them was a professor in the university, Professor Kruus, and he said a presidential decree cannot change the electoral law, and if he couldn't, how could we do it?

It took a little time and so the Government decided that the puppet government would change the electoral law simply by the Cabinet order. And so it was done. The President wrote a decision that he will have new elections and then the Cabinet, itself, knowing that it is quite contrary to the constitution, decided to make a Cabinet order and change the electoral law.

Mr. McTIGUE. So the electoral laws were changed, the constitution notwithstanding?

Mr. KLESMENT. I have not all the documents, but the constitution so reads.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you are looking that up, could we move along a little bit?

Mr. KLESMENT. I think we can submit all these documents later.

Mr. McTIGUE. The electoral laws were amended, the constitution notwithstanding?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes, that is quite right.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many political parties were in Estonia before the seizure?

Mr. KLESMENT. We had four main political parties. Perhaps three main political parties, the Socialist Party, the Central Party, and the Agricultural Party. The Central Party made a new common party of labor people and Christian Socialists and so on. There were three main political parties.

Mr. MADDEN. A little louder. We can't understand you.

Mr. KLESMENT. We had three main parties, the Socialist Party, the Agriculture Party, and the Central Party.

Mr. MCTIGUE. After the electoral laws were amended, what happened then? Were the slates drawn up for the campaign?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes. They meant to change the electoral law and there was a decision that the elections would take place after 10 days, it was on the 14th and 15th of July. The candidates had to be submitted during 4 days. Until the 9th of July.

The leaders of the political parties, I knew them very well, and they asked me, can they submit their candidates, too.

I asked, in a meeting of the Cabinet, "Can they do it?" Yes; they can.

All during this 4 days, all submitted them. We had 80 election districts. The Communists submitted theirs the next day. The other parties did the same. They agreed that there would be only one opposition candidate in all districts. On the 9th of July, or the last day to submit the candidates, there were candidates from the Communists, and one from every section from all our parties.

At 9 o'clock, at the same time and on the same day, on the 9th of July, the Cabinet met. I remember it very well. It was a nice summer day. I, myself, was outside the town. There were many difficulties. The secretary got all the members together, and at 9 o'clock the meeting met. I came a little later—maybe 10 minutes later—and the members of the Cabinet were already there, and Mr. Vares, the Prime Minister, handed me, again, a little list that was written in Russian in red ink. It was the list I had seen from the Minister of Internal Affairs. I asked him who had written that. It was written by the same man (same style) as I had seen some days ago from the Director of Internal Affairs. "Zhadanov, of course," answered Mr. Vares. I was asked to translate it into Estonian. I did it. We have these, here, and we can submit it. It said to prohibit the enemies of the people participating in the elections, all the candidates have to submit the next day at 2 o'clock their election platforms.

It was about 10 o'clock when the messenger of the Prime Minister sent this out and they all had to submit their election platform in 14 hours. The next day at 2 o'clock.

Most of them submitted their platforms, the candidates. They had to say what they intended to do in Parliament, what was their political program.

At the same time, the agents, the people from the Communist Party, are going to the candidates and asking them to withdraw their candidacy, and many did this, too, withdrew their candidacy. We have many people in the United States who themselves had been candidates and this psychological torture was used in this time and they withdrew their candidacy. But most of them submitted their platforms, too.

It was at 2 o'clock on the 10th of July. Already on the same day, about 8 or 9 o'clock, all the candidates were declared to be enemies

of the people. We have many members of the committees here in the United States who can testify as eyewitnesses on this. I only heard this.

It was announced that there would go to the elections only one candidate from every district and all the candidates of the opposition or nationalist parties were canceled.

Mr. McTIGUE. This committee about which you are talking threw out all the other candidates on the list and accepted only one list, the Communist Party list?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes, the Communist Party had only the right to be there.

Mr. McTIGUE. How much of the total vote, then, in this so-called free election, did the Communist Party candidates which, according to this legal process or alleged legal process that you have just explained, receive? What was the percentage of the total vote?

Mr. KLESMENT. It was about 82 percent, or more. It is not a high figure in Soviet elections, as we now know. These competitions usually go between 99.92 and 99.96.

Mr. McTIGUE. The only party was the Communist Party, and the only candidates were the Communist Party candidates?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. They received 86 percent of the total vote. Fourteen percent didn't vote?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes, I would say so. There was only one candidate.

All this time, from the beginning, from the 6th of July, there was made, according to Soviet pattern, a very active propaganda. As we know, the Soviet propaganda is not the usual propaganda of democratic states. They say, "He who is not with us is against us."

In the Soviet system, to be contrary to the power, it is a very dangerous thing. The psychological torture was very active.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think we have the understanding from your statements here that although there were a number of other parties and the vast majority of the people belonged to anti- or non-Communist parties, it was only the Communist slate that was finally submitted, and the people had no opportunity to vote any other way, and that these elections—Would you say they were free or not free?

Mr. KLESMENT. They were not free.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you present at the meeting of the Parliament where the Parliament took action on the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes, I attended the meeting.

Mr. KERSTEN. State whether or not there were any Soviet troops or military there.

Mr. KLESMENT. Oh, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Right in the Parliament?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes, around the Parliament, on the streets, and in the rooms of the Parliament.

Mr. KERSTEN. While the voting was going on?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. While the debates and discussion were taking place?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes, all the time.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you state whether or not they were armed?

Mr. KLESMENT. With arms, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Armed with what?

Mr. KLESMENT. With guns.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many Soviet troops were right in the Parliament when this was going on?

Mr. KLESMENT. The Parliament building is on the hill. There were Soviet tanks and so on in front of the Parliament and in the rooms of Parliament. I cannot say exactly, but I would say 100 men, by all means, with guns and all. All the corridors are full of the Soviet armed soldiers, and on the stairways and all through the rooms.

Mr. KERSTEN. What day of the month, do you recall?

Mr. KLESMENT. It was Sunday, during the first of July.

Mr. KERSTEN. What year?

Mr. KLESMENT. 1940.

Mr. KERSTEN. This was when the so-called incorporation took place?

Mr. KLESMENT. Yes, this was the so-called incorporation.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you know these troops were Soviet troops?

Mr. KLESMENT. We knew they were Russian. They had the uniforms and so on. By all means, there have never been Estonian troops in our Parliament. They are never allowed to come into Parliament in uniform.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean in free Estonia?

Mr. KLESMENT. In free Estonia, yes.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, from your testimony, you say that the Russian Soviet Government through troops and fear and other ways, came into Estonia and took over the Government, against the will of the Estonian people?

Mr. KLESMENT. That is quite right.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

And the elections were not true elections, representing the will of the people, but elections that were forced upon the Estonian people by the Russian Communist Government?

Mr. KLESMENT. You are quite right, sir.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will now be adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:45 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Tuesday, December 1, 1953.)

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIMORE COMMITTEE,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:25 a. m., in room 346, House Office Building, Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Busbey, Bonin, Madden, Machrowicz, and Dodd.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. McTigue, you have a witness?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. At this juncture, I would like to play a recording of certain excerpts made in a speech by Mr. Vishinsky, December 4, 1952, at the 341st meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, seventh session.

We have the record, here. It bears on the testimony and the evidence which we will submit hereafter.

Mr. Lielnors of the Voice of America is here. Will you please come forward, sir?

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, Mr. McTigue, you propose to put on here a witness who recorded a speech of Vishinsky; is that correct?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct. I would like to have him identify it.

Mr. KERSTEN. This speech was made last December?

Mr. McTIGUE. Last December.

Mr. KERSTEN. This speech is in Russian, is it?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes. After we hear the recording, we will get the Russian text and the English translation.

Mr. KERSTEN. You don't propose to play through the whole speech, but just a short sample?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes; just a short sample, bearing on the Baltic States.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you will submit the English translation?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Lielnors? Do you solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF HARRY W. LIELNORS, VOICE OF AMERICA

Mr. LIELNORS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you identify yourself, please?

Mr. LIELNORS. I am Harry W. Lielnors.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you a record with you which purports to be a record or a tape recording which was made of a speech made by Mr. Vishinsky on December 4, 1952, at the United Nations?

Mr. LIELNORS. I have such a record, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is this the record which is before you on the desk, at the moment?

Mr. LIELNORS. It is that record, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you please proceed to identify this record?

Mr. KERSTEN. Counsel, may I ask a few questions? When was this recording made?

Mr. LIELNORS. This recording was made during the time Mr. Vishinsky spoke.

Mr. KERSTEN. What date?

Mr. LIELNORS. December 4, 1952.

Mr. KERSTEN. At that time, what was your position?

Mr. LIELNORS. I was Acting Chief of the Latvian Service and the Acting Chief of the North Europe Branch of the Voice of America.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were in a position to make a recording of the speech made in the United Nations at that time, were you?

Mr. LIELNORS. The technical staff of the Voice of America were asked by me to make a recording of Vishinsky's speech.

Mr. KERSTEN. You had the authority to make that request, did you?

Mr. LIELNORS. I asked for it, and the technical staff made that recording.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have the authority to make the request?

Mr. LIELNORS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was the speech made by Mr. Vishinsky on that day?

Mr. LIELNORS. Yes. It was a speech made by Mr. Vishinsky on that day.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state whether or not you made a recording of it?

Mr. LIELNORS. Our technical staff made a recording of that speech.

Mr. KERSTEN. Under your direction?

Mr. LIELNORS. Under my direction.

Mr. KERSTEN. And is this record that you have before us now "the" recording of Mr. Vishinsky's speech?

Mr. LIELNORS. It is a part of the recording made by our technical staff.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, you have a recording of a part of Mr. Vishinsky's speech made on that day?

Mr. LIELNORS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that recording is a true and correct recording of Vishinsky's speech, is that right?

Mr. LIELNORS. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, Mr. Lielnors, please, with the playing of the record?

(At this point, the witness proceeded to play a phonograph record.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Lielnors, I believe that will be enough.

Mr. Lielnors, the record we have just been hearing, as you have stated, is a true and correct recording of Andrei Vishinsky's speech made in the United Nations last December, is that right?

Mr. LIELNORS. It is, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. There is a further recording, the balance of which you didn't play, but you played enough to give us an idea, is that correct?

Mr. LIELNORS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, do you have a Russian text of the full speech of Vishinsky's made on that occasion?

Mr. LIELNORS. I have a Russian text of part of the speech.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the part of the text that you have, is that covered by the recording that you played?

Mr. LIELNORS. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was a true and correct translation of this Russian text, a portion of Vishinsky's speech, made?

Mr. LIELNORS. It was, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have in your hand a yellow group of papers; what is that?

Mr. LIELNORS. That is the Russian text, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. Of Vishinsky's speech?

Mr. LIELNORS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you have the translation there of it?

Mr. LIELNORS. I have the translation here, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is the translation that you have a true and correct translation of the Russian speech which in turn was played in part by the recording, is that correct?

Mr. LIELNORS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you give us the English translation of that portion of Vishinsky's speech that was made last December in the United Nations?

Mr. LIELNORS. Shall I read it to you, sir?

Mr. KERSTEN. If you will, please.

First, this was in New York, was it not?

Mr. LIELNORS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Give us the exact date.

Mr. LIELNORS. December 4, 1952.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where, in the United Nations, was it given?

Mr. LIELNORS. At the Sixth Committee.

Mr. KERSTEN. Proceed.

Mr. LIELNORS (reading):

It is also necessary to recall that at that time, that is in those years about which I have just spoken, the so-called Baltic Entente, which was transformed into a military alliance with specific aims, was engaged, behind the back of the U. S. S. R., in hostile activities against the Soviet state.

Numerous facts of that time show that the then rulers of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia tried to destroy these treaties, which aroused great dissatisfaction with such politics among the masses of these Republics and caused these circles to lose the confidence of their own people. This was clearly shown in the democratic elections to the Latvian and Lithuanian Diet and to the Estonian Parliament in July 1940. Those who, on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage were elected to the Latvian and Lithuanian Diets and the Estonian Parliament, expressed their unanimous opinion on basic political questions. An the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania expressed their sovereign will by a unanimous opinion in favor of setting up the Soviet form of government in these Republics, and for the inclusion of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The representatives of the United States of America, of England, and of some other delegations, deliberately kept silent about it, in the same way as they kept silent about another very important fact—that as far back as September and October 1939, the Soviet Union had signed mutual aid pacts with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These pacts provided for obligations under which the

Soviet Union and the aforementioned Republics equally pledged themselves to give each other every possible assistance, including military aid, in case of a direct attack or danger of a direct attack by any great European power; they pledged themselves to protect the state boundaries of these Republics and the sovereignty and inviolability of these states. In their speeches the gentlemen of the Anglo-American camp have tried to ignore or to hide these facts; they thus juggled with facts and events, making an attempt to present the case in such a way as to show that allegedly the national rights and interests of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were violated; while actually these pacts and fulfillment by the Soviet Union of the obligations deriving from them prevented the transformation of these countries into a colony of Hitler Germany, with no rights of its own.

The gentlemen of the Anglo-American bloc have likewise concealed everything that has happened within the last 12 years and which is the result of the just national policy based upon the principles of Lenin and Stalin. The consistent application of this noble policy explains those wonderful achievements which became characteristic of the Soviet Baltic Republics after they had established a Soviet regime.

We were asked here what happened since the year 1933 to the Baltic Republics. It is easy to reply to this question. If one compares—said the Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, at the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party—if one compares the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Republics with Norway, Holland, and Belgium, one will see that in the Soviet Republics the tempo of the industrial growth is incomparably quicker than in the aforementioned capitalist countries of Europe. From the beginning of 1952, the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic surpassed the prewar level of industrial production by 2.4 times, the Latvian Republic by 3.6, the Estonian by 4.1, while Norway, Holland, and Belgium by that time surpassed the prewar level of industrial production only by a very small margin, even though the economy of the Soviet Republics had suffered considerably greater losses as a result of the war.

That is the end of this particular record.

Mr. KERSTEN. In this speech reference is made, is it not, to the Soviet-claimed free and democratic elections in these Baltic nations, resulting in the sovietization of the three Baltic nations? That is one point Vishinsky makes in his speech, isn't it?

Mr. LIELNORS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Another point is that Vishinsky at that time compared the Baltic nations with Norway, Holland, and Belgium, and used as his authority to prove that these Baltic nations had increased their economy and became better, his authority was none other than Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria; that is true, is it not?

Mr. LIELNORS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. And he has since fled the Soviet regime?

Mr. LIELNORS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was purged, rather?

Mr. LIELNORS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is all, Mr. Lielnors.

Mr. LIELNORS. Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. Our next witness will be Mr. Alfreds Berzins.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Berzins, raise your right hand, please.

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF ALFREDS BERZINS, LATVIAN MINISTER OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS FROM 1934 TO 1940

Mr. BERZINS. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify yourself, please, Mr. Berzins?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. My name is Alfreds Berzins. I was born in Latvia, October 31, 1899. I was an officer in the liberation group. I was elected to the Latvian Parliament from 1934 to the Communist occupation of June 17. I was Minister in Latvia for Public and Social Affairs.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are you hard of hearing, Mr. Berzins? Do you have some difficulty with your hearing?

Mr. BERZINS. I have a little difficulty with my left ear.

Mr. KERSTEN. How did that happen?

Mr. BERZINS. It was bitten in the German concentration camp by Nazis.

Mr. KERSTEN. You spent some time in a Nazi concentration camp?

Mr. BERZINS. I spent 34 months in Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

Mr. McTIGUE. What position did you occupy in the last legitimate Latvian Cabinet?

Mr. BERZINS. I was Minister for Public and Social Affairs.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you occupy that position?

Mr. BERZINS. From 1934 to the time the Communists came in in Latvia, in 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Latvia at the time the ultimatum was issued by the Soviet to the Latvian Cabinet?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes, I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something about that, please?

Mr. BERZINS. This I can tell you.

You listened to the speech of Mr. Vishinsky's which was made in the United Nations. Vishinsky told to all the world that the Latvian people were willing to go into the Soviet Union. I can answer, here, that it is lies, that the nation was never willing to go freely into the Soviet Union as one subjugated people.

The Latvian people have fought for liberation over 100 years. Our freedom was achieved with blood, in wars. Mr. Vishinsky lies. We can qualify Vishinsky as the greatest murderer of the Latvian nation.

The truth is otherwise. On the 3d of October, the Latvians were pressed to sign a mutual assistance pact in Latvia. After this mutual assistance pact, the Russians had about 20,000 Red army and navy personnel in Latvian territory.

This was proposed to our Foreign Minister by Stalin, himself: That the mutual assistance pact means nothing, that Latvia could give some part of her independence.

After 8 months, the Soviet Union accused Latvia, and Molotov handed an ultimatum to our Minister or our Ambassador in Moscow. The history of this ultimatum was such that from the 9th to the 15th of June, the Red army attacked our border guards, on our east border. They killed two border guards, one woman, and one child. Other people were kidnaped and brought over the border to the Soviet Union.

On the 16th of June 1940, we held our festival in the east of Latvia, a song festival.

Mr. McTIGUE. That song festival is a great national event in Latvia; is it not?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. It is a gathering where approximately 100,000 people assembled for the singing of songs? It is a national holiday?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct. It was a national holiday.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was on the 16th day of June, and you were there?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. It was a song festival held each year. The fifth year had the same festival, and then they had one this year.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were there instead of the President?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. The President liked to go for openings of the song festival, but after the action of the Red army of our border guards, he could not leave Riga, and he sent me to replace him in this song-festival opening.

I went there the 15th of June, 1 day before the opening of the song festival. I was in telephone connection with Riga, at the residence of our President of State.

At the 15th of June, in the night, from the 15th to the 16th, it was a quiet day.

I might go a little back, before I left Riga, we had information that the Lithuanian President of State had left Lithuania and was going in exile. I met President Ulmanis for the last time and I begged him too, to go out of the country and save his life from Communists, because it was clear that when the 15th came, the Red army occupied Lithuania and that the same would happen to Latvia and Estonia, too. It came true.

Ulmanis refused to leave the country, and the answer was that I was with my people all the days, the happy and unhappy days. He said he would not leave his people in the most dangerous hour which would come.

Mr. KERSTEN. You, a few moments ago, stated that with regard to this recorded speech of Vishinsky, that Vishinsky participated in the murder of freedom in Latvia.

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you know as a matter of fact whether or not Vishinsky personally was involved in the takeover of Latvia?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you were going to tell us about it.

Mr. BERZINS. That is right; I will tell about it.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go right ahead. Pardon the interruption.

Mr. BERZINS. Come the 16th of June, I was in Daugavpils, and before noon there was no news from Moscow and there were some dangerous events. There was one moment, approximately about 12 o'clock, that when it was proposed that our President come to Daugavpils at 12 o'clock, as the President told me later in a telephone speech. The Foreign Ministry received a telegram from Moscow, from our Ambassador. In this telegram it was said that in short time to follow would be one very important telegram. This telegram came at 2 o'clock, June 16, 1940. It was the Soviet Russia ultimatum which was handed from Molotov to our Ambassador in Moscow.

Shortly before the starting of the song festivals, President Ulmanis telephoned me once more and told me that this ultimatum was the same as that of 2 days before in Lithuania, and he said Latvian freedom was finished. He told me not to lose my nerve, because in this song festival were together approximately 100,000 people, and if they had knowledge that Soviet Russia would occupy Latvia, naturally it would breed panic in this great mass of people.

At 5 o'clock was the opening of the song festival and I could tell to these people not all truths. I said that we were living in a very dangerous time, because war is in the world, and we don't know what can happen tomorrow. It might be tomorrow will be a very bad scene in Latvia, and that the people, we hoped, would be as patriotic as they had for the past 20 years in free Latvia.

We opened by singing our national anthem. The people had no knowledge about the ultimatum, but the feeling was that there would be coming some very bad days. The people coming to the song festival from our Russian border could tell that close to the border were stationed very strong Russia Red army units, tanks, guns, motorized infantry, and so on.

The people did not understand that it was merely some demonstration, but that in a short time the Red army masses would cross our east border.

At 6 o'clock on the same day, on the 16th of June 1940, there was a meeting of the Cabinet members in Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you there?

Mr. BERZINS. No, I was not there. I was at this time in Daugavpils, Mr. Chairman.

In this meeting was adopted the Soviet ultimatum, because we could not resist with our small forces.

They have regularly, in our army each year, drafted from 13,000 to 15,000 youths for service for 12 months. We have officers in our regular army and the lowest commissions, 2,500 to 3,000.

Mr. KERSTEN. How large was Latvia?

Mr. BERZINS. About 2,800,000 inhabitants.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go ahead.

Mr. BERZINS. In this small army we have not enough ammunition; we have rounds for guns for about 6 or 7 days of fighting. On the 15th of June the Red Army invaded the country. The Red Army blockaded our Baltic seaports. The ships we had on the Baltic Sea were sent by the Red Navy back to our ports.

So, on the 16th of June we were cut from the whole free world. Naturally, we could not resist with our very small forces the Soviet Red Army masses.

On the 17th of June, shortly after 7 o'clock, my train from Daugavpils came to Riga. I visited President Ulmanis and reported what happened in Daugavpils in the song festival.

At 10 o'clock the same day was an emergency meeting of our cabinet ministers. This meeting was not long. President Ulmanis asked of all members who were with me in Daugavpils—he told about the ultimatum once more. All the cabinet members agreed we could not resist because it would mean to destroy our country and it would mean the deportation of our soldiers who would be war prisoners in Soviet hands.

On the 17th of June, between 1 and 2 o'clock, the first Red Army troops arrived in Riga. The first troops were coming from Lithuania. The Red Army troops, without our knowledge and without asking, immediately occupied the Riga radio, telephone, and telegraph stations. We were kept from communication with the West in all ways. We could not use the radio, telegraph, telegrams, and telephone.

It was approximately 2 o'clock on the 17th of June, 1940, when I went to Soviet Ambassador——

Mr. KERSTEN. Pardon me. You mentioned before that there had been a meeting of the cabinet, of 11 members?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes, there were 11 members in the cabinet.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you a member of the cabinet?

Mr. BERZINS. I was a member of the cabinet.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was your position?

Mr. BERZINS. I was Minister for Public and Social Affairs and Acting Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister left our country.

Mr. KERSTEN. Of those 11 ministers, how many, if you know, are still alive?

Mr. BERZINS. I am the only one.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were just telling about a phone call to the Soviet Ambassador. Tell us about that.

Mr. BERZINS. I called the Soviet Ambassador Derevianski and asked him if we could understand why the Red Army had occupied our communications system.

He excused himself and said there was some bad misunderstanding and told me that the army is not made up of the politicians and sometimes they go their own way. He said he would clear the question and after a short time call me back.

Mr. KERSTEN. This is the Soviet Ambassador telling you this?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes, the Soviet Ambassador.

I did not get called back, but after an hour or so I called Derevianski a second time and I got the answer the he is very sorry, but we cannot broadcast anything without music, that the Red Army was still staying and would not leave our radio.

We started at 3 o'clock with music, and no speeches or other text could be read.

Shortly after 3 o'clock started a second meeting of our cabinet. At the same time in the Riga station was a square. On one side was the police headquarters and on the other side was the Riga railroad station.

Mr. KERSTEN. You said all information was cut off, except music over the radio, is that right?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, had the Communists succeeded in cutting off all communications in the country at that time?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes, outside Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. That was on the outside. On the inside, as I understand it, all you could play over your radio was music?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. Only in Riga, and the telephone in Riga was not kept up.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were telling us about the public square.

Mr. BERZINS. We received before information from our secret police, from the Soviet Ambassador, that there is an organized mob on this square for the greeting of the Red Army.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you mean the Soviet Embassy in your country was organizing a mob?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. Tell us about that.

Mr. BERZINS. Organizing a mob for the greeting of the Red Army on this place. It was a Communist-organized mob. Naturally, more hundreds of people were coming to see what happened, so there was a crowd at this place. They attacked our policemen with knives and stones. Some 4 or 5 were wounded. As the police were going to destroy this mob, the Red Army asked to do it.

Then came a telephone call from the Soviet Ambassador. We were told we were using force against the people who were coming to greet the Red Army, and that that is an unfriendly act from our government.

So, from one side the Red Army asked to destroy the mob, and the Soviet Ambassador protested against this action.

It was from approximately 3 to 7 o'clock, this mob on the square, and afterward by the police the mob was thrown out from the square and Riga; at 7 o'clock, on the 17th of June was all quiet.

The same day I got a telephone call—I had one direct line with President Ulmanis—I get on this direct line a call, before 11 o'clock, on the 17th of June, and President Ulmanis told me that Vishinsky was coming to Riga, that he had called him by telephone from the Soviet Embassy, and shortly after 10 o'clock, he came for a short visit.

Mr. McTIGUE. Vishinsky was coming to see President Ulmanis?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; and told the President that he was a special envoy from the Soviet Government to carry out creation of a new government and other events connected with the Soviet ultimatum.

Mr. KERSTEN. On what date did Vishinsky come to Latvia?

Mr. BERZINS. It was the 17th of June. It was at night on the same day the Red Army came to Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. He went to the President's castle, is that right?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Proceed.

Mr. BERZINS. On the 18th of June, our Foreign Minister wanted to meet Mr. Vishinsky and called the Soviet Ambassador for a lunch. He got the answer that Vishinsky was sick from making the long trip and he could not leave the Soviet Embassy.

We received information from the police that at the same time some Latvians were going and coming at the Soviet Embassy. At this time Vishinsky and his aid, Vieteroff—Vieteroff was the second Soviet in Riga.

There was one old Communist in Latvia——

Mr. McTIGUE. He was an official in the NKVD?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; he was such an official, but his official title was secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. So, operating under the guise of a diplomat, he was really an NKVD head, to operate and organize the Communist underground in Latvia; is that correct?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. Using the Embassy as an espionage nest, to help take over Latvia?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. And during the time, as I understand it, that Vishinsky was there at the embassy, telling your people that he was indisposed, there were certain Latvians who were going to the embassy and seeing somebody in there?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. Some Latvians were chosen as members of the people's government. They were called to the Soviet Embassy.

I could mention that Vieteroff is now Soviet Ambassador in Denmark.

Mr. KERSTEN. The same man who helped take over Latvia is now the Soviet Ambassador in Denmark?

Mr. BERZINS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was an NKVD man?

Mr. BERZINS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. On the 18th of June, nothing else happened?

Mr. BERZINS. Nothing else happened. It was quiet in Riga and all over the country. On the 19th, that was Wednesday, before 11 o'clock there came to the castle in Riga, to see our President Ulmanis, Vishinsky. He brought a list of names which was from Vishinsky, appointed as ministers in the new Latvian Government.

I might stress the point, Latvia was, as Vishinsky said at this time, an "independent" country, and Vishinsky, an officer from a foreign government, had presented a list of Cabinet members in Latvia and as Vishinsky presented the President with the names, he could not read the names.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was Vishinsky's official title in the Soviet Government at that time; do you know?

Mr. BERZINS. He was Vice President at this time.

Mr. KERSTEN. In the Soviet Cabinet?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were telling about Vishinsky having a list of names that he had prepared, handing this list to your President.

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. The list of names of the people who should be in the new Latvian Government?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct. Ulmanis asked for Vishinsky, could he possibly make some corrections or suggest other names in this list of ministers. Vishinsky excused himself and told our President that it would be impossible because he has an agreement with all these people from Moscow.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, these were the Moscow-approved members of the new Latvian Government?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct. It was the answer of Vishinsky that Moscow had approved all the names of the ministers for the new Cabinet, and he did not believe that Moscow would make any changes, that Ulmanis could not reject any of them.

Mr. Ulmanis told Mr. Vishinsky, "Mr. Vishinsky, I don't understand. Am I from this moment a prisoner of yours and a prisoner of Moscow, and I must obey what you order me to do?"

It was a great surprise for us all that in this Cabinet were only two known Communists, the Minister of the Interior, Lacis, and the Chief of Secret Police, Latkovsky.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you know how many names were on this list?

Mr. BERZINS. It was not the full 11.

There were on this list such names: Prime Minister Kirchensteins; Minister of Defense Dambitis; Minister of Interior Lacis; Minister for Public Affairs Blaus; Minister for Education Lacis; Minister of Justice Paberzs; Minister of Communications Jagars; and Deputy Minister of Interior Latkovsky.

There were eight names.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, eight members would be the head of the new Government?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. Vishinsky could not get so many traitors in 1 day who wanted to be Ministers in Vishinsky's puppet government.

Mr. KERSTEN. So the known Communists were the Minister of Interior and the head of the Secret Police?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. They were so-called "fellow travelers" who were not Communists. There were some intellectuals, some journalists, one was a professor, some writers, and so on. They were not politicians.

Mr. KERSTEN. How about the head of the new Government? Who was he?

Mr. BERZINS. The head of the new Government was Professor Kirchensteins.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who was he? What was his first name?

Mr. BERZINS. August.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who was he?

Mr. BERZINS. He was a professor, and was a known guest of the Soviet Ambassador.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was a professor where?

Mr. BERZINS. Biology.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Mr. BERZINS. In Riga, in the Latvian University.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did you know about his background, this new Soviet-sponsored head of the new Government?

Mr. BERZINS. He was chairman of the Friendship Society between Latvia and the Soviet Union. It was one organization. The Soviets liked to organize such an organization as being one place where could come together intellectuals, and it was in this association they were educated as Communists.

So he was head of this Friendship Association. He was very often a guest in the Soviet Embassy.

Myself, in my official capacity, I saw the Soviet Ambassador, too. I told Kirchensteins that he was feeling himself like in his own home in the Soviet Embassy. I saw he was going in the kitchen and brought caviar and champagne, and so on.

It was natural that he was once long before chosen by the Soviet Embassy, by Vieteroff, as one man who could be serving in this puppet government.

Mr. KERSTEN. Had he been a professor at the university for some time?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. He was a long time a professor in the university.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go ahead.

Mr. BERZINS. On the same day, at 3 o'clock, the 19th of June, was the last meeting of the Latvian Government. It was a short one. President Ulmanis came to us, the members of the Cabinet, and we all knew that when we left the room that we would never meet again.

I was asked by my colleagues to make a short sentence to President Ulmanis. As I started to speak it was the only time in this tragic

period that the President lost his nerve. He covered his eyes with his hands and said, "Well, I know what you would like to say, but we cannot afford to be weak because the days ahead will be tragic days. We must bring up all our mental and physical forces to stand these days which are still coming, the occupation by the Red army."

On Wednesday the 19th, I went back to my office. On Wednesday nothing else important happened.

On Thursday, June 20, at 10 o'clock, the Vishinsky puppet government took over all the power in our country. In my ministry came the man to succeed me, Blaus, and this man I know well because he was my room mate in military school in 1920.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mentioned something about a demonstration in the public square. What date was that?

Mr. BERZINS. It was afternoon, the 17th of June.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was there another occasion when some people were brought out from jail?

Mr. BERZINS. It was the 21st of June, Friday, 2 days later.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go ahead.

Mr. BERZINS. Blaus was pale and tired when he came in. I said, "What happened to you; you're pale, today. Were you drinking all night?"

He said, "No, I was working very hard all night. I translated the speeches which will be given today, Kirchensteins, himself, and War Minister Dambitis."

The speeches were made in the Soviet Embassy by Vishinsky and Vieteroff. He could translate these speeches, and if any sentence wasn't right, he was to change it.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, Vishinsky had written some speeches in Russian, I assume, which he had to translate, and these speeches were to be given by the members of the new puppet government?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. This was Vishinsky speaking through his puppet?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; it was Vishinsky speaking through these puppet people.

Mr. McTIGUE. And the new minister stayed up practically all night long translating from the Russian into Latvian the speeches that were to be given the next day at the Parliament session, so that they could give it in Latvian?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. I asked whether Latvia was to be independent. He said yes, but he said, "We don't make one step without asking Mr. Vishinsky in the Soviet Embassy."

The new government was under the strongest control of Andrei Vishinsky. At the same time, at 10 o'clock, on the 20th of June, General Bolsteins shot himself to death. He was head of our Border Guard organization, and was head of the Latvian Liberation organization. He was the first victim of the Soviet invasion in Latvia. He wrote three letters, my friends later told me, which were sent to men under him in his staff. One letter was for his officers, one was to his old mother, and a third was to his superiors. He did not mention the new minister.

In this letter, he said that he was fighting for free Latvia, and worked for free Latvia and "I will not live in a Latvia enslaved by Communists."

In 2 or 3 days, the Riga papers, which were under control from the first days, spoke not one word about this tragic death.

On the third or fourth day, approximately, there was a short notice that Bolstein had died of a heart attack. Vishinsky started his lies from the first minute he came in. Each day the lies were repeated by this man.

This same day I was in the castle once more to say goodbye to President Ulmanis, and met in the lobby the new President, Kirchensteins. Kirchensteins was very busy and I exchanged only some words with him.

When the Communists were trying to organize manifestations on the same day, the 20th of June, so-called Thanksgiving demonstrations from Riga people to Vishinsky, to cheer him and the new government, they tried that, but the workers did not leave their workshops so they could not start, and the demonstrations were not organized on the 20th of June.

On the 21st were released some Communists and criminals from Riga jail.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just a minute, please.

At this point, sir, would you like to step aside? We would like to identify some photographs. After you do that, we will call you back again.

(The witness was temporarily excused.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Will Mr. Jekste step forward, please?

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JEKSTE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ALBERTS JEKSTE, FORMER HEAD OF RIGA FILMS

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state your full name?

Mr. JEKSTE. Alberts Jekste.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where is your present home?

Mr. JEKSTE. My present home is Latvia. Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is your home? And how long has it been since you have been there?

Mr. JEKSTE. I was born in——

Mr. KERSTEN (interposing). How long has it been since you have been in Latvia?

Mr. JEKSTE. I was the last time in Latvia, in 1945, April 19.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where do you now live?

Mr. JEKSTE. I live in Baltimore, Md.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been in Baltimore?

Mr. JEKSTE. In Baltimore, from February 1952.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were you before that time?

Mr. JEKSTE. Before this time I was like a DP, in Germany.

Mr. KERSTEN. When you were in Latvia last, what was your business there?

Mr. JEKSTE. My last business was a cameraman.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you mean movie camera?

Mr. JEKSTE. Movie camera.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you belong to some organization or company?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes. Before I was a director in the film company, and since 1928 I organized in Latvia the film and photographic and optical industries.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in Riga, Latvia, in the months of June and July 1940?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you take some moving pictures at that time?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you just step forward, here?

I show you, Mr. Jekste, a series of photographs, commencing with one marked 6-A, and they will be marked 6-A through 6-ZZ.

(The 30 photographs referred to were marked "Exhibits 6-A through 6-Z, 6AA through 6CC, and 6-ZZ." See pp. 541-558.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you recognize these photographs?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were these photographs taken from some movies that you took?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes. These I not alone took, but these were taken under my direction by 10 other people.

Mr. KERSTEN. So these 30 photographs that I show you now are from a movie taken under your direction?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And was this movie taken in the month of June 1940, in Riga?

Mr. JEKSTE. In Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. I will show you 6-A, and ask you if you recognize that?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes. That is when the Russian hordes were coming into Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, this is an actual photograph of the Russian Army coming into Riga in the month of June?

Mr. JEKSTE. The 17th of June.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have heard the testimony of Mr. Berzins here, is that correct?

Mr. JEKSTE. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the events that he is talking about, are they the same events that these pictures portray?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you one picture here in the series, and I think it is the fourth one, 6-D, a picture of a mob scene. Is that correct?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes. This picture of the mob scene is not taken by movie camera. This is taken by film.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is this the mob described by the witness, organized through the Soviet Embassy in Riga?

Mr. JEKSTE. The Embassy and fifth column.

Mr. KERSTEN. By the Communist fifth column?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, I show you 6-F.

Mr. JEKSTE. This picture is one of the state jail.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, it would appear to be a picture of men dressed in prisoners' uniforms?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You heard the testimony of the witness, saying that prisoners were taken from the jails, common criminals?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is this a picture of that same event?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Of the criminals coming from the jails when the Communists took over?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you the next picture 6-G.

Mr. JEKSTE. This is Vishinsky speaking from the balcony of the Embassy in Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. He is being cheered?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes. In this speech, which I can remember, he said that the people of the fifth column are crying in the streets for a real election for Russia, that, Vishinsky replied, Latvia will stay for all time free.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was this picture of Vishinsky from the balcony taken on the same day of the pictures of the criminals released from the jail?

Mr. JEKSTE. I think so, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the mob in the square?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes. Here you can see standing the mob.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you number 6-H in the series. Can you identify that?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes. This picture was taken on the third day of July, 1941.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is this picture that I now show you?

Mr. JEKSTE. This is the criminal photograph.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, this is a police picture of a criminal?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes, a criminal with 2 years and 1 month in the jail. Later, he was an official in the city government.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was he in jail for?

Mr. JEKSTE. He was a thief.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you exhibit 6-I, and ask you if you know what that is?

Mr. JEKSTE. This is another criminal who was 6 years in jail. He was a bandit, a robber. Later, he was made chief of police in the second largest city of Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you exhibit 6-J. What is this?

Mr. JEKSTE. This man was in for 3 years and 6 months. He was later the chief of foreign review in Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was his crime?

Mr. JEKSTE. It is also thief and robber, and he served around 3 years and 6 months.

Mr. KERSTEN. The last 3 exhibits, 6-H, 6-I, and 6-J, were all taken from the police files?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes, from the police files, in July 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. In order to clear the record, these criminals were later appointed by the Communists, to various high positions in government, such as chief of police?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes, appointed by the puppet government.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you exhibit 6-K, and ask if you know what that is.

Mr. JEKSTE. This picture we got from the Russian archives. This is the moment in which Kirchensteins is speaking in the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, and asks for the election of Latvia into the Soviet Union.

Mr. KERSTEN. This picture of the Latvian Public President, speaking in Moscow, also seems to be a picture of Mr. Molotov and other Soviet officials; is that correct?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. In looking at all of these pictures, can you identify all of them as having been taken from the movie, the taking of which movie you supervised?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And are true and correct portrayals of events they purport to show?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Taken for the most part—as they indicate—that most of the pictures are pictures taken in Riga, Latvia?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Others are taken in Moscow, all in connection with these same Latvian events?

Mr. JEKSTE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is all.

All right, Mr. Berzins.

(The Jekste exhibit will be found on pp. 541-558.)

TESTIMONY OF ALFREDS BERZINS—Resumed

Mr. MCTIGUE. We were at a point in your testimony where you were talking about your return from President Ulmanis' castle during the course of which you had seen these demonstrations and witnessed release of criminals.

We have now identified certain of the scenes which you refer to in your testimony. Will you pick your testimony up from that point?

Mr. BERZINS. On the 21st of June was organized demonstrations and there was released some Communist criminals in Riga's jail. Factory owners were told that they would be responsible if the workers did not leave the factories and participate in this demonstration. The Communists organized the Riga people for these demonstrations.

The criminals from the Riga jail were going to cheer the chief, Vishinsky. So the first march from the prison was to Andrei Vishinsky to Soviet Embassy of these criminals. One group of these criminals some days later received high positions, especially among the police in Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you know of some of these common criminals who were released from the jails, who were appointed to positions in the police department?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Can you give us the names of some of them?

Mr. BERZINS. One I remember was Celmins.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was he in jail for? Do you know?

Mr. BERZINS. He was sentenced most frequently as a thief.

Mr. KERSTEN. What kind of position in the Communist government did he get?

Mr. BERZINS. He received a high position in the police.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Mr. BERZINS. So far as I remember, he was in Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. A part of the city of Riga?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you know what part?

Mr. BERZINS. One of the thieves was in the second district.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was Gutmanis convicted for?

Mr. BERZINS. He was convicted as a thief, too.

He was put in jail for 3 years. He was in the second district in Riga. The second district in Riga was the more important, because in this district was located all Government buildings.

Mr. KERSTEN. So that the head of the police in the second district, which included all of the Government buildings, was a criminal, a common thief who had been released from this jail by Vishinsky, and put in this position of power over this area?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Vishinsky made a speech to this mob of criminals who were coming to cheer him as "liberator." At this time I was in my home and listened by radio to this speech. During this speech there was some yell by the people. "Long live Soviet Latvia in the Soviet Union."

Vishinsky spoke in the Russian language and he said to someone on the balcony, "The hooligans are drunk."

Mr. KERSTEN. You were listening to Vishinsky's speech, and somebody in the background made this remark about "Long live Soviet Latvia," and Vishinsky then said something in Russian?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. He said, "The hooligans are drunk."

In all this thing which was organized by Vishinsky in the first days were all the speeches that Latvia would be independent, and all this incorporation came some days later.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, Vishinsky didn't want to let the cat out of the bag at that point, that Latvia was being conquered by the Communists?

Mr. McTIGUE. He hadn't meant to be heard by the radio audience? He whispered to one of his aides in a loud voice, "Drunken hooligans"?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct. His speech, Vishinky, finished in the Latvian language. All the speech was in Russian, but the last sentence was in Latvian, and this was, "Long live independent Latvia and friendship between independent Latvia and the Soviet Union."

This liar Vishinsky, knows very well when he came from Moscow to Riga that he was sent from this Kremlin gang to oppress the Latvian people. But he used other words, later, to the effect that Latvia would be and would stay an independent country. So, I have all the rights to call publicly Mr. Vishinsky the greatest liar.

Demonstrations from the Soviet Embassy moved to Kirchensteins and afterward, from Kirchensteins to Rigan Castle, and there were demonstrations against President Karlis Ulmanis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us about your parting with President Ulmanis, when you went into the forest of Latvia?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes, I will tell you.

In the river was a Russian warship. The guns were pointed at the castle.

Mr. McTIGUE. The guns of the warship lying in the river below were pointed on President Ulmanis' castle?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. I was in my home and I had a feeling that this old man might need some moral support in these hours. I left my home and I saw these demonstrations, because I came into the castle before 7 o'clock and saw President Ulmanis. He was quiet. He had not worked. He was reading one book, some philosophy. I asked him about his feeling. He told me, "I myself, I am clear. My life is finished, but I don't know what will happen to all honest Latvian patriots who were fighting for independent Latvia, which is worth all the 20 happy years for independent Latvia."

I left after some 2 hours or so, I left Ulmanis to come home, and on the 20th of June I left Riga for my farm which was located some 50 kilometers south of Riga. I was 2 days, to the 23d of June, I spent on my farm, but I do not believe Communists because in my youth as a schoolboy in 1918, I saw for the first time this gang of murderers, which is called ideologically "Communists."

I was a schoolboy in Valka, and as Communists came in, there were rumors in the town that there were killed some 100, more or less, people. I myself and some schoolmates were going to look at this. It was a terrible truth. On one road was found about 100 people. Between them was the old pastor of Valka and some other people which I know, personally. All the people were innocent and were killed with hand grenades and machine guns, and in this year 1918, I saw for the first time the real face of Communists.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were at your farm, there, in June. How many days did you remain there?

Mr. BERZINS. I was two days on the farm.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then what did you do?

Mr. BERZINS. Then I went to the forest.

Mr. KERSTEN. For how long did you remain in the forest?

Mr. BERZINS. I remained in the forest through the 29th of June.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then what happened?

Mr. BERZINS. Then came to me one of my officers, the only one who knew where I was.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened, then?

Mr. BERZINS. He told me that Blaus has called my son on the telephone and told him that Vieteroff wanted to see me.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was the NKVD man?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; and he was the righthand of Vishinsky in those days.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you finally get to see Vieteroff, then?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Mr. BERZINS. Between Riga and Yelgava, on the highway.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then what happened?

Mr. BERZINS. I left this place in the forest and Blaus said to my sons that he hoped nothing would happen bad with me. He said that for me and my colleagues it would be very useful to know what Vieteroff and Vishinsky are thinking and to know what happens.

Mr. KERSTEN. So you decided to take a chance to see Vieteroff?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Tell us what took place.

Mr. BERZINS. I came to this place where I might meet Vieteroff. I was crossing the highway between Riga and Yelgava.

Mr. KERSTEN. You did see him later, did you?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. I come to Riga and Blaus connected me with Vieteroff. I met Vieteroff approximately 2 o'clock or a little later, June 29, in Blaus' house.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was the conversation between you and Vieteroff, then?

Mr. BERZINS. It was very short in Blaus' apartment. Vieteroff asked me what is my feeling and I said, "So far as I know, you have no interest in my feeling, and it would be shortest if you tell me what you like of me."

Vieteroff answered that this was not the place where we could talk about it and asked to come at 10 o'clock, Blaunnu Street 9, a part of Riga. I came to this house at 10 o'clock. Vieteroff met me at the door and took me to the third or fourth floor—I don't know which. On the door was the name "Jemehov." It looks Russian because it is a Russian family.

He brought me in one room. In the dining room was table and on the table were 2 bottles of red wine—1 Russian and 1 French red wine. There was 1 box of cigarettes—Camels—and 2 glasses.

Mr. KERSTEN. American cigarettes were there?

Mr. BERZINS. American cigarettes because the Russians like them. The Communists, so far when they are with workers, they are poor, but they like American cigarettes and French wines and champagnes, and so on.

Mr. KERSTEN. So you had a talk with Vieteroff there?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. Vieteroff offered to me some wine to drink. I told him that I am not drinking—that I don't like to drink some alcohol. I said to him, "You can choose which one you like to drink." The choice of Vieteroff was the French wine. He filled my glass with the red wine and his, too. I was suspicious that in this glass was something. I put before him my glass and brought his glass. Vieteroff drank out of this glass of wine, but was not speaking not one word about this. After, Vieteroff asked me if I might sign one testimony that Latvia has one secret agreement with Nazi Germany.

We have no secret agreements; not with Nazi Germany, not with some other country. I answered that it is not true, that I cannot sign such a testimony. I said the best man to ask was the Foreign Minister. The answer was that I was the right hand of President Ulmanis, that I knew all that happens in government, and that they don't need to ask someone else. "You know, and you may sign."

I refused to sign this testimony. When I left this day Vieteroff—Vieteroff said at this time I might go home, since it was about 12 o'clock at night and he said at the door, "You don't forget you have family, too, and in your hands is the future of you and your family."

He told me that he supposed on the second day—the second day was Sunday—I will be so wise as to sign this testimony.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, he wanted you to sign a statement to the effect that Latvia was in some kind of a secret agreement that was against the Soviets?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were here earlier this morning when this little excerpt was played from Vishinsky's speech which was translated and which, according to that translation, Vishinsky claimed that the Baltic

nations were in secret agreements against the Soviets. You heard that; did you?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. And this is the type of agreement they were trying to get you to sign at that time; is that right?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; to press me to sign such a one.

So, Sunday at 10:30 I came the second time to meet Vieteroff. Vieteroff was very arrogant from the beginning. "You might forget that you were once Minister. You will be no more member of the Latvian Cabinet because never will there be an independent Latvia."

He took from his pocket this envelope and put it on the table and said, "You will sign it or not?"

I said, "No; I will not sign." I answered to him that if I am staying in my country I might be killed, too, by the Soviets.

We talked again for 2 hours. Shortly before 12 o'clock, Mr. Vieteroff sent me home and told me that he will give me 1 chance more to think about his proposal, and he hoped—he said I will be so wise and I would not refuse.

I said, "Well, I will come." Vieteroff would like for me to come Monday. I said I could not come Monday because I had work, that I could come after 1 week.

It was on the next Sunday. So I get some days' time.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had about a week's time, then?

Mr. BERZINS. I got 1 week.

On Monday at 5 o'clock I saw the last time my President, Karlis Ulmanis. The doors in the castle were guarded by Communists. There was a small door—

Mr. KERSTEN. You got up to see him and did you have a talk with him?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; I had a talk. I used the secret doors and I had the last talk. It was between 5 and 7 o'clock, the 1st of July 1940. Ulmanis ordered me to leave the country if it is possible, on the same day, and at 7 o'clock I saw this great Latvian patriot for the last time.

I came home and told my wife that Ulmanis had ordered me to go out of the country, and I asked what my wife thought about it. The answer was that it was the only way, because my staying would be for the family more dangerous than my going out of the country.

The family I could not leave because it was 2 weeks after the Communists occupied all 3 Baltic countries.

I left Riga on the same night at 10 o'clock, and I succeeded in coming to Sweden.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you go from Sweden?

Mr. BERZINS. I spent 2 months more in Sweden and at the end of November I was going to Switzerland for our ambassador conference. It was in December in Switzerland, in Geneva.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, the way in which you got from Latvia to Sweden, as I understand it, from a previous talk I had with you, you would rather not talk about that?

Mr. BERZINS. No, I don't tell because it might be dangerous for some people who are now under Soviet control.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you eventually go to, then? After Sweden, where did you go?

Mr. BERZINS. I was going to Switzerland, to the ambassador conference.

Mr. KERSTEN. From there, where did you go?

Mr. BERZINS. From there, I was going to Italy, and I met in Italy Professor Spekke and Camanis. From there I would go back to Sweden, but in Berlin I was arrested by the Gestapo and I spent in police prisons in Alexanderplatz and Sachsenhausen, the concentration camps, I spent 34 months and 14 days.

Mr. KERSTEN. For what were you arrested?

Mr. BERZINS. As a German-hater. That I was accused of. As a Nazi-hater.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were in a concentration camp where?

Mr. BERZINS. In Sachsenhausen. It is located north of Berlin, some 35 kilometers from Berlin.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in solitary confinement?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. For how long?

Mr. BERZINS. It was 32 months. I was in Greatlager 2 months, and in solitary confinement I spent 32 months.

Mr. KERSTEN. When you were in Germany at some time or other, did you get some information about your family?

Mr. BERZINS. I got only two letters from my wife in August 1940, through my friends in the diplomatic service.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were you at that time?

Mr. BERZINS. I was in Sweden at the time.

Mr. KERSTEN. After that, did you get some information about your family?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. After I get from my friends information that my wife and children are deported in 1941, the 13th to 14th of June, deported to Siberia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Your wife and family were deported to Siberia in June 1941?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have you ever heard from your family since?

Mr. BERZINS. Nothing.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were you when you got that information?

Mr. BERZINS. From Mr. Rosenstein's wife, the chief of army staff. Rosenstein was deported, too. His wife was in Latvia and she wrote to me in the concentration camp.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you recall the year you got that information?

Mr. BERZINS. What?

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you recall the year in which you got that information?

Mr. BERZINS. It was December 1941. I remember exactly. It was the 9th of December.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened after the war, then?

Mr. BERZINS. I was released from the concentration camp in November 1943, and I live under police supervision in Berlin. I could go out of Berlin when the Russians were very close to Berlin.

It was the end of March 1945. Then I was going to a small place 12 kilometers from Jena and there I met our liberators, the United States Army.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were then in some DP camps for a while and then you came to the United States?

Mr. BERZINS. I was in DP camps in the English Zone in 1950 and then I came over as DP to the United States.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you have been here ever since, is that right?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, as I understand it, Mr. Berzins, from your testimony, it was Vishinsky, who was the prime mover in the takeover of Latvia, and the loss of the freedom of the Latvian people, and among those who suffered from the actions of Vishinsky, directly, were yourself and your family?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct. Vishinsky is responsible for what happened in Latvia, since. Latvia was occupied by the Red Army and Soviet Russia. Vishinsky is responsible for hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people who were deported to Siberia and who were killed and found in mass graves in Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is your personal opinion of Vishinsky from your own experiences?

Mr. BERZINS. Vishinsky is the greatest murderer in the world. One of the murderers which has gone to this time unpunished. Vishinsky is the greatest liar. Not only in Latvia. When he came to take over and destroy our independence, each word which we heard today in the record of the speech of the 4th of December were lies about the economic life in Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you place any reliance whatsoever on the word of this man with whom you had this experience?

Mr. BERZINS. My experiences lead me to not believe a single word spoken by this man. His words mean one thing and his hands something else. In words, he is the best democrat, but behind it he is working with his agencies to destroy democracy and freedom in the world.

Mr. KERSTEN. From your experiences with Vishinsky and other Communists, would you say the same thing is true of other top Communists?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. That was my experience for a long time because Latvia was close to the border with Soviet Union. We were fighting against communism all the time. In Pleskaw were Communist schools for underground movement in Baltic countries. From this spy academy came residents to Latvia and Estonia, organizing the resistance against legal government and to destroy our independence.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you place any reliance whatsoever on the words of any one of these top Communists that you had to deal with, this Vinshinsky, Vieteroff, or any of the other people?

Mr. BERZINS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you place any reliance whatsoever on the words of any of these top Communists that you had to deal with?

Mr. BERZINS. No, never.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. MADDEN. Could you give us some information as to the policy that the Soviets used in regard to the children of these families whose parents they sent to Siberia, what did they do with the children?

Mr. BERZINS. So far as I know, this information is exactly true: The family was separated. The man was sent to some slave-labor group far to the north and the wives were sent to other slave-labor camps, and the children to special camps for the children. The small children, 2, 3, and 4 years old, were put in orphan houses. Necessarily,

they were educated as Communists, and in time he forgets his family, his mother and family, and is a Russian citizen of the kind is made in Communist-dominated countries.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, the pattern or the policy that the Soviets used was to destroy the home?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. MADDEN. And banish the parents to slave-labor camps?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. MADDEN. And bring the children up as Communists?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. Because the parent is sentenced to death or goes to slave-labor camps. They will never come back.

Mr. MADDEN. Their pattern was one where they knew the parents could not survive very long in these slave-labor camps?

Mr. BERZINS. That is right. We have escaped people from these slave-labor camps who say that most deported Latvians died in the first year.

Mr. MADDEN. Which means that within one generation, all Latvia would become Communist and the Latvian identity as a nation would be wiped out, or obliterated.

Mr. BERZINS. I don't believe so, because Latvian history——

Mr. MADDEN. I am talking about the intention of the Soviets.

Mr. BERZINS. That is the intention.

Mr. MADDEN. That is their pattern. It is their program.

Mr. BERZINS. Yes, it is a program. First they deport and destroy all leading people in politics and in science, and so on. When the people are without leaders, necessarily the place becomes Communist and the education is Communist.

Mr. MADDEN. From your knowledge over the last 10 or 12 years, in your experiences with the Communists, that same pattern was not only used in Latvia, but it was used in Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the other Communist-subjugated nations?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct. Everywhere.

Mr. KERSTEN. There is one more question I would like to ask you before we adjourn, and that is this: Since you have been in this country, and since the war, you have observed from newspaper accounts and other ways, the present activities of the same Vishinsky. Have you not?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have read his speeches and you heard the speech here this morning, the recording.

Would you say from your observations and your experiences with Communists, that the Vishinsky of those days who took over Latvia, is the same type of person, is just as unreliable and is up to the same tactics and antics today that he was at that time when Latvia was taken over?

Mr. BERZINS. That is my opinion. My opinion is that Vishinsky is the same Vishinsky. Communism is the same communism. In Latvia were mass graves. The same mass graves were opened in Korea. The places are 10,000 miles, one from the other. The Communist has not changed his face. The Communist cannot change his face because then he would not be a Communist.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the same Vishinsky operating in Latvia back in 1940 is operating today in the United Nations, is that right?

Mr. BERZINS. He is the same man using the same methods. Be it in Latvia, the United Nations, Korea, or some other place, Vishinsky cannot change, nor can Moscow communism.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have mentioned the fact that this member of the Russian NKVD who participated in the rape of Latvia is now the Soviet Minister to Denmark?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Since you have had an opportunity to see and meet a lot of these Soviet officials who participated in the occupation of Latvia, do you know whether any of those officials are present in the Russian Embassy here in Washington, or any other governmental agency?

Mr. BERZINS. No. I can't tell you.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What?

Mr. BERZINS. I don't know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You also stated that in the first Communist cabinet that was created, only two were Communists, and the others were left-wing Communist sympathizers, or so-called liberals, is that correct?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I would like to ask you a question. What happened to those others?

Mr. BERZINS. So far as I know, Kirchensteins is dismissed and is now working as a professor. One minister of education was arrested shortly thereafter. Two or three months later he disappeared. He was arrested.

Blaus disappeared. The Minister of Justice disappeared.

It would appear that they had done their jobs and afterward were sent to slave-labor camps.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, your testimony is the same as that of yesterday, that the Communists used some of these left-wing sympathizers in order to create an impression of unity government, but soon thereafter either liquidated them or dismissed them completely?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And that is part of the general Russian pattern wherever Russian imperialism has progressed, is that correct?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. We saw it everywhere. It is the same in Czechoslovakia and everywhere.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Another thing I would like to know about, to establish this pattern: When was the first warning that Latvia had of the impending danger from Soviet Russia?

Mr. BERZINS. It was shortly after the war. The war was started after the ill-famed pact between Ribbentrop and Molotov.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you tell us how long it was before this fateful June in 1940 that you got first notice of the danger of Russian occupation?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. Lithuania was accused of kidnaping Red soldiers and there came the first dangerous steps of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How many days or weeks or months was that from the actual day of occupation?

Mr. BERZINS. It was in March, and in February the Latvian Foreign Minister worked out extraordinary powers for our Ambassador in London and for our Ambassador in Washington, because Latvian

Government had the feeling that each day could bring occupation by the Reds. We hoped that our help would come from the great democracies which won once the war against the Nazis and will help us to establish our independence.

So these extraordinary powers were given to our ambassadors in the United States and in England.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When the attack finally came, it came suddenly and without warning?

Mr. BERZINS. Without warning, and on the 16th was the ultimatum at 2 o'clock, and they wanted an answer in 8 hours. At 10 o'clock we were to answer. If we refused the ultimatum from Molotov, it was told to our Ambassador in Moscow that the Red Army would cross, with force, our border, at 10 o'clock that evening.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I notice among these photographs that were offered in evidence there is a photograph of a so-called execution order which translated says as follows:

"Shoot all socially dangerous persons," and carries the signature of an NKVD officer.

What do you know about such orders being issued?

Mr. BERZINS. At this time, I was not in Latvia myself. I was in concentration camp in Germany.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. This was June 26, 1940.

Mr. BERZINS. 1941, it is.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is right. You were not in Latvia at that time?

Mr. BERZINS. That is right. I was in the concentration camp in Germany.

Mr. KERSTEN. First of all, I will say, Mr. Berzins, I would like for you to come back here at 2 o'clock. Mr. Bonin would like to ask you some questions. After you are finished, Mr. Berzins, the next witness will be Mrs. Zenta Visbulis.

The hearings are now adjourned until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:10 p. m.)

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order, please.

Mr. Berzins, will you come forward, please?

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Berzins, prior to Lenin's death, he confessed that the U. S. S. R.'s determination was to conquer free nations, and it would not be governed by either ethics or morality.

Would you say that all the leaders of the Soviet Union have followed his instructions implicitly as far as your country is concerned?

Mr. BERZINS. It is not only my opinion, but it is my experience, too, as a neighbor of the Soviet Union and a citizen of Latvia.

The Soviet organized a fifth column in Latvia all the time and has schooled specialists in schools. We know that everywhere is organized for each country fifth columns. People are educated specifically for the underground movement.

It is my experience that Communists cannot live together with free peoples. They have the intention to conquer all the world. It is in the teaching of Lenin from the beginning of communism.

Mr. BONIN. Earlier in your testimony, you stated that Mr. Vishinsky is a liar, and a murderer.

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Through the medium of the United Nations, today he is following Lenin's instructions to use any ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, and concealment of the truth.

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. BONIN. Do you know if the Communists carried out the inhuman crimes of genocide, murder, deportation, and false arrest right in your own country?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. The Communists started mass deportations in 1941, and the second time they came into Latvia, in 1945, the mass deportations began again. We do not know how many Latvians were deported in the meantime, but it is my belief, approximately between 100,000 or 200,000 people. They are mostly innocent people.

We know, through our channels, of two large deportations between 1945 and now. One was in 1945. There they reportedly deported about 50,000 people.

The second time was the end of March 29, 1949. There was broken the existence of independent farmers, because farmers refused to go in freely, and to break down this resistance—we have information from refugees and others in Latvia—that at this time there were deported between 50,000 and 70,000 people. The deportation from single families, or groups of people, for slave-labor camps is going on still, but not in so large numbers.

Mr. BONIN. It is apparent from your official capacity, and from the facts that you experienced, the Russian Government violated every agreement that they had with your country; is that right?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct. Well, remember that once in the League of Nations Litvinoff said that each agreement is only a piece of paper. A piece of paper. And for the Soviet Union, each agreement is really only a piece of paper.

Mr. BONIN. Therefore, you would agree that this Red Marxist-Communist plan, as they took over your country, followed the same pattern by which they took Lithuania over, as was testified to here yesterday.

Mr. BERZINS. It was the same thing. Elections were the same day. At the same time there was incorporation into the Soviet Union. All three Baltic puppet governments were ordered to Moscow in one session and were incorporated. It was all in the same plan, and done in Moscow and not the Baltic countries.

Mr. BONIN. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that all these things had to be planned out a long time in advance before they actually occurred; is that not true?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes, it is so. It was carefully planned in Moscow and carried out by Vishinsky and others.

Mr. BONIN. It was along the same identical pattern by which they took over Poland?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Afterwards, they took over Czechoslovakia in a similar manner?

Mr. BERZINS. In a similar manner.

Mr. BONIN. If we can rely on the past, they will take over other countries in the same manner.

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. If they take over other countries they will follow the same pattern. The leading people will be killed or broken and the resistance will be no more.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Berzins, do you recall whether or not in 1940 the Communists did anything about religion when they took over your country?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. Communists are friends of religion, they say. It is a lie, too, that religion is free in Communist countries. In Latvia a religion is not free. It is under Communist control and the clergymen—some of the leading clergymen—are Communist agents. So they are using the church as an instrument of Communist propaganda, too.

Mr. BONIN. Therefore, you conclude, and we can assume, that any agreement that the free nations of this world might enter into with Russia could not be relied upon?

Mr. BERZINS. That is my deepest opinion.

Mr. BONIN. Thank you very much, sir, for your splendid testimony here today.

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Berzins, first of all I want to thank you for the very splendid testimony you have given the committee today, but following through on this idea of any agreement being just a scrap of paper, does that not follow, also, to the Constitution of the U. S. S. R., in this respect: It isn't what is in the constitution, it is their interpretation that they put on the constitution.

In other words, if you read the constitution of the U. S. S. R. very carefully, I am sure there are many splendid ideals expressed in that constitution, but they are not interpreted as they are written into the constitution. And the same way in their agreements with any country. It is not what is in the agreement, it is the way they turn it around and the interpretation they put on that agreement that is the real situation to consider; is that correct?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct. Naturally, we can find in the Soviet Constitution the best ideas. It says all people are free, that the people have rights to associate in different organizations, in political parties, but the only party allowed is the Communist Party. There is no free organization allowed in this. In the constitution it says so, but not in reality.

And each man who would like to think free and hold some self-respect, such people are sent to slave labor camps. The legal constitution is one. In reality it is something else. In reality it is cruelty that has been followed by the Soviet Union in subjugated nations.

Mr. BUSBEY. Would you agree with me that Red Marxist communism is the same, regardless of what the control is in that country?

Mr. BERZINS. That is right.

In Germany it is a little different from Poland, and different in Latvia from other countries. It is only a difference in tactics and not in the sense of communism and not a difference in aims.

Mr. BUSBEY. I think the people are becoming more aware every day of what is commonly known as the opposition Communist. These opposition Communists are very hard to detect. You might think they are anti-Communists because their line of propaganda is anti-Stalinist, but they are not anti-Marxist.

We have two sets of Communists, the Stalin-Communists that followed the old Lenin regime, and we have the opposition Communists

in which I place Tito in Yugoslavia, who are on the outs, now, and trying to get on the in and take over where the old Stalinist crowd happened to be in control.

Mr. BERZINS. In my opinion, there is no difference in ideas and, in methods, not much, too. It is only a difference in persons. Tito doesn't like to obey Moscow, and so there was created Titoism. It is called national communism. I don't think Tito has the same kind of communism, but he only could not obey Moscow. Tito will not push the opposition as long as he is not Communist, but naturally there is a Communist Party in Yugoslavia, too, who are in danger, too, when Communists take over again in Yugoslavia. Naturally, Tito and all the people around Tito will be accused as traitors, and liquidated.

Mr. BUSBEY. There are two kinds of Communists in the world. It seems we have two political parties in the United States. Now, here in the United States when the Democrats are in control, the Republicans are trying to get them out. When the Republicans are in control, the Democrats are trying to get the Republicans out so they can be back in.

Now, we have this group of what appears to be anti-Communists. They are anti-Stalinists, and they are the opposition Communists in this country, of which we have plenty. They are followers of Tito. When this opposition group, or the Stalinist-Communists should be thrown out, we would have another group of Communists in there, but they are still Marxist Communists.

You don't have to reply to that, Mr. Berzins. If you want to make a comment, it is perfectly all right.

Mr. BERZINS. There is really opposition to the Communist Party, too, in Moscow, or in the Soviet Union, and in other countries, but all the anti-Stalinists are powerless in this country. One Communist's position cannot change the Communist position in the Soviet Union. That is my feeling.

Mr. BUSBEY. Of course, we have them in all countries, but in this country they stem particularly from the purge of 1929, when Stalin purged the so-called opposition Communists out of the party controlled by the Kremlin in this country. They are still making a great many people in this country believe they are anti-Communists, now, but they are not. They are still Communists. They are opposition Communists. They are in opposition to Stalinist Communists, and not Marxist communism.

Mr. BERZINS. My feeling about this purge in 1929 is that it was a personal fight for the power in the Kremlin, but not an ideological fight in the Communist Party. It was a question of who will be ruling in the Kremlin, whether it will be the Stalinists or some other leading people. It was not an ideological fight in the Communist Party.

Mr. BUSBEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I don't know whether I understood you in answer to the questions put a little while ago. Do you believe there is such a thing as national communism?

Mr. BERZINS. There is one kind called national communism. There was national communism at one time in the Ukraine. They are Communists, but they would like to see the Ukraine a separate country or a separate state, not under Moscow rule. It is communism, but an independent Ukrainian communism. Such was called national communism.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You said the last time you saw President Ulmanis was on July 1, 1940. You didn't tell us what happened to him after this. What happened to him after 1940? Do you know?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes, I know. Our President of State, Karlis Ulmanis, was deported and tried before he was deported. I know about the people who were around him and who escaped afterwards. When the 21st of July came, the so-called Vishinsky Parliament met to decide to incorporate Latvia into the Soviet Union.)

At the same time the Soviet Ambassador came to Ulmanis in Riga and asked him where he will go out of the country—somewhere in the West, or the Soviet Union. Ulmanis chose Switzerland. He was provided a passport for Switzerland and Ulmanis himself has never saved money and he has nothing, but the people around him got together and gave him about \$1,000. It was sent to the Latvian Bank to be changed into Swiss francs. After they came the second time, the same Russian Ambassador told Ulmanis that he could not go to Switzerland but to the Soviet Union as guest of the Soviet Government.

He was taken out one day and put in a car and brought to the Soviet Union. What happened afterwards to our President nobody knows. It is very possible that he has been killed by the Soviets.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You testified that this man Kirchensteins, the man whom the Soviets selected as the Premier of the first Communist cabinet, was a political nonentity, a professor at the Riga University?

Mr. BERZINS. That is correct.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And a president or active member of the Latvian-Soviet Friendship Society; is that correct?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. President of this organization, he was.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Well, the Latvian-Soviet Friendship Society was the left-wing group of non-Communists; is that correct?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; the Latvian group of non-Communists. The tactic of communism is such that they have two kinds of Communists. One is working every time underground, or his Communist Party is illegal, or in the legal Communist Party. Never, the underground Communist which is trying to go in, in some official organizations, or in state service or the like. They won't say that they are Communists. They will never come to Communist meeting, to gatherings and so forth.

The other group of Communists is organized for propaganda purposes. They are working in papers. They are speaking at gatherings and so forth. They are the so-called registered Communists who work openly. The other party is an underground party.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The Latvian-Soviet Friendship Society is very much like our American-Soviet Friendship Society.

Mr. BERZINS. It is the same kind.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The minute the power was consolidated in Latvia those people were thrown out of the Government, including Kirchensteins?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; and were selected from this organization. The friendship organization furnished plenty of the first puppet government.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But shortly thereafter they were all eliminated?

Mr. BERZINS. Most of them.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The reason I ask you that is that I think that is a good thing for some of our American-Soviet Society members to remember. They may be used for a while and then they will be given the same fate as Mr. Kirchensteins and others.

Mr. BERZINS. Yes. They are only blind tools in the hands of the Communists; that is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mr. Berzins. You have contributed a great deal here. You have described first hand your personal experiences in the witnessing of the takeover of your country of Latvia by the Communists and it has been valuable testimony. Thank you.

Mrs. VIZBULIS, will you raise your right hand, please?

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF MRS. ZENTA VIZBULIS, NATIVE OF LATVIA

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your full name, please?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Mrs. Zenta Vizbulis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is your sister married to Mr. Loy Henderson, who is now United States Ambassador to Iran?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I was born in Latvia.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you live in Latvia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I lived in Latvia until 1941. Five years before the war I took care of my father. He was paralyzed.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you living in Latvia in 1940 when the Russians took over Latvia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes, I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. What city were you living in at that time?

Mr. VIZBULIS. I was living in Talsi, and I was just 10 days married when the Red army tanks came in Latvia.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were married 10 days when the Russians came into Talsi?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall when the Russians came in?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes, I remember. It was about 12 o'clock at night. My husband heard some noise. He said, "That must be tanks." I hurried to put a robe on and wanted to go with him, because I was just married a short time ago and I was afraid. I was afraid to let him alone, since it was dangerous times and people were afraid.

Then we went to the next street, to the corner, and I saw big Soviet tanks coming into Latvia, and motorcycles. Then the police came and told the people to go home. That was about 12 o'clock at night. In Latvia at night you can see.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those were the daylight months in Latvia when there are only 2 or 3 hours of darkness?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes; in May, June, and July the nights are light.

Then we went home and after 2 days we went to see my mother-in-law and then we passed the square and we saw there the Latvian soldiers were locked in and the Latvian officers talked with the Russian officers.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was in June 1940?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us briefly what happened during the following months when you were living in Talsi?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. It was very difficult. Since I had to take care of my sick father, I would go out about 7 o'clock and stand and wait for food. There were so many people, and then they would close the door and they would say we don't have any more. I would go home and I would have nothing to eat for my sick father.

The first week the chiefs of police were sent to some other cities and some other officials were transferred to other places and they disappeared. Something happened to them. People were arrested.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you try to get medicine in that period for your sick father?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. My cousins were arrested and my cousin's husband was arrested in October. The next year, in June 1941—

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me go back for a moment. Did you try to get medicine for your sick father?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I tried to get medicine, but it was very scarce. The medicine was \$2. We had to pay \$2 for just one pill of aspirin.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me ask you about the medicine, again. Did you try to purchase medicine for your sick father?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any trouble before the Soviets came in?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. No; I didn't have troubles, then.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you successful in procuring any kind of medicine?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. There was some medicine we would get but not all we needed.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could you buy any aspirin tablets?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Just one aspirin pill cost \$2.

Mr. McTIGUE. \$2 for one aspirin tablet?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall a certain morning in the latter part of 1940 when your husband came home from his position in the newspaper office and asked you to pack your bag?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. My husband came home about 10 o'clock and he said, "Get a suitcase and take some clothes for us and go to the big street"; there was a house where the people had orders to go.

Mr. McTIGUE. And your husband packed his bag and you packed your bag and you went to this central house?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. We didn't take all the clothes, just in one suitcase. We put all the clothes in one suitcase.

Mr. McTIGUE. You went to this central house, you and your husband?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened there?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Later we were separated. I took the suitcase and my husband had just the suit that he had on. We were taken in a truck and carried away.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were there a great many women and men?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Just the women and children.

Mr. McTIGUE. The women and children were put in trucks?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they say the husbands would follow later?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes; but after that I never saw my husband again.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many truckloads of women and children were there?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. There were about three.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did they take the women and children?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. They took them close to Estonia and then they transferred them.

Mr. McTIGUE. They took them on an overnight trip to Estonia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you, along with the other women and children, were transported to Estonia, what happened then?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Then they were put in a train and we were about 7 or 8 days in trains.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before we get to that, they put you, along with how many other women and children, into this train?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. There were very many. They were crowded and sitting very close to each other. I could not remember how many, but they were very loaded.

Mr. KERSTEN. Let me go one point further. Do I understand, Mrs. Vizbulis, that the husbands were taken into a different train than the families?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. The husbands were separated, but what happens to our husbands we never found out.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, the husbands were separated from the families?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And they went elsewhere?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the group with you were women and children; is that it?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was being done by the NKVD agents, or by the Soviets?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes; the Soviet Government gave the orders to do that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were the Soviet soldiers guarding the train?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. There were two soldiers and some civilians.

Mr. McTIGUE. Some civilians who were Russians?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. When they took you and the other women and children from the trucks to the trains, how big was the train? How many cars?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I could not tell that. I couldn't remember that, but there were an awful lot of children and women. Some were crying and some were screaming. A mother with two children was insane; some of them were separated from their children and they were separated from their husbands. Then the train stopped and we met some women from the other cars and they were almost losing their minds.

Mr. McTIGUE. This is on your train trip into Siberia, from Estonia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were placed in cattle cars; were you?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes; in cattle cars.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were the women and children crowded into these cattle cars?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes; they were crowded.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you say that one woman in your car went insane?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How about the other women; what was their condition?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Some were crying; some were screaming.

Mr. McTIGUE. So you started the train trip in these cattle cars to Siberia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did this trip take?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. About 7 or 8 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you have for food and for water?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. We just almost ate nothing. Just a little bread, and for the children in some places where the train stopped they gave some little milk and some little bread. We got some bread and drank some water.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did any of the women and children die, to your knowledge, on that trip?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Not in the train. They died when we got there.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you arrived in Siberia, where did they take the women and children?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. They took them to collective farms. They were divided into different places and put to work.

Mr. McTIGUE. And they distributed the women and the children into various collective farms in Siberia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. This camp or collective farm that you talk about is near what city or village in Siberia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. My house was about 10 miles from Peravole.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that near Gorki?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes, near Gorki. It was 180 miles from Gorki.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you and the other women and children were put into these collective farms, what kind of work were you required to perform?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. They had to work in the fields and in the woods and on the roads.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were doing road work?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Heavy work?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you also work in the woods, chopping down trees?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you work from early in the morning until late at night?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. In the summer, and in the winter the days were very short, there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did any of you get sick during that period?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. The children 2 years old and less—they almost all died.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was there a camp for Latvian children not far from where you were located?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes, in our camp there were about 300 Latvian children, and then in another farm there were about 400, but later they were transferred.

Mr. McTIGUE. There were two camps solely for Latvian children? One camp had 400 Latvian children, and the other camp had 300 Latvian children, and they later on were transferred to other points in Siberia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. And about 80 miles away was a camp for men, and the men were kept like prisoners of war, with a fence, and guarded.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the women transported into Siberia, along with you, have ways and means of communicating with each other?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. They were very careful, when they wrote, "In this place conditions here are better," that meant conditions here were worse.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you hear that some of the younger women who were transported in the train with you, were later put into Soviet military garrisons for the convenience of the Soviet military—in other words, they were made prostitutes of?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. Some of those girls get letters from their friends and they were sent to soldier camps.

Mr. McTIGUE. And they communicated that to you and your friends, that they were sent to the camps and kept there?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you able while you were on the collective farm to get word out to your sister that you were imprisoned in Siberia?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. I wrote a letter to my sister. It was an open letter, a small card. I said I hoped they would give me help as soon as possible. My sister didn't receive a letter but she received a card written with just a few words. She talked with my mother-in-law, who talked to Mr. Henderson and he talked with the Secretary of State to find out if he could help me.

Mr. KERSTEN. At that time that you wrote to your sister your brother-in-law was in the diplomatic service, United States; is that right?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. He was in the State Department, a high official.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Henderson?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were at the collective farm doing this kind of work that you just described, did you talk from time to time with the Russian peasants?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes; I talked with the Russian peasants. They helped me a little because we were almost starving to death. In the beginning they gave us just some little soup and cabbage, some little potatoes and bread. Then we get some small dried fish once a month.

Mr. KERSTEN. So I understand, Mrs. Vizbulis, that the Russian people, the Russian peasants, they really helped you?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. They helped me. They gave sometimes a little soup and they helped me. Because I didn't have clothes, they helped me to get wool so I could make stockings.

Mr. KERSTEN. That treatment the Russian peasants gave you, that was in contrast to the type of treatment that put you in these boxcars?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. You see, the people, they don't like Communists.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, you make a big distinction between Communists and the Russian people, don't you?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. These people who helped me, they believed in God. I was in very bad condition. They had a little to help me with. If they didn't, I would have died. Sometimes my eyes were swollen from not enough food. And I had to work in the fields all day, and my legs were frozen. I was sick from not enough clothes, not enough food. There were some people who were sorry for me. They made this cross.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are making now the sign of the cross. Do you mean these people prayed?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes: they prayed to God, and they helped me because they thought I would die from starvation, not enough food.

Mr. McTIGUE. Weren't these Russian peasants from time to time required to bring horses and cattle into a certain collecting point for use by the Soviet Army?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. When they brought these horses and cattle into town for the Soviet and after they returned, did they tell you anything of what they saw?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. They said the Latvian men they saw in the trains just died there. I was looking for my husband anyplace; I was just looking every place for information.

Also, I would get letters saying, "He is not your husband. We will look some more."

The women had bad conditions, but worse for the men. I saw some men from the camps, and they were just like skeletons. They were young men with deep, black eyes. When I saw those people, my heart just couldn't stand it.

Mr. McTIGUE. You have never seen or heard from your husband since you were separated that day in Talsi when you were put in one truck and he was taken away in another?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I have heard not a thing.

Mr. McTIGUE. For how long a period were you in this collective farm system?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. It was about 1 year.

Mr. McTIGUE. During that year, did some of the children die who were brought into Siberia, on the train, with you?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. The smallest children under 2 years, they almost all died. The older children, they still were living. And then some small children were born there, in the time when we were there, but they almost all died. In the neighborhood there was just one baby who lived, but mostly they all died, these small babies who were born there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was there any kind of typhus disease in the collective farm system, or in the community?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. In 1942 there was typhus. The place was just closed and nobody came in and came out.

Mr. McTIGUE. You knew that efforts were being made by the Department of State and by our Ambassador in Russia, Admiral Stanley, to secure your release; did you not?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you had spent a year in this collective farm and after they had given you a variety of excuses for not securing your release, although you knew that attempts were being made, did you 1 day, or 1 night, decide to leave the collective farm?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. One day I decided to leave without permission. There were two Russian peasant women who gave me some bread and some little eggs. The bread was dry bread, so I could stay for a longer time. In Russia you couldn't buy bread at all. I escaped. I walked 180 miles to the Volga River.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do for food during that time?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I carried the food on my back.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many days was it?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. More than 2 days, or 3 days to Gorki. At night I slept in a coal house. I had skin shoes on and I had blisters on my feet. I just sat down and said I couldn't go farther. I ask this old Russian woman if I could sleep there. She said if I went a little farther, there was a place where I could sleep. However, I was afraid of the typhus.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Russian peasants give you food and shelter during your walk to the Volga River?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. One peasant woman told me to go across the street, that there were some people who could take me. They helped me. They gave me warm water to wash my feet and they got some green leaves in to take out the heat from them because I had some blisters.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you got to the Volga River, you were able to get a boat down the river to Kuibyshev?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Well, I went to the river and I had to sleep. I slept there. Then the next day I went to the ship and I wanted to go without permission, but the captain said, "No; you have to go to the police and get some permission."

Then, I decided it would do no good to wait for another ship because they would say the same thing. I took a small boat. Eighty miles you can go without a license, so I went to Gorki. When I went to Gorki, I went to the police office, from the police to the foreign office, and they sent me back and forth several times. I get the telegrams that I have from the embassy and I am told I have to go to the American Embassy to take out my immigration papers. They gave me permission to go by boat to Kuibyshev.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then in Kuibyshev before you were actually released, you spent some months there, did you not?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Wasn't it through the personal intervention of our Ambassador that you were finally released?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did Mr. Henderson himself come over from Washington?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes, Mr. Henderson. They said they would let me go and the next day they said no, so after 2 months Mr. Henderson was on his way to Moscow and Mr. Stanley went there to the Russian foreign office.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you know while Mr. Henderson was in Moscow, whether he undertook any efforts to secure your release?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. I think Mr. Henderson did a very, very good job, and I am very thankful for that. Mr. Henderson spent a long time in the foreign service and he has very good friends, like Mr. Stanley and Mr. Thruston, and Mr. Smith, the second counsel, and Mr. Dickerson, the first counsel. They did a very good job for me.

Mr. McTIGUE. After your release by the Soviet, you were taken to the United States Embassy in Kuibyshev?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you hospitalized there, then?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes. When I went there I had blood poison in my foot from walking on the blisters and the dirt, and I needed an operation on my one foot. Then I was so skinny that I just couldn't talk. I took a bath and slept. I rested for 2 weeks more after that and then I was feeling all right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened after your recovery? Where did you go?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I stayed in the Embassy and the Embassy was talking to the Russians about getting me out.

Mr. McTIGUE. In November 1942 you came into the United States?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you now living on Cathedral Avenue in Washington, D. C.

Mrs. VIZBULIS. 2816.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where are you employed now?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. I am in the Rembrandt Studios.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a commercial artist?

Mrs. VIZBULIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Vizbulis.

Mrs. Galinska?

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF MRS. HEDWIG C. M. GALINSKA, SECRETARY, POLISH-AMERICAN CONGRESS

Mrs. GALINSKA. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Your name is Hedwig Galinska?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where do you live?

Mrs. GALINSKA. 1709 L Street, Washington, D. C.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is your occupation?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Secretary.

Mr. KERSTEN. For whom?

Mrs. GALINSKA. The Polish-American Congress.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been secretary?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I think about 14 months.

Mr. KERSTEN. I didn't understand you.

Mrs. GALINSKA. Fourteen months.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been in the United States?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Twenty-two months.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you at one time live in the city of Vilna?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is an area concerning which there is a dispute between Poland and Lithuania?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was your husband's occupation at that time when you lived in Vilna?

Mrs. GALINSKA. He was director of the National Health Insurance.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long had you lived in Vilna up to June 1941?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Since May 1935.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did something happen to you in the month of June 1941?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Something happened.

Mr. KERSTEN. In the early part of that month in this city, did you notice anything unusual going on?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, all the time unusual things have been going on. People have been arrested, put in prison, and deported to Russia, since 1939.

Mr. KERSTEN. Since 1939?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened to you in the month of June? Were you arrested?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, I had been arrested.

Mr. KERSTEN. On what day?

Mrs. GALINSKA. On the 17th of June.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, just a few days before June 17, 1941, did you notice things in your neighborhood, in the city?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, They started on the 13th of June, at night, to arrest people in the suburbs of the city and on the farms.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you tell us something of the things that you saw?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. When I got the news of the mass arrests, I went out to notify my husband, who left home at 5 o'clock in the morning. I was sure he didn't know anything about it. I dressed up and went. When I walked there, I saw them take nuns from St. Catherine's Church, and push them into a covered truck.

Mr. KERSTEN. You saw this?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were you at the time?

Mrs. GALINSKA. On the corner of the street, just opposite the church.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were standing in the street?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, bent like that [indicating], because I just don't know what happened to me. I couldn't straighten up.

Mr. KERSTEN. You saw some nuns being put into a truck?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Twenty or thirty. I wouldn't know, now.

Mr. KERSTEN. From some particular convent?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. They opened a big door, you know, a gate.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was the name of that church?

Mrs. GALINSKA. St. Catherine's.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who was putting these nuns into the truck?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I guess it was the police. Plainclothesmen. They waved everybody to the other side of the pavement.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there soldiers there?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And guns?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, and on the guns, bayonets.

Mr. KERSTEN. And these were the people putting these nuns into trucks; is that right?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened after that?

Mr. GALINSKA. To me, or to them?

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, that you saw?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I went straight to my husband, where he worked—pretended to work, at least—and told him about that. He told me to go home, to prepare some food if it is possible, to buy something and prepare it to go out from our home. He didn't believe that he could be arrested. He always thought that since they hadn't done it to then, they didn't know about him.

Mr. KERSTEN. A number of other people had been picked up in their homes, had they?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. I saw people on the main street being taken away in open trucks.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there Soviet soldiers?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Always the soldiers.

Mr. KERSTEN. In the trucks?

Mr. GALINSKA. Yes. You can tell they are soldiers. They are differently dressed, in navy blue.

Mr. KERSTEN. And were there people in your block taken out this way, in the block where you lived?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. Sometimes they took 2 or 3 families together; sometimes only 1 family.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is the next thing that happened?

Mrs. GALINSKA. The next thing, I went home. I couldn't buy anything on the way because all the shops had been closed. It was 11 or 12 o'clock in the morning. People were scared and closed their shops. I came back and people began to come in with all kinds of gossip and say who was already arrested.

I tried to prepare a small basket. We wanted to go to the country, to stay with some people who had a farm. My husband came home and took some of his documents with him, and we tried to leave, but at the same moment when we wanted to leave our house, a young lady came in to whose parents we were supposed to have gone, and she said in the night her parents had been arrested and deported. They didn't take her because she had a different name, so they let her go. She walked all the way from a small village to Vilna, so it took her several hours to come.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did you do about your husband then?

Mrs. GALINSKA. We went to some friends only two streets away. She had a small cottage and a garden, and she decided to keep me for the time being. I closed my door and we stayed there, from Saturday about 3 o'clock, until Monday evening. Then people in this house started to say that the owner of the house would get in trouble because of us. Monday morning I decided to go home.

Mr. KERSTEN. You went alone, did you?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. I wanted to go alone because I already knew that I wanted to get some information on what happened. Again, at the same moment when I went out, the housekeeper of the people who

shared together the apartment said, "Don't go, because already they came to arrest your husband," so I have to go back.

Now we didn't know what to do. If my husband didn't come to work in the morning, they would call it sabotage, so something had to be done about it.

Those people had been terribly scared that something could happen to them. We decided to go to some other people. All day long we stayed at some other people's home, on the same street, and again someone came in and said they arrested my housekeeper. We put all those people into a terrible condition, so I make up my mind to go home and, as I said, I didn't think they would arrest me because I knew he had the order in my husband's name. So Tuesday, I went home.

Mr. KERSTEN. Alone?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened?

Mrs. GALINSKA. As soon as I came home, the administrator of the house who was in charge of some of the buildings on that street, he let them know. He was observing everything that was going on.

So 7 people came in, 2 or 3 officers and plainclothesmen. It was about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and they left the next day at 10 o'clock after their visit with me.

Mr. KERSTEN. They took you at 10 o'clock the next day?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How did they take you? I mean was it in an automobile?

Mrs. GALINSKA. No; an open truck. They told me if I tell where my husband is, they wouldn't take me, that they had no order to arrest me. They arrested me without an order. All the time in Russia I had been on his name.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did they take you to on this truck?

Mrs. GALINSKA. To Nowa Wilejka. It is about 12 kilometers from Vilna.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was done with you in that little town?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I was put into a cattle truck.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you mean a railway truck?

Mrs. GALINSKA. A railway truck.

Mr. KERSTEN. A cattle car?

Mrs. GALINSKA. A cattle car.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there other cattle cars attached to that?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long did that train remain at that place before it pulled out?

Mrs. GALINSKA. At 10 o'clock I went in and left Saturday at 7 o'clock in the evening.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, about a day and a half?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Almost 2 days.

Mr. KERSTEN. When the train pulled out, how many people were in this cattle car that you were in?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Forty-three.

Mr. KERSTEN. How were they, so far as adults and children are concerned?

Mrs. GALINSKA. There were 15 children from 1 month to 2 years.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the rest?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Men and women, some separated from their husbands.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you notice anything about some women or wives being separated from their husbands, there, at the train?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; they had been. They were Lithuanian families.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened to them?

Mrs. GALINSKA. One was brought in with two boys. One was the victim of polio and she begged them to stay a half-hour longer because something was coming for the boy, but they didn't agree to that. She was very hysterical. She cried because she was sure that her husband was taken to be shot.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there other wives there?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, there was another Lithuanian woman. Just before they left, she was taken away from her husband, and there was a woman with a month-old baby boy, separated from her husband.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you say you remember the names?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I just wrote them down. I just remembered.

Mr. KERSTEN. The names of whom?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Thirty-nine persons. I can't recall the rest.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there some Lithuanians and some Polish people?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Polish, Lithuanian, White Russians, and Jewish people.

Mr. KERSTEN. Some Jewish people?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. All being packed into this boxcar in a little place near Vilna?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. They did it during the first and the second day. All the time they opened the door and they pushed in some more.

Mr. KERSTEN. When the train pulled out, do you have any idea about how many boxcars were in this train?

Mrs. GALINSKA. No. Later on when the train came around someone counted 78 cars, but I don't know if it was so.

Mr. KERSTEN. Someone said they counted 78 cars?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Cattle cars?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Cattle cars.

Mr. KERSTEN. And yours was filled with 48 people?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. So far as you know, the others were filled with people too; were they not?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; because I know about some people who have been together, 56 persons in 1 car.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many days did you travel in this cattle car?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Seventeen.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what about food and water?

Mrs. GALINSKA. That was very bad. For the first 48 hours they didn't stop at all. Then after 48 hours, they would stop at night, and took out 2 people from the car, and they came back after perhaps 3 or 4 hours, because they always stopped the train on the outskirts. Never at the town or railroad station. Far away. They brought in two boxes of food.

Mr. KERSTEN. Anything would taste good after several days without food.

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. They were given salt herrings, for one thing.

Mr. KERSTEN. And were they given enough water?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Not enough water.

Mr. KERSTEN. How about the condition of these people who traveled in the boxcars for 17 days?

Mrs. GALINSKA. It is beyond imagination. It was just horrible.

Mr. KERSTEN. How about the condition of the people in your car?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I don't know if I have to mention the man's name, he was the Lithuanian burgomaster of Vilna, before they took over.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you recall his name?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, of course, I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Can you give us his name?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I hope it can't do any harm to him, now.

Mr. KERSTEN. Don't mention his name if it will do any harm, now.

Mrs. GALINSKA. I think he is not alive any more, because I left him there. He was the leader of the Lithuanian people in Vilna. He was taken sick at Karachis with his wife, his daughter, and his grandchildren.

Mr. KERSTEN. How about the 15 children on the car?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Fifteen children, yes. One of them 1 month old survived.

In my car no one died and no children—of course, there had been sick people all the time. Some couldn't move at all.

Mr. KERSTEN. But in some of the other cars on the same train, did any people die?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; some people died.

Mr. KERSTEN. En route?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did the train finally put you or where did you get off the train?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Barnaul.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was it in Siberia?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you know about how many miles that is from the east of Moscow; was it pretty deep into Siberia?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; it is.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were you taken to?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I had been taken to Barnaul with all those people in the Lithuanian barracks. They were unfinished barracks. The floors were only boards put on, not even nailed. We had to balance ourselves when we walked. That was on a Saturday, and Tuesday morning they started to take us on.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were you taken to?

Mrs. GALINSKA. To the wooden barrack. Some people were up and some down.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many people in one barrack?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I was in one with 26.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there a number of these people with whom you traveled and with whom you lived who had been separated from other members of their families?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes, yes, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is, by "other members," I mean either husbands or wives or children.

Mrs. GALINSKA. Only husbands and wives. Children had been together with mothers. I don't know of anyone being separated from children.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you then have some kind of work to do after you got to these barracks?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What kind?

Mrs. GALINSKA. From 6 o'clock in the morning until 6 in the evening. Hard work.

Mr. KERSTEN. What kind of work?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I have been a bricklayer. I dug in the streets.

Mr. KERSTEN. A bricklayer?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did you build?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Big stalls.

Mr. KERSTEN. For what?

Mrs. GALINSKA. For the barracks. They go through the whole barracks.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you carry bricks?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you dig ditches?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you work on building construction otherwise?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. I was a mason for some time.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you have to carry things up ladders and so on?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; I have. I have to do what you have to do to build. I have to carry sand and lime and water. Everything in Russia is not organized and everything was in different places. I would have to bring one thing together and then make a mixture of this.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, the first week after you got to this barracks in Siberia, was there anybody that you know of who died there?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; children died. I think seven Lithuanian children died. Small children.

Mr. KERSTEN. In one barracks?

Mrs. GALINSKA. In all the barracks. I don't know what was going on in the other barracks.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many people within your barracks?

Mrs. GALINSKA. 205.

Mr. KERSTEN. And in the first week seven children died?

Mrs. GALINSKA. A week or 10 days.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was the death rate following that?

Mrs. GALINSKA. I really don't know. I think that many more men died than women, because they just adjusted themselves better than the men.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long did you remain in this barracks in Siberia?

Mrs. GALINSKA. October 26.

Mr. KERSTEN. That same year?

Mrs. GALINSKA. That same year.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened then?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Then I went together with a party and worked for the Polish Army.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand, at that time there was an arrangement whereby the Polish people could be released from Siberia?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were among those able to get out of that camp?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. We tried to do it on our own, because they didn't really release us. They called us together, 5,000 people, and they had a long speech that you should stay for the victory of the Russian Army and so on, because now we are together. That is all right, but we still preferred to work with our own authorities.

Mr. KERSTEN. There were a number of Polish people who didn't get away, too, were there not?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Of course.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was there an incident while you were at this barracks, about burying one of these children in a wooden coffin?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Tell us about that.

Mrs. GALINSKA. A small baby died, of a Lithuanian teacher, and there was a nice man there—he died also—and he started to do things. He wasn't a carpenter, it was just his hobby, so he did the coffin. They noticed that too much wood was missing, because they made things with it. They saw the coffin when it was carried out, so they were told to take the child out and give it back. The people started to shout, so he let it go.

Mr. KERSTEN. When you made your way out of Russia, did you have contact with the various Russian people?

Mrs. GALINSKA. In Russia?

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. GALINSKA. Oh, yes. All the time.

Mr. KERSTEN. And how did they treat you?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Fine, fine. They are nice people.

Mr. KERSTEN. They treated you very well?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Very well. They are kindhearted people.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did some of these Russian people tell you?

Mrs. GALINSKA. They told me if I ever got out, to tell the truth, how hard they have it.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there some, even of the young in the organizations, who talked that way?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes.

There was a telegraph girl and others. They got through a telegram for me which allowed me to get out.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did some of the Russian people give you food and so on?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. Sometimes they would share their last piece of bread with me. Of course, I gave them some things of mine, but even if I didn't, some of them had been very kind.

Mr. KERSTEN. They treated you with kindness and charity?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes; they did.

Mr. KERSTEN. In contrast to the treatment of the NKVD and the commandants?

Mrs. GALINSKA. Yes. I was very rundown and upset. I wanted to do something foolish and a Russian woman told me, "Don't do it; I am sure you will get out from here; you will be happy again," and so on, and I stopped thinking of doing something foolish.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mrs. Galinska.

Before we adjourn, I will state that we contemplate having further hearings in New York City commencing Thursday of this week at 10 o'clock in the morning in the Federal Courthouse on Foley Square, room 36 in that building.

At this time, we will adjourn to an executive session, after which we will adjourn until that time in New York, Foley Square, Thursday of this week, 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 p. m. the committee proceeded in executive session.)

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIC COMMITTEE,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11:45 a. m., in room 110, United States Courthouse, New York, N. Y., Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Bentley, Bonin, Madden, Machrowicz, and Dodd.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order.

This is a continuation of the hearing of the special committee of the House of Representatives, a continuation of the hearings that were instituted in Washington on Monday of this week.

At the outset we wish to introduce into the record at this point a letter that yesterday was sent to Mr. Andrei Vishinsky, pursuant to the testimony that was given in Washington on Monday and Tuesday of this week, which implicated in a very substantial way Mr. Vishinsky. The letter invites him to appear before this committee in view of this testimony in Washington and, Mr. Counsel, I will ask you to read the letter.

Mr. McTIGUE. The letter is dated December 2, 1953, and reads as follows:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., December 2, 1953.

His Excellency ANDREI VISHINSKY,
*U. S. S. R. Representative to the United Nations,
United Nations, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. VISHINSKY: As you may know the 83d Congress, 1st session, authorized the establishment of a Committee to Investigate the Illegal Seizure of the Baltic States by the U. S. S. R., because the fate of these small nations and of many more similarly seized is a matter of present grave concern to us and other free nations.

The committee has begun public hearings, the purpose of which is to hear and evaluate all testimony by interested parties. In the customary manner the committee welcomes the appearance of any and all witnesses who can contribute valid information to this study, or, who, because charges have been made against them, may wish to appear.

The duly accredited diplomatic representatives of free Latvia, free Lithuania, and free Estonia have already appeared before the committee making serious charges against the U. S. S. R.

And further, in the course of these public hearings, the committee has heard testimony concerning the Latvian Government during the period 1938-41. The sum total of this testimony, supported by substantial documentary evidence, including photographs, points to one Andrei Y. Vishinsky as the key political commissar assigned by the U. S. S. R. to advance its political objectives in Latvia. Further, the charge is made that one Andrei Y. Vishinsky was person-

ally present in Riga, Latvia, and from the Soviet Embassy and elsewhere directed the military and secret-police forces of the U. S. S. R. in such manner as to dissolve the legal Government of Latvia, and to cause a new election in which the Latvian people were denied their right of free elections by secret ballot. It is also charged that one Andrei Y. Vishinsky was responsible for the death and deportation of thousands of Latvian men, women, and children, and that he remains today as the outstanding unpunished criminal of our times. Moreover, it is charged that said Andrei Y. Vishinsky is the same Andrei Y. Vishinsky now serving as chief of the delegation of the U. S. S. R. to the United Nations.

You will agree, I am sure, that these are grave charges.

I am aware of the official position you take regarding the Baltic nations, having read your December 1952 speech, stating that they willingly joined the "happy" association of "people's democracies" of the U. S. S. R. But the committee is interested in your response to the specific attack against you as an individual, referring to the above charges that you were personally present in Riga, Latvia, to engineer the enslavement of Latvia and charging you personally with prime responsibility for the horrors that followed in that tragic country. It is concerning this specific personal attack against you, therefore, that the committee is interested in your response.

The American tradition of justice has always held that the accused be given every opportunity to state his side of the case and to support his case with such other witnesses and documentary evidence as he deems appropriate. This inviolable principle applies in the courts of the United States as well as in the conduct of investigations by committees of the Congress of the United States. The upholding of this principle, so vital to the preservation of all human freedom, demands that no exceptions be made to it.

Consequently, the committee extends to you an invitation to appear before it in order that you may have an opportunity to answer this specific charge. Since the committee will hold hearings in New York City on December 3, 4, and 5, room 36, Federal Courthouse, Foley Square, New York City, before undertaking like hearings throughout the United States, it is hoped that you will find one of these dates convenient. However, the committee is prepared to hold special hearings in New York City if you find these suggested dates inconvenient.

Awaiting your reply, I am

Sincerely,

CHARLES J. KERSTEN, *Chairman.*

MR. KERSTEN. This letter will be made a matter of record. It is so ordered. It will also be on the record that this letter was mailed yesterday.

Who is your first witness?

MR. McTIGUE. The first witness is Mr. Grantskalns.

STATEMENT OF ATIS GRANTSKALNS

MR. KERSTEN. Will you raise your right hand, please? You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. GRANTSKALNS. I do.

MR. KERSTEN. Have a chair, please.

MR. McTIGUE. Before proceeding with the witness, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make reference to the fact that as we go along with this testimony I will introduce certain photographs which have already been identified by Mr. Jekste in Washington and which are a part of the record. I am going to introduce these photographs because Mr. Grantskalns was present when the acts and incidents which are revealed in the photographs took place and knows of them personally.

MR. KERSTEN. Well, I assume by your latter statement that they can be further identified by this witness, and if there is any further identification necessary, I see Mr. Jekste is in the hearing room. He has already identified them in Washington, as you state.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is right. Mr. Grantskalns can also identify them, particularly the incidents revealed in the photographs.

Will you identify yourself, please, Mr. Grantskalns?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. My name is Atis Grantskalns.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you spell it for us, please?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The first name is A-t-i-s; last name, G-r-a-n-t-s-k-a-l-n-s.

I was born on December 26, 1907 in Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where do you presently live?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. My mailing address is R. F. D. 2, Box 4-2-C, Nixon, N. J.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been in the United States?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I came to the United States in March 1950.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a judge of the Riga court in Latvia?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes. Before the Russians occupied Latvia, I used to be a judge of the district court at Riga, Latvia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you an examining judge of the court, which is comparable in American jurisprudence to a district attorney?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Something like that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, please, with your statement concerning what happened after the Soviets left Latvia. Let me go back a moment. Were you there when Latvia was seized by the Soviet?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do during the time it was under Soviet control?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. When the Russians took over the control of free Latvia I was fired as a judge and was most of that year unemployed; only the last part I got a job as a truck driver.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us what happened after the Soviet left?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The Soviets were driven out of Latvia 1st of July 1941. And all of us that formed the Latvian Government—employees, judges, and so on who were still alive and around—arrived on the 1st of July. We went back to our jobs which we left a year ago when the Russians, the Bolsheviks came in, because we never recognized that Bolshevik regime and felt that we still are in our positions; only temporarily we couldn't work.

So right on July 1 when the Russians left we came back and took our seats again and stayed to organize administration in Latvia again. That was the day when the Riga courthouse was surrounded by thousands of Latvians who were very anxious to get some information about their family members and relatives which were arrested 2 weeks earlier and deported to Russia, to Siberia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Grantskalns, what date are you talking about now?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is July 1, 1941.

Mr. KERSTEN. This was immediately after the Soviets, the NKVD left, is that correct?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. And do I understand correctly that a short time before, that is a few weeks before they left, and during that period up to the time they left, a great many things were going on in Latvia, such as deportations and murders?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go right ahead.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Latvians were in a state of terror at that time. And so on July 1 they came to the courthouse of Riga and were anxious to get some information. The only thing we could do at that time was we started to register or to put on a list all the people who were missing since the deportations took place.

So that was where we started that big list which later was handed over to International Red Cross in Switzerland. This list is now printed in Sweden, in book form, which has the title, "Those Names Accused."

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Grantskalns, you were present during the first year of Red occupation?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And it was immediately after the Soviets withdrew that these lists were made, is that correct?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct. We started with those lists on the first day after the Soviets left.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was this in the city of Riga?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That was in the city of Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. How big is Riga?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, Riga had a population of about 350,000.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were a judge in that city?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go right ahead.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened on July 2, 1941?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. On July 2, 1941, I got information from an employee from the Riga Sanitary Office that the surroundings around the Riga central prison are filled with very heavy smells which comes from the prison. So I went to the central prison and found that the prison was totally abandoned; it was empty, and there were no guards and no jailed persons, no prisoners.

An investigation showed later that the prisoners were deported. A couple of days before the Communists left they were all deported to Russia, except for a small number who managed to escape in that tumult, and so we could interrogate them later.

Well, in the prison yard, between the buildings, I found two places where the ground was disturbed and those places had that smell which was characteristic of corpses. So I immediately founded a commission which I headed. This commission had as a member 3 district attorneys, 2 court physicians, 2 examining magistrates, and some technical assistants.

This commission started to open up those two pits between the prison buildings. We discovered that those pits were filled with corpses, with bodies.

Mr. McTIGUE. This photograph has already been identified by Mr. Jekste in Washington. I hand you this photograph, Mr. Grantskalns, and ask you if that is a photograph of the central prison yard in Riga?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is a photograph of the central prison yard in Riga. This photograph was made in my presence.

Mr. McTIGUE. It was made in your presence?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. When, what day? Do you recall the approximate time?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That was July 3—yes; I am sure July 3. Excuse me. We were there 2 days, so maybe that picture was taken on July 4. It was taken on one of those days.

Mr. KERSTEN. Does that photograph correctly represent the scene that you saw at that time?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct. That is a part of the prison yard. It shows part of the corps he took out of the pit.

Mr. McTIGUE. This photograph, Mr. Chairman, which I would like to introduce, has not yet been identified by Mr. Jekste.

Mr. KERSTEN. It will be received; it has been identified now as correctly representing the scene that he saw.

Mr. McTIGUE. I am referring to this one that I have in my hand.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean the first one you referred to?

Mr. McTIGUE. I am referring to this one I have in my hand now. I am through with that photograph.

Mr. KERSTEN. May we mark this?

Mr. McTIGUE. That has already been marked as an exhibit.

Mr. KERSTEN. The first photograph which you referred to, Mr. Counsel, as showing the courtyard between the buildings of the prison, has already been marked "Exhibit 6-DD."

Mr. McTIGUE. It has been marked "Exhibit 6-DD," and is also admitted as part of this witness's testimony.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Grantskalns, I submit you a photograph. Will you identify that photograph?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes. This photograph was taken also in Riga central prison yard and shows a couple of the workers, the assistants, which are taken off the bodies. This particular person I can identify because I know him. That was a doctor's assistant who used to work all the time with my commission.

Mr. KERSTEN. Whom are you identifying on there, a live person or a corpse?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. A live person. The name of the particular corpse I don't remember any more.

Mr. KERSTEN. But the man in the picture who is stooping over there is a person you recognize; is that right?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is he a doctor?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. No, he isn't a doctor. He is a doctor's assistant, something like an orderly.

Mr. McTIGUE. I ask that this be marked for identification and entered as exhibit 7-A.

Mr. KERSTEN. So ordered.

(The photograph was marked "Exhibit 7-A," see p. 558.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, Mr. Grantskalns?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. When we took out the corpses we counted them, and in the first pit we found 62 bodies, and in other one 37; so, altogether 99. We found in the pockets of the clothes on the bodies some documents, some slips of paper, and so we could identify those bodies. Then we notified the relatives of the victims, and the relatives came in and recognized the bodies, and then they were buried.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who were some of the victims?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, we made up a nominal list of the victims, and when we went over that list we could see that among the victims

there were officers, army colonels, laborers, lawyers, doctors, businessmen; even the aide-de-camp of the Latvian Prime Minister, the director of the department of schools, and so on. That was a cross section of the Latvian population which was compiled in that prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you a photograph, Mr. Grantskalns which I will ask you to identify, if you can.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I know personally the person who is pictured here in this photograph. That is the former director of the department of Latvian schools, Arnold Chuibe. This is a picture of how he looked when he was alive. And this is a picture taken of his body which we took out of the pit. That picture was taken in my presence in the prison yard.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you identify that body?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I don't remember particularly how we identified Mr. Chuibe's body, but generally all of the bodies had in their pockets some papers with their names. Then we asked the relatives, the wives, the children that came in and recognized the bodies.

Mr. KERSTEN. That will be marked "Exhibit 7-B."

(The photograph was marked "Exhibit 7-B," see p. 559.)

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. When that work was finished in the prison yard we went inside the prison office and looked over what was left, what kind of documents we could see there. At that point we found a nominal list of some, close to 100 Latvian citizens, and this list was endorsed in red ink, dated June 26, 1941, signed by the NKVD Commissar, Schnstin, which was in charge of the Latvian secret police. That was endorsed with the following sentence in Russian, but translated in English that means something like—

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you know the Russian word that was on there?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The Russian text was—

Mr. McTIGUE. Before proceeding, I will show you a photostatic copy of a document, Mr. Grantskalns, and ask you if you can identify it?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Sure. That is a document we found in the prison office.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you seen the original of that document?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I have seen that original many times, and that original is now outside of Latvia. It is in Germany. I know where it is and who holds it.

Mr. KERSTEN. I might say for the record that recently in Germany I saw the same original list. That is signed by NKVD officer Schustin, and with an endorsement near his name of some Russian words which in substance, as I recall, mean "To be shot."

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes. In view of the danger to the Socialist system, all have to be shot. That is what is written here in Russian.

Mr. KERSTEN. Can you spell out the Russian word on there that means "to be shot"?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, if you will return me that paper. I will spell it out "To be shot." In Russian it is R-a-s-d-r-e-l-a-t-j. The last letter is a Russian symbol, but it might be a "j."

Mr. KERSTEN. It means "To be shot"?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many names on that list?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, on this list are, I think, a little bit over 100. I can't remember that exactly. But this list was made up not

very carefully, so at least four persons are listed here at least twice in that list. It is interesting to look over this list, and each time the reasons for it are marked down why the people are——

Mr. KERSTEN. Let me understand you, Mr. Grantskalns. Did you find the original of this list over there at that time?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Not I personally.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see it there?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, it was handed to me right after it was taken out of the file cabinet.

Mr. KERSTEN. File cabinet where?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. In the Riga prison office.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who had been occupying that office just before the Soviets left?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Soviet prison guards.

Mr. KERSTEN. The NKVD or the prison officials?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, the prison officials were a part of the NKVD.

Mr. KERSTEN. And was Schustin in charge?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Schustin was in charge of the People's Commissariat of National Security in Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is it his name that is signed to this document?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, there is a list of the names, a hundred more or less, and opposite each name there is some information as to the reasons why he was imprisoned?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, the reasons why he was arrested.

Mr. KERSTEN. After this notation on there, which means "To be shot." was there some other endorsement on the order indicating that it was put into execution?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. No, there is no such order. Only later, a couple of days later——

Mr. McTIGUE. Before we get away from that, Mr. Grantskalns, I hand you this copy of the document which purports to be a translation of the document which you just identified. Can you tell us whether that is a translation of the document? Will you compare the two, please?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, it would be difficult to go through the whole document, but that is a translation of this document.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were some of the charges against these people for which they were shot or executed? Just give us 1 or 2 or 3.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, this document contains the charges, and some of them—as for instance here, the man who was arrested was arrested because during the air raid he sought cover in the cemetery.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was his crime?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That was his crime.

Mr. MADDEN. What was that?

Mr. KERSTEN. He sought cover in the cemetery, I understood you to say.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes. That is here listed under No. 45.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was his crime?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, I will try to read this:

Accused of hostility towards the Soviet regime. During an enemy air raid over Riga was found in a cemetery, violating military regulations. Committee decree provided by paragraph 58.

That's all his crime.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have 1 or 2 others that you can pick out?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I remember one here. The only crime is that he owned a baking shop and has hired help. I don't know the correct explanations in English.

Mr. McTIGUE. Exploiting labor?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Because he owned a bakery shop and had some hired help?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, that was his crime. There is one person whose crime was that he sang Latvian patriotic songs on the street.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is the name of Dr. Chuibe who you just identified and whose photograph I hold up—is his name on that list?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, his name is here on this list.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was Director of the Department of Education.

Mr. KERSTEN. How is Dr. Chuibe's name spelled?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That's C-h-u-i-b-e. That's the last name.

Mr. KERSTEN. The first name?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The first name is A-r-n-o-l-d.

Mr. KERSTEN. What, exactly, was he?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. He was the Director of the Department of Schools.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. In Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right, give us the information about him, please, the charges against the Director of Education.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS (reading):

Former Director of the Department of Schools, Fascist Latvia. During German air raids signaled bombing squadrons for espionage purpose.

Mr. KERSTEN. That's what they charged him with?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. For that he was executed?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you know this Director of Education?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, I knew him.

Mr. KERSTEN. Had he been in office for some while, had he held that office for sometime?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. He didn't hold that office under the Russians, but before the Russians took over he was Director of the Schools, I think for over 10 years.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was he well respected in the community?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Very, very respected person.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was he a good educator so far as you know?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. So far as I know, one of the best.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was selected by the people there, is that right?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before proceeding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these documents marked for identification and entered as exhibits.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit 7-C," and the translation was marked "Exhibit 7-C-1," see p. 560.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, Mr. Grantskalns?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. A few days later I received many reports from the various locations which were close to our capital at Riga about other mass graves. So I continued my work as the head of that com-

mission, consisting of court officials and other specialists. We conducted those examinations all that summer and fall of 1941. About 18 kilometers from Riga, on the banks of Lake Baltezers, there is a big summer house which belonged to a former industrialist in Riga. This summer house was taken over by the NKVD Commissariat and used as a recreation place for the NKVD soldiers.

They built a very thick and high fence around that property so from the outside the people weren't able to see what was going on inside that property. As the witnesses told me, during the Bolshevik rule they heard, in the afternoons usually, shots in that garden of the summer house, but they didn't pay much attention to those shots, because they were shooting on the banks of the lake outside the fence, too, target shooting.

Mr. McTIGUE. Practicing?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Practicing. After the Bolsheviks left I was informed that in the summer house garden there were pits. I investigated that, and we found in that garden about 10 pits, which each contained about 10 or something bodies. Altogether in that garden we took out of the pits 113 bodies.

We identified them all, and among them we found very-well-known Latvian Government officials, army officers, police employees, and so on—even a pupil.

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you a photograph which I will ask you to identify if you can.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, this is Colonel Streips, and that's one of the victims that we found in Baltezers.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell that name?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. S-t-r-e-i-p-s. That's the last name.

Mr. KERSTEN. The first name.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The first name was—I am not so sure, but I think it was V-a-l-f-r-i-d-s. As I say, I am not so sure, but that is so far as I remember.

This is a picture of his body in Baltezers, taken in my presence after we took out the corpses of the victims.

Mr. McTIGUE. That will be marked for identification.

(The photograph was marked as "Exhibit 7-D," see p. 565.)

Mr. McTIGUE. You mentioned a schoolboy whose body you dug up.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was the schoolboy?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The schoolboy's name was Franckevich.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was his crime?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. In the pocket on his body we found two blood-stained documents. One of them showed that he was tried the first time and he was given 10 years' prison. And a short time later he was tried for the second time, and the second time he was sentenced to death.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was he charged with?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The death sentence said no reasons given for the death sentence. There was only a description of the person, of his person, and that said that he has been a member of the 4-H Club.

Mr. McTIGUE. The 4-H Club?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, the 4-H Club. That is repeated in a very great number of the death sentences as one of the offenses.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is like our 4-H Clubs here in the United States?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes. The same 4-H Club in Latvia was introduced by our President Ulmanis who established it.

Mr. KERSTEN. I suppose that type of activity in 4-H Clubs in agriculture didn't exactly fit in with the collective farm idea of the Communists, is that it?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes; I know that. Most; not most but a great number of the death sentences belonging to the 4-H Clubs was something which was to be punished.

Mr. KERSTEN. How old was this boy, do you know?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That boy was 17 years old at the time he was shot. He happened to be the son of a well-to-do industrialist. That was mentioned in the death sentence, and in consequence it said that a young man who is the son of a well-to-do father and who belongs to a 4-H Club is a potential enemy to the Soviet system.

Mr. KERSTEN. That's enough to make a criminal in any Communist state.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you a photograph and a photostat and ask you if you can identify them?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is a picture taken from the boy's body, and this is the photostat of his death sentence which we found in his pockets. It says that the sentence is final, can't be appealed; but only during 72 hours it can be, well, appealed to the court that doesn't go into the substance of the subject but only to see if legal procedures have been correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you find some of the bodies with the hands tied behind their backs?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, in Balezer most of the bodies, if not all.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I interrupt a moment please? May we have this marked for identification.

Mr. KERSTEN. Which photograph?

Mr. McTIGUE. The photograph that refers to the murdered school boy.

(The photograph was marked as "Exhibit 7-E," see pp. 566 and 567.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you give us the spelling of this boy's name?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. F-r-a-n-c-k-e-v-i-c-h.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you know his first name?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I don't remember the first name.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were talking when I interrupted you, Mr. Grantskalns, about finding certain bodies with the hands tied behind the backs.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes. In Baltezers most of the bodies, if not all, that we found had their hands tied up on their backs.

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you a photograph and ask you if you can identify the photograph?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes. This is one of the photographs taken in Baltezers which shows a body with the hands tied up. This particular photograph is a photograph of the body of a former Latvian policeman. He has still on the Latvian policeman's uniform, breeches.

Mr. McTIGUE. May we have that marked for identification, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

(The photograph was marked "Exhibit 7-F," see p. 568.)

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Each body had a hole in the back of the head, and when we found some of the bullets in the head, our experts told us that that was a bullet from the pistol. So the victims were shot by a pistol.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Grantskalns, were you in Riga in June of 1940 when the Bolsheviks first came?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. No; I wasn't in Riga. I was in the city of Daugavpils.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, please, Mr. Grantskalns?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. But there is an interesting thing that in each pit that had, say, 10 corpses, 8 had holes in the back of the head and at least 2 had holes of the shots on the top of the heads. And those two bodies which had the holes on the top of the heads were always on the very bottom of the pit.

So the only explanation we could make was that those two were chosen to dig the pit and shot when they had finished their job and were in the pit, and the rest of that transport were shot at the edge of the pit and then thrown into the pit.

Mr. KERSTEN. All of these people that you are able to identify, as I understand your testimony, were people that were good people, members of the community, respected citizens, professional people, completely innocent of any ordinary crimes so far as you have indicated in any way; is that about the situation?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Altogether during that year I dug out over 900 bodies and none of those victims were a former criminal. They were all the most respected persons in our country.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, they were among the leadership of your normal society there before the Bolsheviks took over; is that correct?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That's absolutely correct, because among those victims I found were the leaders of our communities, the most outstanding intellectuals, teachers, officers, government employees, and so on.

Mr. KERSTEN. These people, the leaders of your society of Latvia, met their deaths of these various horrible kinds after Latvia was taken over under the leadership, the personal leadership, of Mr. Andrei Vishinsky; is that correct?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right. When Mr. Andrei Vishinsky came in and started to direct all the administration of Latvia, that was when those people were arrested.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is the same Vishinsky that is presently at the U. N. here in New York, isn't it?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes; because I have seen Mr. Vishinsky at that time in Latvia, and I have seen him in New York now.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, Mr. Grantskalns. Where was your next visit?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, then from Baltezers we went to various places in Latvia, and even we followed information that some of the Latvians were shot outside the Latvian border. So, following one of such information we went to a Russia city in Russia; it's name is Pskov. We had information that a transport of Latvian deportees which went through Pskov was stopped there and the people were shot.

So we went; so our commission went to Pskov, and we found a grave but only with seven corpses. In this grave the bodies were buried in a very shallow and damp place, and the corpses were falling apart, so we couldn't identify them. But we made a conclusion from the clothes and some other small things that they were Latvian citizens.

We made an investigation and I personally interrogated the railroad employees, and I was told that those 7 people were taken out of 1 transport which came from Riga and was proceeding to Leningrad with Latvian arrestees, and those 7 people were taken to Pskov, out of the train, and shot at the railroad station and carried about 200 feet from the railroad station and buried. That's where we found them.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the summer of 1942 did you make an investigation?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. In 1942 I received information that a greater number of Latvians had been shot outside Latvia on the banks of the River Daugava. Daugava is one of the biggest rivers in that part of Europe.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell that?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That's D-a-u-g-a-v-a.

So my mission went to that place. It is about 100 kilometers, about 60 miles, from the Latvian border, near the village Una. It is spelled U-n-a.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were these people found?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, I already testified about that. That was in Pskov, but now I am speaking about a village, Una, in Russia. That's about 60 miles from the Latvian border. I was informed that in Una a great number of Latvians were shot. So our commission went down to Una and we were told by the people in Una that in 1941, when the war between Russia and Germany broke out, a huge column of arrestees were driven along the highway eastward. When this column—which consisted of about 2,000 people, male, female, and even children—came out of the woods and reached village Una; just before that village that highway goes uphill—it is a small hill. On top of that hill is an intersection and there is a big road that crosses that way.

When this column reached that intersection it was stopped by the guards—the NKVD guards which guarded that column. Those 2,000 people were stopped on that intersection, divided in 4 groups, placed out like wings, corners, so it formed something like a cross. Then the guards went down the hill and the people stayed on top on that hill, and the guards opened fire on that column, on those 2,000 people, from all sides and kept up that fire by machine gun 'till all of those people who were on top of that hill were dead.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They were all Latvians, were they?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Will you tell us who was there; besides Latvians, what other groups?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. When we opened those graves we found those bodies very much falling apart, and no documents were found in the pockets—no documents at all. But judging by the clothes, by the buttons, by belts, by shoes, by socks, we came to the conclusion that mostly those people came from the eastern part of Lithuania and

Poland. Some of those bodies had beards and had long hair, characteristic of the Greek Orthodox Church, and some of the bodies—a great number of them—had long clothes which the priests in Europe wear—clergymen.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were they all civilians?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. All civilians. When we opened those graves the bodies were piled up in four rows. There were 9 huge pits containing altogether 2,000 men and women.

We opened graves in Latvia, Ulbroka, Babita, Litine, Bikernieki, Ropasi, Dreilini, and Aglona.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us about the investigation you made at Dreilini?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That was one of the last ones we opened, in Dreilini, where we found, I think, 39 bodies. Those corpses were tied, their hands behind their backs, but two of them had their hands tied and beside them was a rope, a noose—it was around their necks. First, we had the impression that those two victims were not shot, but they were hanged. When we looked at them close we found the holes in the back of the heads again, and then we decided that we couldn't explain those ropes around the necks. They must be some kind of important persons and they used those nooses for a special security on the way from the transport machine in the woods, so that the prisoners can't escape.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Grantskalns, to get this a little clearer in the record, I would like to have you tell us at this point a little bit more about this commission that you were with. About how many members of the commission were there? Were they Latvian people?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The number of the members was not always the same.

Mr. KERSTEN. It varied, did it?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. It varied, because in one spot we used more help, in another one, less.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you have medical men?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. We had two court physicians as permanent members of my commission.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you the head of the commission?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was the name of the commission?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, it is hard to translate; maybe I could ask a translator to translate that. It was a commission to——

Mr. KERSTEN. Investigate?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes; investigate, to investigate the Bolshevik atrocities, documents, and everything, all evidence about the Bolshevik atrocities. The membership of that commission varied from 5 to 10.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long did it operate?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. It was in 1941 very active, and then only when something turned up again, but that commission was in action all the time.

Mr. KERSTEN. How soon after the Bolsheviks left did you start organizing this commission?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The commission was organized on July 2.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Bolsheviks left when?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. July 1.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you continued to operate thereafter and you were uncovering these graves?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was it a German-appointed commission?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. We had nothing to do with the German occupation forces. That was a Latvian commission which was built in the Latvian court system.

Mr. McTIGUE. July 1 officials like you, after the Soviets left, immediately reverted to the positions you held before the Soviets came in?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct. On July 1 we all went back to our work.

Mr. McTIGUE. And the Latvian Government immediately started to function as the Latvian Government on that date?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. The provisional government that commenced to operate almost immediately, was that Latvian?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And then ultimately the Nazis came in and they took over?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, the first couple of weeks the Germans had no time to organize. Later they started to organize some things in Latvia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Berzins, will you come around here, please? I would like to have Mr. Berzins sit here.

STATEMENT OF PETERIS BERZINS, DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTE FOR RENDERING SCHOLARLY EXPERT OPINIONS TO COURTS

Mr. KERSTENS. Mr. Berzins, you do solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BERZINS. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify yourself, Mr. Berzins?

Mr. BERZINS. Peteris Berzins.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you born in Latvia?

Mr. BERZINS. I was born in Latvia in 1893.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you live there from 1893 through 1940 when the Soviets occupied Latvia?

Mr. BERZINS. I lived there but at the First World War I served in the army.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your occupation?

Mr. BERZINS. I am a master of pharmacy.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you employed by Mr. Grantskalns' commission, or the commission which he headed as judge?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. In July of 1941?

Mr. BERZINS. No; 1943.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you employed by this commission in the identification of certain documents?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now I want to proceed with Mr. Grantskalns' testimony.

Will you go on, please?

Mr. KERSTEN. Just at that point your commission had been in operation for a couple of years, then, before Mr. Brazins was employed on this other matter, is that correct?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct. We found those two bodies with the ropes around the necks and when we started to identify them it turned out that those two bodies were corpses of two Latvian Army generals. The first one was Gen. Karlis Goppbers.

Mr. MADDEN. I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the most important thing is to get this record and if the reporters will interrupt at any time, I think that would be satisfactory, so that they can get the correct spelling.

You speak up at any time for the correct spelling.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is certainly desirable.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. General Goppbers was the president of the Latvian Boy Scout organization. He disappeared during the Bolsheviks regime and nobody knew what happened to him until 1943 when we found his body in the pit near Dreilini.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before proceeding, Mr. Grantskalns, I hand you a photograph and ask if you can identify it, please?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. This photograph was taken in my presence at Dreilini and I personally recognize myself on this picture.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you identify yourself in that picture?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I am the last man on top here.

Mr. McTIGUE. I will ask that this be marked for identification, Mr. Chairman.

(The photograph was marked "Exhibit 7-G," see p. 568.)

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you another photograph.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. There are two pictures. The one on the left side was taken in the Riga prison yard and that on the right side on Baltezers. Here you can see even that fence I spoke about, that big fence that is around the garden. There are the bodies taken just out of the pits.

Mr. KERSTEN. This photograph shows the head of the Boy Scouts?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. He was the president of the Latvian Boy Scout organization.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was well known—or internationally known—for Boy Scout activities?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. I suppose the Boy Scouts would be a subversive organization under Communist rule; is that right?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is how it looked like.

Mr. McTIGUE. You identified this body as being the body of General Goppbers?

(The photograph was marked "Exhibit 7-H." See pp. 569 and 570.)

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. We found that body in 1943, so that was about 3 years after he was shot, but his body was put in a dry, sandy place, so the body was well preserved. We had some difficulties from the beginning, but I asked his dentist to come out with the book where he had records of the work he had done with the general's teeth, and then we found that the body's teeth corresponded to that chart. Then we asked the son of the general to come out, and he recognized that body and later on some documents were found in some pockets.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Berzins, did you identify, or take part in the identification of those documents?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes; on the bodies we opened and we made pictures. Then we started to find what we can find in the pockets.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you able to establish the identification of General Goppbers through various documents?

Mr. BERZINS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, Mr. Grantskalns?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The second body with the rope around the neck belonged to the former commander of the Latvian Home Guards. That was General Brauls. General Brauls' body was identified also later by the Institute for Scientific Investigation for Legal Proving in Mr. Berzins' laboratory.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you find other bodies of leading officers in the Latvian Army there?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. We found a former colonel and we found some other high-ranking officers, but I don't remember the names now.

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you a photograph and ask you if you can identify it, please?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is a former commander of the Railway Defense Guard. His name was Ozolins.

Mr. McTIGUE. I ask that this be marked for identification.

(The photograph was marked "Exhibit 7-I," see p. 571.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you go ahead, please?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is about all the bodies we found. Altogether my commission dug out 979 corpses.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you find in the basement of the Riga—

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I would like to point out that between those 979 victims there was 1 child 6 years old who was found in rubbish. But of those 979 victims which we dug out, they were not all murdered in Latvia during the Bolsheviks' time, because those we found were those who were led to the place of execution alive. That was established. A much greater number of arrestees were shot in the Cheka execution camps and those corpses were transported by trucks out of the Cheka cellars and those were put in a very good hidden place and we didn't find that place.

I investigated that Cheka cellar and that Cheka execution chamber. That execution chamber had a concrete floor which was slanted to one corner and in that corner was a drain I opened that wire which was over the hole and that drain was full of old blood. I personally took out close to 200 empty shells out of the drain. The walls in that chamber were paneled with wood and between the concrete wall and the wooden panels where was some kind of insulation—upholstering. I think that was for the purpose to prevent ricocheting. Over that wooden panel was hung a rubber cloth and in that rubber cloth and in that wooden panel there were hundreds of bullet holes. That rubber cloth was bloodstained and there were water holes in that chamber.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where was this chamber?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That was NKVD house.

Mr. KERSTEN. What house?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The former Ministry of the Interior of Latvia was turned over to NKVD when the Russians took over. That is the building right in the middle of the Latvian capital, Riga, and the main street.

Mr. KERSTEN. When did you first see that execution chamber?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I saw that for the first time if I remember well on July 5 or 6.

Mr. KERSTEN. Of 1941?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, a few days after the Bolsheviks left, during this first year of occupation that was engineered by Mr. Vishinsky; is that right?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct. Before that there was no such cellar below that house. That was built in that year.

Mr. KERSTEN. This type of thing followed Mr. Vishinsky's appearance in Latvia; is that right?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct. He took over and directed in Latvia and this cellar and this execution chamber was built.

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you a photograph, Mr. Grantskalns, and ask you if you can identify it, please?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. This is a door which opens.

(The photograph was marked "Exhibit 7-J," see pp. 572 and 573.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Is this the chamber you are talking about?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is the door to the execution chamber about which I am talking. This is a tile floor and this is the rubber cloth on the wooden panel on the wall. You can see that this door is well upholstered, it is soundproof. Another door from this execution chamber opened to the garage and the corpses were transported by trucks out of this Cheka cellar. In this garage I found in the corner a canvas which I think was used to cover the bodies. That canvas was very, very much stained with blood, the same as the rubber cloths on the wall in the execution chamber.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley, do you want to ask a question?

Mr. BENTLEY. Going back to the beginning of your testimony, when did you send the list of these missing people to the International Red Cross?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I didn't do that myself but after that list was mostly finished I turned over that list to the Latvian Red Cross and the Latvian Red Cross goes over and rearranges that list in alphabetical order, typed it over once more and sent that one copy of that list to the International Red Cross in Switzerland, if I am not mistaken, in 1942. I can't tell that exactly because that was to be done secretly because the German occupation forces didn't allow to do that legally.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were there many people on this list who were never accounted for, whose bodies were never found?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. No, we never found a body which is listed in that because there are two different types of arrestees in that year, the people who were arrested during those years or who disappeared somehow and nobody knows what happened to them, because they arrested people on the street and how did we know what happens?

Another category is the people who were deported in June 1941. That is a big number which is listed now in the book.

Mr. BENTLEY. You say that most of the people whose bodies were discovered were shot in the back of the head, had their hands tied behind them, mostly shot on the spot where they were buried?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. All of them.

Mr. BENTLEY. And they were shot by a type of pistol which you said was used by the NKVD?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did they show, in addition to the bullet marks, any evidences of torture?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Some of the bodies had broken jaws, one or two had broken skulls. Some of them had broken ribs, some had broken legs, but, yes, there were some with no lips or broken noses, even without ears. By that time were were too busy to make a very good investigation as to what happened to those bodies and in what manner, and so on.

Mr. BENTLEY. But presumably it was during questioning, wasn't it?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. We presumed that but I personally have no proof of that, but when you can see the bodies with no lips, broken jaws, ribs, you can easily make your mind up what happened to them.

Mr. BENTLEY. Going back to the people you found in the prison courtyard, when did most of those people disappear, as far as you or their families knew?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Most of them were arrested in the last 10 days.

Mr. BENTLEY. And how long, approximately, had they been dead when you found them?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. They were shot from the 27th to the 28th, according to some political prisoners who escaped from the jail when the Russians left and who testified to me that they had heard those shots on that night in that particular part of the prison yard.

Mr. BENTLEY. And these people were killed just before the Soviets left?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I think 24 hours or 48 hours before the Soviets left.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is it possible they were killed because of the fact that the Russians had to flee the country before the Germans?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, executions were in that time.

Mr. BENTLEY. Two more questions: On this document that has been offered in evidence as a translation of the document that was found in the prison headquarters, I notice these people are accused of crimes under a certain penal code, under a certain legal code. What legal code is that?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is paragraph 58 of the Russian Criminal Code.

Mr. BENTLEY. They were convicted under Soviet law?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Have you checked these particular references to determine if they were actual provisions of Soviet law? Does the Soviet law actually provide the death penalty for such crimes as these people were accused of?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, because all of them are accused under paragraph 58. Paragraph 58 in the Russian Criminal Code is a very outstanding paragraph.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean the Soviet code?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes. It has points, something like 40 or so, so actually it is not a paragraph; it is a chapter. It contains all sorts of activities which can be labeled as anticommunistic.

Mr. KERSTEN. For all anti-Communist activities the penalty is death, isn't it?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes, but the Bolsheviks think that anti-Communist activity is belonging to a 4-H club, too.

Mr. BENTLEY. And the reason the criminal code was used was because at that time the fiction of Latvia being incorporated into the Soviet Union existed?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. After the investigations were finally completed in which your commission engaged, what report was made and what disposition was made of the report, if any?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. There were no reports made because we didn't think we had finished our work. It turned up always something new, some new graves. We tried to interrogate the relatives of the victims and find everything out about those murders, so that our work wasn't finished and no final report was made.

Mr. BENTLEY. And no use was made of your findings at that time?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. What kind of use would you mean? The victims were dead.

Mr. BENTLEY. This is the first time that the facts which your commission uncovered have been used in any kind of investigation?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Grantskalns, Mr. Vishinsky and others connected with the Soviet leaders, in speeches and otherwise, stated that Latvia, along with Lithuania and Estonia and other victim nations volunteered to join the Soviet orbit because they wanted to be under the Russian Soviet Government. From your testimony, Mr. Vinshinsky's statement and the claims of the Kremlin rulers is untrue, is that a fact?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. If Mr. Chairman will allow, I would like to tell a small story about that volunteering: It is true that the Latvian Parliament, which was elected in 1941 in July after the Russians took over, sent a delegation to Moscow, but I had a small experience about those elections when I went to the place where the ballots were cast, the voting booth. At that time I saw a woman who came into that voting place. In the center stands the ballot box and on that ballot box was a huge picture of Stalin. Latvia was independent at that time. There was the head of a foreign state on that ballot box.

In one corner was a dresser, put in the corner so if somebody wanted to look over that list of the candidates which was handed to the voter—there was only one list of candidates. No more were allowed. If somebody wanted to examine that list he could go in that corner behind the dresser. Nobody did that, nobody, only one woman. Right at that time when I was in that voting place the woman made use of this right to go in that corner and when she came out she went to the ballot box with the list of candidates folded in her hand and tried to put that list of candidates in that ballot box. Right at that time two of the Red guards who stood by that ballot box slapped her hand. She tried in vain to put the list of candidates in that ballot box but that list was taken out of her hand.

Mr. KERSTEN. By whom?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. By the two Red guards. The election officials went together and had a look at that list of candidates and that woman was immediately arrested and taken away and never returned to her community. I don't know what she wrote on that, but evidently she wrote something.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, there has never at any time been any fair election held?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. No, that was a farce, a comedy.

Mr. MADDEN. The Soviet Government has taken over control of Latvia through elections, just as you outlined, and by threats and murders, just as you testified?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct. The whole nation was terrified.

Mr. MADDEN. And the people who in the majority were assassinated and murdered and buried in these mass graves were mostly potential leaders of Latvia?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct; mostly. But then, there were very common people between them, laborers and people without much schooling, and so on; even children.

Mr. MADDEN. But that pattern was not only used in Latvia to take over the Latvian Government, but do you know whether that pattern was used in Lithuania and Estonia and other countries as well?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, when I found those graves near Una, I was on my way back to tell the Lithuanian officials about those discoveries and then I heard from them that the same thing has happened in Lithuania as well.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, I might say for the record that from the testimony of Mr. Grantskalns, also other testimony that we have taken in Washington, the pattern used by the Soviets in Latvia and Lithuania and Estonia was identical with the same pattern used in Poland. As a member of the Katyn Massacre Investigating Committee, we took testimony along the same lines. The same pattern was used in Poland as was used in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

I might say further that we had dozens and dozens of witnesses who testified regarding the Katyn massacre, including doctors who exhumed the bodies from the Katyn mass graves. The same method, the same pattern was used in massacring these Polish officers and intelligentsia as was used in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. With very, very few exceptions, the 4,200 bodies found in the Katyn graves were all shot in the back of the head, their arms tied behind them, the same as has been described in regard to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The pattern is identical, as the testimony of the Katyn massacres revealed.

I might state that in connection with the propaganda sent out by Vishinsky and the Russian leaders regarding Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—particularly Latvia, because Vishinsky was present in person there—the Russian Soviet leaders lied immediately after the graves at Katyn were found by the German army in the spring of 1943. Moscow, through the Kremlin radio, sent out word that the Katyn massacre was committed by the Germans and, of course, the Katyn report reveals, by the testimony of over 110 witnesses and by two-hundred-odd exhibits that the Russian Soviet NKVD massacred the 4,200 Poles at Katyn.

That testimony is the same identical pattern, Mr. Chairman, as this committee is unraveling regarding Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden, I think it is important that the statement you have just made be made a part of the record. You, having been chairman of the Katyn Forest Committee, were certainly in an excellent position to make these observations and I am very happy that you have because we here in America are interested to know the

pattern of Soviet Communist aggression and occupation. It is becoming clear that under the leadership of Vishinsky in Latvia this pattern was imposed. It has been imposed by other Soviet leaders in other countries, in Poland, as you point out, and in other countries of Eastern Europe. From accounts coming from all over the globe it was in operation in Korea. It is a very current pattern that the Communists would like to employ wherever they have the opportunity to do so.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, you are correct. I might further add for the record that a year and a half ago when the first reports from General Hanley came out of Korea, the soldiers and prisoners who were massacred in Korea were massacred in the same manner, to wit, shooting in the back of the head with their hands tied behind them. That same program of massacring and murdering was carried out in Korea as in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Katyn.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden, this afternoon we intend to put on the stand Mr. Voldemar G. Ludig who experienced a brain-washing type of persecution in Estonia. We intend to have with him to also tell his story, Sgt. George Morar of the United States Air Force, who was subjected to the same treatment very recently in Korea. They will show the identity, pattern, and blueprint that the Communists would employ all over the world.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin, go ahead.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Grantskalns, you said you investigated one grave in which there were 99 people found murdered.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Two pits, 99 people.

Mr. BONIN. Another one with 113 bodies?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct.

Mr. BONIN. Another one with 2,000 bodies?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Another one with 979 young people's bodies?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is a mistake. That figure, 979, represents the sum of the various small graves all around Latvia. That is the total sum of the small graves but that doesn't include those 2,000 in Uua.

Mr. BONIN. These atrocities, brutalities, and murders, are the Russian plans for happiness, peace and contentment which we hear being sounded off in the United Nations here in this city? Is that correct?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. So far as I understood the Russian policy, I was sure that the Russians intended to destroy the present generation.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are speaking of the Communists, aren't you, not the Russian people, but the Communists?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. The Communist rule of the Russian nation. I get the impression that it was to destroy the Latvian nation.

Mr. BONIN. We have seen demonstrations of the same occurrences in Estonia, Lithuania, and in Poland. We have heard of the same identical things being practiced in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, in the Eastern Zone of Germany, therefore it is logical to conclude that this pattern and these plans would even take effect in the United States if they were able to accomplish it.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Wherever the Communists will take over, the same pattern will be executed. There is no doubt about that because in all countries where the Communists took over, conquered, the

same thing happened again. I don't see why it would be, for instance here, different.

Mr. BONIN. A little earlier in the testimony you described the voting precinct during the course of the elections in 1940. Would you mind describing to the committee just exactly what was in that voting precinct? Was there a picture of Stalin in that voting precinct?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. As I told, that was a big room and on the left side from the entrance doors there was a table at which sat some girls. They handed out to the voter a list of candidates and then in the center of that room stood a small table. On that was a wooden ballot box. There was an opening on the top. Behind that opening there was a very big picture of the head of Soviet Russia, Stalin. In one corner was a dresser, turned in the corner so that it was a hiding place. All around in that room there were the Red guards, the Red militia, police, Red police, and representatives from the district and a lot of officials. I can't identify them all; I don't know what kind of duties each had. Of course, there was the Red flag, the Red banner.

Mr. BONIN. But they did have another box there where this woman wanted to put her ballot?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That was the same ballot box. Usually everybody who came in took that list of the candidates, went right to the ballot box, didn't fold it, but put it in. This woman took that list and went into that corner behind that dresser. She spent about a minute there, came out with that list folded and tried to put it into the ballot box. That woman, her hand was slapped and opened and that list of candidates taken out of her hand. Those officials looked at that list and that woman was taken away and she never returned.

Mr. BONIN. That is the free type of elections guaranteed by the constitution of the U. S. S. R. and of the U. S. S.—whatever they call it for Latvia now, and the U. S. S., whatever they call it for Estonia, and the U. S. S. for Poland, Lithuania and all other countries?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is the type of elections which we had in Latvia and everybody has seen it who lives in the countries dominated by the Communists.

Mr. BONIN. Can you visualize how people in this Nation here, with all the freedom they have, can be stupid enough to follow that type of philosophy?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. If at everybody's neck there is a soldier with a pistol in his hands, I can visualize that; yes. That is what happened in Latvia.

Mr. BERZINS. All leaders at first were arrested, put into jail, and sent to Siberia.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, anybody who has sympathy with the Communist philosophy today—if they were successful, the same sympathizers would be shot or put into concentration camps?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. I am afraid.

Mr. DODD. Following up Congressman Bonin's question, let me ask you this: Were there a substantial number of people in Latvia who believed that Russian communism was a desirable thing in any respect before the occupation of Latvia?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. No, I don't think so, because the Communist Party in Latvia—there were practically no Communists in Latvia, maybe a few. The number can be set under 100 in the whole Latvian Nation.

Mr. DODD. Previously a witness in Washington told us some of the left wing liberals—I believe he described them—cooperated with the Soviet people when they came in there.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. After the Communists took over there were some—I might say traitors—who were thinking Now the Communists are the rulers and they are going to make the best out of the situation. There were only a couple of men, maybe.

Mr. DODD. I had the impression—and I feel; and perhaps some of the other members of the committee do too—that there were some people in Latvia who were foolish enough to believe that the Soviet Communist group in Russia were not as bad as some people were trying to tell the world for several years even before 1939 and before 1940.

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Well, at that time when the Communists took over the country, Latvia, the whole world didn't know as much about Communists as they know now, so no wonder that some of the Latvians were foolish enough at that time to believe that they couldn't be so bad as they turned out to be.

Mr. DODD. You don't need to feel badly about that and I didn't mean to raise any question about Latvia. We have some here, too.

Mr. KERSTEN. From your experience in Latvia with Vishinsky when he operated through the Soviet Embassy at Riga and put into motion this new Communist system, what would you expect if he, operating in the United Nations, were able to get any of the ideas across in this country so as to impose his will? Do you think he would do the same thing or not?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. Mr. Vishinsky is following the general policy of the Communist and the Communist general policy is to take over the world. Sometimes they go that way, sometimes this way, but they have only one goal and that is to destroy the free world.

Mr. BONIN. And is it immaterial what methods they use and what type of cunning or how much deceitfulness and how much lying and everything else, just to accomplish their purpose. Is that correct?

Mr. GRANTSKALNS. That is correct. They don't care about the way they do it.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will now adjourn until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p. m.)

(The committee reconvened at 2:15 p. m.)

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order, please.

Mr. LUDIG, will you step forward, please?

Is Sergeant Morar here? Will you come forward, please?

Will you both raise your right hands, please? You do solemnly swear that you and each of you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LUDIG. I do.

Sergeant MORAR. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, to identify each of these witnesses: Sergeant, will you give us your full name and rank?

Sergeant MORAR. M. Sgt. George Morar, United States Air Force.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are presently in service, are you?

Sergeant MORAR. Presently a patient at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

Mr. KERSTEN. You recently returned from the Far East?

Sergeant MORAR. I returned from Korea and entered the United States the 14th of September 1953, after being repatriated on the 2d of September the same year.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were a POW in Korea, were you?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. When were you released from the Communists in Korea?

Sergeant MORAR. The 2d of September 1953.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long had you been in Korea prior to that time?

Sergeant MORAR. I came to Korea in June of 1951 and was shot down and captured in September of 1951.

Mr. KERSTEN. That will be all for the time being, Sergeant. In just a few moments we want you to go on with your story.

Mr. Ludig, will you identify yourself, please?

STATEMENTS OF VOLDEMAR G. LUDIG, UNITED STATES MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE ESTONIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, NEW YORK; AND OF M. SGT. GEORGE MORAR, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Mr. LUDIG. My name is Voldemar George Ludig.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where do you live?

Mr. LUDIG. I live in the Bronx, New York City.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been in the United States?

Mr. LUDIG. I came to the United States a displaced person in October of 1949.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where was your home originally?

Mr. LUDIG. My home originally was in Estonia.

Mr. KERSTEN. State whether or not you fell into the hands of the Communists in Estonia.

Mr. LUDIG. That is right; I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. When?

Mr. LUDIG. In 1940.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long were you in the hands of the Communists?

Mr. LUDIG. I was in a Communist prison from December 1940 until March 22, 1941.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many months?

Mr. LUDIG. Approximately 4 months.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is your occupation?

Mr. LUDIG. I was a lawyer in Estonia.

Mr. KERSTEN. You had been a lawyer before the Communists came into Estonia, had you?

Mr. LUDIG. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Practicing in Tallinn?

Mr. LUDIG. Yes. At the moment when the Communists took over I was connected in an executive capacity with the Estonian Shipping Co. in Tallinn, Estonia.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right for the moment, Mr. Ludig.

Sergeant, where is your home?

Sergeant MORAR. Fort Walton, Fla.

Mr. KERSTEN. Your folks live down there, do they?

Sergeant MORAR. I have no parents. I was born in Ohio, settled in Florida.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you spend some time in the consular service, Mr. Ludig?

Mr. LUDIG. Yes; between the years of 1924 and 1941 I was employed by the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs and during this time I served as a secretary to the consul general in Leningrad, in Stockholm, Sweden, in Copenhagen, Denmark, and at the end I was employed by the Estonian Legation in London. Afterward I was secretary to the Consul in Newcastle-on-Tyne.

Mr. McTIGUE. In June 1940, when the Russians marched into Estonia and seized the country, what was your position?

Mr. LUDIG. In June 1940, when the Russians took over, I was employed in an executive capacity with a shipping company in Estonia.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to the shipping company after the Communists took over Estonia?

Mr. LUDIG. Shortly after the Communists took over Estonia, all private businesses were nationalized, which means they were taken over by the Government.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you instructed to assist in the nationalization?

Mr. LUDIG. Since the senior member of our company was in his seventies, I had practically to do the work and turn over all the company's assets and liabilities.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was put in charge of the company?

Mr. LUDIG. The usual procedure was that a person was appointed by the Soviet authorities as a commissar of the company to supervise the winding up of all the affairs and the turning it over to the Government.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall who was put in charge of your particular shipping company?

Mr. LUDIG. Yes; a jobless ship engineer was put in charge of our company at that time as a commissar to supervise our activities.

Mr. McTIGUE. We have had testimony here before that the Communists were in the habit of putting former criminals in positions of responsibility. Did this happen in the case of the shipping company?

Mr. LUDIG. It may have happened in some cases, but I should say there were numerous companies in the country that didn't have so many criminals to put in.

Mr. KERSTEN. They didn't have enough criminals to go around?

Mr. LUDIG. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you please describe the event that led to your arrest?

Mr. LUDIG. After the Communists came in I was busy about 2 or 3 months winding up the business and turning the business over to the Government. It took me about 2 or 3 months. After that I didn't have any intention to take up a job. Actually, what I thought was, I intended leaving the country, by necessity unlawfully. I intended going to Finland or Sweden if possible at all.

After I finished the job with my own company I think I stayed at home about 3 or 4 days. After 3 or 4 days a car was sent after me. I was taken to the Central Shipping Administration and ordered to take over the job of the Central Shipping Administration.

The Central Shipping Administration was a government agency which took over all the nationalized former private companies. In

the Central Shipping Administration my job was assistant legal adviser.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you worked there for a period of 3 months were you arrested?

Mr. LUDIG. After working there for a period of about 3 months and getting my office more or less in running order, I was arrested. It seems to be the policy to get things running by people who have been formerly in the business and who know something of the business. Afterward they were eliminated and Communist persons were put in their places.

Mr. McTIGUE. On what date were you arrested?

Mr. LUDIG. In the beginning of December; I don't remember the date.

Mr. McTIGUE. December of 1940?

Mr. LUDIG. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you taken and what were you charged with?

Mr. LUDIG. I was taken to the building of the former Estonian War Ministry. I wasn't charged with anything. According to the head of the Shipping Administration they wanted to ask me questions about claims with regard to insurance companies abroad.

I was taken over to this building. I was left there for 4 or 5 hours; nobody seemed very much to care about me. After 4 or 5 hours I was told to get out, that they wouldn't question me this time.

When I got outside the room I was surrounded by 4 or 5 Mongolian guards who took me to the basement. After a thorough search I was locked up in the basement.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were locked in a cell?

Mr. LUDIG. In a cell.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you locked in the cell alone?

Mr. LUDIG. At the beginning I was alone. The cell was intended, actually, for 8 people. At the end there were 17 people in the cell.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us what happened after you were confined to the cell as far as the NKVD was concerned?

Mr. LUDIG. After, I was trying to speak to the guards, or trying to speak to a responsible person, which is a natural thing to do. I mean, I just wanted to get somebody to explain to me what the trouble was.

I was informed by the guards that I would be informed about my troubles in due course.

I don't quite remember the number of days I was in there; I think it may have been 4 or 5 days. Nobody asked me any questions at all. Then on the 5th or 6th day—well, that is the usual procedure—about 11 o'clock or midnight I was taken out of my cell; I was taken upstairs.

The usual procedure seemed to be that before a person was interrogated they put him in a box.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are these boxes built into the wall along the room?

Mr. LUDIG. The boxes were affixed to the wall. The boxes were of such a size, about 4½ feet by 1½ feet by 3 feet.

Mr. McTIGUE. So that you couldn't stand upright?

Mr. LUDIG. You couldn't stand upright. I couldn't very well stand up in 4½ feet. I couldn't sit down because the box was too narrow and I couldn't lie down. The box was illuminated by a very powerful

bulb which was perhaps the most baneful thing about it, because it caused you headache and you were kind of blind after it.

Mr. McTIGUE. The strong light was directly above your head in that small closet where you couldn't stand up?

Mr. LUDIG. Protected by wiring, yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could you see outside?

Mr. LUDIG. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had no view at all?

Mr. LUDIG. No view at all; no, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you confined in that closet?

Mr. LUDIG. That was the usual procedure for the first time and afterward the people who were taken for interrogation were usually kept a couple of hours, 2 hours, 3 hours, just as the case may be. They were kept in such a box.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was a softening up process?

Mr. LUDIG. That was surely a softening up process, to make, so to say, softening the power of resistance.

Mr. McTIGUE. After 2 or 3 hours this first night were you taken out of the closet?

Mr. LUDIG. I was taken by the guard out of the closet and taken to the room of the—well, let's call him the examining judge or something like that, perhaps.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were just you and he alone in the room?

Mr. LUDIG. Occasionally other people were present to assist, but I mean the interrogation was more or less directed by one person.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of interrogation was it?

Mr. LUDIG. To begin with, my first question, which was probably a natural one, was to explain to me what I was charged with. He told me I would be informed about the charge, the accusation, in due course. In the meantime he said I would have to explain, to give all the information about my life story. I had to explain in detail where I had been; having served with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs I had been abroad quite a few times. I had to explain what the addresses were, what I had been doing, of course. I had to explain where I was staying, the friends I had had, where I went to have some meals, with whom I was corresponding. I mean, there were all sorts of personal questions they could think of.

Of course, it was rather difficult to reconstruct because after years one doesn't even remember where one has stayed, I mean 4 or 5 years ago, what hotel or what street.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did this interrogation last?

Mr. LUDIG. This interrogation about my life story?

Mr. McTIGUE. I mean the first night.

Mr. LUDIG. The first night it lasted—well, I was in the box 2 or 3 hours. I was taken out about 2 o'clock in the morning until 6 or 7 in the morning.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the interrogation you were returned to your cell?

Mr. LUDIG. After the interrogation I was not returned to my cell; I was returned to the same box.

Mr. McTIGUE. To the same box?

Mr. LUDIG. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you confined for another hour or two or three?

Mr. LUDIG. For another hour or two until the guards came and took me to the cell.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you permitted to go to sleep?

Mr. LUDIG. According to the rules of the prison you were not supposed to sleep during the day even if you had been interrogated the whole night through.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the guards see that you didn't sleep?

Mr. LUDIG. There were apparently special instructions for the guards to see that no people would sleep, especially the people who were under interrogation for the preceding night.

Mr. McTIGUE. If the guard saw you asleep, he would come in—

Mr. LUDIG. Threatening all kinds of disciplinary measures. Of course, that was accompanied by cursing.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were questioned all night long and you weren't permitted to sleep during the day?

Mr. LUDIG. No, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did this go on?

Mr. LUDIG. Well, I didn't keep count of any days, but the questioning went on for approximately 6 weeks, I would say.

Mr. McTIGUE. Night in and night out you were given the same treatment, first the softening up room, the closet, then to the interrogation room?

Mr. LUDIG. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. During this period of 6 weeks did the interrogation take a general course or were you asked about certain specifics?

Mr. LUDIG. After 5 or 6 nights when we had finished with my life story, the interrogating judge told me he was in a position to tell me what I was accused of. He told me I was accused of being a British spy.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did he tell you—

Mr. LUDIG. I realize I am under oath so I may as well say I have been an ordinary, average citizen. I have never been engaged in any spy activities and I never thought of getting involved in spy activities.

Mr. McTIGUE. The fact that you had served in the consular service and were on duty at one time in Leningrad or St. Petersburg, I suppose made you more suspect?

Mr. LUDIG. That made my record bad, of course.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the course of the interrogation, after you had been told of the charge that you were a British spy, did they question you along any lines concerning any incidents which they thought might verify the charge?

Mr. LUDIG. My first reaction to the charge was—I said I was no spy and that I would appreciate if they gave me some proofs or some kind of evidence of what made them think I was a spy.

The answer to that was, "It is up to you to prove you are not a spy." It was not the task of the accusing authorities to prove I was guilty.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the course of this interrogation, was any incident related to you which they felt pointed to the fact that you were a British spy?

Mr. LUDIG. The main fact that supported this accusation seemed to be the general fact that I had been abroad many times. That fact seemed to be more or less sufficient to accuse a person of being a spy.

There were also simply stupid incidents. When I was arrested all my desks were searched. All my papers, all correspondence was taken away.

There were some humorous incidents. One night the investigating judge hurled a question at me, asking me while I was living in England who of my conspiring fellows was called to my home. He mentioned something about "Whitehorse." Of course, I didn't know; I told him truthfully I didn't know. I said I had never called anybody Whitehorse.

The interrogation on that subject went on for perhaps hours and hours. I asked him to show me the proof. He said, "I will show it to you."

While I was living in Newcastle I had a student friend—I was young at that time, too. I had a student friend from Estonia at the University in Edinburgh. Sometimes I went to see him and he came to see me and we had sometimes some drinks. He wrote me a letter one day saying he was preparing himself for the examination and keeping away from Whitehorse, which was a bottle of whisky.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that was Mr. Whitehorse?

Mr. LUDIG. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What pattern did the interrogation take? Was it specific, was it general? Were you continually accused with specific charges?

Mr. LUDIG. I was never accused of any specific charge. I was generally accused of being a spy and I was asked questions which were sometimes absolutely incomprehensible to me. They were stupid to me and ridiculous to me.

Mr. McTIGUE. And some nights—probably a great many nights—they just talked and talked and talked?

Mr. LUDIG. They talked; yes. I mean, the talking was probably one of the methods of softening up, of course.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you subjected to any physical beatings?

Mr. LUDIG. I have never been subjected to any physical beatings. One of the methods was certainly an intimidating method; you were insulted almost every night.

Mr. McTIGUE. Yours was brainwashing, then?

Mr. LUDIG. You can call it brainwashing. Other people who were in the same cell with me underwent beating almost every night.

Mr. McTIGUE. They were taken from the main cell in which you were?

Mr. LUDIG. To the boxes and afterward to the interrogating judge and they were beaten up. Quite a number of my friends that time in the cell were people from Ingermanland which is a border country between Estonia and Russia. Ingermanland people are more Finnish and their Estonian language resembles more the Finnish language.

Don't forget, in this connection, that was about the time when the first Finnish-Soviet war went on, so the whole population was accused of being Finnish spies, according to what I heard from the persons in the cell. All villagers were taken away. Some were arrested, some simply deported, some to Siberia, so the whole Ingermanland country was made empty.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I refresh your recollection in one regard? When you were in the closet, did you happen to see any other names which were scribbled on the wall or on the ceiling?

Mr. LUDIG. At the end, when I was transferred to the central prison in Tallinn, they put me into a closet, and when I left it the loose board which was supposed to be the seat, where you couldn't actually sit down because it was too narrow, I lifted the board so there might be a little bit more room, and when I lifted the board I found an inscription underneath the board. It said "Friedrich Akel"—who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, actually my former boss—"was locked locked up here," I think, and the date.

Mr. McTIGUE. So the Foreign Minister of Estonia probably underwent the same kind of treatment you did?

Mr. LUDIG. He most certainly did.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you finally sentenced after these weeks of imprisonment?

Mr. LUDIG. I was finally served with the accusation document, which contained, I think, 2 or 3 lines, saying the same thing, that I was a British spy, and that was that. One night I was taken upstairs in the presence of three people. They asked me whether I had read the accusation, and I said I had, but that I had to say something. I said, "I have never been a spy and I expect you to investigate it." They said that my guilt was proved, and I was sentenced for 15 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were then brought back to your cell, and what happened thereafter?

Mr. LUDIG. I may mention, perhaps, in this connection—you mentioned brainwashing. Actually, I seemed to belong to the category of people who were unfit to live and to work in the Soviet community, so actually the whole procedure was, in my opinion, an unnecessary technicality.

Let me put it this way: Sometimes when you read in the papers that a well-known person has been arrested by the Communists, has been charged—well, let's say that the Hungarian Cardinal Mindszenty was accused of treason, spying. He was accused, I think, of a number of other actions. You sometimes wonder why a cardinal readily admitted he had committed those actions which a cardinal is most unlikely to commit, and which I personally feel he hasn't committed.

In connection with my little experience, let me put it this way: I was interrogated in Russia and I happen to speak fluently Russian. Speaking the same language as the interrogating judge, I had all the time the feeling that we were speaking two different languages. It wasn't a question of not understanding words; I mean that he didn't understand my Russian words or I didn't understand his words; it was the difference in the notions and ideas.

To explain it, let me say so much: For instance, being under criminal accusation—and I was under a political criminal accusation—if you belong to a party, say, in America, if you sometimes disagree with Mr. Eisenhower or Mr. Truman, you quit the party. You can't disagree with anything that is an established general line there; there isn't even a possibility to disagree even if you are under suspicion that, according to your background, you may not agree with the general line. Well, you have to be destroyed. That is a notion which doesn't occur to a person who is struggling to establish justice. To begin with, such differences of notions don't occur to him. Say an ordinary person is brought up in a normal way and he has, I would say, a certain code of rules or set of rules which one usually doesn't

violate without losing self-respect. I mean, I wouldn't go around and throw suspicions or denounce my best friends or my brothers and sisters.

In a Soviet community, if you want to be loyal to the party you are required to do it. You are required to do it if you want to prove your loyalty and if you want to make a living in the Soviet Union. You encounter those differences of notion at every step during the interrogation.

For instance, a practical question in connection with my shipping company. We employed quite a lot of sailors. I was asked about the company's relationship to the trade union.

The trade union as we understand it—the way it used to be in Estonia—was a free association of labor to protect the common industries. In Soviet Russia it is a Government agency. If you start discussing those things you don't understand each other.

When I said I had a feeling of talking a different language than my judge was talking, it was because he didn't understand me; I didn't understand him. In the long run it causes such a feeling of helplessness and hopelessness. You start to give up the struggle. What is the use of struggling, anyway? You wind up that when the judge says you are a spy, well, that is O. K. with me. If he says I am a spy, I am a spy. What is the use of arguing anyway? It has no sense.

MR. KERSTEN. I think you inferred a while ago that under this system if one's close relative, a father or a son or a member of the family is a member of the Communist Party, a real Communist, that communism is even stronger than the family tie, or something to that effect.

MR. LUDIG. That is certainly so.

MR. KERSTEN. That is what they try to establish under their system of society, isn't it?

MR. LUDIG. That is right, sir.

MR. KERSTEN. I would like to show you something. You said you read Russian?

MR. LUDIG. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. This is a Russian textbook for non-Russian schools, is it not?

MR. LUDIG. That is right.

MR. KERSTEN. For the year 1952?

MR. LUDIG. Yes, sir.

MR. KERSTEN. A modern textbook in Russian for non-Russian schools?

MR. LUDIG. That is right.

MR. KERSTEN. Do you know the story of Pavlik Morozov?

MR. LUDIG. I don't.

MR. KERSTEN. Here is a picture in connection with that story of a young boy testifying in court. I can tell you from having this translated that this is a story of a boy who testified against his father in court, his father being condemned to death because he hid grain in the home. For this act the boy is glorified and a statue erected to him in Moscow.

Is that consistent with your ideas of the Communist society?

MR. LUDIG. I think that is exactly what it is.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, praising a boy who would turn his father over the executioner because the father hid grain in the home in order to keep the family from starving?

Mr. LUDIG. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is consistent with what you are telling us and that is what is presently being taught in the non-Russian countries with Russian language, and in the captive states?

Mr. LUDIG. Exactly. If I may add something, as the interrogation went on, my personal case came more or less to an end; so I was asked by the interrogating judge a question which, at the beginning, seemed harmless to me. I was asked whether I knew many people in the capital of Estonia, Tallinn. It is maybe 200,000 people and if you have been in this place in school, if you were a member of a couple of clubs and societies, you could very well almost say you practically knew everyone in town. It seemed quite a harmless thing to stick to the truth and tell him so.

I soon realized what a terrible mistake I had made. They started asking me questions about where are the people, and that is how my last two weeks went on. I would say they were the most terrible weeks I had. The questionings about my personal affairs weren't so bad as the questioning about other people.

Here comes again the same story. You may give a perfectly harmless answer to a question and you never know what meaning will be attached to this harmless answer.

You would perhaps say, why not say, if you are asked about a person that you have never seen that person, you don't know anything about him. For all I knew, the same person about whom I was interrogated may have been under interrogation in the next room. You didn't make any conflicting statements, not for your own sake, not for the sake of the other persons. So, the last weeks during the interrogations I was trying to say something and at the same time to say nothing, but that put me under a mental strain.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you were sentenced, how was your release eventually effected?

Mr. LUDIG. At that time there was no war between Soviet Russia and Germany. There was an agreement between the Soviet Government and Germany about letting go certain categories of Estonian and Latvian and Lithuanian people.

While I was in prison my wife did everything possible to get me released. She went to all possible Soviet authorities, which proved to be, of course, fruitless. Good friends of my family made the suggestion to my wife that she should apply at the German Legation for me being claimed by the Germans.

One night—I didn't suspect anything—one night I was transferred to the central prison in Tallinn. I was kept in a box, as usual, and afterward pushed into a cell, and to my great consternation the whole cell was German.

Afterward I was informed that those were the people who would be handed over to the German authorities, so I found myself quite unexpectedly out of this prison and I found myself in the woods of Bavaria in Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all.

Sergeant, is there something familiar in the story that you just heard as far as you are concerned?

Sergeant MORAR. The whole thing is rather familiar as far as methods employed and timing; just the very similarity all the way through.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you shot down in Korea?

Sergeant MORAR. I was shot down on the morning of the 14th of September 1951.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were aboard what kind of plane?

Sergeant MORAR. A B-26 bomber.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you parachute out of the plane?

Sergeant MORAR. Partially; I was parachuted and blown, a combination of both.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you land?

Sergeant MORAR. I landed in the mountainous area of North Korea.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you captured?

Sergeant MORAR. Not immediately. I got out of the immediate area as fast as possible. That is conducive to longevity there. The second day out I was being trailed by a patrol, more or less, and I was wounded in the right leg, but I got away from them and then a couple of days later I had to give myself up because I lost so much blood and my face wounds had caused my eyes to close, to swell closed.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you burned?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, I was burned on the hands and face, on the parts of my body that were exposed during the burning of the airplane.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you shot in the arm and in the leg?

Sergeant MORAR. I was wounded by shrapnel in the back and I was shot in the right calf.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you finally picked up by a Communist patrol?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir, indirectly. I went to a Korean civilian's house and they turned me over to the Korea security police.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened then?

Sergeant MORAR. They walked me from the point of my capture to Yongdoc.

Mr. McTIGUE. They walked you from Yongdoc to what point?

Sergeant MORAR. They walked me from the point where I was captured, unknown to me: I don't know where it was. They walked me back to Yongdoc.

Mr. McTIGUE. How far was that, about?

Sergeant MORAR. About 10 miles.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you given any kind of medical treatment?

Sergeant MORAR. No, sir. As soon as I got there they started interrogating me.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of interrogation was it?

Sergeant MORAR. They wanted to know everything, the group I was from, where I took off from, what kind of airplane I was flying, the members of my crew, the type of mission I was on, all the units in Korea and the theater of operations, regardless of what country they belonged to, any members of the United Nations organization that had personnel in the Korean conflict. They wanted to know everything.

Mr. McTIGUE. This interrogation went on incessantly?

Sergeant MORAR. It went on all that night.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you taken from Yongdoc?

Sergeant MORAR. I was taken from there to the east coast, to Wonson.

Mr. McTIGUE. Still with no treatment for your wounds?

Sergeant MORAR. No, sir. I asked for treatment but they told me I was an air pirate, a war criminal and I didn't deserve treatment.

Mr. McTIGUE. How far was that?

Sergeant MORAR. That is about 35 miles from Yongdoc to Wonson. Why they took me there I didn't know, because they didn't apparently do anything at all to me except turn around and come back.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many miles all told were you walked in this wounded condition?

Sergeant MORAR. A little over 150, between 150 and 175. I subsequently ended up at Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, and I was in quite a state of shock. I don't remember too much of the trip. It was rather exhausting and I was pretty weak at the time. I don't recall too much of the trip except walk, walk, walk all the time.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were walked approximately 150 miles and continually questioned night and day?

Sergeant MORAR. Walked by day and questioned by night. There was a joint interrogation center, it was run by both Koreans and Chinese. I was placed in a room; the room was in a bombed out building. They had rice sacks over the front of it. They started to interrogate me and at this point I could hardly talk any more. I finally got to where I couldn't get off of the floor.

It obviously became apparent to my captors that I couldn't talk if I were dead so they had better keep me alive. So they sent me to what we would call an aid station and they administered medical supplies to me, enough to get my wounds which were infected pretty bad at this time, back to where they started to heal. But all this time the interrogation continued.

Mr. McTIGUE. During your period of so-called hospitalization, the interrogation kept up night and day?

Sergeant MORAR. Mostly in the evenings and, well, just any time they felt like it, actually. There was no set pattern to follow. You couldn't get used to when you were going to be interrogated because it was at their desire.

Mr. McTIGUE. When they were reasonably sure you weren't going to die—

Sergeant MORAR. Oh, at that time I was transferred to an interrogation center a little bit away from Pyongyang. It was the interrogation center for the North Korean Army, the best we were able to determine. We called it Pox Palace. Most prisoners know it by that name.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you confined there?

Sergeant MORAR. I arrived there the 1st of October 1951 and I stayed there until the 8th of December 1951.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened there?

Sergeant MORAR. Initially, on arrival, I was put in what we called a hole. It was a very small room about 5 or 5 feet by 6 feet, maybe, with a dirt floor, just built right on the ground. The walls were mud and the roof was thatched. It had a big, heavy door in front of it and I was placed in there, kept under lock all the time. There were no windows in the place. It was dark all the time in there. From

there, for the ensuing period of 3 days, I was taken only for interrogation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Taken out of the mudhole every night for interrogation?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of interrogation was it?

Sergeant MORAR. I would be taken into a room and there were five Korean majors sitting about a table. They would have a weapon lying on the table, a sidearm, a pistol. Each one would take turns asking me questions. They were very diversified questions. Whatever came to them they would ask me. They would ask me anything ranging from when and where I went to school to who was my commanding officer and where was such and such unit, how many Navy units, and then back to where did I go to school. They would keep that up; each one would take a turn.

Mr. McTIGUE. Much like the questioning Mr. Ludig was exposed to, the same general line?

Sergeant MORAR. You didn't know what they were after, actually. They were questioning you on everything.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were they continually accusing you of being a war criminal?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes. They accused me of being a spy because when I was shot down I had a civilian pilot's license in my possession. I wasn't able to destroy it; I thought I could hide it from them, hide my wallet, which I couldn't do. They got hold of that and of course it said I was a pilot of a single-engined plane. To them that meant officer, by reasoning it out that pilots are officers and therefore it stood to reason that if I was a pilot, I must be an officer.

When I denied this, right away they started working on that point right there. They wanted me to confess that I was a spy because why would I be posing as a sergeant if I wasn't, and I obviously wasn't a sergeant because I was a pilot. I tried to explain it, that it was only a CAA license, but that didn't go. They just kept asking about that.

Mr. McTIGUE. It is cold in Korea in October, isn't it?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, it is a lot colder when they take your clothes, too. They left me a pair of summer flying coveralls and a pair of shoes; everything else they took.

Mr. McTIGUE. And they shuttled you back, between the mudhole and the interrogation room, with the ever-present persuader on the desk for how long?

Sergeant MORAR. The initial confinement was 3 days and 3 nights. The guards had a fine deal too, because to take care of the basic necessities, nature's calls, and so forth, you had to ask permission and, of course, they just laughed at you. They played a game; even a drink of water they wouldn't give to you, nothing. They wouldn't get you anything. For 3 days that kept up and then I was put in the regular compound with the other prisoners. That was a normal Korean house, a courtyard of about 20 feet by 30 feet. It had a t-room building and confined in that area were between 70 and 80 men, all in just that little area. There were 2 rooms and all the men had to sleep in 2 rooms. It was necessary to sleep overlapping, actually. We actually had to overlap each other. That is just the way it was. Then we had to work.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of work?

Sergeant MORAR. We dug bomb shelters, and this is digging bomb shelters in rock. It was in the mountains, with a very minimum of tools, and very primitive, what were available. That was alternated with going up into the mountains and chopping down trees and brush and bringing it down the mountain, chopping it up and stacking it over by the Korean house.

I must point out that we didn't build any bomb shelters for ourselves. They were only built for the Koreans. We didn't have them.

Mr. McTIGUE. And the interrogation kept up in the meantime?

Sergeant MORAR. If you weren't working you were interrogated.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you required to assume any position during the interrogation? Were you required to stand at attention, or were you seated?

Sergeant MORAR. It depended on the whim of the interrogator. Sometimes you had to stand at attention to be interrogated and other times he would let you sit down. He would talk to you and if he was dissatisfied with an answer he would put you at attention again and possibly make you raise your arms over your head and hold them in that position, or he would make you assume what you would call a front support position, like you were about ready to do a push-up. You would have to stay in that position.

Mr. McTIGUE. A man can hold that position for so long. What happens to him when he can't hold it any longer?

Sergeant MORAR. He falls on his face first and then the guard makes him get up and do it again.

Mr. McTIGUE. And if he falls again he makes him get up again?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you struck or beaten during any of these interrogations?

Sergeant MORAR. I had them pull their weapons on me. They always wore sidearms and they always threatened to kill me. One time I was beaten rather severely. They tied me up first and a Korean captain and a Korean sergeant administered the beating, first with their fists and I guess their fists got sore so one of them picked up a shoe and started with that. I was tied after that in a regular Oriental manner with the arms pinioned by the elbows, behind the back, your hands tied across the front of your stomach and then a rope drawn around your neck so that if you tried to lean forward you would strangle yourself. Then they make you kneel on some stones and place a stick in between the back of your thigh and the back of your calf so that when you sit down on it, you are down and you can't get up. They also put bricks under your ankles. This is to stop the flow of blood.

As soon as they got me there one of them picked up a stick he had found and he beat me on the back a while. Then he left and then they would come back and on the way in they would stop at the woodpile—this Korean major I was telling you about. They told the other men in the compound that I was to be shot and if they caught anybody in the compound trying to help me, they would go in there with me; that they should disregard me and forget about me because I was going to be shot. They told me this, too.

I stayed there that day, night, and part of the following day, then they came and let me out. Of course, I couldn't walk so I

crawled into the building and the men in the building helped restore circulation to my legs.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were still suffering from your original wounds?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time when you were moved from this camp that you have just described to a camp on the Yalu River?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir; on December 8, 1951. I imagine that things were in such a state that they figured an armistice was forthcoming in the immediate future. We didn't know anything about the news. They took us up to the Yalu River and we were placed, then, in the custody of the Chinese.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the Chinese method as distinguished from the North Korean? Was there any difference?

Sergeant MORAR. They were a little more subtle and they were interested in indoctrination. They were trying to indoctrinate us, working on the assumption, I guess, that you can catch more flies with sugar than vinegar; they worked that way.

I was interrogated there and of the men I know who were interrogated there, if they didn't get the answers, it was outside, stand at attention in the cold. That seemed to be a standard thing up there, put them outside and stand them at attention. This was in the dead of winter and it got quite cool outside.

Mr. McTIGUE. I think probably that is the understatement of the year, isn't it?

Sergeant MORAR. I was initially interrogated on arriving at camp No. 2 on the Yalu and I guess I wasn't very good fertile soil for them because they didn't bother me too much. They usually try to feel you out. The first thing there, they would give you a questionnaire. They wanted to know your entire family history, every single thing. They wanted to know about all your relations, whom you worked for, all the officers you knew, all the people you knew. They even wanted to know where they worked, how much property they owned and were they Republican or Democrats, what their religious and social affiliations were.

Mr. McTIGUE. It was at this camp, wasn't it, that some of the confessions about germ warfare were obtained?

Sergeant MORAR. To the best of my knowledge that was the camp that the bacteriological confessions were obtained.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall any incidents at that camp?

Sergeant MORAR. One incident: All of the prisoners in camp were aware of the fact that since they had accused the United Nations command of using bacteriological warfare, it was going to go hard on any pilot subsequently captured, because it was our opinion that they were going to get somebody to confess to it; it was the handwriting on the wall. We saw this one man; I learned about him later. I shan't mention his name, however, for obvious reasons. He was being interrogated for bacteriological warfare. The reason I know he was, was because the rest of the members on his crew were interrogated along the same lines.

This man was a young, intelligent airman. He wasn't an old man and from what I have been able to find out about him, he wasn't anything but a levelheaded person. He was a good, healthy young Ameri-

can, but he was interrogated. The first time I saw him he was trying to get into our compound; he was not trying to escape; he was trying to get into the compound with the rest of the prisoners, among people he thought would be friends. He was in a pretty bad way; he looked bad.

The guard was shooting at him and we hollered and told him not to come any further, that he would get shot. A whole mess of Chinks descended on him and they beat the heck out of him.

Another time he tried to do the same thing. He was shot in the leg the second time and beaten up.

I never heard of him again until the day after I was repatriated. The Chinese Communists handed a list to the U. N. side. I figured the exact amount of names on that list; it seems to me there were about nine. His name appeared on this list. It said he was shot while trying to escape and it is my opinion that the man was insane; there is no doubt about it. He was driven that way by the interrogation and the interrogators. They couldn't let him be repatriated and everybody knew he was a prisoner. We all knew he was. They had to cover up some way. They probably shot him. Either they drove him to the point where he did something drastic himself or they just shot him.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then in this camp, your indoctrination courses were maintained and kept on every day?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes. We were awakened in the morning. We did some preliminary study in the room—we were supposed to. Then we were taken down to a fairly large room at the end of the building where they had pictures of Stalin, Molotov, Harry Pollard, William Z. Foster, all the great leaders. Foster's picture was the first one in line after Marx. They had Marx, Engels, Lenin, and then came William Z. Foster.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was Vishinsky up there, too?

Sergeant MORAR. No. Rudolf Slansky was, though. I guess that was a mistake. There were several whose names I don't even know. They were all around the room. We had to sit and listen to somebody expounding on the glories of communism and we were requested to comment on it. They would pass around questions that we were supposed to answer and they finally decided it wasn't going over at all and they quit it. They tried surreptitious methods of handing out things. The literature that was available was the New York Daily Worker, the San Francisco People's World, Masses, and Main Stream. I think the publishing house is International Publishers that handles a lot of these things. There was a lot of stuff by International Publishers, Soviet literature, New China, all the literature from so-called people's democracies. That was all available to us.

I might point out that after they did start exchanging mail, the New York Daily Worker was a lot fresher than the mail we got. It got there quicker.

Mr. KERSTEN. That was one of their early deliveries over there to North Korea for indoctrination purposes?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir. They used that in their training program.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Daily Worker?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir; articles in the Daily Worker by Pettis Perry or Elizabeth Gurley Flynn or something. They would use that

as the basis for a study program. A lot of these names I didn't know before I was captured. I got an education. It was the wrong kind, but I got one. The indoctrination didn't work, apparently, so they stopped it. There is one thing I would like to point out. It was mentioned that leaders were chosen from a criminal element, possibly for a control factor there. That was also done up there. If a man incurred the wrath of the Commies, then oddly enough he was placed in the position of squad leader. You couldn't see the reasoning behind it, but they figured they had control on him. He was already in trouble and he would have to walk the straight and narrow because under their system, there are no unsolved crimes. Nothing goes unexplained; it is all explained; everything is explained eventually even if it is the wrong person. If they want a confession, somebody is going to confess so they can clear the docket.

But they gave up that indoctrination in our camp. Our camp was composed of officers and Air Force enlisted men; all officers, ground and air force, and enlisted men. They placed us all in the same category for some reason. Their indoctrination didn't work.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have a feeling before the armistice that it was going to be signed?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes; that was apparent because they started to fix up the camp. They were repairing it, bringing it up to a state—of a pigpen. They continued this work, fixing up the place. They let us fix it up, which was something they didn't do before. We were always willing to do it if they would give us something to do it with. We always wanted to run the camp ourselves, which is according to all concepts of prison camps; they are usually run by the inmates, and they are responsible to their captors, but they are run by the inmates. But they wouldn't let us do that.

Anyway, they started fixing up the camp. That continued until they announced that the armistice had been signed, and continued after that. We were there for the remainder of July and August, and we left there in late August. But even when we left, in fact the day we left, there were people in there fixing up that camp even though we were already gone.

We figured it was for the benefit of the joint Red Cross teams that were coming up there, because they bounced the prisoners out of those camps just one step ahead of the Red Cross. The Red Cross didn't visit any camp that had prisoners.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long, Sergeant, were you a prisoner of the Communists?

Sergeant MORAR. Almost 2 years, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were repatriated on what date?

Sergeant MORAR. The 2d of September.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Sergeant. That is all the questions I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. I would like to ask 1 or 2 questions addressed to both gentlemen, Mr. Chairman. In the first place, I would like to ask both of you, during your interrogation, what was your average daily ration; what were you given to eat? Mr. Ludig, will you answer that question first?

Mr. LUDIG. We had a big cup of tea in the morning, and a piece of bread. We had soup for lunch, sometimes with spaghetti or macaroni, and we had sweetpotatoes and three small fishes for supper.

Mr. BENTLEY. What did they give you to eat while they questioned you?

Sergeant MORAR. The first year the ration consisted of 400 grams of some kind of grain food—millet cracked, or rice—400 grams per man per day. Now the basic issue to the soldier is 700 or 800 grams of grain food. That was supplemented by what they called a side dish. But we got 400 grams per man per day. As soon as one died, they would come and get his portion and take it out of our supply so that his portion would not be eaten.

Mr. BENTLEY. This is another question I would like to address to both of you. While you were being interrogated, did you feel that your diet was deliberately being kept low in order to weaken your strength and your resistance to the interrogation?

Mr. LUDIG. No, the diet was the same all the time. There was no special diet for the time of interrogation.

Mr. BENTLEY. What do you say?

Sergeant MORAR. It was not apparent, but in retrospect, while I was undergoing the most intense interrogation was when the ration was the lowest.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Ludig, was the same person talking to you all the time or was it different individuals?

Mr. LUDIG. It was the same person talking to me all the time, very often.

Mr. BENTLEY. You said they finally brought you before the then NKVD court and said they had proven your guilt. Did they get any admissions out of you which seemed to satisfy them as far as trying to prove a case was concerned?

Sergeant MORAR. They didn't get from me no admissions but maybe, as I say, in the long run, after weeks and weeks of questioning under physical and mental strain, I simply didn't care to argue any longer.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see. Did they tell you if you would confess what they would do with you?

Mr. LUDIG. I was told that would be an extenuating circumstance in determining the penalty.

Mr. BENTLEY. Sergeant, in that connection, I would like to ask you that same question. Were you given promises of better treatment if you answered their questions?

Sergeant MORAR. When you tried to find out what they wanted from you, they would tell you, "You just confess and we will be finished."

Mr. BENTLEY. One thing more, Mr. Ludig. Was your family threatened while you were being interrogated?

Mr. LUDIG. I was living in a house—

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me. Did they tell you what they might do to your family if you wouldn't confess?

Mr. LUDIG. My family would be deported anyway.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, Sergeant, I would like to get on to your question just a minute, and that is this: I have read various reports in the press concerning two newspapermen who during the war covered the fighting from the Communist side of the battleline. One man's name is Alan Winnington—I believe he is an Englishman—and Wil-

fred Burchett who, I believe, is an Australian. I remember him very well. He covered the Cardinal Mindszenty trial while I was in Hungary.

There has been some talk that a great deal of the examination of you fellows was prepared, at least in part, by either one or both of those men. Do you have information or any impressions as to that?

Sergeant MORAR. Well, I can't say that because I don't know who prepared them, but I will say that at the North Korean interrogation center there were questions submitted in writing that were above the comprehension of the interrogators; they didn't know that much, they weren't that intelligent about, say, aircraft and engines.

Mr. BENTLEY. The questions were submitted in English?

Sergeant MORAR. In good English, good grammar, good punctuation, and everything.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you say it was an "English" English or an American English?

Sergeant MORAR. No; it was in neither. It was just English.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you have any English-speaking Chinese interrogators?

Sergeant MORAR. Oh; yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did they speak colloquial English?

Sergeant MORAR. Of the Chinese that I know, two Chinamen spoke colloquial English.

Mr. BENTLEY. Probably proving they had been in the United States?

Sergeant MORAR. No; proving that they had been associated with GI's because they had GI jargon. The other one—I don't know—spoke English like an Italian.

Mr. BENTLEY. I wanted to bring those things out. Thank you both very much.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just one question. In any of this interrogation while you were there did you see some Russian personnel?

Sergeant MORAR. Well, I saw, I used to see a courier go by just about every day. He was dressed in a Russian uniform, lacking the insignia of rank and the red star, but from the boots to the overseas cap it was a Russian uniform.

Mr. KERSTEN. From his appearance.

Sergeant MORAR. Yes. He was spoken to by one of the men who spoke Russian, and he acknowledged it. Also I saw other Caucasians there.

Mr. KERSTEN. Other than the North Korean or Chinese?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes. They were in civilian clothing. They wore those huge overcoats and rather gaudy clothes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see this Russian courier frequently?

Sergeant MORAR. Frequently, very frequently; almost every day.

Mr. KERSTEN. Coming where?

Sergeant MORAR. Just walking by in front of our place, going to and from some place. He went right by our camp.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was right in touch with the Chinese Communist or the North Korean Communist authorities.

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Ludig, could you state whether or not the Soviets made any effort to take over jurisdiction of the younger generation in Latvia; that is, to indoctrinate them into communism?

Mr. LUDIG. I can speak only about Estonia. Certainly, yes. The old school system was remodeled according to Soviet pattern. As I say, I happen to be a lawyer, so we were all ordered to the indoctrination. While I was still working as an assistant legal adviser with the shipping company we were all ordered to attend courses on Leninism, Marxism, and Stalinism. It had actually very little to do with laws. It was more, I would say, a philosophical thing.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, the Soviet leaders, the Communist government of the Soviet Union, came in through the methods that you just described in your testimony and took over the government of Estonia against the will of the people?

Mr. LUDIG. Most certainly, through monstrous force and monstrous pressure.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. We assume that the same thing would happen here and to other free nations of the world if they were able to occupy them.

Mr. LUDIG. When the Second World War broke out, the Baltic countries were probably the first countries taken over by the Soviets. Now after the war other countries have been taken over by the Soviets, and you can distinctly see that it is more or less the same.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, the plan of approach is identical in almost every case?

Mr. LUDIG. The plan of approach—putting people into responsible positions who had never been anything. Just as was mentioned here, criminals who under no regime had to respect anything were put into responsible positions and were maybe willing to serve the new government.

Mr. BONIN. Therefore, if that has been true in the past it would remain true in the future?

Mr. LUDIG. Most likely it has proved to be a good method of making other countries Communist who otherwise would never become Communist. I have been interested in those things, and so far no country has become Communist without the Communist Soviet Army being in the country.

Mr. BONIN. Sergeant, what is your reaction to it? Do you believe that future generations of the free world can anticipate the same type of treatment until they would completely conquer every free nation in this world?

Sergeant MORAR. Well, from the way I got communism or learned about it, it is their ultimate aim—world domination. They say, of course, it is their aim to let countries destroy themselves, and they will move in and take over. But I have been told several times by either Chinese or Koreans that when the Soviet Union is ready to march on the United States, they will have a lot of help in the United States. In other words, the country would be paralyzed by strikes, and they would be able to take over very easily.

Of course you must remember that these people I was talking to, they were just little guys in the party; they weren't big guys. But still that's the whole point, that the little guys believe it; it is that widespread.

Mr. BONIN. That is a type of indoctrination that they continually give to all their subjects?

Sergeant MORAR. That is right. Those people that I talked to, the fanatics—and that is what they were up there—believed all that sort of stuff. I imagine that if Stalin, who was the boy at that time, had told them that black was white and white was black that it would be gospel to them and they would believe it.

I would like to get in here—it has not been brought from me, I think—that occasionally they had purges, they had to get rid of our leaders, they had to take our ranking officers and get rid of them. They had to have an excuse, so they would trump up some excuse—that they were leading a resistance movement. So they would take them out of camp and they would have a trial. They would bring these men in and accuse them and sentence them.

When asked why the men were not defended, why was not a defense counsel appointed, we were told at least that it was not necessary because the men were guilty; if they weren't guilty they wouldn't be there. Since they are there, they are guilty; therefore they need no defense counsel, and they were subsequently sentenced and we didn't see them until we were repatriated. That was their "justice."

Mr. BONIN. Were you indoctrinated with any theories of their attitude toward religion?

Sergeant MORAR. Well, I read the Communist manifesto, and it said that they were absolutely hostile toward all religions. I guess that puts it as bluntly as anything. We had one chaplain left and they discouraged him completely. They made it so hard for him that at one time they even cut him out trying to talk to us, they put him in jail and everything. They discouraged him. He was the only chaplain that lived through the captivity. But then all their works say that religion more or less blinds the workingman, "the opiate of the working class," I think is the term they used.

Mr. BONIN. I wish to thank both of you men for the splendid testimony that you have given here. It has been very helpful, I believe, to the public at large to realize some of the factual situations of communism.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Machrowicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just one question, Sergeant. During the time that you were undergoing this inhuman treatment, you and your colleagues, did you or any of your colleagues at any time refer to the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners and object to your treatment as a violation of it?

Sergeant MORAR. From the minute I was captured almost, I was asking for medical attention. They told me that I was a war criminal, I deserved no medical treatment and they were not signatories to the Geneva Convention; therefore they were not required to supply anything under that.

All through the entire captivity we brought that up and especially with the Chinese, and the Chinese would come back with, "We are not signatories, we don't need to abide by it."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Their answer was twofold; first, that they were not bound by the Geneva Convention because they were not signatories, and secondly you were not prisoners of war?

Sergeant MORAR. That is right. When we asked why not let the Red Cross bring in or send in some parcels, they told us that every-

body knew that the Red Cross was just a spy organization, and they wouldn't let anything come in.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Ludig, I would like to ask you one question also. You referred to this questioning that you were subjected to. Was that questioning by Estonians or by Russians?

Mr. LUDIG. I was questioned by Russians, NKVD officials.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. At all times?

Mr. LUDIG. Yes; with some assistants.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And that was at a time that the Russians were trying to maintain the fiction that Estonia was really independent?

Mr. LUDIG. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Yet the questioning was not conducted by Estonians but by Russians?

Mr. LUDIG. Exclusively by Russians.

Mr. DODD. Sergeant, do you know now whether or not you were reported as a captive after you were captured?

Sergeant MORAR. Not for quite some time, sir.

Mr. DODD. How long; do you know?

Sergeant MORAR. Oh, not until the initial list was turned over in December. They always threw that up in our face, too. Often during my interrogation I was told, "Nobody knows you are a captive." In other words, they just said that they could go ahead and do with me what they liked, and nobody would know.

When we were repatriated, on the way down to be repatriated, somebody told one of the chiefs about Stalin dying and said, "What is the matter with the great Russian scientists that they couldn't keep the old boy alive? They are so great and they should be able to keep him alive, but he has passed on." This man replied, "Maybe it is a good thing now to pray to Stalin instead of God." The Chink told him, "You must remember that you are not home yet."

On the day that they told us the armistice had been signed we were told that, if we did anything, if we violated any rules, we would be sentenced and we would serve the sentence regardless of the fact that the armistice had been signed. Their rules are something like this article 58 or 85 that I heard, that rules governing the conduct of prisoners was anything from 5 days to death. It was just at the discretion of whoever was making up his mind as to what it would be. I mean, it wasn't written as a law should be written. It was just for breathing at the wrong time. If it was against regulations, you would have a hostile attitude. I often got stood at attention for a hostile attitude. They made up the rules as they went along, the most lying, deceitful people I have ever seen.

Mr. DODD. Were you told before you were sent on a mission what you might expect if you were captured by these people, or did you have an idea that they would abide by the general rules of land warfare?

Sergeant MORAR. It was my own personal knowledge of the orientals from the Second World War when I was in the Pacific.

Mr. DODD. You had had some experience with it?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes. So I knew what to expect, more or less.

Mr. DODD. Let me ask you this, if you know: Was the average man in the Air Force or the Army aware of what he was up against or did he believe that he was facing an enemy who would behave well anyway?

Sergeant MORAR. I really don't believe I am in a position to say. I can say what I know of my own personal things.

Mr. DODD. For example, were you allowed to write letters to your family?

Sergeant MORAR. Oh, certainly—you mean before I was captured?

Mr. DODD. No, I mean after you were captured.

Sergeant MORAR. Oh, no; not for a long time, not until January of 1952. Initially I requested permission to write to my wife and let her know that I was alive, and they said, "Sure, go ahead, but you write to General Ridgway also." I told them I couldn't write to General Ridgway. They wanted me to write and tell him to stop the war, etc.

Consequently I didn't write to General Ridgway nor did I write to my wife. I wrote a letter, but they wouldn't take it. They said, "When you write to General Ridgway, we will mail both letters together." They wouldn't let me and I never did get to write one until I got up to the Yalu River.

Mr. DODD. Just one other question. Was there any attempt made to wage a kind of psychological warfare on you? I don't know that that is exactly the way to put it. Let me explain what I mean. Were your questioners or your captors ever trying to tell you stories about what was going on, let us say, in the United States of an adverse nature, to worry you or disturb you or anything of that kind?

Sergeant MORAR. Oh, yes, they always told us that, stories that the average American family, because of war losses and everything, was in a turmoil, that the average family in America had to save up all year to buy a coat; that all the families in America were only eating meat once a week; they had to save their money during the week so they could eat meat once a week—things like that.

Mr. DODD. Did they ever ask you any questions about your family?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir, they tried. I told them I had no family.

Mr. DODD. Right in this court building there was a famous spy case that was tried here involving the Rosenbergs. Did you ever hear about that while you were a captive?

Sergeant MORAR. Well, to quote it, I will say that they referred to it as "The legal lynching of a glorious pair of peace fighters." That is the way they brought it out. We would always read letters that some Outer Mongolian Association had written demanding the release of the Rosenbergs. The Daily Worker followed it very closely too.

Mr. DODD. Thank you very much.

Mr. KERSTEN. Sergeant, did you happen to read the Daily Worker version of the Korean war; that is, how they described the Korean war in the Daily Worker and what was going on, and so on? Do you remember reading about that?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. How did that version accord with the facts as you were experiencing them?

Sergeant MORAR. Well, in prison camp we weren't experiencing too much; we didn't know what was going on. They kept us completely blacked out.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes, of course, but I mean that was completely carrying out the Communist line, was it not?

Sergeant MORAR. Definitely.

MR. KERSTEN. And all the news you got from America was, I suppose, either via that or what the Communists there told you; is that correct?

Sergeant MORAR. That is correct. Even the Daily Worker, regardless of where this news originates it is the same; you can spot it. They use the same phraseology, the same verbiage and everything, whether it comes from Russia or Pakistan or Britain. If it comes from the party it is the same thing.

MR. KERSTEN. The same line whether it is in Russia, Britain, or the United States.

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir.

MR. KERSTEN. If it is a Commie party line; it is the same; is that right?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir.

MR. KERSTEN. When you were sent into this hole what about your limbs; were they in any way tied?

Sergeant MORAR. Initially, no.

MR. KERSTEN. After a while?

Sergeant MORAR. Then when I was beaten I was tied.

MR. KERSTEN. You were tied at that time.

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir.

MR. KERSTEN. From your experience with these Communist interrogators and the Communist people that were around you there, what is your impression of the Communist way of life?

Sergeant MORAR. Well, from the personal experience I had with it, as I understand it, it was the most deceitful, lying thing I had ever seen. The minions of communism were liars and cheats; anything for the party. No lie is too great, no deceit too foul for the party or for them. In fact I think it got to a point where they would rather tell a lie than tell the truth.

MR. KERSTEN. Would you place any kind of reliance whatsoever on the word of a Communist, big or little?

Sergeant MORAR. No, sir; I wouldn't. I wouldn't put that much [snapping his finger] faith in what a Communist said.

MR. KERSTEN. Written agreements, whether he swore on a stack of Bibles or took several oaths?

Sergeant MORAR. Oaths mean nothing to them because, as I say, they are atheistic. That means nothing to them. The party is all-powerful. Everything is for the party. They would even swear upon their honor as a Communist about something, and then turn around and do something else because they figured the party would benefit. They are a lying, deceitful, cheating bunch of people. I am just sorry that I didn't get to do more before I got shot down. I got in a little trouble telling them that. That is exactly the way I feel about it. I wouldn't have no more qualms about killing them than anything.

MR. KERSTEN. Do you think the American people fully realize just what kind of people these Communists are?

Sergeant MORAR. Obviously not. I do not think that the majority of them do. Some do, undoubtedly. This is my opinion and it does not reflect anybody else's opinion, but I don't think that the average American knows enough about America let alone know about some force that is trying to break up America. It is pitiful what people don't know about their own country.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you think that good Americanism and an appreciation of what we have in America here is very important for all of us, particularly our youth?

Sergeant MORAR. Yes, sir. I don't think that we have to fear anything; that we should be what we are supposed to be and stand for what we are supposed to stand for, what our people have always stood for, our Constitution, what it guarantees.

We don't have anything to fear. There is nobody on earth that we have to be scared of. We don't have to be scared of anybody; just, by God, be Americans, and that's all. It doesn't take any super weapons.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Ludig, would you place any reliance on the word of a Communist from your experiences with them?

Mr. LUDIG. No, sir, I wouldn't believe them, a single word.

Mr. KERSTEN. Big or little.

Mr. LUDIG. That is right. You read in the papers about some conference that is going to take place again. May I ask you, what kind of a conference or what kind of agreements have the Russians kept in the past? To the best of my knowledge they didn't keep a single one.

You are speaking to me as a former national of Estonia. Well, the independence of Estonia was guaranteed by the peace treaty, by solemn agreements of commerce and friendship, and things like that. What has happened to them all? The whole thing was a lie.

Mr. KERSTEN. I certainly want to thank both of you gentlemen. I think you have demonstrated here that there is a Communist pattern which is the same as it was back in 1940 when they took over the small Baltic nations of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and the other nations, Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe since that time, and now China and Korea. I think you have demonstrated rather clearly from your testimony that the pattern is the same from that time until now and will continue to be the same as long as there is communism.

Are there any other questions?

Mr. MADDEN. I would like to make one comment. In regard to the remarks made by the chairman and both of you gentlemen regarding the Communist line, it has been proven time and time again that the Communist leaders, from Stalin, Malenkov down, have absolutely no regard for the truth.

I think the most glaring demonstration of that was when they found the mass graves of 4,000 Polish officers in the spring of 1943 at Katyn. The German radio announced it to the world. Immediately Moscow, the Communist radio and Pravda came out and stated that those Polish prisoners were massacred by Hitler and the Germans when they took over the Katyn area in August 1941, that when the Germans came in there they immediately massacred these Polish prisoners.

Well, when they discovered the fact—their minds in the Kremlin were evidently not quick enough to think of it—that all these bodies had winter clothing on them, heavy overcoats, heavy shoes and heavy socks and so on, underclothing, it occurred to them that they couldn't have been massacred in August 1941. So they immediately changed it to December 1941.

So truth does not enter into the picture with the Communist leaders at all. They will say anything that will suit their own convenience, and that is one of the outstanding demonstrations of how they can lie.

I want to join with the chairman in stating that both of you gentlemen, along with the others who testified before this committee have paid a great penalty, you have paid a great deal in suffering toward the future liberty of not only countries under subjugation but also keeping countries that now have their liberty free.

The information and testimony you are offering here will be brought to the minds of millions that the Communist conspiracy, the Communist leaders of Soviet Russia are nothing but a gang of criminal, barbaric conspirators, trying to control the world, and no set of tyrants has ever been able to rule the world or rule any country very long by murder and massacre and prison camps.

Mr. KERSTEN. Sergeant, I want to ask you this question. Did you have any contact at all with any of the boys or any of those of the prisoners who supposedly refused to come back and be repatriated?

Sergeant MORAR. Not personal contact, sir. Back in 1951 I saw some of them. I didn't know them.

Mr. KERSTEN. Considering the type of long, devious, cruel treatment and brain washing that you were subjected to along with others, it is probably not surprising that a few of them would succumb to that; is that probably true?

Sergeant MORAR. The percentage was extremely small to the total number captured. I would like not to have had any, however, but I think it is about the right figure in a group that large that would succumb to that sort of thing due to whatever the circumstances might be. Why they did it, I don't know; I am not prepared to say.

Mr. KERSTEN. Again, gentlemen, we want to thank you, and we think you have contributed a great deal to the work of this committee. Thank you.

We have a witness with a very short statement to make, Dr. Leetaru, and then we have one more witness after that.

STATEMENT OF DR. EDMUND LEETARU

Mr. KERSTEN. You solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. LEETARU. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have a chair, please.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify yourself, Doctor?

Dr. LEETARU. My name is Edmund Leetaru—L-e-e-t-a-r-u. I was born on March 20, 1910, in Tallinn, Estonia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you educated?

Dr. LEETARU. I was educated in Estonia at the University Tartu, where I got my medical degree in 1935.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you a practicing physician in the city of New York?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes, I am a duly licensed physician in New York City.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Estonia at the time the Communists occupied the country?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes; I was, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do during the period of Soviet occupation?

Dr. LEETARU. Before that I worked as a physician, and during the time of occupation I also worked as a physician.

Mr. McTIGUE. In July 1941, when the Soviets left, do you recall an incident that happened?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes. Before that my sister was deported to Siberia, and they ordered that I be arrested, and so when I heard of it I fled to the capital city of Tallinn where I worked a few weeks, and then I went to Tartu. There I hired out with my friends.

When the Germans invaded Estonia, they took half of the town of Tartu. Tartu is divided by a river on the south and northern part. I just happened to be in the department of health. That was about July 9 or 10. I don't remember the exact date.

Mr. McTIGUE. Of 1941?

Dr. LEETARU. Of 1941. Then we got the information that the Communists had massacred several hundred people in the prison. Then the chief of the department—that means the former chief—when the Germans came he ordered a committee to investigate the rumors. The committee was formed and had five members. I was included because I was outside, from Tallin—there was nobody else there; I was the only one at that time.

And so we started to investigate the murders in the prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many members of this committee?

Dr. LEETARU. The committee consisted of five members.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were they professional men?

Dr. LEETARU. They have been all physicians. The chairman was a former professor of judicial medicine at the university.

Mr. KERSTEN. Wasn't there a Lutheran pastor there at about the same time, too?

Dr. LEETARU. Oh, the Lutheran pastor was among the murdered.

Mr. KERSTEN. There was a Lutheran pastor murdered, but wasn't there one that survived who was also there who assisted in the burial?

Dr. LEETARU. Maybe because that was in two parts. The committee worked in the prison yard and the bodies had been taken to the cemetery. Maybe the pastor was there.

Mr. KERSTEN. At the cemetery?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes; because we hadn't too much time to look because we had been all the time under artillery fire.

Mr. KERSTEN. I just mentioned that because I happen to have talked to that Lutheran pastor over in London, and he also told about the Lutheran pastor who was murdered there.

Dr. LEETARU. Yes; that is true. I recollect this gentleman, Tauler.

Mr. KERSTEN. Pastor Tauler.

Dr. LEETARU. Yes; I didn't recollect at the moment.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did the commission find the corpses?

Dr. LEETARU. The corpses have been in the prison yard.

Mr. McTIGUE. What prison yard?

Dr. LEETARU. That was the prison yard of Tartu. They had been covered with earth, with loose earth, and then we dugged out the prisoners. They dugged out altogether between 190 to 200 corpses. But there was also, I have to mention, a well—an old-fashioned well—in the prison yard. They dugged out about 16 or 18 corpses from this well.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many were men and how many were women?

Dr. LEETARU. About 70 to 75 percent of the corpses we saw were men and the rest were women.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were there any children?

Dr. LEETARU. I don't recollect any.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you examine the women?

Dr. LEETARU. We did examine all the corpses in the purpose to make sure the cause of death. About the women, the younger women, their underclothes we missed, and many of the younger women had their dresses torn. We then examined them more closely, and we saw quite a few of them had broken fingers and hands, of these younger women. We got at that time the impression that they had been attacked criminally.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were the men shot?

Dr. LEETARU. The men had been mostly shot, mostly on the neck, on the back of the skull, but quite a few had also on the face bullet shots, but several didn't have any bullet holes at all; their heads had been crushed. Quite a few corpses which we took out from the well didn't have any violation marks at all, but we didn't have time to perform autopsies, so we couldn't make the test if they had been drowned or not.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did your examination show anything with reference to the time that they may have been killed?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes. As I mentioned before, several of these corpses showed the marks of crushed skulls, but quite a few, besides these women I mentioned before, showed fractures of legs and hands too, mostly just legs.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you remain in Estonia, Doctor?

Dr. LEETARU. I remained until September 14, 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you go from Estonia?

Dr. LEETARU. From Estonia I went to Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you subsequently emigrate to the United States?

Dr. LEETARU. I emigrated to this country in March 1949.

Mr. McTIGUE. Since that time you have been a practicing physician in the city of New York?

Dr. LEETARU. The first 2 years I worked at hospitals, but about 3 years now I am licensed as a physician.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you say that you had been able to identify many of these people?

Dr. LEETARU. I personally knew 3 or 4 of these people, but I remember we could identify about 120 or 130 of the corpses, but the rest remained unidentified.

Mr. BENTLEY. Of those that you were able to identify, generally who were they, Government people?

Dr. LEETARU. I can't swear to that, but I remember I personally saw this pastor. Then I knew personally an actress, a writer, a teacher, but fellow members recognized a few police officers. Then they recognized a few businessmen, and also I personally recognized a farmer, a friend of mine. His brother was killed and, therefore, I knew this farmer.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you present during Mr. Grantskalns' testimony this morning?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes; I was.

Mr. BENTLEY. The circumstances of the causes of death and the type of people who were killed are quite similar, aren't they?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes; I couldn't make any difference.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. No questions from anybody?

That was right after—this was how long after the Soviets left Tartu?

Dr. LEETARU. That was I guess 24 hours or 48 hours later, when we started the investigation.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, they left, the NKVD left, and then shortly thereafter, a day or two, you were examining these bodies?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. These were the bodies that they had left behind?

Dr. LEETARU. That they had left behind and that they had murdered within a short time before they left.

Mr. KERSTEN. They were all political prisoners as far as you were able to see?

Dr. LEETARU. I don't know.

Mr. KERSTEN. They are not ordinary criminals?

Dr. LEETARU. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. So under the Soviet system the good people or the leadership of the good people are brutally, barbarously murdered in this way and the criminals are released from jail and put into authority; that is the way it turned out there, isn't it?

Dr. LEETARU. That's the principle, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. That's the principle of communism, isn't it?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. The new way of living?

Dr. LEETARU. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. Dr. Devenis.

STATEMENT OF DR. MYKOLAS DEVENIS

Mr. KERSTEN. You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. DEVENIS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have a chair, Doctor?

Mr. McTIGUE. Doctor, will you identify yourself?

Dr. DEVENIS. I am Mykolas Devenis—D-e-v-e-n-i-s. I was born on May 1, 1891, in Lithuania, came to the United States in 1914, and was graduated from Yale Medical School in 1919, and I practiced medicine in Waterbury, Conn., from 1919 up until 1932, except for a few short visits to Lithuania. Then in 1932 I went to Lithuania. I was caught during the Communist occupation and was arrested—not exactly arrested, I would say I was kidnaped—on July 22, 1940. The Red Secret Police, armed, came to my place under pretext to search for arms.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were you at that time, Doctor?

Dr. DEVENIS. I was in Ukmerge, near Ukmerge, which is about 3½ miles from my farm. I had a farm there and I lived on the farm.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were in the city at the time?

Dr. DEVENIS. No; I was on my farm about 2½ miles from Ukmerge. There was stationed the Red Army, and they had NKVD headquarters there.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were an American citizen?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes; I was naturalized in 1920.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you still are an American citizen?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, all the while. I didn't lose my American citizenship.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go right ahead now.

Dr. DEVENIS. I emphasize the fact that I was not arrested but rather kidnaped because I didn't have a formal warrant and no accusation. The armed men came in my place under pretext of searching for firearms. Then after a cursory search they said, "You come to police headquarters for half an hour and you then come back." They forced me to take my car there, and I went there and didn't come back for 2 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you show them your American passport?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, and I told them——

Mr. McTIGUE. What did they say about that?

Dr. DEVENIS. I told them that I was an American citizen. They just laughed, "You think that you are an American citizen and that you can't be arrested?"

Mr. McTIGUE. They said it didn't make any difference whether you were an American citizen?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, that it didn't make any difference whether you are an American citizen or a Lithuanian citizen, and I should emphasize the fact that those were not Lithuanian secret police but were Russians. One Lithuanian man was an interpreter, but I spoke better Russian than he did, so they didn't use the interpreter.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you arrested?

Dr. DEVENIS. On my farm.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were taken from your farm to where?

Dr. DEVENIS. To Ukmerge. I was taken without formal charges, without any accusations. They just told me to come to headquarters for further questioning and for an explanation of a half hour and I would be back. But after sitting there the officer came out and said, "Well, you are a dangerous person for public safety. You are going to be detained." And I was held in the prison for a year.

Mr. McTIGUE. In the city?

Dr. DEVENIS. In the city of Ukmerge.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell that name?

Dr. DEVENIS. U-k-m-e-r-g-e.

Mr. McTIGUE. And were you charged with being a person dangerous to public safety?

Dr. DEVENIS. That is a provisional charge, but later on they tried, you know, to fix some crime. They charged me later on for anti-Communist activities, espionage, and for following capitalistic, bourgeoisie philosophy.

Mr. McTIGUE. You spent 1 year in that jail?

Dr. DEVENIS. I was arrested on July 22. I spent there until March, and then was transferred.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before we go on from there, during that period of nearly a year, did you continually protest that you were an American citizen?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. That you as an American citizen had certain rights?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, I protested, and well, I was not allowed to communicate and was not allowed to send any letter or any notice.

Mr. McTIGUE. During this period, how were you treated?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, just like a prisoner I was treated. I mean I was at first put in solitary confinement in a cell, and after several weeks was put in with other prisoners in a small cell, probably 6 feet by 12 where there were about 10 or 12 prisoners, a newly built cement cell. The walls were dripping with water. The straw mattresses on the floor were just blue from rotting straw.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were there in this prison, were you subjected to any kind of punishment, beatings?

Dr. DEVENIS. Not beatings, except probably just moral and mental torture during interrogation.

Mr. McTIGUE. But continually interrogated?

Dr. DEVENIS. After almost 3 months I was continually interrogated for 4 days without being allowed to sleep, and during the interrogation I was ordered to stand at attention for about 8 hours. The interrogation usually began at night when the other prisoners went to bed. They used to call me about 10 o'clock and probably return back to the cell at 6 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. McTIGUE. The interrogation went on all night long?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did they interrogate you about?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, they interrogated me—for instance they found on my American passport that I had visas to foreign countries, England, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and so on. They tried to fix that I was spying for those countries. They tried to find out who I saw, to whom I talked and what I talked about, and so on. They couldn't imagine that a free American citizen could travel to foreign countries. Then they interrogated me, well, they tried to fix that I was anti-communistic because I exploited the workers, because I didn't divide equally my profits from the farm. They said I probably underpaid them all, although I actually paid more than anybody else on the surrounding farms.

Mr. McTIGUE. Because you owned a large farm and because you employed a great many people, you were anti-communistic?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you finally tried?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, I was never tried. At the beginning I was told that I was going to have an honest people's trial by a court selected by the people, that I was going to be allowed to have an attorney, and then after being in prison for about 8 or 10 months, one night about 1 o'clock I was called by guards and was brought to a secret service man, and then he just read the sentence, that I was condemned to 8 years of hard labor.

I asked, "Where, how condemned, where was the trial?" Well, he said the trial was in Moscow, that I was tried and condemned in absentia.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were tried in absentia in Moscow?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Under, I suppose, paragraph 58 of the Russian Criminal Code?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, and that paragraph included almost everything—anti-Communist activity, espionage, and even, due to the solidarity of the international proletariat, they could condemn a man even in foreign countries, in America, for instance if he lived in America, and

if he did something against Communist activity they could try him under that paragraph.

Mr. McTIGUE. I was just wondering whether there might be a trial in absentia after this morning's press conference. But I guess that is beside the point.

After you were sentenced, Doctor, what happened?

Dr. DEVENIS. Then I was transferred to prison in Vilnius. That is the ancient capital of Lithuania. There men were waiting for transports to concentration camps.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you transported from the prison in Vilnius?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, I was transferred there in March, and I stayed there until June 22.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you transported from Vilnius?

Dr. DEVENIS. From Vilnius I was transported to Kozva in the northern part of Russia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that in Arctic Russia?

Dr. DEVENIS. In the Arctic region.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that near the Ural Mountains?

Dr. DEVENIS. That is not far from the Arctic Ocean, the Ural Mountains.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you transported along with other men?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, I was transported with other prisoners. The transport consisted of about 80 to 100 cattle cars. In each car there were approximately about 40 to 50 people. They were so packed that when you laid on the floor the other men couldn't move around. If he wanted to turn on the other side, somebody had to get up from the line and allow the man to move. That lasted for 16 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. Sixteen days?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes. In hot weather, in June, we were without water, without hot food, and besides that they gave us a small piece of salted fish that increased thirst. The people in every car were just yelling for water, but nobody would supply water.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were there any women and children?

Dr. DEVENIS. Not in our car. In other cars there were.

Mr. McTIGUE. You saw women and children being deported from Lithuania?

Dr. DEVENIS. Usually the families were split. The children separated from families, the wife separated from her husband.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your wife in Lithuania with you at the time?

Dr. DEVENIS. When I was arrested she was in Lithuania, and I was very much upset because I had three children, American-born children. I later found out that my wife escaped to America. That relieved me and gave me moral support and courage to stand that brutal treatment.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your point of destination in Arctic Russia?

Dr. DEVENIS. In Arctic Russia I was transported to a region, Vorkuta. That was a city in the Arctic region that administrated a newly formed coal mine and construction of railroads, they were building some new camps there, experimental farms.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was this a distributing camp?

Dr. DEVENIS. No. At first I was in Kocva.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time thereafter that you were taken to Kozva, a distributing camp?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes. All the prisoners from Lithuania, Estonia, Poland were brought to that camp, and then they were distributed to different camps.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you stay there?

Dr. DEVENIS. About 2 months.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were your duties?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, I was assigned to work as a physician. I wouldn't say I practiced medicine there because that was just sham practicing because there were no drugs and no facilities to practice medicine. A physician's duties were just to find out whether a man was able to work, and, well, just sign a statement that he was free from work.

Mr. McTIGUE. After your time at Kozva, were you transferred to another camp?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes; to the Red City. That is where the Pechora flows into the Arctic Ocean.

Mr. McTIGUE. How were you taken from Kozva?

Dr. DEVENIS. From Kozva I was taken by boat.

Mr. McTIGUE. By transport?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall anything happening on that transport?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, an unusual thing happened. On the second day I was called to the hull of the boat. One of the guards—they were transporting sick people on that boat—got sick. They found out that I was a doctor, and they called me to treat that guard.

I experienced an unusual sight there. There were about 80 people, invalids, some without arms, without legs, with frozen noses, ears, and so on. I was wondering what was happening. If they were taking them to hospitals, they would be taking them in the opposite direction, but they were taking them north to the Arctic Ocean.

Later on, about several months after, when I was in Sovchos, I met that guard, and I asked what had happened with those people. He was rather friendly to me. He said, "What do you think? Don't you know the Russian constitution? Everybody who eats is supposed to work. Who don't work don't eat. They are invalids, they are unable to work. Why should we feed them? We just took them to the ocean and dumped them into the ocean."

Mr. McTIGUE. These were live people?

Dr. DEVENIS. Those were live people.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many?

Dr. DEVENIS. About 80. I didn't see that they were dumped.

Mr. KERSTEN. But that was the information you got?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, that was the information I got.

Mr. McTIGUE. The guard told you that?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you arrived at the Red city what happened?

Dr. DEVENIS. There was a camp of prisoners. Before, I was told there were about 5,000, but when I was there there were about 1,500. Those prisoners had to unload ships that came in with machinery, with supplies, with food, from a Russian transport, coming from a Russian port, Archangel. Their duty was to unload machinery and food and supplies from the barges that went through the river. We stayed there from—

Mr. McTIGUE. Before we get away from that, Doctor, it was very cold there, wasn't it?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, in the winter about 55 below zero. That is almost the same as 55 below zero Fahrenheit.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you happen to know where the machinery that you just referred to as being unloaded at Archangel came from?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, from different parts of Russia. It came probably by railroads from deeper Russia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Might some of it have originated in the United States?

Dr. DEVENIS. It could be, yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you the only doctor among the prisoners in the Red City?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, I was the only one.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many prisoners were there?

Dr. DEVENIS. When I was there, about 1,500.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any medical supplies?

Dr. DEVENIS. Hardly any except a few tablets of aspirin and quinine for malaria, but that is not enough.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to people when they became sick?

Dr. DEVENIS. They just let them deteriorate and then later die, especially from—there are not so many infectious diseases there—lack of vitamins, from scurvy and pellagra. A man used to get sick and physically deteriorate in about 4 or 5 or 6 months. I was surprised to see men in the prime of life, about 25, 28, 26, with their teeth just shaken, they could be pulled out by hand. The gums were swollen and there were sores over their arms and all over their bodies.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you try to do anything about the scurvy?

Dr. DEVENIS. The only thing I could do—from reading literature I found that some vitamin C was in the pine needles and pine cones. So I used to cook them in a big kettle, and all the prisoners were given about a glass of that concoction to drink every night. That, to a certain extent, prevented scurvy, but it was not enough to cure well-developed scurvy.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your home remedy enabled a great many of these men—

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, to stand it all and to prolong the deterioration.

Mr. McTIGUE. You went out into the woods, collected the pine needles and pine cones?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Boiled them?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, and filtered through a cloth, and then I gave it to those prisoners to drink.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were there many cases of frostbite and gangrene?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, quite a few because the clothing was very poor. Every prisoner wore cotton-padded mackinaws and cotton-padded pants. But those were probably given out once in 2 or 3 years. And then when they wore out they tried to patch it, but still they were insufficient to prevent from cold.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of food did you have?

Dr. DEVENIS. Just a moment. The footwear was very poor. The only footwear they had was from old rubber tires made with burlap. And then in the cold they were wrapped with sacks, and then dipped

their legs in cold water and then let it freeze to prevent slipping; they wrapped it again with sacks, and they walked like that.

Food was mostly bread mixed with sawdust. About 20 percent sawdust added to the poor flour.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you have to drink, water?

Dr. DEVENIS. Water, and then thin soup from millet seed.

Mr. MADDEN. Could you explain again how those shoes were made with the burlap, and then freezing, and then wrapping them again? I didn't get that.

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, ice is a poor conductor. So if ice froze around the burlap it prevented cold and prevented frostbite. It was very difficult to walk, but still, to such an extent it kept a man from frostbite.

Mr. MADDEN. Then they would rewrap it over again?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, to prevent slipping.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you exposed to any kind of sickness while you were there?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, I was exposed. I had toothache and I probably suffered for 3 weeks because there was no dentist and there was no medicine and there were no instruments to extract. If I would have instruments I probably would have done the extraction myself, but I suffered for 3 weeks, and later on forgot about it, got used to that pain. I was suffering, probably from lack of food and scurvy. There was more suffering from that than from toothache. The Russians are used to that. They say that if you have a toothache, you just take off your shoes, go outside in the snow and let your feet freeze and then your toothache will be gone because you think about your frozen feet, not about your toothache, you would forget all about the toothache.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you stay in the Red city?

Dr. DEVENIS. I stayed in the Red city until December, and then when the Germans got into the war and began to bombard, when the bombardment got very active, they couldn't transport any more of those supplies. Then that camp was dismantled and we were transferred to Owbor. That is about 200 kilometers, or approximately 140 miles, from the Red city. It happened in the middle of December. The weather was very cold. As I said, at that time it was about 40, 50, 55 below zero. The rule was that we shouldn't walk when the temperature was below 35.

Mr. McTIGUE. You walked, then, from the Red city?

Dr. DEVENIS. We walked from the Red city.

Mr. McTIGUE. In 45° below zero weather?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes; up to 55 below zero in almost knee-deep snow.

Mr. McTIGUE. How much of a walk was it from the Red city to your new point of destination?

Dr. DEVENIS. About 140 American miles.

Mr. McTIGUE. About how many men were in the march?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, they were divided into groups, from 50 to 80 men. They didn't want to have bigger groups because they didn't have enough Red guards to accompany the prisoners, so it was from 50 to 80 men in a group. That lasted about 14 to 15 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. What would happen as far as resting was concerned?

Dr. DEVENIS. In the Arctic area there, there are no farms, no villages, no cities at all. When we rested we were lucky if we found some empty shed to stay in a few hours overnight. If not, then under the trees. If we found a shed it was empty, unheated.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were walking through deep snow?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes. On the fourth or fifth day I collapsed and couldn't walk any more and I didn't remember what happened. Later on I was told that the guard ordered them to pick me up just because I was a doctor. He said, "We will pick him up. Don't leave that man behind because we need him because he is a doctor, and we don't have very many doctors there." So I was saved.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to the other men who fell out?

Dr. DEVENIS. The other men were just left behind. I don't know, probably wild wolves and wild animals devoured them.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were wolves stalking the column as you were marching from the Red city?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, I saw wolves following us.

Mr. McTIGUE. As men collapsed or fell out of the line of march, they were left there?

Dr. DEVENIS. They were left behind.

Mr. McTIGUE. This march took how long?

Dr. DEVENIS. About 14 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened when you arrived at your destination?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, I was again put there to take care of the sick people, but I wouldn't call that practice of medicine. It was mostly to check whether they were able to work or not. If a man refused to go to work, he would be tried for sabotage. If he had a doctor's certificate that he is sick, that he can't work, then he was excused from the work. But many a time, if many people were on the sicklist, they overruled the doctor's decision; they just took even sick men and made them go to work.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any kind of difficulty with the Soviet authorities while you were at that camp?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, the only difficulty I had is that when I was in that Red city one time the men were unloading wine, probably for the NKVD officials. They made a hole in the barrel and several prisoners got drunk. One man got so drunk that he was unable to work that afternoon, and he was sleeping.

Then at night when the men were returning, about 150 of them, they made them stand and I was to find out who was drunk and who was sober. I happened to miss that man. The next day I was transported to headquarters of NKVD, and I had to give excuses, explanation of why I missed that man, I was probably sabotaging. They said, "Well, we are going to give you another 8 years for that."

Well, I explained that the man was drunk several hours and he was sleeping and he had already got sober. Well, there was a strong admonition, he said to me, "Look out. You are going to get another 10 years and you will never get out of this camp."

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you spend at that place?

Dr. DEVENIS. I was liberated on April 13.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were the circumstances of your liberation, how were you released?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, one day I was told that the administrator of the camp received a telegram from the administrative center of all the camps. They read me the telegram that said, "Repeat. Immediately free Dr. Devenis." I was told to get ready in 1 hour. The horse with the sleigh was standing already. In an hour I had to get ready, and I was transported to the other camp.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why were they so anxious to get you out in a hurry?

Dr. DEVENIS. I had an impression that they didn't want the other prisoners should see that I was liberated. It was something unusual. They were surprised. Even the administration didn't believe it, and they sent another telegram to confirm the previous telegram that I was liberated. So I was transported to a neighboring camp where I waited for transportation to Russia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Soviet guards have any comment on your release?

Dr. DEVENIS. One guard said, "Well, the American Government must be good if they care for individual persons." It was something unusual for a government to interfere and have a person liberated.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your wife living in Connecticut then?

Dr. DEVENIS. I don't know, I didn't know whether she was living in Connecticut, but I knew she was living in America. When I was in Ukmerge a boy who went to school, 14 years old, a student, was arrested for anticommunistic activities. He was in the same class with my son. He happened to come in my cell. He said that he had heard that my family escaped to America.

Mr. McTIGUE. That's the only communication you ever received?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes; that is the only communication I had.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then how were you finally released, Doctor?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, when I was transported to that other camp, Medveziaka, and then from there I was taken by airplane to the distributing camp, Kozva, where I had to wait for a train, the American Embassy—

Mr. McTIGUE. It was through the intercession of the Embassy and the continual efforts of your wife that brought about your release through Admiral Standley who was our Ambassador to Moscow?

Dr. DEVENIS. Through the efforts of my wife, but the main credit belongs to Ambassador Standley. I think he came on April 10 to Moscow, and on April 13 I was already released. Previous to that they used to tell my wife that I was not in Russia, I probably was in Germany or somewhere else, or probably I was killed. They never admitted that I was deported to a concentration camp.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who never admitted it?

Dr. DEVENIS. The Russians in Washington, and so on, they said they didn't know where I was. Then later when the Russians were expelled, my father-in-law got a prison record that my number was such and such, and that I was transported to such-and-such camp. Then he telegraphed to my wife that information. With that information she went to the State Department. She just confronted the Russian Ambassador, and she said I was in such and such a camp.

Mr. McTIGUE. Finally, after 2 years' imprisonment in a Soviet camp, you, an American citizen, returned to this country?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you are now a practicing physician?

Dr. DEVENIS. Practicing physician, yes, in Waterbury, Conn.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. Doctor, what year were you released from the prison camp?

Dr. DEVENIS. April 13, 1942, but I came to America in September. I had to go to Teheran, India, and other places.

Mr. BENTLEY. All the time that you were in those various camps in the Soviet Union, how many other nationalities did you see represented there; have you any idea?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, Russians, Polish, Estonians, Latvians, Ukrainians, representatives from almost all—

Mr. BENTLEY. All the Satellite countries?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were those mostly political prisoners?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes. The criminal prisoners were rather privileged. They were the officials of the camps.

Mr. BENTLEY. Those were the common criminals, the murderers and thieves who were given positions of privilege?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. You say there were Russians there also?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes; there were Russians, mostly those who were arrested during the purge of 1934 and 1935.

Mr. BENTLEY. In other words, this system of slave labor, as you saw it in these camps, was true not only of the Baltic countries but of all the countries that the Soviet Union brought under its domination?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir. They were not only for the purpose of getting rid of unreliable elements but they were cheap labor because they didn't pay anything. For instance, as a physician, I got about 28 rubles a month, and for those 28 rubles I probably couldn't buy a half a pound of butter a month.

Mr. BENTLEY. As a physician, would you say that the food, the rations that you received in those concentration camps was deliberately calculated to weaken a man over a period of time to the point where he usually just died?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, to a certain extent, yes; but they were anxious to exploit, to get as much as they could from that man in physical work. When a man got weak and when they saw that he couldn't do any more work, that they couldn't get any more work out of him, then they didn't care any more. They just purposely cut the ration and they deliberately let them die.

Mr. BENTLEY. When you talked with people from Russia who were in these camps, how did they feel about the Government?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, I think everybody was against the Government, but they were afraid to talk to anybody, even in the camp.

Mr. BENTLEY. You had spies within the camps?

Dr. DEVENIS. Informers everywhere. I knew the Russian language, I probably spoke Russian better than English. When I traveled through Russia I spoke to people. They were also against the Government but they couldn't do anything because it was like a great prison camp. There were no stores, no stores, no places to get food. I had to travel from that liberation camp 16 days. In that camp I was supplied with black bread stacked high like that for 16 days. On the third day

that bread got moldy and could hardly be eaten, but I couldn't do anything because there was no way to buy and I had no money.

Mr. BENTLEY. One more question. How long would the average person who was deported to one of those camps be expected to live on the average?

Dr. DEVENIS. I should say not more than 4 or 5 years.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Mr. MADDEN. Doctor, along the lines of your testimony of their policy to eliminate the people in these camps, if they can't produce manual work they would be starved so they would die quickly, don't you think that that is a well-programed Communist policy to destroy the older people of these subjugated countries and then educate the younger generation into communism so they can obliterate or banish all forms of nationalities under communism, all forms of patriotism from the standpoint of nationalities to their own countries, adherence to their own nation?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes. Not only do I think that, but it is in Lenin's and Stalin's writings. They say that a bourgeoisie is a bourgeoisie; you can never trust him, you have got to exterminate him. Only the new generation can be true Communists, you can't depend on the older generation.

Mr. MADDEN. From your knowledge in talking to the people from other subjugated countries while you were in prison there, the same pattern was used in Poland and Lithuania and Latvia and Estonia and Rumania and these other nations?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir; everywhere the same pattern.

Mr. MADDEN. What became of your farm over there?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, later on they confiscated it. I think I was about a month free. During the Communist occupation the Red army used to come to my farm, and they used to take hay. I had a dairy there, and they used to take butter. They would just give a slip of paper at the beginning. Later on they wouldn't give anything. They would come and take it just like it was their own, just confiscate it without paying anything and without accounting for the things they took.

Mr. MADDEN. Let me ask you this, Doctor: Of course, nobody in these prison camps got any news of what was going on in the world outside of the Iron Curtain?

Dr. DEVENIS. No, sir; not in the prison camps. Several times while I was in prison camp I wrote to the American Embassy that I was an American citizen and would they take steps to have me liberated. Later on I found from the Embassy that they didn't receive any communication at all. It didn't go any further than the wastebasket.

Mr. MADDEN. Do you know whether or not the great percentage of the people inside of Russia that are not in prison camps are getting any factual information from outside of the Iron Curtain?

Dr. DEVENIS. Not as far as I know, because censorship is very strong, and they are not allowed to listen to the radio. In fact, there are no receivers like here in America. They have only loud speakers; from it they could hear only what is transmitted from the official radio station. They can't dial any place they want, so they can't get any information. Newspapers are not allowed from the outside world.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. Doctor, while you were in Lithuania shortly after the Russians occupied that country, was there any effort of any kind on

the part of the Lithuanian people to try to overthrow this Russian system, if you know?

Dr. DEVENIS. How could they? Ukmerge probably has a population of about 35,000. But there were probably 2 divisions of the Red army, and the people were unarmed. All firearms were confiscated. If anybody had a gun for hunting, or a pistol, they had to turn it in. How could they do anything?

Mr. BONIN. It seems to me as though I had read some place at some time that there had been some kind of effort.

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, they were underground. The underground was working. I mean they were hiding in the woods, and they would attack some Red police and so on. But it was not sufficient to overthrow the Army regime.

Mr. BONIN. We understand that. You say you occupied a rather large farm in Lithuania?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Eventually it was nationalized?

Dr. DEVENIS. It was nationalized; yes, sir.

Mr. BONIN. Did these Russians ever pay anybody for nationalizing it?

Dr. DEVENIS. No. When I was liberated and came to America I filed—as the State Department advised me to do—a claim for my watch, my wedding ring, my car, and so on. I filed this claim against the Soviet Embassy. They never admitted that those things were taken from me.

Mr. BONIN. Do you know whether or not in any of their nationalization they paid any of the individuals?

Dr. DEVENIS. Not as far as I know, no, because they claim, according to their authority, that the land belongs to the Government, and then the Government is not supposed to pay for the land taken.

Mr. BONIN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. I have no questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just a question or two, Doctor. You have told us quite a terrifically impressive story, a factual account of life in a slave labor camp. I believe you are a graduate of Yale University?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yale Medical School.

Mr. KERSTEN. That was before all of this happened to you.

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you told us about being deported in a cattle train, a cattle car. How many cars were there?

Dr. DEVENIS. In the train about 70 to 80 cars. There were no windows and no doors, no facilities for sanitary necessities except just a hole in the floor. The people were so crowded that there was no place to sleep.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mentioned something about a gold mine.

Dr. DEVENIS. A coal mine. But they claim that there is gold in that region.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you notice any gold mining going on there too?

Dr. DEVENIS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. I know there is some gold mining supposed to be carried on in some of those Arctic regions.

Dr. DEVENIS. They claim there is.

Mr. KERSTEN. That gold mining is carried on by slave laborers too, I understand.

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, most of them.

Mr. KERSTEN. And there are a lot of dead people as a result; that is, people who have died mining this gold. Is that your understanding too?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is some of the gold that Russia is trying to put on the market here recently, mined with slave labor?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now you talked about these invalids, some without legs and arms, that you saw. How many were there?

Dr. DEVENIS. About 80, as I remember.

Mr. KERSTEN. All in various conditions of invalidism?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes; various conditions of invalidism.

Mr. KERSTEN. Under the Soviet Communist system they, not being able to work, weren't entitled to eat?

Dr. DEVENIS. Not entitled to eat.

Mr. KERSTEN. And your information was that they were dumped into the Arctic; is that right?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. This again is the Communist way of life that we hear so much propaganda about from behind the Iron Curtain.

You also mentioned about the criminal persons in these camps that were given a privileged position. That fits into the Communist pattern, too, doesn't it?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now there is one more thing I want to ask you about and then I will be finished. You said that nearly everybody was against the Government but they were afraid to talk; is that it?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you say, from your several years in Russia, that that would be your opinion of the average person, whether he was a prisoner or not? Do you understand my question?

Dr. DEVENIS. They were afraid to talk.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is it your impression that the average person in Russia is against the Government?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, yes; against the Government and against the conditions, because they are suffering.

Mr. KERSTEN. As you have detailed here, they have a system of government that is antihuman, puts criminals in positions of power, and destroys sick people, invalids. The average person in Russia, from your observation, doesn't like this any more than any of the rest of us, wouldn't you say?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes; that is true.

Mr. KERSTEN. For that reason they are not for this kind of inhuman government; would you say that is right?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes; I would say that is right. They are kept in this condition by terror.

Mr. KERSTEN. Can you see any reason why people that are in this type of government, promulgating this type of idea, could be trusted in any agreements?

Dr. DEVENIS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you believe a Communist under oath?

Dr. DEVENIS. No; I don't believe so because Communist teaching is that they should use any means—lying, deceit, and so on—to reach their goal. So agreements, according to their theory, could be broken if they don't serve any more their goal. They never keep agreements.

I can see, from the Lithuanian point of view, that they have so many agreements, 1922, 1929, and 1939 agreements where they pledged, the Russians pledged neutral security pact, but when they invaded, they broke that. They have never kept that agreement.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mentioned about the state radios. Were you in a position to know whether or not there might be some secret radios around that weren't obvious—that some people had?

Dr. DEVENIS. I imagine there were, yes, but the people had to be very careful because even if they listened to a foreign radio it was capital punishment.

Mr. DODD. Do you have any idea as to how we could reach these people in Russia?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, I think by the Voice of America, and probably supplying radios, free radios. I think that Iron Curtain could be pierced by the Voice of America.

Mr. DODD. That would be difficult to do, wouldn't it?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. That is all.

Mr. MADDEN. Doctor, from your experience over there and observing the Communist conspiracy, what do you think will be the future? Do you believe there will be eventually an uprising or a revolution or a split among the leaders of the Kremlin? You can answer that if you care to. If you don't know or don't have any opinion, that is all right, too. Would you have any opinion about what is going to be the outcome of this?

Dr. DEVENIS. Well, I think that if war breaks out with Russia, if Russia is going to be engaged in a war with the West, then the people—that would be the moment for the people. But if external help is not going to be supplied to Russia, the Russian people themselves without external help wouldn't uprising.

For instance, in East Germany there was an uprising. If at that time enough help had been thrown to those people, that uprising would have spread all over Russia, and so on. But if there was no external help, that uprising is just forced down.

Mr. BENTLEY. One more question, please, Doctor. I don't imagine that in these camps you got much of an opportunity for any form of religious worship, but from your experiences would you say that all the leading religions of the Western World were well represented among the people in these camps?

Mr. DEVENIS. Well, I should say yes. They were afraid to admit it but inside of their hearts they were religious. I can tell you an experience. In Russia during Easter it is a common habit to go up to anybody, whether you know him or not, and kiss him and tell him that the Christ child has arisen. One day I was approached by a prisoner—I didn't know him—and he kissed me and he said, "Christ has arisen." So in the depths of their hearts they still are religious, but they are afraid to admit it openly.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am certain that among the people in these camps you found Catholics, Protestants, and Jews all subject to such persecution, is that right?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Mr. BONIN. Following the question asked by Congressman Madden, isn't it true that the only reason that Russia refuses to make an outward attack or any formal involvements with another nation through force or violence is that it is afraid of its own people, what might happen if they should do that; and therefore they are using other nations to accomplish their purpose so that they are fearful of what their own people might do and that is the reason they are using the United Nations, they are using incidents such as Korea, they are using incidents in Indochina and incidents such as took place recently in Teheran?

Dr. DEVENIS. I have no doubt about that because if war would break out between Russia and the West or between Russia and any other country, the people would make an uprising against the Russian Government.

Mr. BONIN. The reason I ask that question—and you have somewhat answered it—is that it is a fact that almost invariably in every conflict that Russia has been involved in, sooner or later the people gave up. Is that right, they wouldn't support their Government?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONIN. And that's the reason Andrei Vishinsky today is lying and deceiving and using all forms of hypocrisy in order to fool the free world and continue with it as long as they possibly can?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, because they don't have any other arguments except lying and deceit.

Mr. KERSTEN. Don't you think, too, Doctor, that this lack of desire to support their Government—in actual opposition to it even though it is not spoken—is in a large number of even the young men of the armed forces under the control of the Communists, sons of peasants and other members of the armed forces?

Dr. DEVENIS. Until now the armed forces were under control of the secret police. Almost every 10 or 15 men had a political man from the secret police. They always watched to see whether the men talked between one another, and so on.

Mr. KERSTEN. That again would demonstrate the unreliability of even many of the people in the armed forces?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where such a system of terror is used by the Government, is that right?

Dr. DEVENIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Dr. Devenis. You have made a real contribution to these hearings and you have been a very splendid witness. Your experiences I am sure have not been in vain.

Dr. DEVENIS. Thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearings will be adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10:30 a. m.

(Thereupon, at 5:05 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Friday, December 4, 1953.)

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIC COMMITTEE,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:45 a. m., in room 110, United States Courthouse, New York, N. Y., Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Bentley, Bonin, Madden, Machrowicz, and Dodd.

Also present; James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order.

Is Mr. Watson present?

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. WATSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Watson, will you raise your right hand, please? Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WATSON. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state your full name, Mr. Watson, please?

Mr. WATSON. Thomas John Watson.

Mr. KERSTEN. Your residence is where, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. New York City.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what is your occupation?

Mr. WATSON. I am chairman of the board of the International Business Machines Corp.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were the originator of this organization, were you not?

Mr. WATSON. No; I took it over when it was very small and tried to build it up.

Mr. KERSTEN. That was many years ago, wasn't it?

Mr. WATSON. In 1914.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you have occasion sometime in the late 1930's to visit any of the Baltic nations?

Mr. WATSON. Yes, in 1938.

Mr. KERSTEN. In what capacity at that time?

Mr. WATSON. In connection with my own business, also the International Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. KERSTEN. What position did you hold with the International Chamber of Commerce?

Mr. WATSON. I was the president.

Mr. KERSTEN. I presume you held many positions in organizations of this kind?

Mr. WATSON. I was president of the Merchants Association in New York. I have been a member of the board of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for a long time. I am now an honorary member. Then there were different civic bodies, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the New York Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. KERSTEN. Throughout your career you have had occasion to be in close contact with the evaluation of the economy of this or other countries, haven't you?

Mr. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And conditions, business conditions, commerce conditions, and so forth?

Mr. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You visited the Baltic nations in 1938, you said?

Mr. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were at that time president of the International Chamber of Commerce?

Mr. WATSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long did you remain in the Baltic area at that time?

Mr. WATSON. Well, I didn't remain in Lithuania very long, but I was in Latvia and Estonia and those countries, I would say at least 2 weeks, as near as I remember.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you recall the time of the year that you were there?

Mr. WATSON. It was in the spring.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you have an opportunity to observe the general conditions, including the economic conditions and general condition of the people at the time you were there?

Mr. WATSON. I did. I had an opportunity to talk with the local members, that is, the members of the different countries, who represented their countries in the International Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were particularly interested in observing the economic conditions of those countries at that time, were you not?

Mr. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. With that in mind and referring your attention to the condition of those countries, would you tell us in your own way, Mr. Watson, what you observed about these Baltic nations in 1938?

Mr. WATSON. In Latvia, my first observation was the type of people, the refined people. Everybody appeared to be happy, well dressed and well fed. I was told that they imported harvest labor from Poland to take care of their harvest. I found that they were doing an outstanding job in agriculture. They had cut out the large estates and were down to smaller farms. They had gotten people out on the land. They were developing industries; they showed me a great deal of what was going on. I had a chance to get out in the country. One thing I observed, they had a very, very fine resort hotel in Latvia just outside of Riga. I was quite amazed at the equipment and everything and at what they were doing there. The stores all looked prosperous. We stayed at a very good hotel; everything was up to date. I had no occasion to complain about anything while we were in the country. The people were very courteous.

The President, President Ullmanis, graduated from the University of Nebraska and then taught there for 2 or 3 years.

Mr. KERSTEN. At the University of Nebraska?

Mr. WATSON. Yes, then he went back to his own country and took up educational work which he followed until Latvia became a free country and they made him president. I felt he was doing an outstanding job and he was surrounded by a group of fine people in his cabinet.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you meet Ulmanis at the time?

Mr. WATSON. Yes, indeed.

Mr. KERSTEN. And some of the other members of the Government?

Mr. WATSON. I met the Prime Minister; I can't recall his name just now. He was a very brilliant young man. He presided at several important meetings at the League of Nations in Geneva.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who was this?

Mr. WATSON. The Prime Minister. He was a very outstanding man and that was pretty important work he was doing in connection with the League of Nations.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Prime Minister of the Latvian Government had been presiding over the League of Nations sessions, had he?

Mr. WATSON. Some of them.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was the condition of the people generally as you observed them there, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. From my observations conditions were fine and everybody appeared to be satisfied and happy with their country and what was going on.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you get to Estonia?

Mr. WATSON. I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you tell us what you observed there?

Mr. WATSON. I had a chance there to spend quite a little time because Mrs. Watson was taken with pneumonia. I would like to say she couldn't have had better care anywhere than she got there and she came through all right. I am very grateful to everybody; everybody took an interest. I had two wonderful doctors and a good nurse, and so forth.

Then I was taken over near the Russian border to the textile industry. They had a very nice cotton mill there and a woolen mill. One thing that impressed me with the cotton mill was that they were making various products from cotton imported from Georgia.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean the State of Georgia?

Mr. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In the United States?

Mr. WATSON. Yes. They also told me they were selling white thread in the United States, importing white cotton and thread into the United States, which impressed me very much.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did their condition of export and import to the various countries of the world seem to be pretty good so far as you were able to observe?

Mr. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are there any other things you can tell us about from your observations of the life of these countries at that time, just before or shortly before the Communists took over?

Mr. WATSON. I was so impressed that when I came home I told everybody I came in contact with how deeply I was impressed with the economy and everything else in the country, the quality of the people and their happiness.

Mr. KERSTEN. You didn't get the opportunity at that time to visit Lithuania, did you?

Mr. WATSON. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. But from your conversations with the other people, the people in Latvia and Estonia, as to the economic advance, can you tell us what your understanding or information was as to whether similarly Lithuania had also made unusual advances in economy such as Latvia and Estonia did?

Mr. WATSON. I can't recall that that was discussed in Latvia or Estonia, but my understanding at the time, from what I learned, was that they were making real progress.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, from your observation the progress of these three Baltic nations was all approximately the same and they had all made great economic advances. Is that your understanding?

Mr. WATSON. Yes. They had pretty good balance in their industries; if you would like to hear it, in agriculture, potatoes, oats, rye, barley, wheat and flax.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. WATSON. In potatoes they had 1,751,000 metric tons in 1939. I believe that was the year. They had 450,000 metric tons of oats, 429,000 of rye and 209,000 of barley, 198,000 of wheat and 41,000 of flax. That impresses anyone, I think, with their good balance, not depending entirely on 1 or 2 crops.

In livestock, sheep, cattle, pigs, horses, quite an industry in beans, honey and poultry. They had a million and a half, approximately of sheep, a million and a quarter head of cattle.

In industry, the metallurgical employees were 16,800, woodworking, 15,600, textile, 15,600, foodstuff, 12,900, minerals, 6,600, chemicals, 4,300. They had 1,895 elementary schools, 114 secondary, 124 special schools and two universities. In exports they were about even, about 44 million each way.

In Estonia they had about the same balance but not as large. Their industries were textile, paper, cement, oil, extracted from shale rock, 150,000 metric tons, forestry, timber, flax.

You see, in both countries they were diversified so that they were on what I call a pretty sound economic basis from the standpoint of their industries and agriculture.

The exports from Estonia were 28 million, their imports 29 million. Their imports were cotton and woolen and sugar, exports, dairy products, paper, flax, potatoes, timber.

That is a pretty good diversification.

Mr. KERSTEN. At the time you understood that these three small nations had had their independence for only about 20 years, did you not?

Mr. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what was your information as to how their economy had progressed, say from when they first regained their freedom until the time you were there; in other words, during the course of that 20 years?

Mr. WATSON. My understanding was that they had made real progress all through those years.

Mr. KERSTEN. Through those 20 years of independence?

Mr. WATSON. Yes. Take agriculture, as I said: They cut up the land, no one could own more than 200 acres. They had some large

landed estates and those were cut up into small farms. That gave everybody who wanted to get out on the land an opportunity to do so.

Mr. KERSTEN. So that in 1938, shortly after the Communists took over, the land was pretty well distributed among the people, is that correct?

Mr. WATSON. Yes, very well in both countries. We are talking about two countries. Latvia at that time had approximately 2 million population and Estonia had only about 1,100,000. They were all getting along; they weren't borrowing any money. They were getting along on their own power as far as I could learn. I felt they were doing an outstanding job, that they were people of intelligence, integrity and they had a proper evaluation of the spiritual values.

Mr. KERSTEN. And it was your understanding that the same outstanding progress had been made in Lithuania, was it not?

Mr. WATSON. That was my understanding, although I can't say anything definite about that country.

Mr. KERSTEN. I mean, there was no contrast, there was approximately the same outstanding progress?

Mr. WATSON. Yes, that was my general understanding but I couldn't testify to that. These other two countries—in fact, I was very, very enthusiastic and I felt they were setting a good example for other countries.

Mr. KERSTEN. What about the condition of the freedom of the people at that time before the Communists took over, as you observed it?

Mr. WATSON. I observed they had real freedom from every standpoint; I heard nothing to the contrary.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you make any observations as to the condition of employment of the people, that is in the cities and—

Mr. WATSON. So far as I recall, there was no unemployment problem, as I stated. I was told that in agriculture it was necessary for them to temporarily import harvest labor from Poland.

Mr. KERSTEN. You say you met the President, Mr. Ulmanis?

Mr. WATSON. Yes, I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you have a fair opportunity to observe what kind of person he and other members of his government were?

Mr. WATSON. I was very, very much impressed with the sincerity and intelligence of President Ulmanis. He was a bachelor and he had given his whole life to education in his country after he went back from the United States until the time he became President. I was impressed with the people I met who were taking an active part in the affairs of the country.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Watson, you have given us a very good picture of these 3 little countries in 1938, 3 little contended, prosperous, happy countries. As far as you observed, the people of those countries certainly would have no cause for complaints against the government in power at that time?

Mr. WATSON. From my observation, none whatever. I would like to confine my testimony to the two countries, Latvia and Estonia.

Mr. BENTLEY. On the basis of Latvia and Estonia, you observed no, what you might call, popular dissatisfaction in the slightest degree?

Mr. WATSON. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. And furthermore, in those two countries you didn't observe any condition such as hardship or misery or poverty or any-

thing like that which are supposed to breed communism? You had not observed anything of that kind at all?

Mr. WATSON. Nothing whatsoever.

Mr. BENTLEY. There would have been no reason for those people to change their governments, particularly as far as adopting a Communist form of government goes, so far as you could observe?

Mr. WATSON. Nothing so far as I observed there.

Mr. BENTLEY. And any type of Soviet propaganda which was put out to the effect that the people of those countries voted overwhelmingly for a Soviet type of government you would be inclined to disregard entirely?

Mr. WATSON. From my observations, you understand; I can only give you my personal observations. I came away very enthusiastic about what I saw in those two countries, also the people I met.

Mr. BENTLEY. But you were there only, I believe, about 2 years before this so-called referendum elected for union with the Soviet Republic under Communist government and from your observations in 1938 you would have said there would have been no reason for the people to want to change?

Mr. WATSON. As I stated, from my observations I felt they were a contented people, happy and prosperous enough. I heard nothing about any poverty or anything of that kind while I was there.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Watson.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Machrowicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just one question, Mr. Watson. Did you notice while you were there whether or not there existed any Communist Party of any strength whatsoever?

Mr. WATSON. No, I heard nothing about anything of that kind.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So then it was quite a surprise to you that the Communists should have taken over shortly after you were there when, while you were there, there was no evidence of any such party even in existence?

Mr. WATSON. I saw no evidence of it.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Watson, the accomplishments that were made by those two small countries were made on the basis of a free enterprise system, were they not?

Mr. WATSON. Yes, from my observations it was absolutely free enterprise.

Mr. BONIN. On what is sometimes called the capitalistic system?

Mr. WATSON. I don't know what they call the capitalistic system there but I observed that the people were getting along and taking care of themselves and I think the records will show that they weren't borrowing money outside of their countries. I didn't know about anything of that kind.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Dodd?

Mr. DODD. I have no questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mr. Watson, for appearing before us. Your testimony is important as showing the economy of these countries before the Communists took over.

Mr. WATSON. I thank all of you gentlemen for your courteous treatment of me while I have been at this table.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF ALEKSANDER KUTT, MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE
FOR A FREE ESTONIA

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Kutt, will you raise your right hand, please? You do solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KUTT. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify yourself, Mr. Kutt?

Mr. KUTT. My name is Aleksander Kutt, K-u-t-t. I was born in Tallinn, Estonia, on November 9, 1900.

Mr. McTIGUE. You are the author of a number of articles on economic problems?

Mr. KUTT. Yes, between the years of 1925 and 1930 I wrote quite a number of articles on economic subjects.

Mr. McTIGUE. In addition to that, you were a businessman in Estonia; is that correct?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your business?

Mr. KUTT. My last main occupation was executive vice chairman of a large agricultural central association.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were some of your other business connections?

Mr. KUTT. Other companies in which I was active were Anglo-Estonian shipping lines.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your position?

Mr. KUTT. I was a member of the council board. Then I was in a cold-storage company that was semiofficial, where I was vice chairman.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you please speak right into that microphone so we can all hear you better?

Mr. KUTT. Then I was on the control board of the Mobile, Ltd., representatives of the Ford Motor Co. in Estonia.

Mr. BONIN. If it is possible would you speak a little louder because some of these newspaper people would like to hear you. We can hear you but it is difficult for them.

Mr. McTIGUE. So you had a great many business connections in Estonia prior to 1940; is that correct?

Mr. KUTT. Yes, quite a large number.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Estonia when the Communists seized power there in June 1940?

Mr. KUTT. I was in Estonia, in Tallinn, at the time.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Communists seized power in Estonia in June 1940, were there any reflections of that takeover in the economy of Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. Not immediately, but very soon. In about 1 month it was started with nationalization. Actually, two main trends could be distinguished: One was nationalization and the other was lowering of living standards.

Mr. KERSTEN. I would like to ask a question at this point if I may, Mr. Counsel.

You remained there after the Communists took over; did you?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long were you there under the Communists?

Mr. KUTT. I was under the Communists until the beginning of March 1941; that is about 8 months.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what happened then to you at that time? Did you get out of the country?

Mr. KUTT. I got out of the country at the beginning of March 1941.

Mr. KERSTEN. So you had about 8 months under the Communist rule?

Mr. KUTT. About 8 months; yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to you personally after the Communists took over?

Mr. KUTT. About the middle of July the newspapers started a certain campaign where they, for some reason or other, thought proper to point out that my activities have been to the loss of the Estonian state and Estonian nation and that I have been—it was called sucking out the juices of Estonia's economy. My name was brought together with the name of another man in Estonia, Mr. Jurima, and the slogan was, it seemed to be that Jurima and I were the wrongdoers in Estonia.

Moreover, during the same time, the prime minister of the Puppet Government—

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me ask you this: Soon after the takeover in 1940, did the Communists start slandering you in your position as head of the butter industry?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they continue to slander you?

Mr. KUTT. They slandered for about 10 days. During this 10 days also, another thing happened. It was just after the first or second article—I cannot remember exactly—I got a call from a provincial store owner who told me that just the day before a Russian in uniform had bought a small piece of butter and had returned it the day when the store owner called me and he showed him a handful of glass and the Russian had told that he had found glass in the butter.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you began to feel that was the beginning of the end as far as you were concerned?

Mr. KUTT. I just felt that especially, because in 1938 or perhaps it might have been in 1937, I just by occasion had heard a piece of the Moscow purge trial. Mr. Vishinsky, the attorney general at that time on purge trials, was interrogating a man whom I thought at that time to be some director of a butter trust company, but who, it came out later, was the chairman of the 5-year plan commission. I cannot remember his name.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was in the Moscow purge trial?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did Vishinsky charge him with?

Mr. KUTT. Vishinsky charged him—I heard only one piece of that interrogation and that was that Mr. Vishinsky asked the man whether there were occasions when glass was put into butter and the man answered "yes," there were occasions when glass was put in butter. Then Mr. Vishinsky raised his voice and asked whether there have been occasions when glass was put into the butter but not when glass was in the butter and whether the man understands the difference. Then he said "yes," there were occasions when glass was put into butter, but later on—

Mr. McTIGUE. At this time you were the executive vice chairman of the Central Association of Cooperative Dairies, is that correct?

Mr. KUTT. Yes, that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is the biggest commodity export that the Estonians have?

Mr. KUTT. Just butter it was.

Mr. McTIGUE. So, in your position as executive vice chairman you held one of the most responsible industrial positions in Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you began to see the handwriting on the wall, what with the charges being passed around that glass was being found in the butter, did you try to resign?

Mr. KUTT. Yes, I just thought that the best thing I could do would be to resign and I sent up a letter of resignation and tried to give it to the minister of agriculture. My resignation had to go at that time through the minister.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did he accept it?

Mr. KUTT. No, he didn't accept it. He said that I must not go away, that all my reasons which I brought—I thought I seemed to have no confidence and that therefore I would like to resign, but I didn't tell him anything about glass because I thought it is too dangerous to touch on that subject, but I brought up other things, mainly the confidence point. He thought that he cannot accept the resignation.

Later on he told me that perhaps all the reasons which I am giving are not the real reasons and that there might be some other reasons why I wanted to go away. Then he told me that if my real reason is that I think perhaps the Estonian agriculture would be nationalized, then he told me I should not have any fear of that because—

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you finally resign your post?

Mr. KUTT. I didn't resign because he didn't accept my resignation at that time. We argued quite a lot of time. Then after I tried to resign, I was dismissed by the Minister of the Interior.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your resignation was refused, but 10 days later you were dismissed?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What reason was given for your dismissal?

Mr. KUTT. No reason at all.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to your various businesses?

Mr. KUTT. The only thing which happened was about 3 months later I got an invitation to participate at liquidation of a company called Poul Kojerman & Co.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were one of the leading businessmen in Estonia; is that correct?

Mr. KUTT. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your overall income approximately?

Mr. KUTT. My overall income was about 18,000 to 20,000 crowns a year.

Mr. McTIGUE. What does that mean in the exchange rate?

Mr. KUTT. If we take it by the official exchange rate it would have been about \$5,000 to \$5,500 but naturally the dollars at that time were something else than they are now.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that your salary?

Mr. KUTT. That was my total income.

Mr. McTIGUE. How much did you say it was, again?

Mr. KUTT. About 18,000 to 20,000 crowns a year.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that is equivalent to what in dollars?

Mr. KUTT. That is about \$5,500.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to that income after the Communists took over, after you resigned or were dismissed? Were all your interests nationalized?

Mr. KUTT. Oh, yes; nothing was left.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your income cut off?

Mr. KUTT. All was cut off. I had income from my salaries and income from my house. The house was nationalized, so nothing was left.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do then?

Mr. KUTT. I just tried to live selling off my personal things.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you stay in Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. Yes; I stayed on until the beginning of March.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do in March?

Mr. KUTT. In March I went away to Germany by a method of which I was told that I cannot——

Mr. McTIGUE. You got out through the underground?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What efforts were made by the Communist regime to influence the opinion of workers in Estonia favorably toward nationalization?

Mr. KUTT. At all meetings the Communists tried to drive home the point that now all the sorrows are ended, that now there would be work for everyone and bread for everyone, since all the means of production are now in the hands of the people. All this propaganda was repeated also, sometimes in official declarations which were published in the State Gazette—just the usual Communist propaganda.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have any knowledge, supported by factual observation, of the reaction of the Estonian workers toward the Communist economic plan in general of the nationalization program?

Mr. KUTT. Yes. Naturally all the organized expression of opinion was suppressed and it was not possible to hear that openly, but sometimes when the workers couldn't hold back their emotions or when they were just in small groups, then one could hear what they meant about it.

I personally was a witness to an incident where just a director of a firm had been dismissed and was just on his way out. He walked over the yard in the direction of the main gate. It happened to be that the workers were just returning from their lunch and streamed through the gate into the yard.

At the same time the workers somehow got the word that the director had been just dismissed in the cause of nationalization and, as soon as the workers heard that, they sent around a man and started asking question why and how and offered to send a delegation to the Government to have the order changed.

It took time for the man to explain that it is not a good idea to send a delegation, but even then when they broke out of their ring of workers and walked toward the gate, about half a dozen workers were coming behind him and beside him and still all the time offered a delegation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Kutt, can you tell us what happened to prices and what happened to wages of the workers after the Communists took over in Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. Actually at the beginning nothing happened, but it was either at the end of September or in October when, one day, nearly all stores were closed.

Mr. McTIGUE. You mean just from June to September?

Mr. KUTT. Yes; nothing happened. Only before that, the exchange rate of 1 Estonian crown was fixed, 1 crown, 1 ruble 25. But then at the end of September, or in October, 1 day nearly all stores were closed, especially were closed all stores for industrial consumer goods. Not all food stores were closed because the food was needed. After about 3 days the stores were opened again and then, instead of former prices, the public saw the prices raised in industrial goods up to 10 to 15 times.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean 10 to 15 times what they had been before?

Mr. KUTT. What they had been before.

Mr. KERSTEN. If I understand you correctly, Mr. Kutt, 2 or 3 months after the Communists took over, the stores were closed for a few days and reopened and prices were then 10 to 15 times higher; is that right?

Mr. KUTT. For industrial goods, consumer goods, prices were 10 to 15 times higher.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right; I wanted to get that clear.

Mr. KUTT. In some categories even more. For example—

Mr. KERSTEN. For example, what kind of consumer industrial goods do you have in mind?

Mr. KUTT. For example, shoes. Shoes were before the occupation, about middle quality shoes, about 10 to 12 crowns.

Mr. KERSTEN. In dollars what would that be?

Mr. KUTT. In dollars it would be about \$2.70 up to \$3.20.

Mr. KERSTEN. That was before the Communists took over?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What were shoes after the Communists took over when these stores opened up?

Mr. KUTT. After the stores were opened up, after the 3 days, I saw in 1 store a pair of shoes which was priced at 240 rubles.

Mr. KERSTEN. What would that be in dollars at that time?

Mr. KUTT. 240 rubles, that would have been in crowns about 190 crowns and 190 crowns would have been about \$51 or \$52 a pair.

Mr. KERSTEN. So shoes went from about \$2.70 to \$3.20 to \$50 or \$60 a pair?

Mr. KUTT. \$51 or \$52 a pair.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many people in Estonia could afford to pay that for a pair of shoes?

Mr. KUTT. At that time nobody, because who had money? The money was frozen and the wages were so low. For example, the wages were so low that one hospital attendant would have needed nearly 2 months' wages to buy a pair of shoes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Two months wages to buy a pair of shoes.

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to the wages of the workers?

Mr. KUTT. At the same time, when the prices went up, also the wages went up. When the prices of industrial goods rose about 10 to 15 times and the prices for foodstuff about 3 to 4 times, which gave a so-called weighted average of about 4 to 4½ times, the wages went up

only $2\frac{1}{2}$ up to 3 times. So, the end result was that the real wages had lost about 35 percent during these 3 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. Of the purchasing power?

Mr. KUTT. Yes, about 35 percent of real wages were lost during the 3 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they try to persuade the people that they were doing them a great good by increasing their wages?

Mr. KUTT. I can't remember the word in the newspapers at that time about the raising of prices, but there was a raising of wages by $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 times. It just happened during these 3 days too, when the prices were raised, there was quite a lot in the newspapers about the benefits which the workers are getting with the raise in wages.

Mr. KERSTEN. So all the propaganda was about the raise in wages, but nothing about the rise in prices?

Mr. KUTT. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. What, briefly, happened to the Estonian monetary system? What happened to the banks?

Mr. KUTT. Just about the end of July or the middle of the second half, all banks were given a moratorium. That meant that all the savings were frozen and checks were honored only by special permission for larger amounts. The savings account owners could get also once a month \$30; 100 crowns. At the exchange that was about \$30.

In any case, with the raising of prices of industrial goods up to 10 to 15 times, the savings were all inflated and the savings account owners lost just about three-quarters of their savings, or even more.

Mr. McTIGUE. They lost three-quarters of their savings?

Mr. KUTT. Yes; during these 3 days. That loss naturally went further because, after the 3 days, during the next 6 months or so, there was a further gradual rise in prices.

Mr. McTIGUE. How was the nationalization actually carried out?

Mr. KUTT. At the beginning it was told that nothing else would be nationalized, only the banks, then large scale industries, mines, and transport enterprise, but that was only the beginning. The nationalization ended actually even by nationalizing also the scissors and razors of barbers, sewing machines of seamstresses and the shoe-repair tools of cobblers.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you mean the small instruments like cobblers' tools, barbers' instruments and sewing machines were nationalized? In other words, the ownership was taken away from these people?

Mr. KUTT. Nothing was left.

Mr. McTIGUE. Even a small barber or even a single seamstress was no longer able to go on with his or her very small enterprise, but rather was taken into a collective group where he or she had to contribute to the group and was given a salary of a certain stated amount?

Mr. KUTT. Yes; and the collective group was then the owner of that sewing machine or hammer or whatever it was.

Mr. McTIGUE. What about the rents in Estonia before and after? How much, for example, did you pay for your apartment?

Mr. KUTT. I had an apartment, yes; but naturally after the Communists came in, then they proclaimed that everybody couldn't have more than 9 square meters of so-called living room; 9 square meters is nearly 100 square feet. That was the official maximum of living room for everybody, so, as quite a lot of Russians came to Tallinn, then everybody had to find some friends if he was able. They had to take

friends in. The rents were set up according to what was called the social position of the apartment owners. For example, for workers it was the lowest rent, but if anybody didn't work, irrespective of who he was, the rent was much higher.

It was the same with electricity. For example, electricity for clergy was 10 times the rate, higher than just for a general rate.

Mr. McTIGUE. You mean they charged the clergy 10 times more than they did the general public?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why?

Mr. KUTT. They were accounted for as people who did nothing, who didn't work.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was the Communist version; they charged 10 times more because the clergy did nothing?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead.

Mr. KUTT. That was the rent position.

Mr. McTIGUE. How much did the rents increase, approximately, after the Communists took over?

Mr. KUTT. The rents didn't increase in such a proportion as, for example, the industrial goods prices were raised, the reason being that the Communist policy seems to be not to build new houses, but to press into the old houses during that period, beginning from 1917, as many people as possible.

It is very interesting to follow their building programs as far as living houses were concerned, not factories, and so on. Only the smallest part of funds assigned for building go for houses, for living purposes. They don't pay more rent, they just press more and more into the houses; 4 or 5 or 6 people are pressed into 1 room.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Estonia when the arrests and the deportations started?

Mr. KUTT. No; I came out 4 months before.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were any of your friends arrested or deported?

Mr. KUTT. I lost about 75 percent of my friends during 1 year after the Soviet occupation.

Mr. McTIGUE. During 1 year after the Soviet occupation?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were most of those leaders in industry?

Mr. KUTT. Yes, in economy, in government.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you leave your family in Estonia when you left?

Mr. KUTT. I didn't have any family besides my daughter who was living with my divorced wife, so I didn't risk very much in that sense that anything could happen to my daughter when we were separated.

Mr. McTIGUE. After your business was taken away from you or nationalized, how did you make a living?

Mr. KUTT. I just started selling my things. I got 100 crowns a month from my bank account, but prices were up $4\frac{1}{2}$ times so that didn't last very much, so I started to sell my personal things.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you sold your personal things, what did you do?

Mr. KUTT. They just lasted until the time when I went away.

Mr. McTIGUE. You made no effort to find work under the Communists?

Mr. KUTT. No: I didn't look for work and even if I had looked I think I wouldn't have got it.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you escape finally from Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. I just paid for a document a certain amount of money. I sold my things and I paid for a document which the Communists themselves issued and on the ground of that document I was able to go on a ship and go to Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. What about the ship?

Mr. KUTT. That was just a ship, a passenger ship.

Mr. McTIGUE. Oh, I see. How would you estimate the present living standard in Estonia compared with the standard of the pre-war period, or with the standard of some free country of the Western World? How does it compare now with what we—

Mr. KUTT. Approximately it can be estimated that about one-third of the previous living standard in Estonia has been left. Two-thirds have been cut away. Compared with the living standard of the United States, in 1952, the living standard in Estonia now is approximately 12 percent.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. On what do you base those figures?

Mr. KUTT. I base those figures on prices of foodstuff computed, according to the figures of the Department of Labor, the United States, is 1 against 7.14, and, on the other hand, I worked it out myself and in Estonia at present it is 1 against 16½.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Are you basing those on Estonian figures?

Mr. KUTT. No; just figures which the Latvian Revue just brought out at the beginning of this year—the closing figures. The foodstuff-relation figures are—I am using the figures worked out by the Department of Labor of the United States because I think the Department of Labor will have the most reliable figures in that sense, in relation to wages against foodstuff prices.

Mr. McTIGUE. The dairy industry is the principal industry in Estonia; is that correct?

Mr. KUTT. Yes; it was.

Mr. McTIGUE. And butter, for example, is the principal export commodity?

Mr. KUTT. It was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us briefly how the price of butter increased after the Communists took over?

Mr. KUTT. Before the Communist occupation the price of butter was 2 crowns a kilogram. With exchange rate, 1 crown against 1.25 rubles, the price changed to 2 rubles 50. After these 3 days when the prices were raised, the price of butter had been fixed at 7 rubles 50, but during the next 8 months the price went up to 22 rubles a kilogram. So, instead of 2 rubles 50, say in June or July 1940, in May or June 1941 it was 22 rubles.

Mr. McTIGUE. Which means that it increased how many times?

Mr. KUTT. It had increased 8½ or 9 times.

Mr. McTIGUE. What can you tell us, for example, about a watch, a wristwatch?

Mr. KUTT. The wristwatches went up—I had such an experience myself. I had to sell some things and the first thing I thought I

ought to sell was an old watch, and I didn't know the price because the prices had changed, too, in the 3 days. So I went to a jewelry shop and asked to see the watches and I wanted to know what the price is. I was shown about 20 watches, some of them old watches and some of them silver watches. I had a steel watch to sell, and I asked whether that is all you have here. The man told me, "Yes: it is now all we have."

There were 20 or 25 watches in the tray, but he told me that before he had more than 4,000 watches in the store.

I asked what was the price. He said for the silver watches the price is 900 rubles a watch.

Now, the price for such kind of watches before the Communist occupation was about 15 to 20 crowns, but the silver watches were Soviet made watches and they sold them, instead of 15 to 20 crowns, which made perhaps 19 to 25 rubles, they were sold at 900 rubles, so they had gone up about 40 to 45 times.

Mr. McTIGUE. What explanation can you give to the apparent discrepancy between the comparatively high industrial output and the low living standard during the postwar period in Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. Yes, industry really has gone up so that the combined recovery of industry and agriculture in Estonia is higher than before the war. It is mainly so on account of longer working hours and quite a lot more of people must participate at work to get food.

As the present living standard is only about one-third of what it was before the war, then the only explanation can be that the difference between the larger production than before the war and three times lower living standards—the only explanation is that the difference is being used to purposes other than manufacturing of consumer goods for the needs of Estonian people.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Kutt, you have been telling us about this inflation that took place after the Soviets took over Estonia. When did you leave Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. I left Estonia at the beginning of March 1941.

Mr. BENTLEY. You have been telling us about this inflation that occurred. Was this inflation, as far as you could determine, deliberately planned on the part of the Communists?

Mr. KUTT. It was exactly deliberately planned.

Mr. BENTLEY. What would you assume was their purpose in permitting this inflation? What would you assume their purpose was?

Mr. KUTT. The primary purpose was, by lowering the living standard to get out the resources of Estonia for purposes of their own. For that reason they had to bring to the same level the wages, as well as prices in Estonia, corresponding wages and prices.

Mr. BENTLEY. To drive the living standard of the Estonian people down to the living standard of the Russian people?

Mr. KUTT. Exactly.

Mr. BENTLEY. During the time you were there was a large part of the agricultural produce of Estonia requisitioned for shipment to Soviet Russia?

Mr. KUTT. Oh, yes. The natural export of Estonia was to a large part just agricultural produce and that seemed to be one reason why the prices of agricultural produce were not raised in proportion

as the prices of other goods. The prices for industrial goods were raised by 10 to 15 times. They created an artificial surplus; nobody would buy such goods at such prices.

MR. BENTLEY. Another reason, I presume, for having this inflation was also to drive out what you might call private capital on the part of such people as yourself, capital that couldn't be obtained through nationalization, to bring that out and to frankly impoverish people such as yourself who had any amount of reserves of capital assets. Would that be correct?

MR. KUTT. That is right. All who had money or who had some kind of property were in a very subtle and thorough way cut off from all their resources. For example, even the safes, the private safes in banks were opened and all valuables taken out, except silver spoons and such as that were left. All the valuables, gold and whatever there was, were all taken out to what was called state custody and nobody saw them again.

MR. BENTLEY. One more question, sir, about your recent remarks: You assume that the increase in industrial productivity in Estonia since the war has been probably because a great deal of that industrial production has gone into what you might call heavy industry and not into consumer goods; is that correct?

MR. KUTT. Estonian industry has been actually doubled in both directions, the heavy industry being represented mostly by developing of Estonian oil shale industry and gas and oil distillation, but on the other hand the light industry is still up quite a lot. But that doesn't mean that products which the light industry produces are remaining in Estonia. They are taken out from Estonia to a very large extent. It might be, for example, the produce of textile industries is being taken out of the country by the rate of about 90 percent and sent to Soviet Russia where they will be sold to people who again are working in heavy industry.

MR. BENTLEY. This increase in industries in Estonia which Mr. Vishinsky bragged about a year ago, that has been at the expense of agricultural productivity?

MR. KUTT. Quite a lot. Before the Communist occupation 58 percent of the population was supported by occupation in agriculture and 42 percent in towns, but in 1952 it was exactly the opposite—42 percent of the population got support from agriculture and 58 percent were in towns.

By the way, Mr. Vishinsky's 4 percent which he told last December in 1952, that is not right. It was exaggerated at least by two times.

MR. BENTLEY. Exaggerated at least double?

MR. KUTT. Yes.

MR. BENTLEY. That trend, incidentally, of fostering industry at the expense of agriculture, I presume as far as you know, is not only true in Estonia but in the other Baltic countries, and indeed in all the satellite states?

MR. KUTT. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden?

MR. MADDEN. Could you state for the record what the Communists have done in the way of educating, bringing up the children of Estonia into the Communist ideology? What efforts, what moves have they made along that line?

Mr. KUTT. The main activity in the direction of bringing up the children in the Communist way has been made, I think, in two ways: One is the movement of the so-called Pioneers. That is a counterpart of what in Germany 10 years ago was called Hitler Youth. That is for children. Then for teen-agers and perhaps some older up to 25 years, there is the Communistic League of Youth. That is for youths. For children there is the Pioneers.

Naturally they press into these organizations all they can with the hope that the youths will turn into Communists. In Estonia they do not seem to have had very much success with it because from time to time in the newspapers which come out, the reports, there are remarks that there are not enough members in these youth organizations.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, the youth of Estonia is not following the Communist pressure to be active in these organizations?

Mr. KUTT. According to the reports of the Communists themselves about the lack of membership, it seems that the youths in Estonia are somewhat critical of these organizations.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, you would state that their progress along the line of grooving the youths into the Communist cause has not been a success?

Mr. KUTT. Not a success.

Mr. MADDEN. Now, state briefly an answer to this question: Is it a fact that at no time the people of Estonia, the officials of Estonia—the former officials of Estonia—cooperated willingly in any way toward Soviet takeover of the country of Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. No, never.

Mr. MADDEN. They never cooperated in any way?

Mr. KUTT. No.

Mr. MADDEN. The taking over of Estonia into the Soviet orbit was brought about by reason of pressure and infiltration and threats and massacre and murder and prison camps?

Mr. KUTT. Actually, it was brought about by the Russian tanks, by hundreds of Russian tanks which came over the border on June 21. That was the joining of Estonia to the Soviet Union.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Kutt, in order to keep the record straight, you used the word “nationalization.”

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Actually, by the term “nationalization” you mean confiscation without pay?

Mr. KUTT. Actually confiscation without pay. There was just one thing. In the course of nationalization of shipping the Communists couldn't get the ships back from foreign countries to Estonia, so they then did two things. One thing was that they promised to pay 25 percent for the value of the ships to be nationalized, but nobody ever saw that money for the ships which the Communists got.

The other thing seems to be unique in a certain sense. That is the punishment of ships' masters and their family members and relatives when the ships were not brought back.

If Mr. Chairman allows, I will read that law.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right.

Mr. KUTT (reading):

LAW RESTRICTING THE EXPLOITATION OF SHIPS

ISSUED AS A DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ON JULY 27, 1940

ART. 1. Any kind of leaving harbours or entering harbours without the permission of the Government of the Republic is prohibited for Estonian ships in foreign waters.

ART. 2. Masters of ships who transgress the orders of the Government of the Republic regarding the bringing back of Estonian ships to the home country will be treated as persons guilty of high treason, whereby responsible are also the members of their families and nearer relatives.

ART. 3. Ships are prohibited to enter the harbours of the United States of America and Britain without a permission of the Government of the Republic.

II

The Criminal Code will be supplemented by Art. 801 in the following reading: "Ships' masters who without the permission of the Government of the Republic left a foreign harbour or entered a foreign harbour will be punished by termless hard labor."

This law will be valid with publication.

JOH. VAREN,

Prime Minister, in capacity of the President of the Republic.

That was the puppet Prime Minister who issued that decree. Actually never anybody was paid and the nationalization was actually confiscation of property.

MR. BONIN. You also used the phrase that when the Russians occupied Estonia, they immediately started a campaign of propaganda concerning work—there would be plenty of work for all the people and there would be plenty of bread for all the people?

MR. KUTT. Yes.

MR. BONIN. Actually there has been a lot of work, slave work; is that correct?

MR. KUTT. Yes. Naturally nobody is without work. "Who doesn't work cannot eat, should not eat"—that is the slogan now. It really is so that instead of perhaps about 15, perhaps up to 20 percent more people are pressed into the work, but this higher percentage consists of very young people. Then aged people and a very large percentage of women, wives and mothers, instead of caring for their families, have now been pressed into the factories.

MR. BONIN. In fact, most women are working the farms today; aren't they?

MR. KUTT. Yes.

MR. BONIN. The children are kept in these community houses where they are indoctrinated with atheist philosophy?

MR. KUTT. That is what they are trying to do.

MR. BONIN. And, of course, they have been feeding them with Russian rye bread too; haven't they?

MR. KUTT. Yes.

MR. BONIN. That is the reduced standard of living which they brought down to the equal of the Russian standard of living?

MR. KUTT. That is right.

MR. BONIN. You stated that they increased the value of the rent for ministers and preachers of the gospel?

MR. KUTT. Yes.

MR. BONIN. That is because they were nonproducers?

MR. KUTT. Yes; the notion is that the clergy doesn't work.

Mr. BONIN. It is also one of their methods of subterfuge to eliminate the clergy?

Mr. KUTT. Certainly so.

Mr. BONIN. To cause trouble for them?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Dodd?

Mr. DODD. I have one question I would like to ask: You may have covered this because I had to leave the room. What happened in Estonia with respect to, let us say, life-insurance policies which were in effect? Were they just canceled out; do you know?

Mr. KUTT. Just canceled out. Nothing was left because all insurance business—private insurance business—was just abolished.

Mr. DODD. That would be true of pensions and matters of that nature, as well?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. DODD. All property rights, as I understand it, are completely destroyed?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. DODD. I think that is important because we haven't had too much information as to how the economics of these takeovers work out exactly, particularly in these Iron Curtain countries. I think it is important that we get that and I am grateful to this witness. I think he has been helpful to us on that score.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just a question or two and then we will be through. You heard Mr. Watson's testimony here this morning about the condition of things in 1938; did you not?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In a word, how did the conditions after the Communists took over compare with the conditions he described? How did they compare from the time he described to the time after the Communists took over?

Mr. KUTT. If it would be allowed to express in numbers and in a certain comparison, then I would like to say that only one-third of the wages is left. It would be approximately so that if, for example, the present wages of United States industrial workers which, in 1952 were \$1.53 an hour, would have been suddenly reduced from \$1.53 to only 51 cents.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words——

Mr. KUTT. In other words, just two-thirds cut off and only one-third left.

Mr. KERSTEN. So that would be like a worker in the United States who gets \$1.50 an hour now getting only 50 cents? That is what happened to the workers in Estonia?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You don't mean that the workers even get 50 cents an hour now?

Mr. KUTT. No; not at all. But if we would compare the present industrial worker in the United States and a worker in Estonia, we must divide that \$1.53 by 8.5.

Mr. KERSTEN. Which would reduce it to what?

Mr. KUTT. That would leave less than 20 cents an hour for industrial workers.

Mr. KERSTEN. The industrial workers in Estonia now, from the figures you have examined, get less than 20 cents an hour?

Mr. KUTT. Less than 20 cents; about 12 percent of what the workers get here in the United States.

Mr. KERSTEN. One final question: This law that you read about ships' masters, keeping them from leaving the country or going into a port like somewhere in the United States, as I understood your reading of it, that visits penalties on members of their families. Is that right?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, if a ship's master should take a ship to one of these forbidden ports, members of his family would probably be thrown into jail; is that correct?

Mr. KUTT. It is difficult to say, but it would have been done because in cases where the ships' masters didn't bring the ships back to Estonia, they were accused of being guilty of high treason. High treason contained in Estonia—I am not a lawyer—but I have been told by lawyers that high treason contained the death penalty and if the relatives were made responsible also for these acts, for the same crime, then in certain instances it might even not have been prison, but worse.

Mr. KERSTEN. So one of the classic ways the Communists have of controlling people is to hold their relatives as hostages, isn't it?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that is probably the way they are able to keep some of their diplomats in line throughout the world; isn't it?

Mr. KUTT. That might be.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just one more question: What about the food situation for the workers during the months just before you left as compared to the food situation before the Communists came in?

Mr. KUTT. The food situation was not so bad when I came out in March 1941, just because Estonia had a very large surplus always of agricultural produce.

Mr. KERSTEN. But from your examination of figures and information as of the present time, do you have any idea as to the food situation for the workers now?

Mr. KUTT. At the present time it is awful.

Mr. KERSTEN. It is awful?

Mr. KUTT. At the present time, but in 1941, 6 or 8 months after the Communists took over—

Mr. KERSTEN. They still had some surpluses, is that correct?

Mr. KUTT. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mr. Kutt, for appearing before us and giving us these economic facts.

The hearings are now adjourned until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p. m.)

(The committee reconvened at 2:10 p. m.)

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order, please.

Dr. Trimakas.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANTANAS TRIMAKAS, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY, NEW JERSEY

MR. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

DR. TRIMAKAS. I do.

MR. KERSTEN. Give us your full name, Doctor.

DR. TRIMAKAS. My name is Antanas Trimakas.

MR. KERSTEN. Will you spell it for us?

DR. TRIMAKAS. A-n-t-a-n-a-s T-r-i-m-a-k-a-s.

MR. KERSTEN. Where do you now live?

DR. TRIMAKAS. I live now in Brooklyn, N. Y. I was born in Lithuania, and came to this country in 1947.

MR. KERSTEN. What is your profession or occupation?

DR. TRIMAKAS. At the present moment I am the chairman of the department of economics at the Seton Hall University, New Jersey.

MR. KERSTEN. Economics is your field, is it?

DR. TRIMAKAS. That is my special field of interest.

MR. KERSTEN. Would you give us some idea, Doctor, about your experience in that field?

DR. TRIMAKAS. Well, in my native country, Lithuania, I had an opportunity to work practically. I was inspector of cooperative banks in Lithuania, and chief of the section of inspection of the Farmers Central Bank. Then later on I was also director of one of the regional banks of that Farmers Bank. That was during the independence days. When the Bolsheviks arrived I was with the Central Bank in Lithuania, and also with the Lietuvos Bankas.

MR. KERSTEN. Before you go into the story of your experience there, do you hold any degrees in economics?

DR. TRIMAKAS. Well, I got my doctor's degree in economics in France, Paris. I studied also international law at the Academy of International Law at The Hague. As well I studied law at the law school in Lithuania, and international relations in Geneva at the School of International Relations there, with the League of Nations at that time.

MR. KERSTEN. And following that what has been your study in economics?

DR. TRIMAKAS. Well, I have two major fields of interest—economics and political science too. I was teaching in this country not only economics but political science. So in this capacity I had to study all the relations in Europe and Eastern Europe especially, and also elsewhere.

MR. KERSTEN. How long have you been teaching at Seton Hall University in the United States?

DR. TRIMAKAS. I have been teaching there since 1950.

MR. KERSTEN. Where is Seton Hall located?

DR. TRIMAKAS. That is located in Newark, N. J., but they have their branches in Jersey City and South Orange, N. J.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were you formerly in the service of the Free Lithuanian Government?

DR. TRIMAKAS. Yes; I was in the foreign service from 1929 till the beginning of World War II.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were you in Lithuania when the Russians marched in?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. When the Russians marched in I was in Lithuania, but in the historical capital of Vilnius, where I was active as the consul general for Poland.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had dealings with the Soviet prior to the time of that march?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes; with the commander in chief of the Red forces that occupied half of Poland in 1939, a certain marshal, Kovalev.

Mr. McTIGUE. You knew what to expect then. After the Communists had seized power in Lithuania in June of 1940, were there any reflections of that changeover in the economy of Lithuania?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Oh, yes; major changes. First of all, we should understand perfectly well that the Soviet purpose is to change the people, to change the freeman into the Soviet man. And that has a meaning, not simply that term, but also an essential meaning. For them, first of all man has to be deprived of all what he owned or possessed before in order to make him a kind of slave, a slave of their regime, of their system, and a servant of the new established order. They take away from him all that he possessed. They start from that. They made all people in the Soviet Union miserably poor. They had to do the same with the people in the countries they occupied.

The purpose was, first, to change the type of people; and second, to make also their standard of living the same as they used to have in their own country within the limits of the Soviet Union of 1939. So in order to do that they had to proceed to the expropriation, and by that I understand that they took away everything the people had without any remuneration, without any pay. If you had property, land, industrial, or any business enterprise, that did no longer belong to you.

In principle again we understand that is according to the Marxian conception: all productive means should belong to the government, the state; nothing should belong to the man. Therefore it is to take away everything he has, and that is what they did.

Mr. McTIGUE. Doctor, what happened to the prices and the wages and the living standard in Lithuania after the seizure?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Well, after the seizure, it changed everything. First of all, as I mentioned, they had to level the standard of living. How, by what means? There are several means, either direct control or indirect, by changing the price, charging different prices. To introduce that kind of redistribution of wealth and to attribute to this and that a certain amount would be very difficult. It is much easier to raise the prices to such a point that the people would be unable to buy. That is what they succeeded in getting.

When the prices went up, they went up sometimes 10 and 15 times higher than they had been before. Just for illustration, I could mention some of the prices that I got by various channels. Mr. Kutt spoke of that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes. I remember he mentioned watches. What, for example, was the price of an average suit before the takeover in Lithuania and what is the approximate price now?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Before the takeover by the Communists, we paid \$24. It was already a good suit. From that it went up to \$40. After the Russians took over they changed it to a really huge difference. The people behind the Iron Curtain now pay for the same suit \$500.

A simple dress, cotton dress, costs as high as \$250. So you will understand how much shoes cost, too. Now it is \$70 or \$80. You can understand why the people can't buy. It is not necessary for them to produce, for all the surplus is taken away to the Soviet Union.

Mr. McTIGUE. How much would an egg cost over there?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. An egg costs now 55 cents, 1 lone egg. Very ordinary meat, low-quality meat costs \$24 a pound. It is about the same price for butter. This shows simply the price, but we have to compare the wages. Then we will see what is the purchasing power of money today.

The average income of the Soviet citizen today is \$119 a month. That is true in Lithuania, that is about true everywhere over there. So you can imagine how long a man has to work in order to buy just a suit. Therefore they don't have adequate suits. They really are poor looking. Cotton suits only, no wool; that would cost too much. Under their climatic conditions it is really unbearable, and it makes life terribly miserable and difficult.

If you will permit, Mr. Chairman, I will give an illustration of the situation in the countryside of Lithuania and also a major picture of what it was and what it is at the present moment. That will show you the difference. As you know, the collectivization of farms is the aim of the communistic system. They justify that by saying that they will increase the productivity.

On the other side it has a political reason. They concentrate the people in certain spots, localities where they may and are able to control them easier for political reasons, to control their movements, their daily lives, and also to indoctrinate them. That is the easiest way. Therefore, they had not only to concentrate farms into bigger farms but also to take the housing from those small settlements, homesteads and into certain concentration, into groups where the people are concentrated and live under control.

In Lithuania now we have 97 percent of all agricultural farms collectivized. So they are grouped in collective farms. Those remaining are simply small lots that could not be joined to the big farms and they are without any economic value to the production; they were left out. Then they have small orchards around their small houses which they may cultivate as they like and have a few hens or something like that and improve somewhat their living condition.

According to what I know and to what I saw myself as I remained under the Communist regime for 1 year from the occupation of Lithuania in 1940-41 when the Germans came, this is the situation. The people have nothing better to eat than just that Russian-type dark rye bread; very ordinary, and that is almost all. There is some milk and no fats. It is curious enough that while here fats have no value, or very little, there it would be the highest value the people could get, but they don't have enough.

Therefore, under these conditions you can understand their productivity and their willingness to work on the farms when they, historically, have been accustomed to be independent on their farms, to work for themselves. What is left to them is simply to work as slaves of the state. The state takes everything away and leaves them just that bread.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you got any information on the exports from the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia before the seizure?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I have a very interesting comparison if I could cite it. That is a comparison of the foreign trade in Lithuania and in other Baltic countries. And of course I do not need to emphasize here the difference in size of the Baltic States and the Soviet Union.

For instance, at that time—in 1938—the Baltic countries exported \$293,700,000 of all kinds of goods, and at the same time they did import \$292 million. The Soviet Union, that huge, colossal state in Eastern Europe, exported only \$261 million, and imported \$250 million. You can see the difference.

The Lithuanians exported about \$13 to \$15 per head. The Russians only \$1 per head. That shows you the picture, how the situation is.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are speaking now, of course, of the Russians under the Communist regime?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That's it.

Mr. KERSTEN. They have been under the Communist regime for some years; that is correct, isn't it?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I mean the Soviet Union.

Mr. McTIGUE. These are 1938 figures?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes, before the last war, immediately.

The same could be said as regards their productivity of land. You know that they are changing now the social and economic structure of those occupied countries, that is, not only in Lithuania but everywhere in the Baltic countries—in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and so on, also the Balkans; they are changing from an agricultural type of production to a more industrial type of production.

But at the same time the productivity of the farms declined, disregarding the fact that they concentrated the farms for an increase in productivity and also that they secured certain machinery, but of poor quality.

For instance, in Lithuania in 1939 we had about 25 bushels of rye per hectare. Now today in the same Lithuania, on the same farms, they have only 11 bushels per hectare. In wheat we had 24,000 bushels. Now it is 10. Potatoes, we had 340 bushels. Now they have 185. Horses 480,000; now 213,000. Sheep, 1,200,000; now only 260,000. Pigs, 1 million plus; now 315,000.

All this indicates what kind of food they are able to provide to the people when wheat and hogs decline to abnormal proportions. They can't provide any better food for the city population, nor to the farms.

Mr. KERSTEN. I would gather from those figures that the Communists have succeeded in cutting down the economy of the Baltic Nations, including Lithuania of course, to pretty much the same level as they have maintained the huge Russian economy.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is it.

Mr. KERSTEN. You pointed out, I believe, that in the other nations the Communists have taken over, similar things have happened.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. So that the economy really goes down when the false propaganda goes up; is that about it?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes. You heard the propaganda from Vishinsky, how production was going up, how it increased in those countries, but he took just certain of the factors; he did not give you the full picture.

He took certain items where they increased—the production that they need for Russia.

Nowadays everything is taken by Moscow for their own needs. Therefore, when production went up it was only for those articles that they are interested in and that they need in Russia in the Soviet Union, and that is where it goes. The rest is simply very poor quality consumer goods. The reason for the enormous shortage of those consumer goods is simply the high prices.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me ask you this: Can you tell us anything about labor unions before the seizure and labor unions after the seizure by the Communists?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Well, the labor union problem is really one of the most interesting chapters in the whole Soviet social policy and their activities. They insisted their regime was in favor of labor unions, labor unions as composed and organized by workers, and they claimed always to be the protectors of the workers.

However, these unions, as with any other organizations there, lost their nature and their freedom. Today the unions are organized by obligation. Every one of the workers has to join the unions. They have to pay their membership dues, and the part played by labor unions is entirely different now from that we have in the free world.

Now the unions are not to protect the worker but to serve the regime, to see whether the workers are really performing their duties or not. Thus the purpose of the union is simply to control whether the workers are coming in on time to the factories, whether they are staying at their places of employment the whole 8 hours, whether they are attending the indoctrination courses.

If it sometimes happens that a man falls sick and cannot come, they send their representative to the home of the worker and check to see whether he really is sick.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happens they strike?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. There is no right whatsoever to strike; there is no right. The state justifies this on the basis that the state owns everything and that the state is a proletarian state. How could the proletarians strike against the proletarians? So strikes are, in principle, prohibited, and if anybody does something in this regard they would be punished, and even for any tardiness in coming to the working places, he is very severely punished. The first time you come 5 minutes too late, your salary is deducted by 25 percent for 3 months. The second time you are late 5 minutes, your salary is deducted by the same percentage for 6 months. The third time you disappear.

What does it mean? You know perfectly well. Either you are jailed or you are deported to the Soviet Union for lack of discipline at that place of employment. Thus you are considered an enemy of the regime and of the people and, therefore, you should be punished.

Now the freedom of those same people is restricted also as to where they are to live. They have to live where they get employment. And to get a job is a complex problem. First of all the party checks you: what have you been doing; what are your qualifications; did you attend the meetings, and so on and so on, and if you failed, well, you are not qualified to assume any functions and to take any job.

If you don't get a job, you have no right to live, to reside there where you are. You have to go somewhere else to look for work. If you don't find work, they find it for you, and thus it is a continuous

deportation of people for the reason that you simply could not find a job. They take care of you—they find you a job behind the Ural Mountains. That is the system.

Also very typical for the workers, all of them have to buy Soviet Union bonds to help the state.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean the workers in Lithuania have to buy Soviet Union bonds?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Everybody is obliged to do that. That is supposed to be voluntary, but when you come to pick up your salary or wages, the accountant deducts without asking you. He says, "That is prescribed, that was decided by everybody. You have to pay that."

Mr. McTIGUE. It is a rather sizable deduction?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Sometimes it amounts to 25 percent.

Mr. McTIGUE. 25 percent?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. 25 percent of your wages or salary.

You have those bonds and you need money; you don't know what to do. You either have to sell, which is what the majority have to do, or you go to the bank to borrow money for your consumer needs. You pledge your bonds. You give them the bonds that you purchased for 10 percent of their value. If you are unable to pay back your loan, you lose your bonds. So that is twice you are robbed of your possessions, and you don't get back anything for that.

Another chapter of the same nature but very interesting too is the obligation to save; the people have to save. Then when you keep your money with the banks, a certain percentage from your salary, then you cannot get back everything you want; you must have authorization, you must explain the need, why are you needing the money, how are you going to use it? If you get it, the state takes back half of it at times.

This is continuous in order to keep the people at certain low levels of standard of living.

Mr. McTIGUE. There always was a strong cooperative movement in Lithuania, wasn't there, Doctor?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Oh, yes. In Lithuania, as in most of those countries in northern Europe the people started to organize their national economy on the basis of the cooperative societies.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean before the Communists came?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Before the Communists. They collected small savings to enlarge their capital, and then to organize the cooperative societies. In Lithuania we had about 25 to 30 percent of the whole economy already in the hands of the cooperative societies.

That is more or less the picture in the Scandinavian countries. When the Communists arrived, they could not tolerate such a type of organization, although in principle even their collective farms are cooperative societies. The cooperatives, first of all, had to forget their freedom. Officers of the central bodies of the cooperative societies were appointed. The candidates were indicated by the party and the Government, and those had to be elected, the president, the vice president, and so on. It was the same way all the way up and down—the officers of the cooperative societies were not elected but simply indicated, appointed by the party, by the Communist regime. And so the cooperatives now are simply economic instruments, as any other economic enterprise in the hands of the Soviet Government.

I would like to stress the point of the Soviet Government; not the Lithuanian but the Soviet Union. Any property belongs to the Soviet Union. As such there are certain degrees as regards the administration, but first of all, all that belongs to the Central Ministries in Moscow that dictate the plans, how they are planning the economy and how also they are working out the budget on which depends everything in the country.

The planning is not done in Lithuania today, nor in Latvia nor in Estonia, but in Moscow by the Gosplan. That is the State Central Planning Commission, which then indicates to you the tasks in production, in business, in agriculture, and according to their general needs everything that is necessary for armament, for the army; then what is necessary for nutrition in the big cities, and as I mentioned only 25 percent of the goods produced in Lithuania are left there; the rest being taken away to the Soviet Union.

Mr. McTIGUE. You testified earlier, Doctor, that you had been an official of the Central Farmers Bank at one time, in 1940. Can you tell us something about what has happened to the banks and the currency after the seizure?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Well, when the Communists arrived, first of all they took the Central Bank in their possession. That Central Bank had also the right to issue currency, and it was most important. This bank became immediately a branch of the Gosbank in Moscow, that is the state bank in Moscow, the Central Soviet Union Bank; it was a branch, no longer a Lithuanian Communist institution but a Soviet bank institution.

All gold reserves that they still found were taken, and all the vaults in the banks owned by private citizens were opened—they were obliged to open them—and all valuables were taken, too. For instance, securities. All securities had to be turned in, and they were never returned. All deposits were blocked and all the banks were under the direct control of this single central bank.

Even business enterprises had to submit every day all their cash balances to the bank. The next day they could get back only according to the plan, according to the calculations of the bank. Thus control of the liquid assets immediately was taken by the central bank. All the currency then was under their control, and the Lithuanian national currency, the litas, was then changed into rubles some 3 or 4 months after the occupation. It was in proportion of 1 to 1, disregarding that the Lithuanian national currency was based on the gold standard. That was the only one in Europe, even after the devaluation of the dollar, that remained on the gold standard. It was done by a simple order of the Soviet authorities.

Thus they took possession, the control of the whole economy, of gold currency transactions, business, finances and everything. That was the major instrument of control.

Mr. McTIGUE. All nationalized?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. All nationalized. You must make a distinction there. "Nationalization" usually carries with it certain remuneration. Here it was expropriation, taken away without any pay. So maybe it is better to use the word "expropriation." That corresponds better to reality.

Mr. McTIGUE. Instead of nationalization.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes, instead of nationalization.

Mr. McTIGUE. I am going to ask you the same question that I asked Dr. Kutt. What explanation, briefly, do you give to the apparent discrepancy between the comparatively high industrial output and the low living standards during the postwar period in Lithuania?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Well, following what I have said, you may conclude that first of all the countries that have been annexed or occupied, they had and have to serve their purposes, Soviet purposes, and for this reason: they are taking away the lion's portion of their economy. What remains is at the disposal of the people. Every standard is low.

It is first of all that the Soviets take 75 percent of the production away for almost nothing. As they are the owners, they may do what they like with that.

As regards the productive expansion in certain branches, well I understand it is because those branches are of interest to Moscow, not to the local interests. Therefore, we have certain expansion of industrial production and a decline in agricultural production. Here they have no interest, or very little. And as the people have no interest to increase their productivity, so the agricultural production declines, and thus the nutrition, the food of the people and their standards.

That is the only reason. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the discrepancy that we see. But again you should never believe what the official statistics of the Soviet give you, as they do not publish any official statistics for information purposes.

I myself tried at the United Nations and everywhere else to get that information, but since 1936 no statistical information whatsoever on the Soviet economy has been published. The reason is that they do not want to disclose the real situation. Therefore we have to come to conclusions through all kinds of deductions and comparisons. Otherwise it is very difficult to know.

Again in this connection I should stress the resistance of the people in the country against that regime. As I told you, the farmers have been accustomed to live independent and feel like kings in their realms on their farms. Now they have been simply enslaved. Therefore they resisted and continue to resist even today.

The Partisans are still active here and there. They really tried to prevent them from importing Soviet officers to those collective farms and thus leave more freedom to the people themselves.

And here I should again express my gratitude to The Voice of America. The Voice of America really is followed by the people. I have even certain good news, that there are young people that are going some 20 miles from their residences to listen to The Voice of America, in order to hear what is the truth, what is the reality outside their country and whether there is any hope for freedom, for liberation or not.

So, therefore, any messages from this country, from the free world are very helpful and may render their situation somewhat easier because of the hope for better times in the future. That is of real interest for us.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. Doctor, in reference to the economic and industrial situation of each country that Russia has occupied, is the changing of their economic and industrial situation for the benefit of the people

in the occupied countries, or is it for the benefit of the military and political system of Russia?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. This change is chiefly, as I mentioned, for the Soviet purposes. The Soviet needs certain goods for their armament or for their other needs in the Soviet Union. They take almost 70 percent of the production. So all that is done is for the benefit of the Soviet Union as the owners of everything. I stress once again, it is the Soviet Union, not Lithuania itself.

Therefore, what is being done is being done for Soviet good, for the supply of food to Moscow, for militarization. You may find butter and meat in Boston easier than in Vilnius today as that surplus is being transported, exported to the Soviet Union.

Mr. BONIN. You spoke of the changing of the people in these occupied countries. Is that the term that was used by Stalin when he stated that it was the depersonalization of all the people in occupied countries?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I think he meant that. It is not very pleasant for them to confess that the people should not stay too long at one place of residence and must change jobs. If they don't change by themselves, they are simply advised to do that. If you don't find a job some place else, they find it for you.

There is a reason for it. The longer you stay at your ordinary place of residence, the more you know the people there and the more dangerous you may become to the regime. They do not trust the people, and if they don't trust you, they can't keep you too long in the same place. Therefore, they have to change by themselves.

But that changing is aggravated by their authorization. You cannot change your job as you like. You cannot choose another one as you like. You must have the authorization. You may take the initiative to show your good will that you would like to get another job here or there, but that is all you can do.

But you can neither select your vocational school nor your job, nor change it. You are regimented by the regime. Therefore, these changes are continuous—purposely.

Mr. BONIN. Doctor, Russia isn't operating under the theory of communism at all; it is actually a dictatorship.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That's it.

Mr. BONIN. With the prediction of it being a Communist form of government.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes, that is simply for the people, that "While we are doing that now, it is for your own good. In time, maybe in some remote time, your country will be a paradise, but now you have to serve it, to sacrifice this and that and maybe the future generations will live under different conditions. That's what we are doing for you."

They don't speak about communism. They do not say that their regime is a communistic one. They say that it is just the first stage of communism, that it is a socialistic form of state and economic order, socialistic; that it is the first stage before they are going to organize the Communist so-called paradise on earth.

Mr. MCTIGUE. You mean the socialist state paves the way to communism?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden.

Mr. MADDEN. Doctor, in your testimony you cited the vast rise in prices that took place. Did that same relative increase in prices of foodstuffs and necessities, like clothing, have the same ratio of increase in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and other countries under Communist domination as in Lithuania?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is about the same. There are slight differences here and there, by half of a percent, but that is about the same.

Mr. MADDEN. In your testimony you pictured the economic situation under this Communist domination as practically relegating the people, the masses, to economic slavery. Is that true?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is exact. A Soviet man economically is a slave, even politically he is a slave.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Vishinsky in several speeches stated that the admittance of Lithuania and these other subjugated countries into the Soviet orbit was voluntary, that the Soviet Government wanted to protect these subjugated countries, wanted them to take advantage of their Soviet and communistic way of life.

As a matter of fact, according to your testimony, the Soviet Government, the Soviet leaders conquered through massacres and murders and threats and imprisonments the leaders and the people of influence in Lithuania and in these subjugated countries so that they had no choice; is that true?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is exact. Not only that, but I mentioned already that before the Communists came into Lithuania I was consul in Poland, and then I met that commander in chief of the Soviet forces that occupied half of Poland, that Marshal Kovalev that I mentioned already.

One day during a simple visit of politeness to him—as he was the chief officer I had to pay him that visit—I asked him, “Well, Marshal, what is the matter that you occupied half of Poland? That was a friendly country to you. Now we don’t know even what may happen to my country, to Lithuania.”

His answer was this, “Well, we occupied half of Poland because that was the desire of the Polish population of the nation.”

Mr. MADDEN. Who said that?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Marshal Kovalev. He said that was the desire of the Polish population. I said, “But how? You had no elections there, and how could that nation as such express that desire to be occupied by your forces?”

“Well,” he said, “We had certain agents. That’s enough. They declared what the nation wanted. Communist agents or Soviet agents are the basis of declaring what the population should want. With regard to Lithuania, we are now on friendly terms for sure, but don’t forget that wherever we come in, we never withdraw. We came here and we will remain.”

Again I was so surprised. I said, “Well, what is the matter? The Lithuanian delegation is in Moscow negotiating a mutual assistance pact. It was invited, it was forced to go to do that. Molotov and others declared their good intentions to protect Lithuania, its independence, its system, and so on, and how can I then understand your declaration?”

Well, he was somewhat confused. He said, “Well, you will see. The future will show you that I was true and that I was right.” Well,

later on we understood that when these troops came in they did not withdraw, they remained in Lithuania.

Mr. MADDEN. Well, that is interesting because when you referred to Poland, I happen to be chairman of the special congressional committee that investigated the Katyn massacres which took place in the spring of 1940. There are almost 2,300 typewritten pages of testimony taken in those hearings. The Russian Government, the Polish Communist Government were invited, when we took testimony in Germany, to come before our committee and present any evidence they had regarding the massacring of approximately 14,000 Polish officers, judges, lawyers, and doctors, and they refused to appear.

Now the testimony also showed in regard to Poland—and of course the same blueprint existed in regard to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and other captive countries—that in the winter of 1939 the Communist Soviet Government took approximately 150,000 prisoners out of Poland.

That was when they were coming in apparently “to help Poland out” by taking them over and giving them “protection.” They took 150,000 prisoners, and 14,000 of the leaders from these 150,000, were placed in 3 prison camps. These 14,000, in the fall of 1939 and the early winter of 1940, were subjected to this so-called communistic brainwashing. In one of those 3 camps 4,300 bodies were found in a mass grave, killed off because they were the leaders of Poland, and the Communists were fearful that they would reestablish some day possibly the country of Poland into a free government.

Now approximately 10,000 Polish prisoners in these other two camps have never been found. So there are two other mass graves, similar to Katyn in Russia that have never been found.

I am mentioning this for the record because it is the same pattern that was used in all these countries that they took over, which makes Stalin and Vishinsky and Molotov, as the chairman stated the other day, the greatest unpunished criminals in the world today.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. During the last war they did the same thing with the Partisans. I was in Lithuania at that time and I know also what happened. Our underground was in contact with the Polish underground.

The so-called Soviet Partisans at that time had for their chief purpose to kill the local people that were known as patriots, whether they were Lithuanians or Poles, without any difference, in order to destroy the national element. During the war sons of those same families fought against the common enemy, the Nazis. Their resistance was destroyed by so-called Soviet resistance. While the purpose was clear, maybe in the West the people did not know what was the aim and the purpose of those Soviet Partisans.

Mr. MADDEN. Let me ask you this, Doctor: I am informed that the population of Lithuania in 1939 was around 3,300,000, was it?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is about right.

Mr. MADDEN. Also that the people that belonged to the Communist Party in Lithuania ran around 1,700 members; is that true?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is exactly. They had no influence whatsoever on the national life.

Mr. MADDEN. And in 2 years after 1939, in 1941, there were only 2,200 Communists, approximately, in Lithuania. So that means that

in 2 years they only increased their number about 300 or 400 members in all Lithuania, a nation of 3,300,000.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is exact. Even today there are not many more if we do not count those so-called Communist youth organizations.

Mr. MADDEN. Now, Doctor, I am going to ask you, from your experience as an educator and an economist, what do you think is going to be the ultimate outcome of this; how do you think these subjugated nations and even the people of Russia that want freedom, how are they ever going to overthrow this yoke of the minority that is inflicting this tyranny on them? How do you think the future is going to deal with these people? Some day they are going to get their liberty.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Sure.

Mr. MADDEN. What do you think is the best method to use to aid them; what further aid than we are giving can we give them? I would like to get your opinion on it.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Well, I think it is so, if we follow the historical developments of any of those powers—ancient Rome or Greece, even Napoleon—they have either been destroyed or they collapsed from within. Misunderstandings between themselves, economic rivalries will really weaken their system, their regime. That will be the moment, but maybe not in so short time if there is no external help from outside.

What we could do in order to help them is through our messages to support their hope for better times, better conditions and what we are doing. Our acts of the whole free world should be coordinated and have the same aim, to find these Communist tendencies, communistic infiltration, either in this country or elsewhere. And there are infiltrations in the labor unions even of this country. I do not speak of Europe where there are more.

In the economic system everywhere we have to fight in order make the free world strong. That will impress them more and more and will help those people in the hope for a better future and thus one day, when that time will come, they really will fight with energy. For the time being in their present circumstances, the time is not working for us.

The people, especially the young generation, are being influenced to a certain extent by the regime. That is quite natural. These youngsters very often are sent to training schools, they are separated from their families. They are thinking to change their opinions and they are trying to indoctrinate them. So if the time of liberation is postponed, if it lasts too long, that would not be in our favor.

But if there is a collapse from within, then foreign pressure should be coordinated strongly from all over upon the Soviets, a disclosure of the purposes and aims of their propaganda and their tactics and their deeds.

We are today in Bermuda. We hope that President Eisenhower and Mr. Foster Dulles will withhold the pressure from those Europeans who are sometimes afraid of the dangers and may yield to this and that. Our strong position would be the best help to those unfortunate people, our messages and promises of a better future and an understanding of how to help them. That will also contribute to a certain extent.

That is the only way, short of war.

Mr. KERSTEN. Dr. Trimakas, you were born in Lithuania, when?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. In 1902.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you live?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I left Lithuania in 1944.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you live in Lithuania?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Oh, I was in Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you spend your youth there?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I spent my youth, well sometime there, and also in foreign countries where I studied.

Mr. KERSTEN. You saw the times from 1918, or thereabouts, when Lithuania gained its independence until 1940 when it lost it, did you not?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, over 20 years?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. In a word, without going into the details, what would you say as to the progress of the country in those 20 years that you lived there?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. The progress was really spectacular in many respects. Would you be interested in the economics?

Mr. KERSTEN. I don't want to go into the details, but if you have some figures there we would like to put them in the record. But in a word you did see that progress with your own eyes, is that it?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. I do want you to put those figures in the record, if you will give them to us because they are important.

How long did you live under the Soviets?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. One year, from the occupation in 1940, June 15, to World War II when the Germans arrived in Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. So that, as I understand it, what you saw in your youth, the extraordinary progress of your native land, would you say that in a short period of 1 year was just about destroyed? That is, that the progress was just about destroyed in a year which the Lithuanian people by themselves had built up over a period of 22 years?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is exact.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see some of these deportations?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes. I was on the list of deportations, too, but I was saved for their own reasons.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where were you living, what city?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I was then in Kaunas during the deportation period.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see some of these trucks go through the streets?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I saw many trucks and many people crying on the streets. I was at a certain reception at midnight—it was 1 hour after midnight—and the trucks were in front of the homes where the people were to be deported. They were crying, the children and the women. Terrific scenes!

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see trucks near your home?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes, but for somebody else.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was that right near your home?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see them take people out?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is it.

Mr. KERSTEN. How did they take them out?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. Well, police or the NKVD, police agents, stood with their guns around the house, around the truck, and others within the home, within the house or apartment.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see some of this with your own eyes?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. I saw the arrest and deportation of the former Minister in Rome, Mr. Carneckis, who just lived across the street.

Mr. KERSTEN. From you?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see him brought out of the house?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. That's it.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who brought him out?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. The police, the NKVD, armed with guns, and they took the parents and then small children.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did they put the parents and the small children of this man?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. At that time all in the truck

Mr. KERSTEN. What kind of a truck?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. Simple truck, open truck.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was the truck guarded by soldiers?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. And guarded with soldiers, one soldier in the truck, and then the soldier-driver, soldiers around the truck and around the house.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did these deportations that you saw take place during a period of about 3 days?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. That's it exactly.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were most of them brought out of the house at night or was it all through the day, around the clock?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. Usually at night.

Mr. KERSTEN. Out of the city of Kaunas how many people were taken during these three days?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. During these 3 days in Kaunas we counted about 30,000 people taken away.

Mr. KERSTEN. How big was Kaunas?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. About 150,000.

Mr. KERSTEN. So about one-fifth of the population was taken out of their homes in 3 days, is that right?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. This involved men, women, and children?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. Men, women, and children.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were all of those 30,000 criminals or what kind of people were they?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. They were just well-to-do people, respectable people, leaders or simple people that owned certain property, and as such they were enemies of the people.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean enemies of the Soviet state?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thirty thousand innocent people; is that right?

Dr. TRIMIKAS. Yes. The lists had been drawn by the Communist Party, the list of the people to be deported. They checked the list and some of the people that they needed temporarily, they were still kept.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see these people brought down to the railway station?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Well, I was not at the railroad station, but I saw how the trucks went to the railroad station with those unfortunate people and what happened in the railroad station—well, you know, they were put in those—

Mr. KERSTEN. Cattle cars.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. So far as you know, none of those people were ever heard from again; is that right?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is it.

Mr. BONIN. Would you yield to me for one question?

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Doctor, you stated that these lists were prepared in advance?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. They were prepared in advance.

Mr. BONIN. You stated that these deportations took place within a period of 3 days.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Those mass deportations; yes.

Mr. BONIN. Within 3 days?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. So therefore it must have been somebody in that country that supplied that list?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes. There were at least a certain number of Communists there, as you have heard. They helped to prepare those lists. And then their own agents; they always have agents everywhere. Those agents that lived in Lithuania were often hidden; nobody knew that they were Communists. They knew the people that were active in the society, economic or social or political activities. Those selected were, first of all, anybody that simply expressed ideas contrary to the Communist regime. Or for personal reasons they were enemies of certain individuals, and they were thus listed and deported. Then those lists were checked. That was the mass deportations.

Then later on the deportations were continued in smaller number. Some were maintained for maintenance of economic functions. They kept them, still kept them for a certain time, under their exact surveillance. They visited homes; my home was visited several times before the deportations started. I was on the list too, but I was not deported because they needed me as an expert in economics to help them to plan the food production where I had worked. I was appointed without being asked whether or not I was willing to assume that function. I was planning the food for that period of time. That saved me from deportation.

The day I was to be deported, June 22, the Germans came and I was saved.

Mr. BONIN. Doctor, realizing the amount of Communist activity in this country, are we free to conclude that the Russian Government is supplied with a list of people who would be deported in the event of the overthrow of this country?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I think so. They have already now the lists. They drew the lists in advance.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Are you worried that we might be on that list?

Mr. BONIN. I know I am on it.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. But the lists were drawn much in advance and even the personalities foreseen who will take then certain positions, func-

tions. Oh, that has been organized in advance, in good time. Later on they had to change something, this and that.

I know the Communist organization. The pattern is the same. You take the United States or any other country; they have the lists, they know the persons that are against them, that are active against them. Whether they will succeed or not—I don't think they will succeed—to do anything, but they are preparing.

Mr. BOXIN. I studied the pattern used in China and I know that they used the same identical pattern there.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes, that is the master pattern that applied everywhere, wherever they go.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who was the Soviet Commissar to take over Lithuania as Vishinsky was the Soviet Commissar to take over Latvia?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That was Dekanozov, who later on was Minister of Interior in his native Republic, Georgia. He played the same part as Vishinsky in Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Operating through the Soviet Embassy at Kaunas?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. He was established at the Embassy in Kaunas and dictated everything from that Embassy.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you have some occasion to know that he did that?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Oh, yes; I knew that. I was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time.

Mr. KERSTEN. For the Lithuanian Government?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You know that Dekanozov was at the Soviet Embassy?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That's it. I know.

Mr. KERSTEN. And just as Vishinsky met the local Communists in Riga, Latvia, Dekanozov met the local Communists in Lithuania?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That's it.

Mr. KERSTEN. And organized the plan to take over?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Absolutely the same way. He played the same role, simply with certain local differences. He had different people, different helpers and so on, but the same way. The Communists met at the Embassy. They decided there what was to be done, but major decisions were sent from Moscow. Dekanozov sat in Kaunas, but he received orders from Moscow.

Mr. KERSTEN. In your country—it was testified by another witness with regard to Latvia—where was the center of espionage to draw the noose around the neck of Lithuania?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. At that time they organized in Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. At the Embassy.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Embassy was the center of the espionage activity?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. And the so-called economic or commercial representation.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you say that it is very probable that the lists you have referred to that you think are prepared for this country are also being prepared in the Soviet Embassy in Washington?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. I think so without any doubt.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that the Soviet Embassies in countries where the Communists operate are the centers of activity to help take over those countries, is that right, in your opinion?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is it.

Mr. KERSTEN. They are not ordinary diplomatic establishments but are primarily subversive, espionage centers that mean to destroy the country whose hospitality permits them to reside on that soil, is that right?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. They place everywhere their agents, they control them, they instruct them and, being protected themselves by the diplomatic extraterritoriality and privileges they are free to do what they are interested to do. Those agents are not necessarily members of the Embassy but they are under orders of the Embassy.

Mr. KERSTEN. How safe do you think we are in this country with these Soviet Embassies, Communist Embassies here?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Oh, that depends on the activities of the FBI, and I hope that they are active enough to protect the necessary sources of information, although, as you know, not always did they succeed. So we are safe enough, provided not only our institutions but every citizen is then coached enough about speaking with unknown people or giving information.

Mr. KERSTEN. Certainly from these Embassies they can get a lot of information that they can use to our disadvantage; isn't that right?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Sure.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you believe a Communist under oath?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Never, never.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you try to negotiate an agreement with a Communist?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. All means are good that serve the ends. The end is world revolution, overthrow of the present regime, and all means are good to that end.

Mr. KERSTEN. Your country was lost via the Soviet Embassy in Kaunas, wasn't it?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is it during the activities and so-called, according to their terminology, friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. KERSTEN. I know from study and investigation that you had a wonderful country in Lithuania, as there was in Latvia and Estonia during the independence, built up by the people. But all that is now lost due to the Communists; isn't that true?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is exact.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You brought in the name of Vladimir Dekanozov who was the counterpart of Vishinsky as far as Lithuania is concerned.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Isn't it true that at the time Dekanozov acted as the person who took over Lithuania he was actually the Deputy Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is exact.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Deputy of Vishinsky?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. At that time Molotov was the commissar.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know what happened to him?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Well, as I told, he was Minister of Interior in Georgia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That was in 1952.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes, before the fall of Beria. He was a native of the same country as Beria and a friend of Beria. Well, his fate is unknown. He disappeared from the scene. He has been arrested and whether there will be a trial or not, nobody knows, but he does not exist any longer in freedom.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He was a close associate of Beria?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When Beria disappeared, Dekanozov disappeared with him?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. He followed him.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. All of which proves that even if you are a good Communist it does not always help you in Soviet Russia.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Not at all. There can't be any friends but the ideology of Communist world revolution.

Mr. BONIN. They had the ideology, didn't they, Beria and Dekanozov, but whatever happened to them today, we don't know.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is exact. It is not to be forgotten that everything is being regimented and that the person who regiments everything dictates the line to be followed. If you deviate from that line you have to disappear, you have to follow that line. Under Stalin, Stalin dictated, he was the chief person. Now it may be Molotov or it may be Malenkov. If you deviate from Malenkov you disappear.

Mr. BONIN. Communism, then, is a dictatorship of individuals?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. One hundred percent, 150 according to their calculations.

Mr. BONIN. Individuals.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That's it.

Mr. KERSTEN. How would you think that the Soviet agents in the Embassies here would be actually preparing lists for people in America for elimination; how would they go about it?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. They have first of all Communist Party members, and any Communist Party member is obliged to render any services the party organization asks. If they are asked to supply certain information on certain persons here, they have to do it as long as they are members of the party.

Mr. KERSTEN. Through the network of the Communist Party in the United States they would get a lot of information at the Soviet Embassy?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is the best means of information for them.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is that the way they operated apparently in Kaunas?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. That is what they did. Besides that, they have their own official network of spies, of agents that are working, but all of them are members of the Communist Party. They don't trust others.

Mr. KERSTEN. I have seen some of these lists and we intend—

Dr. TRIMAKAS. When I say "Communist Party member," it does not mean that he is in the position of a Communist Party card holder, not necessarily.

Mr. KERSTEN. I know. I have seen some of these lists that were used in Lithuania, lists of categories to be eliminated. My recollection of those lists is that all of the ordinary groups in society, as was mentioned here yesterday—4-H Clubs, Boy Scout leaders, and groups like labor unions, officials, civilian and otherwise, teachers, the professions—all of this type of people are listed for elimination, for liquidation or deportation, aren't they?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In order to create this new Soviet man that you spoke about, they have got to get all of these other elements out of the way, is that it?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Yes; to destroy the old generation.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is what was done in Lithuania, and you have a conviction that that is being done for the United States?

Dr. TRIMAKAS. There is no doubt about it. They have to destroy, according to Marx, the whole element that is against their conception, their ideology and to educate a new one along their own lines.

Mr. MADDEN. As a matter of fact, a member of the Communist Party, is not any more safe than an anti-Communist like yourself would be. Trotzky was shot in the back by the Communists, and Beria who has disappeared, as far as we know, and the hundreds that were purged by Stalin back in 1936 were not safe when the Soviet leaders decided that their usefulness ended.

They weren't any more safe from execution and liquidation than you or the members of this committee.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Absolutely.

Mr. MADDEN. Being a Communist you are not immune from danger because once the Kremlin head takes a personal dislike to a member of his own party, he is liquidated.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. Absolutely true. You never know who will be dictator tomorrow, Malenkov or Molotov. It depends.

Mr. MADDEN. It might be somebody in this room who is serving the Communist Party who may be picked up in a short time, maybe a year or maybe a month and be liquidated. And he thinks he is doing a great job for the Communists right today. I know we had them at the Katyn committee hearings. They would attend hearings and take notes, report back on our hearings. I used to see them in the audience at the Katyn committee hearings.

Mr. KERSTEN. I believe, Mr. Madden, at some of our sessions here we have had the Tass reporter. He might be on the liquidation list ultimately.

Mr. MADDEN. You can't tell. He isn't any safer than you or me. You live at sufferance, being a member of the Communist Party.

Dr. TRIMAKAS. As long as you please your boss, the dictator, you may stay for today, but you never know what happens this night when he may be changing his mind.

Mr. MADDEN. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Dr. Trimakas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Zalcmannis.

Do you solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. I do.

STATEMENT BY JANIS ZALCMANIS

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you identify yourself, please, Mr. Zalcmannis?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. My name is Janis Zalcmannis, Latvian citizen, living at 158 West 92d Street, New York. I was born in Riga in 1887.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you talk a little louder, please?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes. I left Latvia October 13, 1944—over Sweden. I arrived in New York on November 6, 1945.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your occupation in Latvia?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Shipowner.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were some of your activities?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. I was vice president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Riga, chairman of the Riga Trade Association, and member of the Exchange Committee.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you say member of the Exchange Committee, is that like the New York Exchange here?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes, only smaller.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is a financial exchange?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes, for trade and industry and business.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you proceed, please, Mr. Zalcmannis?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. That is about the occupation of Latvia?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes.

Mr. ZALCMANIS. On June 17, 1940, Latvia was occupied by the Russian Communist forces.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to your shipping industry?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. A week after the Russians came in there was a decree of nationalization issued which took over all industry, commerce and shipping business and offices and companies.

Mr. McTIGUE. After that decree was issued was a commissar of some kind assigned to take over your shipping interests?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes, in the same time there was a decree of the commissars which should take over the lead of the enterprise, was issued too.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you permitted to stay on there?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. I was permitted to stay as an employee and helped them in the beginning because the commissar never was a man who knew the business so we had to help them in the beginning.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to the Latvian ships that were formerly under your control and jurisdiction?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. We had seven ships.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had seven ships?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes. Three of them were in the free world waters of America. The four others were in Latvia or in the Baltic Sea so that the Russians took them over and nationalized them too.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were those ships seized?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did any of those ships have American cargoes?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Not these. They were without cargo or cargo for Latvia, but the ships which were trading between the American ports had sometimes also American cargo.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those ships were instructed to return to port?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes. The people from the shipping department, and the commissars often asked us in the evenings to return to the office and to sign cables, telegrams to our captains of the three ships in American waters. The order was given to go with the ship to Communist port of Vladivostok. If not they threatened their families, but the captains knew already who could give the orders, such an order. They were sure it was not the order of the owner but the Communist government, the Communist regime. So they don't follow these orders, especially then when there was a cargo for the American citizen or for American firms.

Mr. McTIGUE. So that the ships did not return to Latvia?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. The Latvian shipping owners tried to change the cables because they could not give such an order to go with cargo which don't belong to them, to Russia. We tried always to change this, but often we were threatened that we will be treated as saboteurs, and they say, "You know what happens to saboteurs."

Mr. McTIGUE. Before we get off the subject of the three ships, they were kept in this country then in 1940?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. You mean the three ships?

Mr. McTIGUE. The three ships did not return to Latvia?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. They did not.

Mr. McTIGUE. They were then used during the war?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. They were sunk?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes, by the Germans.

Mr. McTIGUE. You made a claim, did you?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes, for the insurance. My agent here claimed insurance from the insurance company.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who defended against the suit?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. My agent here, our agent here.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Russians also file a claim?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes, the Russians asked for a trusteeship and together with the agent they got permission for such a trusteeship. The trusteeship was accepted here by the courts. So they acted for the exploitation of the ships.

Mr. McTIGUE. The Russians claiming that since the Shipping Ministry in Latvia was nationalized the ships belonged to the Soviet?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that case tried in the Supreme Court of the United States?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the verdict?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. The verdict was against the Russians and for the real owner.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the amount of your recovery?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. About \$1,250,000.

Mr. McTIGUE. Going back to your Latvia shipping industry, right after the takeover and after the political commissar was installed, did you continue, for example, to pay your income taxes?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes. The income tax was very high in 1939. We got permission to pay from the Communists to pay from our income of the ships, the first and second part of the taxes, but deferred on the fourth. They refused to allow it, and said we have to pay ours from our income which we had none.

Mr. McTIGUE. Their claim was that you had to pay the income tax for your shipping lines out of your personal income, which was nothing?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you manage to do that?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. We cannot do it. They took away our furniture, silver, and our personal property. They took our personal property away. Even then they taxed so that we could not pay even the taxes and we were always in tax department, so they would have the right some time to jail us.

Mr. McTIGUE. In addition to your shipping interests, did you also own an apartment house in Riga?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes; apartment house in Riga, summerhouse on the seashore.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to your apartment house in Riga?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. They took it away.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to your residence at the shore?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. They took it away in 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. In short, they took everything you had?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. They took everything they could.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you manage to survive; did you look for a job?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. We were dismissed from our enterprise, from our office. There was a long time I was without a job. I had to sell something to live on. But then in springtime I became a gardener. I had a friend who took me for some work in his garden. So I worked there until June 13, 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a gardener?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes. He was arrested for that, that he took some capitalists who had no right to work in his enterprise and gave them work.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened on the morning of June 14, 1940; do you recall that?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes. June 13, in the evening, I was warned that something will happen in this night. So I went out of my house, but I did not know that the families will be harmed, so my wife remained in my apartment. But the Communists took her away and deported her.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you ever heard from her since?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. I have not.

Mr. McTIGUE. Not since that night?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. That is right. My partner was also deported and mostly all of the shipowners and captains.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to you?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. I had to hide. I was 5 days in a forest, and then I came back and stayed in another's cellar, always changing because I was not sure they could find out where I am, until the 1st of July when the Germans came in.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then how did you eventually emigrate to the United States?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. I managed to escape in a fishing boat to Sweden and came over from Sweden to the United States. I had to settle here the matter for the three ships, so I was the only one of my partners from our shipping enterprise. I tried to come over to the United States and got the permission in November 1945, so I came here and entered the United States, New York, on the 6th of November 1945.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were big business in Latvia?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were a shipowner, you were chairman of the Riga Trade Association, you were a member of the stock exchange?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were big business in Latvia. You were taken over by the Communists almost immediately?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to small business?

Mr. ZALCMANIS. They promised in the beginning to take over only the biggest and the big enterprise business. By and by they took over all except maybe the market shops. They took all business over by and by.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all the questions I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is all, thank you.

STATEMENT BY PERRY A. BECK, LAWYER

Mr. KERSTEN. You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BECK. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state your full name, please?

Mr. BECK. Perry A. Beck.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are an attorney at law, are you?

Mr. BECK. I am.

Mr. KERSTEN. Duly registered and licensed to practice in the State of New York?

Mr. BECK. Duly registered and licensed to practice in the State of New York and the Federal courts of New York and the Supreme Court of the United States.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have been practicing for some years in New York, have you?

Mr. BECK. About 35 years.

Mr. KERSTEN. In the year 1941 did you handle some litigation involving a Lithuanian ship?

Mr. BECK. I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you what purports to be a true copy of an original deposition taken in a certain lawsuit. Would you take a look at that?

Mr. BECK. I am very familiar with it. I don't need to look at it again.

Mr. KERSTEN. You observe the document I am showing you, do you?

Mr. BECK. To keep the record straight, I will take it and examine it. The document you just handed me and which I examined is a true copy of a deposition that I had taken in the proceeding that you just mentioned.

Mr. KERSTEN. And briefly what was that proceeding?

Mr. BECK. The Russian Government, I call the Russian Government—

Mr. KERSTEN. That was the Soviet Government?

Mr. BECK. Soviet Government, had brought an action against the steamship *Denny* under the Lithuanian flag, in the United States District Court in Newark, N. J. I think the title is on that document. No, it isn't. The English of it anyhow was the Latvian State Cargo & Passenger Steamship Corp. That was an organization in Latvia formed for the purpose of taking over Latvian steamships, but as Lithuania had very few steamships they didn't organize a separate Lithuanian State line, but added the few ships that Lithuania had to the Latvian State Steamship Line.

That organization intervened in the suit later on as being the true owner. It was in my preparation for the trial of that suit that I took the deposition that you just handed to me.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is that the deposition of one Owen J. C. Norem; is that correct?

Mr. BECK. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. And according to the deposition Mr. Norem was the United States Minister to Lithuania at and before the time of the Communists taking over in 1941; is that correct?

Mr. BECK. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you take his deposition?

Mr. BECK. I took it in my office.

Mr. KERSTEN. And according to this copy he was sworn, was he?

Mr. BECK. He was sworn and he signed the original impression of his deposition.

Mr. KERSTEN. Substantially in that deposition he describes conditions in Lithuania just before and at the time of the takeover, does he not?

Mr. BECK. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. In the city of Kaunas?

Mr. BECK. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. You heard him give that testimony as set forth in this copy of the deposition?

Mr. BECK. That is right. I was the interrogator.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the copy which we will have marked as an exhibit is a true and correct copy of the sworn testimony of Mr. Norem, is it?

Mr. BECK. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you mark this, Mr. Reporter?

(The deposition was marked "Exhibit 8", see p. 574.)

Mr. KERSTEN. I think we should have this exhibit now marked "8-A" conditionally. I think an attempt should be made to ascertain the present whereabouts of Mr. Norem, the former United States Minister to Kaunas, and in the event we can get Mr. Norem personally, it wouldn't be necessary to have this deposition as part of the record, but in the event he is not available, it being sworn testimony, I think it adds an important fact to this record.

Mr. BECK. Mr. Chairman, I don't like to be placing myself in the position of volunteering, but I sat here yesterday and some time today and heard a description of a pattern of action on the part of the Communist government. I can say a few things on that score myself if you would care to hear them.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is it from a knowledge of being in one of these occupied countries, Mr. Beck?

Mr. BECK. It is this—

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in one of these occupied countries?

Mr. BECK. No; I was not. I will tell you this, if you care to hear it, subject to being stricken out.

I had made available to me from diplomatic sources the decrees of confiscation from all three countries. They were dated at about the same day within a day or two, and the language of all of them was exactly the same except for slight differences in translation and the names of the countries involved.

After these decrees were promulgated, cables were sent by the newly established governments in the three countries to the ship's agents and to the captains of the ships, and those cables were in the same language. The statutes providing for the punishment of the captains and the

owners who did not see that their ships returned to Murmansk and to the port in eastern Siberia, in the same language.

I just state that as showing the common source of all of the things that went on and in each case, I think there were six in all of Estonia, were first commenced in the name of the old owners and later on the respective State steamship lines were substituted, or they intervened.

We have the same thing going on in Washington now in the Court of Claims.

MR. KERSTEN. You mean that the decrees of confiscation of various ships of these three countries——

MR. BECK. Yes. They were all the same.

MR. KERSTEN. In other words, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania confiscating these ships; is that correct?

MR. BECK. That is right.

MR. KERSTEN. Where did you see these documents?

MR. BECK. I have them in my office and I received them from the ministries and consulates of the respective countries. They showed me the originals in their language, in the respective languages. I had them translated. They were the official publications of the Government.

MR. KERSTEN. These are copies of the originals that you have, are they?

MR. BECK. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. True copies?

MR. BECK. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. Could you make them available to the committee?

MR. BECK. Yes, I can.

MR. KERSTEN. Did you see the originals?

MR. BECK. I did. I think I have copies in my office but I am certain——

MR. KERSTEN. I understand that the three originals are in the possession of the respective diplomatic offices here and that we can't get those originals, and if we can't get those originals or photostats, we will call upon you.

MR. BECK. I am quite sure that the originals are in the three respective consulates or ministries.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you for calling that to our attention.

MR. BECK. There is one thing more, if I may. There was a cable that went to Amtorg telling the Amtorg that the organization or the State corporation in Russia set up to own the ships, and conduct commercial enterprises, that they had a long list of ships and gave the names of all of the Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian ships that were outside of the country. They told Amtorg to get in touch with the captains, arrange for supplies, to get them to Murmansk, or what is it, in the complete eastern part?

MR. KERSTEN. Vladivostok.

MR. BECK. Yes, they were to take them to one of those ports. And they were to go irrespective of whether they had cargoes or not.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mr. Beck.

MR. BECK. I felt it my duty to appear here.

MR. KERSTEN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Beck.

STATEMENT OF ANTANAS DICMANAS

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Dicmanas, you solemnly swear to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DICMANAS. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify yourself, Mr. Dicmanas, please?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes, sir. My name is Antanas Dicmanas. I was born in Lithuania in 1891, in the city of Siauliai. I emigrated to this country in 1907. I worked in men's clothing business until 1918. In 1918 I was drafted in the United States Army. In 1919 I was discharged and I obtained my citizenship in 1919.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you return to Lithuania?

Mr. DICMANAS. In 1921.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you stay on in Lithuania after 1921?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you go into business in Lithuania?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. From the period 1921 to 1939?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes, 1939 or 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were your interests and your net worth approximately at the time the Communists seized Lithuania in 1940?

Mr. DICMANAS. \$135,000.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is, in American dollars?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your net worth was approximately \$135,000?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were your interests; what did you own?

Mr. DICMANAS. Well, I owned apartment houses. Here is my deed if you would want to see it.

Mr. McTIGUE. No; just tell us what you owned. That is enough.

Mr. DICMANAS. I owned apartment houses, 22-family apartment house, which cost me 540 thousand litas. That is equal to \$90,000. Secondly, I owned a farm. That cost me \$11,500 on the land and houses and then equipment and livestock 35,000 litas, which cost me about \$6,000.

Then I purchased a summer house. I have some pictures too, if you are interested.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to your farm and what happened to your apartment house after the Communist take-over?

Mr. DICMANAS. Well, the communists came on June 15, 1940. The Russian Army occupied Kaunas, and on June 16 and 17 entire Lithuania was under occupation.

On June 17 all my bank deposits were confiscated and payments withheld. Here is a bankbook, 50,000 litas, and there is a receipt of shares.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all right. We will take your word. You are under oath.

Mr. DICMANAS. On July 3, 1940, two NKVD officers called at my apartment, accompanied by a local communist party agent, and announced that my 22-apartment house will be used to accommodate the Red army officers and their families. They ordered to hand them the list of my tenants. On hand of the list, they inspected on the same day 12 apartments, the tenants of which were issued order to vacate the apartments within the next 24 hours. They were threatened with se-

vere punishments, should the order not be followed. On July 5 and July 6, the 12 apartments were fully occupied by the NKVD officers. One of the apartments was converted into office.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you get any rent from the Soviet after your apartments were taken?

Mr. DICMANAS. No, sir. I will tell you shortly how it happened.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead.

Mr. DICMANAS. On August 1 I called at the office and inquired who is going to pay the rental for the 12 apartments in question. There I was introduced to the NKVD Captain Yuryev, who instructed me to write out bills for rent for each tenant separately and to leave the bills with him (Captain Yuryev). I asked Captain Yuryev to give me a sample text of such a bill. Captain Yuryev, for about an hour, scribbled something on a paper, tearing it again and again to pieces. Finally, he gave me a sample of a bill text. I immediately set out to writing bills following the instructions-orders of Captain Yuryev and left them at his office. Captain Yuryev told me to call at his office in 2 weeks.

When after 2 weeks I called, Captain Yuryev advised me that the bills were not correctly written and gave me a new text sample. I rewrote the bills according to the new, Captain Yuryev's, instructions and submitted them to him. I was told to inquire in 2 weeks. When the 2 weeks were over, I was again in his office only to hear the same story that the bills were not correctly written. Captain Yuryev, for the third time gave me a new text sample, according to which I again prepared new bills and submitted to him.

After the elapse of the further 2 weeks, I called again at the office where I was told that Captain Yuryev left for 4 weeks. By that time I understood perfectly well the meaning of his absence, as I have talked in the meantime to other owners of houses, where the Red army members were located. All complained of the same thing, of same crooked deal, and no one was receiving rental from their new tenants.

After 4 weeks, I learned from my janitor that Captain Yuryev is back. I came to his office and inquired when am I going to be paid the rental. Captain Yuryev's answer was as follows:

You don't want to understand that bills have to be approved by the government in Moscow. The special employees will transfer the money through the financial department to the staff of the division.

Since more than 3 months have passed from the beginning of my dealing with Captain Yuryev and since by that time I was absolutely sure that I had to do with a gang of liars and crooks who, during the past 30 years have acquired tremendous practice in terrorizing people, I replied to Yuryev's remark "My farm is run by your commissary, and I get no profit from it; my business 'Vienybe' in Vilnius is also administered by your commissary, and I have no income from it; the rental from my real estate will never be paid to me—and you are very well aware of it. So why then this unfair method of dealing? Where is your logic?"

Yuryev blushed furiously, grasped from his desk a pistol and showing it to me retorted: "This is our logic." Thereupon, he ordered me to leave his office and to never show here again.

The same night, at about 10 p. m., a young soldier of about 18-19 years of age, working as a clerk in Captain Yuryev's office, came through the rear door of my apartment to see me. He talked in whispers and asked me where could he talk without being overheard. I closed the doors to the adjoining rooms, and the soldier started talking, again in whispers:

"I am not of Russian nationality, I am a Ukrainian, and I am not a Communist. My parents were farmers; because they did not want to join the kolkhoz, my father severely beaten by Communists and died. The farm buildings were reduced to ashes. My mother and sister were compelled to join the kolkhoz. At that time I was 7 years of age and I was sent to an orphanage. Neither my mother nor my older sister were allowed to see me during the following 5 years. Only when I was 12 years of age, a permission was granted to me to see my mother and sister, who were working in a kolkhoz. When I was 18 years of age, I was drafted into army and appointed to the NKVD, to stay with Captain Yuryev. I would advise you to act very prudently, not to argue with Captain Yuryev, and not to call on him, because this can result in deportation to slave labor camp of you and your family." Taking leave he told: "May God's help be with you."

Immediately after the soldier's departure, the same night at about 1 a. m. I left the house, and for the subsequent 6 weeks lived in hiding at some smallholders-farmers, maintaining contact with my family in Kaunas. I learned that on the day following my departure, 2 NKVD soldiers appeared in our apartment asking my wife for my whereabouts. When answered that she does not know they produced an order for 3 rooms in our apartment. On the next day they moved in, confiscating all furniture they found in these rooms. My family consisting of 4 persons were allowed 1 room and a kitchen.

During the 6 weeks the NKVD agents did not inquire about me. As my morale and my money were reaching the bottom and being extremely tired, I decided to return home and to start looking for some job. However, to get a job a certificate from Communist Party was necessary. Of course, the Comparty did not issue me such a certificate, and I could get no job. To fight the starvation, which was facing me and my family, I started peddling family clothing, underwear and other household objects to farmers in exchange for food, risking high penalties if caught.

I had no income whatsoever coming from business, real estate or farm, which were administered by special commissaries. During January and February 1941 began the nationalization of private property, during which all my property was expropriated.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Dicmanas, you have already told us about your property. I have your statement here. At the end of this page here "On June 22, 1941—" do you want to continue with that part?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes, sir. On June 22, 1941, war between Germany and Russia broke out. Within two days, the Red Army was wiped out from Lithuania. After the Germans occupied Lithuania I asked them for some kind of a job. So then they said, "Well,"—they made inquiries—they said, "You owned a farm?" I said yes, I did own a farm, but it was nationalized.

They said, "You won't get back that farm, but you can go back to your farm and start to work."

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, Mr. Dicmanas, you abandoned your property there and you finally got out of Lithuania; is that right?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes, in 1944.

Mr. KERSTEN. When the Reds were on their way in again you didn't want another period under them?

Mr. DICAMANAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. You finally got back to this country; is that right?

Mr. DICMANAS. Yes, and I am glad that I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mr. Dicmanas.

We will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Saturday, December 5, 1953.)

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIC COMMITTEE,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:40 a. m., in room 110, United States Courthouse, New York, N. Y., Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Bentley, Bonin, Madden, and Machrowicz.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearings will come to order.

STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT HOOVER, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. President, will you state your present address?

Mr. HOOVER. I live at the Waldorf-Astoria.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Hoover, we are very thankful for you coming here this morning. I believe you can contribute a great deal to these hearings because of your personal knowledge of the three small Baltic nations.

I will ask you, Mr. Hoover, whether or not you were associated with the liberation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia at the end of World War I.

Mr. HOOVER. Mr. Chairman, you remember that President Wilson had announced the doctrine of self-determination, and at the end of World War I, after the defeat and surrender of the Germans, these three Baltic States, all of them, declared their independence from Russia and organized themselves as a constitutional government.

Their hold on political life was rather tenuous. All of them were starving, but worse than that, they were invaded by the Communists, each one of the groups, immediately after they had attempted their own independence. They formed sort of ragged armies with such arms as the Allies were able to furnish them and they did the astonishing thing that in each of these cases they repelled the Communist invasion eventually.

Their difficulties in Latvia were greater than the other two, but in any event, they did manage to defend themselves.

My participation in it was directing the relief and rehabilitation, but also I was assessed with the duty by the Allied Governments of furthering their successful resistance, and we undertook various measures at that time in their help, entirely aside from relief.

The ultimate result was that in the spring of 1919 the Allied Governments recognized their independence and they were able subsequently to make treaties with Russia by which their independence was recognized.

Some years ago I published a short account of those incidents in 1919 and I thought perhaps it might be of some interest. I don't know that it is worthy of introducing into the record.

MR. KERSTEN. I think at this point, or at any point in your testimony, it should be introduced into the record and made a part of the record.

MR. HOOVER. It does indicate the nature of the service which we gave and the amount of expenditure which was made at the cost of the United States in establishing their independence.

There were some measures that are not mentioned here. For instance, the American Navy occupied all of the Baltic ports.

MR. KERSTEN. You were involved in that?

MR. HOOVER. It was done at my request because I had a large staff of Americans in that area and they were in considerable jeopardy all the time. The Navy occupied the ports for their protection.

MR. KERSTEN. You had a staff in these countries and they had to be protected during this period?

MR. HOOVER. That was the idea. Our staff at that time consisted largely of American Army officers. You see, during the armistice the Army had nothing to do and I borrowed some thousands of American Army officers from the Army to conduct our operations. Most of them were temporary officers. Some of them are back in this country and if you wanted to pursue the subject in more detail, you probably could call some of them.

In any event, the presence of the American Navy and, subsequently, the British Navy in those ports, undoubtedly had a considerable moral effect on bringing about their independence.

There were some incidents which happened that were more political than they are perhaps of direct interest. When the armistice was made with the Germans it was provided that a General von der Goltz in command of an army of Balts—the Balts were citizens of the Baltic States—should remain in that area to preserve order. That army was inactive until I was called on the authority of the Allied Governments to take the city of Riga away from the Communists. That turned a tide in the independence of Riga. So that what we were doing there was more than food, we were trying to establish the independence of those nations.

I might add, before I leave the subject, that I furnished an expert staff on government, finance, and railways and various other technical services to each of these governments as they were reestablished.

MR. KERSTEN. And at or about the time of their independence, what was their economic status at first?

MR. HOOVER. Oh, it was terrible. The people were starving, there were probably 200,000 deaths in Riga alone from starvation. In any event, the Americans had a large part in the establishment of the independence of those three States.

During the years afterward I had many invitations to come to the Baltic States, Poland and other countries. They wanted to express some appreciation for our services, but I was busy with other things,

as you may know, and it was not until 1938 that I responded to those invitations, 19 years after my previous experience.

I then visited Latvia and Estonia. I did not go to Lithuania, although I made very considerable inquiries as to how they were getting on.

I was also interested in knowing what was going on in Russia because there was a constant migration back and forth, chiefly of skilled mechanics from the Baltic States going into Russia for employment in Russian industry. These people were coming back and they knew all about the details of life in Russia. I interviewed a great number of them and could give you something of the picture and contrast.

Mr. KERSTEN. We would like that picture.

Mr. HOOVER. The problem you are working on bears directly in that direction.

Russia at that time was drastically rationing all food and clothing. They had an entirely unstable currency, if you could call it a currency at all. You know the course and nature of the Russian Government, and the characteristics.

The Baltic States, in contrast, had a free economy. Their currency was stable, their currencies were convertible into gold, they were accepted all over the world. Their fiscal policies were completely successful; their budgets were all balanced, their industries were thriving; their agriculture was making an astonishing progress.

The result was that the standard of living in the Baltic States was about as high as any standard of living in Europe, possibly outside of Switzerland and Norway.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. President, what year was this?

Mr. HOOVER. This was 1938.

The contrast with Russia was so great that it became one of the menaces of the Baltic States. The Russian people were constantly attempting to escape from Russia into the Baltic States. The Russians had established a barbed-wire fence over some portion of that border—I don't know how many miles—but in any event, they maintained a rigid picket line in order to repel their own people from escaping into the more prosperous Baltic States to live.

The contrast was enormous and I should say that those three states had made more progress from the very low beginnings they had had 19 years before, than probably had ever been made by any series of states on record.

They had had good governments; they had had magnificent leadership. One of the interesting characters in this whole development was a man named Ulmanis. Ulmanis was brought to this country when he was 10 years old to live with an uncle in, I think, Nebraska. He was educated in one of the Midwest universities; he taught economics in the high schools. He left the United States to get his mother before the First World War. He got caught in the melee and had to serve through the Russian Army.

When he came out he became the leader of the Latvian Revolution and, as such, was practically the spiritual leader in all three countries. He established men in all of them because he was convinced that he could not maintain the independence of Latvia unless it was accompanied by the independence of Lithuania and Estonia.

Ulmanis was largely in the leadership up to the time that I returned there 19 years later, in 1938, where I found him again the President of Latvia and indeed proud of the success that they had made.

I have no data here as to the details of their economic situation. I expect it is available to you as it stood at that time, but certainly it represented an astonishing advance of a people.

I don't know whether you want to go on with the purely historic phases of what happened to them after that.

Mr. KERSTEN. We would like to have anything you may wish to comment on in that regard, Mr. Hoover.

Mr. HOOVER. The turning point in world history was a guaranty by the British and French of the independence of Poland. That started a chain reaction which led to the Second World War. Evolving out of that situation became an establishment of stealth and the Russians in a position to bargain either with the British and French on one side, or the Germans on the other. Stalin sat back and received bids for his support.

If you will examine the history of the period you will find that one of the things Stalin was demanding was the Balkanization of the three Baltic States. In the end he made the well-known agreement with Hitler in August 1939 by which he received that concession—if you want to call it such.

The British and French had not been able to outbid Hitler for the simple reason that they were people of political morals and they could not justify giving away the independence of these three states. That was the reason why the negotiations between Stalin and the western democracies broke down.

Then you find, immediately after that agreement between Hitler and Stalin in August of 1939, that the Russians moved on the three Baltic States. They first summoned representatives to come to Moscow and they demanded of them that Russia should have the right of establishing airports and military posts in the three states. The people, being helpless, finally had to accept.

The Fins, who received the same demands, refused and, as you know, it led to a war with Finland and Russia. But these three states tried to save as much as they could out of the situation by agreement, but immediately after the Russians had established themselves in those strategic positions, they went step by step further until they had occupied the complete country and started to communize it and you know the history since.

That is as much as I have on my mind at the present moment. If I can answer any questions for you, I would be delighted.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. President, you have made a great contribution here.

There is just one thing I would like to say at this time corroborating what you said about Stalin being in a position of bargaining with one or the other. I would like to show you a photostat of a map which I don't think has ever been made public before, but which came from the German Foreign Office.

It is a map of Eastern Europe bearing the signatures of Stalin and Ribbentrop, dated September 28, 1939. It indicates that Stalin finally made his bargain with the Nazis so he affixed his signature, "Stalin," and the signature of Ribbentrop which, as you indicated, threw the Baltic States into the realm of Stalin and also affected Poland.

That would tend to corroborate exactly what you have stated, Mr. President.

Mr. HOOVER. That is very interesting. There is a little side issue to this. Apparently in the original bargain the Germans were to have part of Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is right.

Mr. HOOVER. And subsequently Stalin wanted it and he made a settlement—I forget the date—by which he paid actual cash to the Germans for that piece of Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. That part of Lithuania apparently was purchased.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. As Mr. Machrowicz pointed out, Molotov was involved in the same bargains for Stalin and I might say, Mr. Machrowicz, that he signed the agreement, the protocol, but the map itself was signed by Stalin personally and initialed by him and Ribbentrop for the Nazis.

Mr. HOOVER. You want to bear in mind that it was Molotov who conducted the negotiations with Ribbentrop in Moscow at that time.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. BONIN, would you have any questions?

Mr. BONIN. I just want to compliment the President on his fine statement and his contribution to these hearings.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. President, I want to endorse the remarks made by the chairman and thank you for coming here today and giving us the benefit of your wide personal experience, in regard to these three countries, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.

During the progress of these hearings we have heard startling testimony, firsthand information, from various witnesses who were captured, taken as prisoners, relatives massacred and murdered. One witness testified that he was placed in a cattle car with, I think, 40 others, women and children, and on this same train there were 70 cars—cattle cars—with people being transferred into Siberia.

Of course, that is merely one of hundreds and hundreds of incidents of brutality and massacre and murder which not only includes these three countries, but Poland and other subjugated countries which come under the heel of the Communist tyrant.

Considering your vast experience through World War I, and World War II and your knowledge of what has taken place over there, would you care to comment, or would you have any personal opinion as to what you might think would be the solution or be the ultimate outcome of what is going to happen in the future, what course these countries can take or whether they are absolutely helpless, or what in your opinion the future holds forth for these Baltic countries?

Mr. HOOVER. I don't know; that is a very difficult subject. You have only a certain historic background to cling to. These races in the Baltic States, for instance, represented some ancient migration of peoples who were not Slavs. They were more akin to the Hungarians than they were to the Slavs. During all of these thousands of years they had periodically attained their independence and they had constantly maintained their fundamental racial institutions; their language, their literature, even under the most tremendous oppressions. When these three States came out from under the Russians in 1919 they

had a flowering literature, they had great vitality in all of their racial qualities.

Now, I have the belief that you cannot stamp that out of a people; you can't stamp it out of the Poles, you can't stamp it out of the Czechs, nor the Baltic peoples.

The only hope I can see is that some day, in some world cataclysm, those people can rise again as they did in 1919. That is the only solution I can see at the moment and it is the main hope.

I might add, on the outrages, that I had occasion to go to Eastern Europe on missions for our Government in 1946 and 1947 in Poland and Finland. I did not get into the Baltic States; the Russians wouldn't allow me to. I did get to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and so forth. In all of those cities there were refugees from the Baltic States. A great many of them came to me to tell me what had happened after the Russian occupation.

I have no memory as to the details of these heartbreaking stories; there were so many of them one couldn't remember. But in any event, they were ample testimony as to the terribleness of the Russian regime. I was told by great numbers of them scattered all the way from Helsinki clear down to Budapest that the Russians had undertaken a systematic migration of the peoples out of the Baltic States into some place in Siberia, not slave camps, but resettlements, and the movement of Russians into the Baltic States with the intention of finally Russifying that area. They are trying to extinguish the racial spark that might still be alive in those peoples.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. President, I want to join my colleagues in thanking you for the contribution you have made and expressing my personal happiness for your presence, because as I have explained to you briefly, it was my great privilege to work with you in those years of 1919 and 1920 as a member of the Technical Advisory Commission of the United States Government to Poland. I think I have had some personal experiences which prove to me that had it not been for the great help furnished by you and through your Commission, those governments would never have had an opportunity to survive because of the terrible conditions under which they were created.

I also want to comment on the answers to the questions of Congressman Madden. Isn't it true that there is a fiction maintained in this country that Russia is a monolithic nation, a fiction which is absolutely untrue, that probably nearly two-thirds of the Russian Empire are peoples who are not Russians?

Mr. HOOVER. I should think, fully. I counted up the races at one time. I think there are 36 now in the Russian complex.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And I think the American people don't fully realize that.

You were also in Eastern Europe in 1945, I believe?

Mr. HOOVER. 1946, 1947.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You didn't get into the Baltic nations then, of course?

Mr. HOOVER. I went to Finland. The Baltic States had been annexed at that time and I was not able to go in that area. The Communists had retained a dislike for me ever since the First World War.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You did get into eastern Poland?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would you care to comment as to what you saw, as to any change in the conditions from the time that you had visited that section of the country last?

Mr. HOOVER. That is in Poland?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In Poland or anywhere in Eastern Europe.

Mr. HOOVER. Poland at that time was under a so-called provisional government of about 15 Ministers, of which I think 13 were either Communists or extreme leftwing Socialists. The President of Poland was an avowed Communist who had been raised and trained in Russia.

The Russian secret police dominated Poland at that time. There were concentration camps reported to me by the American Ambassador as having fully 200,000 Poles in them and great numbers of Poles had been taken out and sent to Siberia. This was in 1946. There obviously was no possibility of establishing anything in the nature of the government that had been portrayed at Yalta. Already the Communists had taken full possession.

There were 2 independent men in the Polish Ministry at that time, Mikolajczyk and 1 other, both of whom had to escape from Poland to save their lives.

In 1946 Poland was again in dire straits. The people again were starving, the industries were closed and there seemed to be little hope of industrial revival under the Russians. I doubt whether Poland has made any great recovery since. There is some nominal improvement.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have also testified that in Europe all these peoples—the Latvians, the Estonians, the Lithuanians, the Poles, the Czechs and others—have a hope for a restoration of their freedom through some cataclysm in the future.

Mr. HOOVER. All of those who still hope for freedom in this world have their minds placed on the fact that someday there may be some great convulsion out of which they can emerge.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That leads me to another question, Mr. President. Do you personally see any hope for the restoration of liberty and freedom to those nations by agreements or treaties with these present Soviet leaders?

Mr. HOOVER. I had to deal with the Communist movement beginning in 1918. I was delegated by the Allied Governments to look after 12 Communist revolutions in Western Europe. I naturally was interested in the Communist movement per se. From that time on I became quite an earnest student of the whole of Communist literature and Communist processes as applied to international life.

No one can read the directions and speeches of Lenin and Stalin and Molotov and ever believe that agreement with Russia has more than purely temporary value.

There are occasions when I think agreements could be made which would be to their interest or to the mutual interest, but those are pretty rare occasions. Such agreements would last only just so long as it suited the Russians.

You have to bear in mind that during the interval between the First World War and the Second World War, it suited the Russians to have a peaceful front. During that time they made 36 different non-aggression pacts or treaties guaranteeing nonaggression activities.

Every one of those went by the board the day they made the agreement with Hitler in August 1939.

That ought to indicate the sacredness of an agreement in the mind of the Russian when it doesn't suit him.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I am in full agreement with you, Mr. President. I believe most of the members—if not all of the members—of the committee, are in full agreement with you.

Just one other question: Do you feel, Mr. President, that the restoration of freedom and liberty to these nations—the Baltic States and Poland and the other countries behind the Iron Curtain—is or is not conducive to worldwide peace?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, of course I am one of the believers in the fact that the only hope of worldwide peace is in the growth of government among peoples.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. KERSTEN. In fact, any agreement which would permit the Communists to further communize these captive nations would merely lead to the threat of universal war; would it not, Mr. President?

Mr. HOOVER. I wouldn't put it that hard because they may have a long period here when they would like to consolidate their position. It would be difficult to fix the time.

Mr. KERSTEN. We would like to have your statement as part of the record if we may. It will be marked as an exhibit.

(The article was marked "Exhibit 9." See p. 577.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. President, we are very grateful for your appearance here this morning. You have made a great contribution and we certainly hope that the work which you helped to start in 1919, the self-determination of these nations, will again prove the basis for their ultimate freedom.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. KERSTEN. We will take a recess for a few minutes.

(The committee then recessed briefly.)

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearings will please come to order.

Reverend Kiviranna.

STATEMENT OF PASTOR RUDOLF KIVIRANNA, FORMER PASTOR OF ST. JOHN'S EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH, TALLINN, ESTONIA

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you identify yourself, please, Pastor Kiviranna?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. I am Pastor Rudolf Kiviranna. I am pastor of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church of New York.

As a Lutheran minister I experienced the tragedy of the Estonian nation and the Estonian church in the time of first Communist occupation of Estonia. I was at that time pastor of the St. John's Lutheran Church in Tallinn, capital of Estonia, a congregation with a membership of 11,000. That was one of the largest congregations in Estonia. Mostly the members belonged to the factory workers, so I had the opportunity in a relatively large part of the population to experience what happened when the power was taken over by the Communists.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were pastor of St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tallinn with a congregation of approximately 11,000 members at the time the Communists occupied Estonia?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. And when was that, Pastor?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. I was elected to that congregation in 1940, and I very vividly remember the day in June of 1940 when the Red army marched into Tallinn. I was coming from a pastoral call, and so I had the possibility, standing in the crowd, to experience what kind of effect the marching in of the Red army had on the Estonian population.

Nobody knew what would happen, but an unconscious feeling that something terrible was going to happen was in the souls of the Estonians. We had lived as neighbors with Soviet Russia, but I can testify to the committee that we didn't have very much reliable information on what communism really is and really means.

We had seen persons who succeeded in spite of the Iron Curtain, which was already at that time in existence, in escaping from Soviet Russia and they had told their stories, but we were unable to believe that reality, Communist reality, could be so terrible.

Only at first hand, experiencing the terrible losses and sufferings, did we see the real face of communism.

Mr. McTIGUE. When the Communists occupied Estonia, what was the effect of the occupation on you and your congregation? Before answering that, Pastor Kiviranna, what is the predominant religion in Estonia?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. Estonia, since the time of the Reformation in Europe, is a Lutheran country. So the national church is the Lutheran Church, and 79 percent of the population are members of the Lutheran Church.

In answer to your question I would briefly characterize the influence, the general influence which the Communist occupation had on Estonia.

The first thing in the Communist machinery and system was the breaking of the political and national resistance of Estonia. It was done in the way that a very large percentage of the national leadership in the field of state, politics, press, radio, and other fields were arrested, and we do not have any information about the fate of the vast majority of those people.

The Communist aim was, through arrests, to take away the national leadership in the hope that if the national political resistance is liquidated it will be easier to influence the masses of the nation.

The second strategic step was to break the economic resistance of the nation. The Communists who first came to Estonia were mostly military personnel, and they were followed by the families and persons who belonged to the civilian Soviet personnel. We were astonished about the very low economic standard, their clothes.

In turn they also were very astonished and it was difficult for them to believe that Estonia, a small country, had such a high economic standard.

It is quite understandable that to the Communist method of liquidating the life of free nations belongs very cardinally the breaking of economic resistance. It was done in the way of so-called nationalization. That means that the property of corporations, of private persons, or of churches is taken without any remuneration.

For example, a man owns a small workshop. He has also debts. The workshop belongs to the state after the nationalization, but if you have any debts on your enterprise, those are your personal responsibility.

So in breaking the economic resistance it was not only a question of taking away the factories, large businesses, but went to every private home of the civilian population. Many members of my congregation were employed by the Estonian Railways, and they had small one-family homes in a suburb near Tallinn. Those private homes were considered too large by the Communists; they were considered as belonging to the capitalist form of living.

Those homes were taken away from the people, the owner was driven out, and he had to take either a room in the basement or he was driven out altogether. The same thing happened to private cars.

This breaking of national resistance was also carried on in the field of the churches. All church property was confiscated by the state. In my case in Tallinn we had a parish house which had also the apartments for the clergy. From my apartment all the rooms except one, the smallest, was taken away. Part of the apartment was given to persons from the Red army. People were placed in other parts. For me only one room was left, the smallest.

I approached the Communist authorities and I asked, "I am a pastor. That room is enough that I could live and eat in this room, but people are coming to me to talk with me as their pastor." They said, "It is better that you do not make any application, official application, of getting one room more or you will be considered under the new regime as an enemy of the nation and as an enemy of the Soviet Union."

The third method in the strategy of breaking and liquidating free life was done through the efforts to break the moral resistance of the nation. Maybe they had been too long in power in Soviet Russia; they didn't consider very important the fact that it is not easy to take over the power in a small democratic nation through violation of all rights, through brutal liquidation of national life, and keep up that power through terror.

They didn't understand that it is very difficult to break the moral resistance. They were very well aware that the main moral resistance is in the Christian churches. I should like to emphasize that communism is not directed against Christianity only. The Communist attitude is radically anti-Christian, but it is also radically against any form of religion. Of course, in a nation as Estonia, a Protestant Lutheran nation, the main aim was to liquidate the greatest church.

I should like to characterize briefly some of the methods which were used to break the moral resistance. We had, as in any free country, the opportunity of proclaiming the gospel and training the children. We had an excellent old institution at the Tartu University for training the clergy. Some weeks after the power was taken over by the Soviets they immediately started, through rules and regulations and through the directives given by the puppet government and by the Communist Party to undermine the religious life.

We consider it in all free Christian countries as basic for the religion and for the freedom of conscience that children might be trained by the church and in the homes. We heard very soon and we were told very strictly that it is against the Soviet law, it is against

some paragraphs in the Soviet criminal code to train children in the church or in private homes or any place to give them religious training.

It was not understandable to us, used to democratic form of living, that it is a crime in the constitution of any state—for a constitution is supposed to contain all these basic liberties declared as in other constitutions in the Western World—to teach children in religion.

However, all Christian organizations of any type, for any purpose, including the Christian charity organizations, were liquidated and prohibited from teaching religion in the schools. Also the theological school at the Tartu University was closed and we had no ways and means to train the clergy.

The economic life of the congregations was supported by small voluntary contributions. All contributions or subscriptions were prohibited. The whole church life was made possible on the basis of the voluntary contributions given in the plate offering in the church.

To make hindrances to the work of the church which was left to us there were issued regulations that if electric current was used for religious purposes or in church, you had to pay 14 times more than in a private home. Gentlemen, you can understand the aim of this type of regulation.

For that small room where I lived and worked I had to pay many times more for the very reason that I was considered by the foreign occupants as an enemy of the nation, of the Soviets.

As they very many times have emphasized in the Soviet press, the Soviet press has dealt with the question of the church and called it a capitalistic enterprise, the enemy of the nation, and also we were many times attacked in the press as secret collaborators with foreign powers, and it was meant America and England.

We were cut from all contacts with the free world. So we had to appeal to the moral strength, using the force and the power of the Christian religion in order to survive.

The most difficult time to Estonia and to the Estonian church came in the last weeks before war broke out between the two dictators. They had made plans, they had said that the Baltic States will belong to the Soviet sphere of influence. But, no, the situation had radically changed, and at that time in addition to the great number of arrests we had to experience the terrible night of deportation. I escaped deportation through the help of the president of my church who was a simple man, who was courageous to remain on his position.

He came in the dead of night and said, "Something terrible is happening in Tallinn. The Russians are arresting not only individuals but whole families. There are cattle vans in the railway station to transport the unhappy victims to Soviet Russia." So I left my apartment immediately in the dead of night.

I saw those trucks going in the direction of the railroad station with the arrested Estonians—men, women, small children from all classes, from all walks of life. I succeeded in surviving, hiding myself about one month and a half. In 1944 in September, 2 hours before the Russians again marched into Tallinn, I had the opportunity through God's grace to escape with my two small children and my wife—my girl was 11 months old at that time—crossing the sea to Sweden in a small duck boat.

And in Sweden we started to inform the free world about the experiences of the first victims of the Red aggression in Europe. We worked very hard to find believers and understanding hearts.

Mr. KERSTEN. Right at that point, Pastor, I think there are still some people who are unbelieving as to what the Communists really are; isn't that true?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. In 1948, Mr. Chairman, I came to the United States of America, called by the New York Lutheran Church. I started, with my poor English, and I went to Detroit, Chicago, Washington, other places in the Nation telling the very simple story of a pastor who lived and worked behind the Iron Curtain. And I found at that time that many didn't believe.

I told them also that we, as neighbors of Soviet Russia, found it hard to believe, but I have come to give testimony and to tell the story very simply, the fact that the American Nation upon which the eyes of hundreds of millions of victims are placed, people in the occupied countries, and also, I think, many of those who are in Russia proper, that America has the world leadership and must recognize the danger and be prepared to face the situation.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. Pastor, you have given us a very dramatic and moving statement. I have 1 or 2 questions I want to ask you dealing more with your personal experiences.

During the time the Soviets were in occupation of Estonia, from 1940 to 1941, the first period of occupation, was your church kept open during that time?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. The Soviet authorities gave for the church only one opportunity to continue the work, and that was to have divine services in the church proper. So in spite of the economic difficulties we had to face, we had the support of those men and women who were maybe considered by the Communists as persons with whom they could collaborate.

They were factory workers mostly, but they understood the situation and they very freely supported the church, and the attendance of the services was rising. As the tide of suffering of the people was rising, the attendance and the freewill contributions arose. So we were able to pay for those expenses and to keep the church doors open.

After the war broke out we had in that church two congregations, and my colleague who was present in Tallinn, Alexander Tahevali, and myself hid ourselves one night in this place in the suburbs. We couldn't get out from Tallinn, so we were hiding one night here and the other night there. He is at present in Stockholm, Sweden.

Mr. BENTLEY. But apart from holding divine services, you were forbidden to have any other work in the church? For example, you said the religious education of the children was forbidden.

Mr. KIVIRANNA. Yes, that was against the Soviet Criminal Code.

Mr. BENTLEY. Can you cite this committee the exact part of the Soviet Criminal Code that makes that prohibition?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. As I recall, it is in the Soviet Criminal Code under 203.

Mr. BENTLEY. Article 203?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. Article 203 which, in plain words, forbids the religious training of children.

Also as an example, we couldn't carry on other activities such as young peoples' work, we couldn't have any services transmitted through the radio, we couldn't read, or print, one word in the press.

The religious books, bibles, hymn books, they were confiscated and destroyed. You can understand what kind of future is left in those conditions for the church.

MR. BENTLEY. Now, apart from the interference with your church work, were you personally interfered with at any time during the Soviet occupation?

MR. KIVIRANNA. I was told by the members of my congregation that they noticed that young men and women were sent by the NKVD, by the Soviet Secret Police, and were taking down parts of my sermons. But they didn't have any idea about christianity and the Christian religion, and if they were listening to my sermons they were unable to really understand the meaning, and if they went to the secret police, they were unable to tell in plain facts what the pastor was saying.

But the selection of the text, the selection of the hymns and so on, it was understandable to those who were members and religious people; they could understand why that song was sung that Sunday.

MR. BENTLEY. Pastor, to the best of your knowledge, were there any of your colleagues, were there any ministers of the Lutheran faith in Estonia who gave you the appearance of collaborating with the Communists, going along with them?

MR. KIVIRANNA. I know some cases, in the large number of the clergy, in which I think the fear of persecution and the fear of terror was the reason that they resigned. I know two cases. I know cases in which they were called to the secret police, they have later told me, and they have confidentially said it to the archbishop at the very time they were called in, that they were taken to the secret police and they were pressed with threats, that they have so many contacts with the people, people are coming to them, and they should report to the secret police about their experiences.

They tried to find persons who would give them valuable information, but the pastors were intelligent enough that all they told was of no value, knowing that they could not be forced to tell, at least if they were not tortured, things that they would like to hear.

MR. BENTLEY. One more question. From what information you may have received, what could you tell us about the religious situation in Estonia as of today?

MR. KIVIRANNA. The Estonian Church in the beginning of the second occupation was left in a very difficult position. Those men who survived the first Communist occupation, who had difficulties also in the time of the Nazi's occupation, those men were given by the church the freedom to stay or to flee to the free world.

So our archbishop, Dr. Kopp, and a large number of the clergy of the Estonian Lutheran Church, of the Orthodox Church, of the Baptists and other denominations, they preferred to escape. One of the main reasons was also to have the opportunity to go to the west and to tell the tragic story of the first victims of the Communists in Europe.

Many of the clergymen succeeded to escape, but many of them perished on the way to Sweden; many of the ships were attacked by the Soviet airplanes. A small number of the clergy remained.

On the basis of indirect information—we have no direct information—we have the following picture, that the persecution of the church

is continuing. Those few men who are left are under a very hard pressure. The Soviets are using in the large extension, in that long period of time that they have had now, hard means to force them into some kind of cooperation.

I know most of those men. I know my nation and my church. I think all those pressures will not really be successful in winning among those occupied nations real collaboration in the church.

They have succeeded, unfortunately, I am sorry to say, in finding cooperation in Russia proper. We have the case of a man, very high orthodox representative, whose name is Sergius. He was sent as the representative of the Patriarch of Moscow to the Baltic States. And the metropolitan of the Estonian Orthodox Church who recently passed away, Metropolitan Alexander, testified that his and the honest opinion of the other members of the high clergy in the Orthodox Church was that Sergius, that the bishop sent from Moscow, was only a Soviet spy.

I have informed, I think in 1947, the Federation of Churches, with headquarters in Geneva, about that incident.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you very much, Pastor.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden.

Mr. MADDEN. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. Pastor, is this the first time that you have had the opportunity to tell your story to an official committee of the Government?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. Yes. I had the opportunity to be invited by church groups, in Detroit, Chicago, Washington, mostly large conventions or special meetings that I would testify and that I would tell my story as a Christian minister behind the Iron Curtain. I have participated in some conferences in which Mr. Chairman and other members have been present, but not before any official committee; I have not had the pleasure of meeting any official committee of the Government before.

Mr. BONIN. I think it is splendid on your part to come before this committee and tell us this very illuminating story of what the Communist threat is to the free and independent world.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Machrowicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just one question. Could you tell us, in view of this persecution of the church in all these acts that you have described, what the attitude of the general public was? Did it diminish their faith, did it diminish their participation in the activities of the church to any great extent?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. We had a very strong fear in the beginning that under such totalitarian terror the people will become afraid to come to church and participate in church activities. We could baptize children and we could have a Christian burial, and so on. We could have those things which were considered by the Communists as the culture of the church.

We were very much encouraged by the general reaction. You can imagine if the free press is taken away, the free radio is not in existence, books which are published are mostly Communist propaganda, then people believe that there is only one way left and that's the way in that direction.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You say "in that direction," and you are pointing upward. May the record show that.

Mr. KIVIRANNA. Yes, I am pointing upward.

So the number of attendants in all churches all over the country was rising numerically.

I recall also that persons came as family units to the holy communion, and as they came to me to register for the holy communion in the sacristy, they told me, "Pastor, maybe that is the last time we are together."

So, the fear of being arrested or sent to a concentration camp was so strong that they considered every Sunday as maybe the last opportunity to hear the word of God and to participate in holy communion. So the general reaction in the soul of the Estonian nation was entirely and radically different from that which was expected by the Soviets.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, they did not succeed in discouraging the general public from participating in the church affairs?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. That is right. As I mentioned, I lived among the factory workers, and I could see what kind of reaction that had.

They do not succeed to break the moral resistance in the occupied countries, with one exception. I would like to emphasize that very strongly. If the period of the Red terror and occupation is too long, they will train a new generation, and I cannot see any future for the whole free world in that case in which new generations are trained in all those occupied countries.

So I think we have a limit of time; the time is very limited.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You feel the time is on the side of the Russians?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. The time is working on their side.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Pastor, I want to compliment you for your magnificent statement. You have very clearly told us as to what communism has meant to Estonia insofar as the spiritual values are concerned. You have mentioned the matter of time, and I think it is very significant, namely that the free world cannot permit indefinitely to see the good people liquidated and destroyed, giving the Communists the opportunity to raise a new generation who are indoctrinated from infancy only with communism.

Would you not agree with me that whereas now the vast majority of the people that are thus enslaved are really the enemies of the regime, unless we in every practical way help them as we can, that when this new generation is raised up who will know nothing of anything else other than communism, they and the millions of them, the hundreds of millions of them will be willing to fight the West, and that is a situation that we want to avoid.

Would you agree with me on that?

Mr. KIVIRANNA. I fully agree, Mr. Chairman, and I have the conviction that it has tragic consequences. We are living in a tragic world situation, but we cannot afford any more tragic mistakes. I consider the activity of this committee as a valuable encouragement, moral encouragement to those Baltic and other nations behind the Iron Curtain.

They are very careful to watch the steps of the West. The words which are spoken here, especially in America, and the moral encour-

agement we are able to give in this situation will help to create a better, a free world.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF BISHOP VINCENTAS BRIZGYS, FORMER BISHOP OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, KAUNAS

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you give us your full name, Bishop?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Vincentas Brizgys.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were and are the bishop of Kaunas?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Roman Catholic bishop of Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were consecrated a bishop when?

Bishop BRIZGYS. On May 19, 1940.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you received your religious training for the priesthood during what period?

Bishop BRIZGYS. In 1920-27. Then I spent 5 years at the Gregorianum College in Rome.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you presently are the guest of Cardinal Stritch, the Archbishop of Chicago?

Bishop BRIZGYS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is your address in Chicago?

Bishop BRIZGYS. My address in Chicago is 6727 South California Avenue, Chicago.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is that in connection with the big, beautiful new high school, Lithuanian high school?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes, my apartment is in this new building.

Mr. KERSTEN. Lithuania is largely Roman Catholic, isn't it?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Before this second war, Lithuania was 87 percent Catholic.

Mr. KERSTEN. As the pastor who just preceded you stated, Estonia was largely Lutheran, and Lithuania is largely Catholic?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Roman Catholic; yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Bishop, you have a statement, have you?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I prepared one statement but concerning religion and the church only. In my statement that I have before me, I have nothing about economics, cultural, or political questions. I am ready to answer anything you ask.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just a preliminary question. During the first year of Communist occupation, from June of 1940 until June of 1941, you at that time were auxiliary bishop of Kaunas, were you not?

Bishop BRIZGYS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. And as such in touch with all religious affairs of that diocese, is that correct?

Bishop BRIZGYS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. How large was that diocese?

Bishop BRIZGYS. We had in this diocese over 500,000 Catholics.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that included the capital city of Kaunas?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the area surrounding it also.

Bishop BRIZGYS. The area was from the River Nemunas to the Latvian border.

MR. KERSTEN. Would you make such statement with regard to the effect of the Communist occupation upon religion as you care to make or any comments or observations that you would like to make, Your Excellency?

BISHOP BRIZGYS. Well, Mr. Chairman and Congressmen, my statement does not concern either the Russian nation or the Russian army. It does concern the activities of Russian Communists and Communist institutions in Lithuania under the occupation of the Soviet Army.

I wish to make this difference quite clear, because the Russian people are suffering for religion the same as other enslaved nations and are expecting the collapse of Communist tyranny. One of the primary purposes of Moscow is to combat religion. And for this purpose Moscow has a minutely elaborated system.

On January 14, 1941, I was summoned by Moscow's plenipotentiary, Pozdniakov, to renounce my efforts to have a priests' seminary in Lithuania because very soon the Catholic Church would be abolished in Lithuania, according to Pozdniakov's statement to me—"with all its power and all its experience, Moscow will combat religion everywhere." Moscow was quite sure that the free world will not concern itself over its abolishment.

For many reasons Moscow attacked the Catholic Church in Lithuania most harshly. A chronology of facts shows how quickly Moscow began to attack the Catholic Church in Lithuania.

The Russian Army occupied Lithuania on June 15, 1940. Ten days later, June 15, the Concordat was abrogated. The Papal Nuncio received an order to leave the country by August 25. Chaplains from army hospitals, schools, prisons were dismissed July 2.

During the next 2 weeks all private hospitals, schools, kindergartens, all charity institutions, orphanages, old people's homes were expropriated. All the property of these institutions was confiscated.

All leading personnel of organizations were arrested the night of July 12, 1940. Beginning that night, one by one disappeared the more or less active members of Catholic and patriotic societies. Some were shot in torture chambers, while others were sent to concentration camps in Russia.

All Catholic newspapers and magazines were suppressed during the first weeks of occupation. Efforts to have at least one catechism or prayerbook were futile. Without any compensation all printing establishments were taken over.

Subsequent decrees required the collection of books of religious library of the Marian Fathers at Marianapolis was loaded in trucks and taken outside of the town and burned.

All priests' seminaries were seized during the first days of the occupation. After very long and difficult efforts 1 seminary was allowed for the 5 dioceses in Kaunas, which after 4 months, however, exactly January 13, 1941, were closed. The students and professors were expelled within 12 hours.

All monasteries were also closed during the first months of the Communist regime. All property and deposits in banks were also seized.

With few exceptions, the rectories of the churches were taken over for various fictional purposes of the Communist Party. I say fictional purposes, because the Communist Party had members in only a small number of towns.

All bishops and chancery office staffs were banned from their residences. Among the last to be expelled from their residences were the Archbishop of Kaunas and his auxiliary bishop. This was December 8, 1940. This was only 6 months after the occupation.

The Communist government did not assign one single new residence to an expelled bishop or priest. It was most difficult for the clergy to find a room anywhere because all houses were nationalized.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were virtually put on the streets, were you not?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes. And furthermore we were ordered to leave our apartments without knowing where we would go now.

Bishop Kukta of Kaisiadorys and Bishop Staugaitis of Telsiai were repeatedly evicted from rooms which had been given to them by private persons.

All this and more was accomplished by the Communists in 5 months.

During independent Lithuania prayers were usually said before and after school sessions. In the beginning of the school year 1940 this was forbidden.

After 4 months, in October 1940, the Communist government began a very strong movement against the observance of Christian holidays—Sundays, Christmas, Easter, and so on. The observance of the Sabbath and Christmas was attacked not only by the press but by the commissars—now occupying the rank of ministers—and the President was sent by the Russians to factories for meetings to agitate the workers against the observance of Christian holy days. But the outcome of the meetings was most unexpected. Instead of accepting the proposed resolutions, the workers expelled not only the commissars from the factories but President Paleckis himself.

Nevertheless a decree introduced an obligatory Sunday workday in factories, offices and in schools. I personally know many cases where schoolchildren, workers, and officials were summoned, intimidated, arrested for assisting at Sunday mass.

Finally, on April 25, 1941, a sector order was released to call in person every clergyman and to intimate to him that the teaching of religion to children in churches and elsewhere is absolutely forbidden.

If you will allow, Mr. Chairman, I have here the translation from the Lithuanian text of this secret order.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, Your Excellency, with regard to this secret order, will you briefly describe the circumstances under which you were able to get and make a copy of it? As I understand it, this is an order of the Communists that was meant not to be published or to be known.

Bishop BRIZGYS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. And do I understand you correctly that you saw the original of this secret order with regard to religion?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes, I had the original of the document, official document.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where was it that you saw the original?

Bishop BRIZGYS. This document that I have the translation before me I saw in my room, in my private room, and it was forwarded to me by an official of the same office where this order was released.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, he was not supposed to show that to you.

Bishop BRIZGYS. He was not supposed to, but you would remember, as Pastor Kiviranna of Estonia said, in those countries like the Baltic countries, Poland and so on, I don't know how many real Communists are over there. You will remember the facts today of how many police are fleeing from East Germany to West Germany, even of the police.

The same was in the Baltic countries among the police officials, among the officials in government institutions, and so on. Russia has not so many real Communists.

Mr. KERSTEN. They couldn't trust everybody to be absolutely reliable, is that right?

Bishop BRIZGYS. They can't.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was it a high Communist official or some Communist official?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I think they did not belong to the party, but I am not sure about this.

Mr. KERSTEN. At any rate, did he bring you the original order to your residence?

Bishop BRIZGYS. He brought to me the original of this document to show and to present me as the bishop of what is prepared for the church and for religion.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you make a copy of it?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I made myself a copy.

Mr. KERSTEN. That which you have here this morning is a true copy?

Bishop BRIZGYS. This copy in Lithuanian is the true copy made by myself, and the translation in English is made in Chicago from this Lithuanian text.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the translation into English, therefore, is also a true translation and therefore a true copy of the translated text of the original document; is that correct?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes, that is correct.

I would remember one circumstance, that we Lithuanians are in possession of more secret documents concerning religion and deportations. This is the method of Lithuanian Partisans. On the first day of the war they seized approximately all of the records of the Communist Party in Lithuania, and so we were in possession of important papers that were prepared for the Lithuanian nation and for the church, and so forth.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Lithuanian Partisans or underground were able to seize many of these original Russian or Communist documents; is that right?

Bishop BRIZGYS. In such cities like Kaunas and Marianapolis all archives were seized by the Partisans. Nothing was deported to Russia of those documents.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you give us, therefore, the English translation of this one? I am referring to the secret order for religion in Lithuania.

(Bishop Brizgys then read as follows:)

[Secret—Personal]

No. 8

LITHUANIAN SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC,
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNTY OF KAUNAS,
Kaunas, April 25, 1941.

To the chairman of all executive committees of all townships in the county of Kaunas and of the town of Jonava.

I request that immediately upon receiving this statement you invite all the clergy (priests, ministers, rabbis, etc.) in the township assigned to your supervision and announce to them the stringent prohibition of teaching religion to the children, at the same time collecting their signatures on the enclosed forms. Before getting their signatures, the clergyman's name, surname, and address should be written on each form.

Also, I request that you invite each clergyman separately or visit each at his home. This letter should not be shown to the clergyman.

The signed forms must be sent to me by secret personal letter by the 10th day of May. At the same time this letter and all unused forms must be returned.

Since this matter is completely secret, I request you also to keep strict secrecy and not to speak of or show any one else this matter. It is not necessary to register your document, so I ask you not to show it even to the secretary.

(Signed) BILIS,
Chairman of the Executive Committee.

[Copy of form on which clergyman's signature is to be obtained.]

[Signature form]

I, the undersigned clergyman ----- living at ----- district ----- county ----- village, acknowledges that on April --, 1941, I was informed that I have been strictly forbidden and have no right to teach religion to children of school age, either in the schools or in my home or any place in general. Thus I have no right whatever to talk to them on religious matters.

At the same time I have been informed I will be held responsible for failure to comply with this warning, whereto I affix my signature.

Clergyman's signature.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is the promise or that is the document that they sought to get every clergyman to sign; is that correct?

Bishop BRIZGYS. That is.

Mr. KERSTEN. And at the beginning of that secret order, I believe I noticed when I looked at it last night that it said, "I request that immediately upon receiving this statement you invite all the clergy"—priests, ministers, rabbis, etc.—in other words the minister of every religion was included in this secret order; is that correct, Your Excellency?

Bishop BRIZGYS. That is correct, and not only Catholic clergymen but orthodox priests, ministers, and so on.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there other secret orders that you similarly made copies of with regard to religion? For example, is there one pertaining to how the Communists were supposed to handle the situation on Christmas Day and other religious holidays?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I have the copies and translations in English of four documents concerning the holidays, and so on. But those documents are not secret any more for Lithuanians, because they were seized by the Partisans, and so they were published information.

Mr. KERSTEN. They were supposed to be secret at the time, were they not?

Bishop BRIZGYS. They were secret.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you have one there pertaining to what they were supposed to do on Christmas Day?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I have one concerning the days of All Saints and All Souls. The second one I have is concerning Christmas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you read that one pertaining to Christmas?

Bishop BRIZGYS. There are two pertaining to Christmas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Read one that would be typical, if you will.

Bishop BRIZGYS. The heading on this is, "Completely Secret."

Mr. KERSTEN. The heading on that is, "Completely Secret"?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes.

(Bishop Brizgys then read as follows:)

[Completely Secret]

On the 25th and 26th days of December Catholics celebrate the so-called Christmas holidays. On those days beginning with the evening of the 24th-25th of December services are held and sermons are preached in the churches. Both of these days are considered by the faithful to be very great holidays, that is, not working days.

The nationalistic counterrevolutionary element and especially the clergy this year will try to use Christmas for their work of opposition, especially along the following lines:

- (a) By attempts to stop work in factories and studies in schools;
- (b) By agitation from church pulpits against participation in the elections through the guise of sermons of a greater or lesser religious content, and at the same time by instructing the faithful individually or in groups in churches, sacristies, church houses;
- (c) By spreading counterrevolutionary literature, whether its contents be religious or otherwise;
- (d) By attempts to lead the faithful in street demonstrations or to other excesses, etc.

Mr. KERSTEN. I suppose that a religious procession would come under that?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes, they were forbidden. [Continued reading:]

For the purpose of preventing events of this sort, you must:

1. Study once again Directive No. 1919 of November 27, 1940, and carry it out in detail.
2. Obligate your entire network of agent-informers to unmask the anti-Soviet preparations of the clergy and allied organizations (Ateitininkai), the Catholic Youth Organization known as the Futurists, and others; meeting with your agents from December 20 to the 27th, and through more frequent reports.
3. Insure jointly with the police organs, the maintenance of civil order on the holidays, avoiding, however, the posting of too many police groups near the churches.
4. Take means of insuring normal work in the factories and of classes in the schools.
5. Organize city patrols and patrol duty for the nights of December 23, 24, 25, and 26. Consult regarding this matter with the secretary of the county party committee in order to enroll as many as possible activists of the party and Kom-somol youths and instruct them in this work.
6. Document all the facts of any anti-Soviet actions and report them to me.

GUZEVICIUS,

L. S. S. R. Peoples Commissar of the Interior.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now this was one of the orders, and you do have copies of other secret orders pertaining to the same subject?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I have one concerning the visitation to the parishioners. It is a tradition in Lithuania that the pastor visits every family for the census, and so on.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is that order, Your Excellency?

Bishop BRIZGYS. This order in short is to enroll possibly more sacristans among the spies to follow what the priests are speaking in the churches and to the families, and so on, and to have members of the families who would inform the secret police and the party about the conduct of priests during those visitations of the families.

Mr. KERSTEN. We would like for the record to include all of these orders, some of which you have not read in full, and Mr. Reporter, you will have copies of those orders and we would like them inserted in the record at this point.

(The following represent copies of documents copied into the record:)

October 27, 1940
Nr. 1669

[Completely Secret]

To the County Chiefs of the People's Commissariat of the Interior:

On Friday, November 1, faithful Catholics celebrate the so-called feast of All Saints, and on Saturday, November 2, the so-called feast of All Souls.

Special services are conducted in all churches on these days and on the eve of All Soul's Day candlelight processions proceed to the cemeteries.

There is no doubt that the clergy, having recently intensified their counter-revolutionary activity, will attempt to use this opportunity for their agitation, to incite the people to anti-Soviet action, to spread counterrevolutionary proclamations, etc.

Besides this, the L. S. S. R.'s Commissariat of the Interior has information that the nationalistic students are preparing anti-Soviet demonstrations at the cemeteries on All Soul's Day, at the graves of the dead Baltic soldiers.

For the purpose of stopping all possible counterrevolutionary activity, the spread of anti-Soviet proclamations, etc.

I command:

1. On these holy days operatives be sent to meeting places of the faithful, cemeteries, etc. For this purpose plainclothes men may also be used.

2. The network of agents-informers should also be instructed in this work. They should be obligated to immediately inform the local People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs about all anti-Soviet activity that they have noted: the spreading of counterrevolutionary proclamations, the anti-Soviet speeches, etc.

3. The people guilty of anti-Soviet activity should be immediately taken into custody without any fanfare and with the use of a suitable pretext for their detention.

B. BARANAUSKAS,

Deputy Commissar of the Interior of the L. S. S. R.

[Completely Secret]

To the Chief of the Vilnius City Administration of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the L. S. S. R.:

To County and Branch Chiefs of the People's Commissariat of the Interior of the L. S. S. R.:

To the chairman of all operating sections of the center:

Comrade-----
Town-----

On the 25-26 of December the Catholics celebrate the so-called birth of Christ. In connection with this (beginning in the month of November) the priests take the parish census, make the traditional visits to their parishioners, during which they solicit donations for the church, church institutions, the clergy, organists, sacristans, etc., and at the same time they examine the children in their cate-

chism. And in many places the faithful are informed about the time of the visits through special mimeographed announcements.

According to information had by the People's Commissariat of the Interior of the L. S. S. R., this year the clergy will use this period of visitation for hostile action: agitation against participation in the elections, against the reading of the Soviet press, to spread anti-Soviet rumors, to create dissatisfaction with Soviet rule, etc.

In order to beat them to the punch, you must immediately recruit your entire network of agent-informers, to seek more information and recruit new informers amongst the clergy and people in the vicinity who receive the visiting clergy so that all anti-Soviet acts of the visiting clergy may be unmasked.¹

Whenever it appears possible, county and branch chiefs should speak to authoritative representatives of the clergy (canons, monsignors, and deans, but not bishops) and in a polite conversation give them strong warning that we are not hindering their religious duties; that we will, however, not tolerate any anti-Soviet agitation or action; that all offenders would be punished. All investigations should be made by day either in organ, party, or Soviet institutions—according to conveniences and correctness. The entire action should be conducted in a very polite tactful, and cultured form: no roughness, insults, or attacks are permitted, and I will hold you strictly responsible for them.

All the material about the anti-Soviet activity of the clergy during the visitation period according to their behavior should be immediately sent to the UGB PCIA L. S. S. R. section 2.

GUZEVICIUS,

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, L. S. S. R.

November 28, 1940

Nr. 1919

Kaunas.

Bishop BRIZGYS. The extreme measure against religion was and is the extermination of the clergy.

One hundred and fifty Catholic priests were arrested in Lithuania during the first year of the Soviet occupation. Every priest had to choose 1 of 2 courses to follow: to be deported to Siberia or to spy on other priests and his parishioners. In 1 year, 16 Catholic priests were killed in Lithuania, 6 are missing without any trace, the rest were freed by the Lithuanian Partisans with the beginning of the war in June 1941.

Mr. KERSTEN. Those who were freed had been held in jail; is that correct?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes.

In 1944 the Soviet Army returned to Lithuania. During the months of the war under the military government, the Soviets showed more tolerance toward religion. After the war, Communist action against religion was intensified.

During the first 2 years after the war, 4 Lithuanian Catholic bishops and 89 Lithuanian priests were arrested, and each year following about 100 priests were arrested.

Since the Communist regime in Lithuania, there is no Catholic press, no private schools, no teaching of religion. Even parents must be overly cautious in teaching religion to their own children, because very often the children are interrogated by spies—they are asked if they go to church, do they know their prayers, and who taught them.

Now we and 10 other European countries can see how true was the statement of Moscow's plenipotentiary, Pozdnaikov, made to me on January 14, 1941—"with all its power and all its experience, Moscow will combat religion everywhere."

¹ All investigated facts about the clergy's antisovietism should be documented either through the secret interrogation of witnesses or from informational sources and agents.

I would remember or call attention that my experience is that the free world understand exactly an article of the Russian Constitution. In the free world I hear speaking that the Russian Constitution guarantees the freedom of religion. It is not exact. The Russian Constitution, if I remember correctly article 8, speaks in terms that the Russian Constitution guarantees the freedom of worship and the freedom to atheistic propaganda. Between religion and worship there is a very great difference.

Worship: only the ceremonies in the church like funerals, like blessing of the marriage, like the mass; that is worship. But religion means something more; religion means teaching of religion. That is not allowed by the Russian Constitution, teaching of religion.

Mr. KERSTEN. Particularly to the young.

Bishop BRIZGYS. Particularly to the young. This statement or this document that I read, the translation in English, accord with the Russian Constitution and with the penal code of Russia. That is teaching of religion, especially to the youth and to the children, and it is forbidden, it is not allowed.

So it is not exact to speak about the Russian Constitution guarantees the freedom of religion. It is not true. It guarantees only the worship.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, Your Excellency, as I understand it, you lived under the first year of Communist occupation.

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes; I lived in Kaunas in Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then you lived there for a while after the Nazis came in?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I lived 4 years under the Nazis.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now during that second occupation—that is the one under the Nazis, will you state what if anything you did or said with regard to the Nazis persecution of the Jewish people?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I am not prepared for a statement on this matter because I understood from the letter which invited me to come here—I am prepared only to speak about the situation of the church and of the different nations under the Russians. But, concerned with the German occupation, the destiny of the Jewish people was very, very deplorable.

Mr. KERSTEN. And how did you happen to leave; what was the reason for your leaving Lithuania? Under what circumstances did you leave Lithuania?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I was taken by the Gestapo on the 26th of July 1944.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Gestapo took you out of Lithuania?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes. All Lithuanian Catholic bishops we decided to remain in Lithuania even under the second occupation of the Russian Army because our feeling was that we must stay with our churches and with our people. But three Lithuanian bishops were taken away by the Gestapo by order of the German Government.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were included in that order?

Bishop BRIZGYS. I was included in this order.

Mr. KERSTEN. So you were taken from Lithuania by the Gestapo?

Bishop BRIZGYS. The order was to take all Catholic bishops from Lithuania. From Lithuania was taken only three because the rest were at this moment in the hands of the Russian Army. So they had no possibility to fulfill this order.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. In the last paragraph of your statement, Bishop, you quote Pozdniako as making a statement on January 14, 1941.

Bishop BRIZGYS. I did.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did he make the statement direct to you?

Bishop BRIZGYS. To me.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think the committee would be interested to know under what circumstances under which he was speaking to you on the subject of religion.

Bishop BRIZGYS. Would you put your attention, Congressman, that January 13, 1941, was expelled the Priests' Seminary in 12 hours. And so the Lithuanian bishops united in Kaunas and considered this situation. Bishop Borisevicius and myself were asked to go to Pozdniakov, Plenipotentiary of Moscow, to ask the possibilities to continue the work of the Priests' Seminary.

On this occasion he made the statement that our efforts are imprudent because, "You are providing young men for the priesthood, and in a few years, in a short time, the church will no more exist, and for what purpose, what good are those priests?"

Mr. BENTLEY. You heard him say those things?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes, it was the discussion in his office on this matter.

Mr. BENTLEY. Just one more question. Regarding the churches in many of the occupied countries, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, some people think that the Communists are attempting to nationalize it; that is to cut it off from all outside contacts with Rome, and so forth, and then to leave it alone; and other people think the idea is to abolish it entirely. What would be your idea?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Well, I answer to this question indirectly. The Orthodox Church is not an international church in such sense as the Roman Catholic Church. All local Protestant churches—and Moscow combats even those churches. So that this is a kind of deceiving action of Moscow. First it is to go gradually, first for the Catholics from Rome, to try to put the church in the service of the regime, and after the service will be rendered, then it will be abolished.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was there any collaboration among the priests in Lithuania with the Communists?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Well, I must be sincere in such matter and agree that one priest in Lithuania was collaborating with the Russians.

Mr. BENTLEY. Out of how many approximately?

Bishop BRIZGYS. We had over 1,400 priests.

Mr. BENTLEY. And one collaborated?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Bishop.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think it is interesting at this point to note that Congressman Bentley who has just questioned you, Your Excellency, has had some very first-hand experiences with this same thing in Hungary at the time of the trial of Cardinal Mindzenty.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden.

Mr. MADDEN. Bishop Brizgys, from your testimony and also from the testimony of the preceding witness, Pastor Rudolf Kiviranna of the Lutheran ministry who testified regarding the education of the children in religion, I take it that the purpose of the Communist Soviet regime is to prohibit and banish the teaching of religion to

the youth of any denomination, and in that way within the period of one generation all religion will be banished from the nations under Soviet domination. Is that how you feel?

Bishop BRIZGYS. From my experience as far as I was able to meet with the Russian military is that it is not so easy to finish with religion in one generation.

Mr. MADDEN. But that is their intention.

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. Do you think that their intentions and purposes will succeed in one generation or two generations?

Bishop BRIZGYS. In two or three generations it can succeed. That is, instead of religion, will remain ignorance in religious matters. Then in place of religion can be put some kind of mythology that was tried in Nazi Germany.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. Your Excellency, I notice that one of the first steps was the cancellation of the concordat signed by Lithuania and the Vatican in 1933. After they canceled that—and we have also heard testimony before this committee that they have canceled all other forms of solemn agreements that they entered into with other nations in this world—

Bishop BRIZGYS. All agreements made between Lithuania and the different countries were canceled.

Mr. BONIN. We have heard testimony in Washington and in New York that all solemn agreements that the Russian Government ever entered into have been abrogated and tossed to the winds.

Bishop BRIZGYS. What concerns Lithuania is right.

Mr. BONIN. Do you believe that we can rely upon the word of the officials of the Russian Government in future agreements, treaties, concordats, any form of pact?

Bishop BRIZGYS. From my personal dealings with those personalities, and considering the past, how they held their agreements between Lithuania and Russia, I beg your pardon for my expression but it would be too naive to believe that the Russians in the near future will be changed.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, in your opinion, gathered from previous experience, it is questionable in your mind whether any agreement would be lived up to by the Russians?

Bishop BRIZGYS. With the Russian regime I would not believe that any agreement would be lived up to by Moscow. As far as how much is useful for Moscow, yes; but no further.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is just about exactly what former President Herbert Hoover said here this morning.

Bishop BRIZGYS. I am very thankful to Mr. Hoover for this statement on this, our common feeling.

Mr. BONIN. Your Excellency, in making a study of some of these occupied countries, I notice that it was the policy of the Soviet system to make all religious holidays workdays to keep the people away from church.

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. You have found that to be true also in Lithuania?

Bishop BRIZGYS. That is not only factual but there were obligatory orders on holidays. We were forced to observe only Communist holidays.

Mr. BONIN. Certainly as one member of this committee—and I am sure we all feel the same way—we appreciate your testimony because we are convinced the only way that we can apprise the American people and the other freedom-loving people in the world is to bring these matters to the attention of all our citizens.

Bishop BRIZGYS. Thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. It has been suggested that we introduce into the record in connection with Bishop Brizgys' testimony these three pamphlets with regard to religion in Lithuania. It will be so ordered.

(Marked in evidence as Exhibits 10-A, 10-B, 10-C, being, respectively, "The Situation of the Church and Religious Practices in Occupied Lithuania," "Martyred Bishops," and "Fifteen Liquidated Priests in Lithuania," see appendix.)

Mr. KERSTEN. There is one question I would like to ask you before you leave, Your Excellency. As I understand it, in your position as bishop in Kaunas, you had occasion a number of times to observe what the true feeling of some of the supposed Communists was and even the Russian Communist officers who came in there.

Was there one occasion when, secretly, one of these officers came to you with regard to a baptism matter?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes; I had this case——

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you tell us briefly about that?

Bishop BRIZGYS. In September 1940 a colonel of the Russian Army asked to baptize two of his daughters. One was perhaps 16, and the second 12 years. We agreed to do this. We satisfied his desire because I was persuaded that this request was sincere.

Mr. KERSTEN. Can you state whether or not he had his suspicions about one of the metropolitans who was sent over, or was that a matter that did not pertain relevantly to this?

Bishop BRIZGYS. On this time was living in Kaunas an Orthodox metropolitan named by my colleague from Estonia.

Mr. KERSTEN. Sergius?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Sergius. I tried to send this official, this colonel to the Orthodox bishop because the colonel was Orthodox.

Mr. KERSTEN. So you suggested that he see the Orthodox bishop?

Bishop BRIZGYS. Yes; but he refused. The reason was because this bishop was sent to the Baltic countries from Moscow, and he said exactly that if he got permission from Moscow to go out of Russia that he promised to be loyal to the Moscow Government—"and therefore I can't leave this matter with him."

I don't know if the colonel had ground for his suspicion. I state only what he answered.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, as I understand it, this colonel from his own statements did not want to trust it to be known or let it to be known to this Moscow-sent clergyman for fear he might perhaps get into real difficulties if it were known that his daughters were being baptized.

Bishop BRIZGYS. As far as I know from my experience with the Russians in Lithuania, if they feel that one clergyman, he could be Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant, if he is in good relations with their Government, they don't believe more in this clergyman.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that is the same clergyman that the colonel was referring to and the same one the Lutheran pastor who preceded you here this morning referred to?

Bishop BRIZGYS. It is the same Bishop Sergius named by my colleague.

Mr. KERSTEN. I believe the pastor mentioned that he thought there was a suspicion that he was a spy.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then, as I understand it, there was an occasion when two Russian girls, knowing nothing about Christianity, asked you something about getting Gospels.

Bishop BRIZGYS. I had this case in September 1940. I was walking in the garden of the seminary and came to me two girls, Russian girls. They introduced themselves as the daughters of officials of the Russian Army. The purpose was, why they come to a Catholic priest, to have the Gospel in Russian. I asked what they know about the Gospel and what they will do with the Gospel. They say, "We intend or we wish to know something more about Jesus Christ."

I asked, "What do you know about Jesus Christ?" "Well," they answered, "we know as far as we heard in the schools speaking against." In the schools they were taught against such religion; that it was a legend about Jesus Christ, and so on; that he founded a religion and the dark western world believes in this legend and follows this legend; but Russia now is more instructed and cultural than the West, and in the past Russian nations they believed in this, but no more. So they say, "It is curious to see what is this Gospel and who was this Jesus Christ."

I was able to give a book of Gospels in Russian. I had with me some copies of an edition from London, England, Gospel in Russian. What followed after this, if they were satisfied with this Gospel or not, I don't know what happened after.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, your Excellency. You have made a great contribution to us here in a better understanding of what happened to religion in Lithuania, and we are very pleased that you have appeared before us. Thank you.

At this time I would like to state that we have consulted with one of the leading Jewish rabbis of Lithuania, one of the Baltic states, and because of the fact that he has relatives back in that country he believes that it might be dangerous for them under the special circumstances of his appearance to make a public statement.

We intend to arrange, if possible, for an executive session, which we very likely will have shortly, for the story of the persecution likewise of the Jewish people, of the Jewish religion, which was certainly corroborated by the secret order referred to by Bishop Brizgys, that ministers, rabbis, and priests were all equally persecuted.

At this time we would like to present one more witness for the committee, and will call a priest from Lithuania who was tortured. He also has relatives back there, and for that reason we must keep his identity unknown, but we will take so much of his story that he can relate about the treatment to him that he can personally testify to, at the same time protecting his identity but in order that we may have for the record the story of this clergyman who was tortured.

STATEMENT BY AN ANONYMOUS PRIEST

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are a clergyman, are you?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. Yes; I am a Catholic Priest.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you are from Lithuania?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. Yes; I am from Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you have a statement that you wish to make?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. Yes; I have a statement I wish to read.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you please read that statement?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. Very well.

In January 1941 an election was held to select Lithuanian deputies in the Soviet Supreme Government. The election was a farce; in my parish for example, only 13 percent voted. In neighboring localities the percentage was about the same.

I, myself, refused to vote. Many people for no other reason than their refusal to vote were arrested. Night after night more and more nonvoters disappeared.

On the fatal night of January 29, 1941, I was arrested by the secret police of the newly formed Communist state. After an exhaustive search they discovered in my room a photo album and two letters from a sister of mine living in the United States. These were considered additional justification for my arrest.

In the prison to which I was taken the other inmates and I were subjected to brutish and utterly inhuman treatment. We were pistol whipped, slugged, kicked, and eye gonged. My head was slammed against the wall, and time after time under this treatment I collapsed into unconsciousness. My jailers alternated torture and interrogation. All told I was questioned 18 nights from 10 o'clock until 4 in the morning. During these periods I was always stripped naked and brutally beaten.

Sometimes when they themselves needed sleep they would throw me into solitary confinement in an underground cell. One of these periods lasted for 8 days during which time they gave me neither food nor water.

On another occasion I was stuffed into a wooden box like a coffin, so small I could neither kneel or sit, much less fall down. I was locked in this torture closet for 8 hours. On still another occasion I was stripped to my underwear and locked for 20 hours in a room half filled with ice. On my release I collapsed from the terrible cold.

During the 6 months of my imprisonment, I was prevented from informing even my mother of my whereabouts.

Halfway through this period when I was weakened by the bestial treatment I had received, I was forced to sign five pieces of blank paper. I was then told that my ordeal was at an end.

I can now understand how Cardinal Mindzenty and others "confessed," because if you sign those blank papers, I believe that later they filled those papers, and my signature was, it means that I confessed all those things.

Mr. KERSTEN. You can't understand—

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. I understand now how they can "confess," those clergymen.

MR. KERSTEN. They forced you to sign some unfilled papers; is that correct?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. Yes; that is correct.

Finally they readied me for my trip to Siberia on June 25. Fortunately for me, the Germans attacked on June 22. The Russians fled within 8 hours. The 500 prisoners broke down the doors and broke through the barred windows. Within 3 days the Germans allowed us to return to our homes.

Before leaving, however, I entered the prison office and found the NKVD record of my 6 months' imprisonment. I kept this, my own prison record in the handwriting of my jailers, as proof of my charges.

MR. KERSTEN. I show you a document—I have covered over the name on the first page—and ask you what that is.

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. It is my record of imprisonment.

MR. KERSTEN. How did you happen to get possession of that?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. We escaped, and then we broke into the jail office, and I find this, my record, in the prison office.

MR. KERSTEN. So, when the prisoners broke out, you made your way up to the front office after the NKVD had left the building, and you went to their records and you got your own prison record of your imprisonment?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. That is right. It is my own record.

MR. KERSTEN. In looking through this record portions of which would reveal your identity and therefore I will not disclose it, I notice there are some portions of the record which refer to your being put into solitary confinement. You have examined this record and know what is in it; do you not?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. I know but I cannot read Russian. I find some Lithuanian in that record, and I know which is the record of my punishment.

MR. KERSTEN. Can you state briefly what the record shows of some of the punishment and torture that is in this Russian-written document?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. It is in Russian and Lithuanian. For 3 days special punishment without food in a cold basement. Another time, 5 days without food in the same place in a cold basement.

MR. KERSTEN. This was written by the NKVD officers and placed in your file?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. That is right; that is correct.

MR. McTIGUE. You said, Father, that night after night you were taken to a room, stripped of your clothing and beaten brutally by the NKVD agents. Did they say anything to you during the course of your beatings? Was it done in silence or was there any conversation?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. They did that in a completely closed room, and also used insulting words, immodest words, cursing. Then they tried to insult my religion. They cursed me and were foolish of God and of our religion.

MR. McTIGUE. Did they knock you down and pick you up?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. They did.

MR. McTIGUE. When they were doing that, did they have any comments to make on your religion, on your God, on your faith?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. They said many times insulting words against religion and against my duties as a priest.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did they say, for example?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. One day when they were beating me I was screaming, and I called out, "Jesus, help me." Then that same man who was questioning me, he beat me and he says, "Show me where is your God now. Your God is on vacation now. Nobody can help you."

Mr. McTIGUE. They wanted to know where your God was?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. They did, they said so.

Mr. McTIGUE. In your testimony you referred to the fact that you were put into an ice storage vault.

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. In the ice.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that room filled with ice?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. The room was very dark, small room in the basement, and they put me in that room, and I can't see anything. I just touch with my hands, and I find it is pieces of ice, I think about half filled of that room with ice. I have about 1 yard distance between the pieces of ice and the door.

Mr. McTIGUE. So if you collapsed you would have fallen on the ice?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. No. When they took me out through the door, instantly I collapsed not on the ice.

Mr. McTIGUE. If you fell down in the room, would you have fallen on the ice?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. Just on the door.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Any questions, Mr. Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. Father, what were you charged with when they brought you into the prison?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. First they believed that I make such influence that people did not vote in that neighborhood. Many, many people were arrested for that reason, and they arrested me for that reason.

Mr. BENTLEY. They were trying to get you to confess to that during this torture?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. They did, they forced me to confess that I make influence that people will not go to vote.

Mr. BENTLEY. On the basis of your confession you were going to be deported to Siberia, except for the fact that the war broke out?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. From time to time, because the jails were filled, they tried to make room for others, and from time to time they were shipping those men to Siberia so they would have more room for others to come in, the newly arrested.

Mr. BENTLEY. After you escaped from the prison, when did you leave Lithuania?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. I was in Lithuania all the time.

Mr. BENTLEY. After you escaped from the prison, when did you leave Lithuania to come to this country?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. During the war. I left my country in 1944 and lived in Germany, and in 1946, in September, I came to this country.

Mr. BENTLEY. One thing more. Have the results of this brutal torture and treatment that you have been telling us about left any lasting physical effects upon your condition?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. Not now, but for about 2 years I have those marks.

Mr. BENTLEY. Up to 2 years ago you still had the marks of your torture?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. Yes; I had.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just this question. Did the guerrillas or partisans help you to get out of Lithuania?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. No; because when I left Lithuania——

Mr. KERSTEN. I mean out of jail; who got you out of jail?

ANONYMOUS PRIEST. We broke ourselves the windows and the doors and we escaped, and in 3 days we were to our homes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. Dean Kullitis.

STATEMENT OF DEAN JEKABS KULLITIS, REPRESENTING THE LATVIAN EVANGELIC LUTHERAN CHURCH

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KULLITIS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state your full name, please?

Mr. KULLITIS. Jekabs Kullitis.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are presently residing where, Dean?

Mr. KULLITIS. In New York here.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is your present situation?

Mr. KULLITIS. I am the representative of the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church and of the archbishop and I am also supervising the Latvian congregations in the eastern part of the United States.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you have a statement?

Mr. KULLITIS. Yes. I am happy to testify here to the committee and I think I shall not repeat the statements made so well by Pastor Kiviranna, who spoke of Estonia. But I can tell you some details concerning the Communist regime in Latvia.

Mr. KERSTEN. If you will, Dean; yes.

Mr. KULLITIS. I shall tell the committee about the persecution of the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church by the Soviet invaders in 1940-41, about deportation of thousands of members of the Latvian congregations and about economic ruining of the Latvian church.

I am deeply convinced, on the basis of my personal experiences, that communism is the worst enemy of the Christian religion and of the whole mankind, because it is a totalitarian regime which enslaves not only a man's body, but also his spirit and soul. The words of our Lord Jesus Christ can well be applied to communism: "Do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matthew 10: 28). And it is communism that strives at destroying our soul and body.

I experienced communism twice. For the first time during the years 1918-19, when after the First World War the Communists invaded Latvia. At that time I served as a pastor's assistant in Rauma, Latvia, and my superior was Pastor Adams Jende. The Communists arrested Pastor Jende in my presence and accused him of being a German spy.

Consequently he was deported to Russia and was murdered near the city of Pskow (Russia) by shooting. Pastor Jende was an innocent man and died as one of the martyrs of the Christian church.

During the first Communist invasion of Latvia during the years 1918-19, the intruders murdered 32 pastors of the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church. These are the men about whom the Holy Bible says: "Be ye faithful unto death, and I will give you the crown of life" (Revelations 2:10). At this time I was a young pastor and the Communists did not touch me. I remember the advice given to me at that time by Communist officials. In order to hold divine services a permit was to be obtained from the chairman of the Communist executive committee. On these occasions I was given the following Communist advice: "Young comrade, you must change your profession. Your present profession will not last long. Religion is opium and all clergymen are liars." I answered that I disagreed with his words and would wait for future events.

Mr. MADDEN. What year was that?

Mr. KULLITIS. This was in the year 1918.

The first Communist rule in Latvia in 1918-19 lasted only for a few months. The national armies of the Baltic States drew the invaders out of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

My second Communist experience was in the years 1940-41, when Soviets for the second time invaded my country. At that time I was pastor in Jelgava, Latvia, with a parish of 12,000 souls. I had three assistant pastors. During the early part of 1940 I had also been appointed dean of the diocese of Jelgava and had 16 subordinated pastors there. During the same year I also was appointed a member of the supreme board of the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church. The chairman of the board was Archbishop Prof. Dr. Teodors Grinbergs.

In June 1940, the Communists violated all treaties they had concluded with Latvia and occupied the latter. At this time people used to say, "Maybe the ways of communism have changed." However, it soon became evident that Communist methods and aims had not changed; they only used more caution in applying their methods.

Shortly after this second occupation the Communists started their spiritual oppression. They proclaimed that church was separated from the state. This was no innovation since already from the beginning of Latvia's independence, church and state had been separated similarly to the United States pattern. But under the Communists this separation was applied in a different way: In a Soviet controlled country state fights the church and aims at the destroying of the latter.

In order to express disdain of all holy things, the Communists immediately issued an order forbidding to capitalize the word "God." Newspapers had to spell the word "God" with small letters.

Schools were forbidden to teach Scripture and Christian ethics. These were substituted with antireligious propaganda. It was forbidden to explain religion to children under the age of 16, while anti-religious schooling of children was greatly encouraged. Teachers and Communist propaganda workers taught antireligious subjects.

The name of Sunday was replaced with nonworking day and all Christian holidays were abolished. On Sundays during church services Communists held meetings in factories and schools and workers and pupils were compelled to attend. At these meetings endless lec-

tures on Marx ideologies were held. Communists, like Hitlerite Nazis, had a special pattern for voluntary work to help Communist construction.

At Christmas time the sale of Christmas trees was prohibited throughout the country. Only during the last days of December Christmas trees could be sold. The great celebration was to take place on New Year's Eve in commemoration of the new Communist era and its founders, Lenin and Stalin.

On Christian holidays daily newspapers carried an increased number of antireligious articles in which the historic existence of Christ was denied and the entire Christmas story explained as superstition.

The separation of church and school had grave consequences for the teaching staff, which was not permitted to take part in any congregation activities. For example, I had a good organist who was also music teacher at the State Teachers' College. He received orders to discontinue playing the organ in my church and I had to look for a replacement. This is an example showing how congregations were deprived of their workers. Within a short time rural congregations had great difficulty in obtaining substitutes for those active members deprived from participation in church activities.

During divine services agents of the NKVD (Soviet secret police) were present in churches and closely followed the contents of the sermons made by pastors. They duly reported their findings to the NKVD.

The Bolsheviks also forbid the use of church bells and the holding of services outside the church building. For funeral services a special permit from the NKVD was required.

The Soviet Government also closed both theological faculties at the Latvian State University in Riga—the Evangelic Lutheran faculty and the Roman Catholic faculty, which were the country's only institutions preparing clergymen. The Parochial High School in Riga, the only high school established by the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church, was also closed. All religious publications were discontinued in order to give the people only antireligious literature and propaganda in the newspapers. Such is liberty of the press in countries ruled by the Communists.

Shortly before the Communist invasion, the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church had 18,000 copies of hymn books printed which had to be bound before distributing. The Bolsheviks immediately confiscated these books and later ordered them sent to political prisons for use instead of toilet paper. Bibles and other religious books were removed from public and school libraries.

Mr. KERSTEN. On that point, Dean, I think I saw an order in Russian listing as a criminal offense the possession of a Bible. Is that in accordance with what you are telling us now? In other words, it was criminal for a person to possess a Bible?

Mr. KULLITIS. Yes, and the distributing of Bibles was criminal. The pastors used to distribute Bibles for confirmation. This was a criminal deed; it was prohibited.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you go ahead, please?

Mr. KULLITIS. Economic ruining of the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church: The Bolsheviks aimed not only to destroy the spiritual influence of the church, but also tried to ruin the church economically.

All church property was confiscated, churches, pastorates, (par-

sonages) and other church sites included. Land owned by churches and even cemeteries were nationalized. All monetary deposits in banks, bonds, and so forth, belonging to churches were confiscated. The congregations were ordered to pay rent for occupation of premises they had owned before the occupation. Rents were greatly increased. For instance, as pastor I had to pay twice as high rent for my residence as other people. My congregation was a large one and therefore able to meet the high expenses for a certain time. The smaller congregations were unable to make such high payments and therefore joined others. This explains the decrease of number of congregations in Latvia after Communist occupation.

Some of the nationalized churches were taken over by various Communist organizations and used for profane purposes. For example, the newly erected church in Ludza was converted into a movie house and the Riga Anglican Church was used as a warehouse.

Deportation of clergymen: The deepest sufferings, however, to which the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church has been exposed since Communist occupation, were brought along with deportations of church leaders, pastors, and members of congregations.

During one night alone, June 13 to 14, 1941, 15,000 Latvians were deported to Soviet slave labor camps in remote Siberia. Among these victims there were also two professors of theology:

1. Prof. Dr. thol. Ludvigs Adamovics, former Minister of Education of Latvia, who was deported with his wife and two children.

2. Prof. Dr. thol. Edgars Rumba, graduate of Upsala University in Sweden, deported with his wife and two minor children, of whom one died en route. Professor Rumba was a member of the supreme board of the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church. According to information recently received in Sweden, Professor Rumba is no longer among the living.

Two other members of the supreme church board were also deported:

3. Attorney-at-law Heinrichs Rūsis, vice president of the supreme board of the Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church and its legal counselor, and

4. Aleksandrs Dzerve, chairman of the Latvian Chamber of Agriculture.

Eight pastors were also deported during this one night of horror. Three of them died en route. They were:

5. Pastor Arturs Krauklis of Krimulda congregation in Vidzeme, who had been arrested earlier and kept in prison until June 14, when he finally was deported;

6. Pastor Janis Kangars of Lutrini congregation in Kurzeme. He was arrested and deported together with his entire family;

7. Pastor Ernest Ilens of Celminieki-Pampali congregation. He is no longer living;

8. Pastor Edgars Placis of Lasi-Ilukste was also deported;

9. Pastor Augusts Sembergs of Nica in Kurzeme—no longer living;

10. Pastor Pauls Gailitis, former Minister of Education;

11. Pastor Janis Lapins of Sece congregation in Kurzeme, deported and murdered en route;

12. Pastor's Assistant Fricis Smilga, arrested during the early part of 1941 and later deported. The pastor had been forbidden to continue preaching and was doing manual labor at the time of his arrest.

There are among clergymen of Latvia also a number of other direct victims of Communist occupation. I am going to name a few of them:

1. Dean Atis Jaunzemis, from Ventspils district. He was deputy-director of the department of schools with the Ministry of Education and former director of the Ventspils High School. He was robbed and murdered by members of the Red army. Dean Jaunzemis was a very close friend of mine. We both graduated from the Tartu, Estonia University in 1917.

2. Dean Janis Reinhardts, my former superior, for many years pastor of the Jelgava City congregation. He was 84 years old and had served as clergyman for 57 years. He was murdered in Jelgava by Red army soldiers who took his golden cross of merits and disposed of the old and faithful servant of the Lord Jesus Christ.

I also want to mention some clergymen who died as a result of the Soviet occupation and Red terror:

1. Dean A. Kundzins died of a heart attack on the day of the Communist invasion of Latvia, on June 17, 1940.

2. Prof. Dr. thol. Voldemars Maldonis died of a stroke during the Soviet administration.

3. Prof. Dr. thol. Janis Rezevskis died during the retreat of the Bolsheviks.

4. Dean Ernests Kronbergs died when the Bolsheviks returned in the fall of 1944.

5. Dean Janis Straummanis, 85 years old, died in October 1944, after the second Communist rule had just begun.

6. Dean Alberts Virbulis, member of the supreme church board, died of a heart attack on the day when Communists invaded his residence town.

7. Pastor Fricis Treicis, from Rauna, died on his flight from the Soviets when the Red army, for the second time, entered Latvia.

I could go on and on naming Latvians, faithful members of the church, who were deported or murdered by the ruthless Communists.

As the committee already knows, this ruthless regime and enslavement of innocent Latvian people still continues. Terror and communism are inseparable. While Christian religion preaches love, Communists promote cruelty and atrocities. They say, "Thou must be cruel like Lenin and Stalin were cruel against the enemies of the people." But who are these enemies of the people? The rulers in the Kremlin name these according to their taste and desire. Let us only remember that Comrade Beria only recently was one of the top Communist leaders. Overnight he became an enemy of the people, will have to stand a trial and undoubtedly will be sentenced to die for his crimes.

The present world knows of nothing worse, of no greater punishment than Communist slavery. It is evident that in a Soviet state the Devil is on his own and freely disposes of human body and soul.

Therefore, it only remains to hope that the Christian nations will join in the struggle to liberate their Christian brothers and sisters from these sinister forces of the Red Devil.

Fully convinced that the investigation carried out by this committee, headed by Representative Charles J. Kersten, will be of great help to achieve our goal, the liberation of all enslaved peoples, I humbly pray to God for the success of this work contributing to a

better understanding of peoples and long-lasting real peace for all human beings.

Mr. KERSTEN. Any questions?

Dean, we certainly wish to thank you for a magnificent statement, and thank you for your remarks concerning the committee. You have made a great contribution to these hearings.

Mr. KULLITIS. Thank you for your attention.

Mr. KERSTEN. Monsignor Stukelis.

STATEMENT OF MSGR. EDWARD STUKELIS, FORMER COUNSELOR OF ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE AT RIGA

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Monsignor STUKELIS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you identify yourself, Monsignor, please?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Edward Stukelis.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where is your present residence, Monsignor?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Now in Manhattan, 23d Street, 332 West. I am chaplain of the Leo House.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been in this country, Monsignor?

Monsignor STUKELIS. I came in 1949, August.

Mr. KERSTEN. Your home was in Latvia, was it?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Latvia, in Riga.

Mr. KERSTEN. When did you leave Latvia?

Monsignor STUKELIS. In 1944.

Mr. KERSTEN. You had some experiences with the Communist occupation of Latvia, did you not, Monsignor?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Before the Communists came into Latvia, Riga, what was your position?

Monsignor STUKELIS. I was counselor of the Archdiocese of Riga since 1924.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you tell us, Monsignor, of your experiences following that with the Communist occupation?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes; I have a statement.

The total population of Latvia was 2 million in 1940, of whom 500,000 were Roman Catholics.

There were 184 parishes and about 200 priests, distributed in 2 dioceses (archdiocese of Riga and diocese of Liepaja). The Catholic Church in Latvia enjoyed freedom and liberty. All faiths and all people of the country were living in freedom and prosperity.

Then came the tragic day of June 17, 1940, when the tanks of the Red army rolled into Latvian territory and occupied the country. This happened just at that time, when the relations between Latvia and Soviet Union had already been definitively settled by various treaties and conventions, such as: The treaty of peace of August 11, 1920, the treaty of nonaggression of February 2, 1932, and of April 4, 1934.

Immediately after seizure of power, Mr. Andrej Vishinsky, Special Plenipotentiary from Moscow, and Mr. Dereviansky, the U. S. S. R. envoy to Latvia, set up without any cooperation with the Latvian organs a puppet government, which did whatever the Communists ordered.

As soon as Latvia was incorporated into the Soviet Union (August 5, 1940) the puppet government issued laws and decrees, which brought about the end of the freedom and liberty of Latvia. All property of the church was nationalized, all Catholic organizations, as well as all religious orders, were closed and their property confiscated. The work of the faculty of the Catholic theology was disrupted (August 5, 1940), and premises of it, as well as of the Catholic seminary, were nationalized. The Catholic schools (at Aglona and Jaunaglona) were closed. Only state schools were permitted. The teaching of religion in the schools was prohibited. Antireligious instructions were made a compulsory subject in all schools.

No Catholic periodicals and books could be published. The consecrated cemeteries were liquidated. The Christian symbol, the cross, was removed everywhere they found it. The church and its bodies lost status of juristic persons and had no longer the possibility to defend its interests before the authorities. Sundays and religious holy days were replaced by workless days. The Catholic places of worship with all their appurtenances, including even the holy vessels and vestments, were declared to be the property of the state (March 20, 1941). The state reserved for itself the right of permitting its further use by the faithful. The rent which they had to pay for the use of the churches was 10 times more than that of rents paid for housing space. The churches and places of worship which were not returned for use to the parishioners were used for storage (the Capuchin Church at Vilaka), as halls for dancing (the church at Ozolmuiza), for archives (the church at Cesis).

The activity of the church was paralyzed. Divine services, as far as tolerated, were attended by NKVD (political police). The clergy and the faithful were subjected to constant maltreatment. Communication between the bishops and the priests was restricted; all connection with the Holy See was suspended. The apostolic nuncio, Archbishop A. Arata, was expelled (August 1940); the Ambassador to the Holy See, Prof. H. Albat, who at that time was in Riga, was deported to Siberia. According to the news gotten later he was dead. The priests, as well as the bishops, had to leave their homes. The work of priests, as well as of church servants, was excluded from the categories of employees approved by the state and they could not get bread cards. Forty-nine priests were questioned by the Peoples Commissariat of the Interior and they tried to force them to enter into the Secret Service of Communists. No one did it.

In June 1941, the Communists assassinated six priests (Vladislavs Litauniks, Stanislavs Kapacis, Sigismunds Tabore, Vitolda Paskevics, Edwards Bekers, Kazimirs Strods) as well as the sexton of the Shrine of Kraslava, Antons Vilmanis. The first four priests, before having been killed, were horribly martyred. Five other priests, as well as scores of thousands of the faithful, were deported at the same time to forced labor camps in Siberia. For the deportation were scheduled many other priests, but because of the outbreak of the Second World War, it could not be realized at this time.

The first period of Communist occupation, which lasted 1 year (1940-41) was followed by Nazi German occupation. The Germans did not bring liberty. Their occupation powers left in force the nationalization decrees issued by the Communists. Except some release in teaching of the religion in the schools, the oppression con-

tinued, together the calamities and horrors of the war. In 1944 three Latvian bishops (Most Rev. Antons Urbss, Joseph Rancans and Bole-slavs Sloskans), as well as some other leading priests, under the escort of the Gestapo, were deported to Germany.

After the end of World War II the Communists occupied Latvia again, and this occupation is still lasting. This is more horrible than the first. The Communists now have time to carry out the previous plans. They changed nothing in their intentions. Not one law or decree issued during the first occupation has been canceled by them or changed in order to ease the religious life of the faithful, no matter of which Christian faith. The church remains subjected to the state power. The teaching of religion in the schools is forbidden, even outside the church it is against the law to teach the Holy Gospel to minors under the age of 18. Churchgoers are watched and followed by the secret police. The priests, as well as the faithful, are living in constant fear. The worst thing is with the youths who are growing up without any religious instruction, except that their pious parents secretly give this to them. The Communists are doing everything in order to demoralize the youths and to make them atheists.

On July 17-18, 1948, the Riga radio broadcast an appeal to the members of the Communist Party and the Communist youth to destroy the last remnants of religious "prejudices" and to fight the preachers and defenders of religion.

On October 23, 1953, the same radio invited the pioneers at the schools to fight the erroneous belief about the creation of the world by God.

It is not possible to get news about the religious life in Latvia through the ordinary channels of the church. Generally, the corresponding is very limited because of the great danger to write and to receive the letters from abroad. But the Communists themselves help much in this matter through broadcasting or writing in the papers. It happens, also, that some of the Latvians escape and bring it personally.

According to the news brought in such way, there are churches which are still open, for which the faithful are paying high rent. There are also priests, but the number of them is very small.

An old mother wrote to her daughter in this country (this was the first letter gotten from her in the last 8 years) saying, "Last Sunday we had the mass in our church. Next Sunday the mass will be said in X Church." But this X Church, as we know, is 26 miles distant. This means that they see a priest very seldom.

Such is the religious freedom in a country under the domination of Communists. Not only the Catholics in Latvia are terribly persecuted; the same may be said about the Lutherans, also. The Christian faith there is in great danger of being exterminated, despite the heroic attitude and inexpressible sacrifices of the clergy, as well as of the faithful.

According to the news gotten in the way as above, the archbishop of Riga, Most Rev. Anthony Springovics, 77, is living under the supervision of police, in the country, in the province of Latgale.

In the past 8 years many priests have been deported to Siberia. In the spring of 1945, as we know, there were 19 priests taken in 1 week. Meanwhile, many of the priests died, thus the number of them in the country does not exceed 50.

Mr. McTIGUE. Monsignor, did you preside over an ecclesiastical court?

Monsignor STUKELIS. I was counselor.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did that court investigate some of these murders?

Monsignor STUKELIS. We didn't; we had records.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had records?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Of what happened?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes, after the Communists left the country.

Mr. KERSTEN. That was after the first occupation?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you verified what happened to some of these priests to whom you have just referred in your testimony?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. I show you four photographs. Can you identify these?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes. Litaunieks Vladislavs. He was a priest, a young priest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you assign him to his parish duties?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes. I knew him well. He was a very fine priest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where was this record taken from?

Monsignor STUKELIS. It is the same place.

Mr. McTIGUE. This is on record in the archbishop's court?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. It has been verified and documented?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. It reads as follows:

The Martyr Litaunieks Vladislavs victim of Cheka, shortly before his death. He was a dangerous opponent against Bolsheviks. Therefore they arrested him, inhumanly tortured him, verdicted, and murdered him in the prison of Daugavpils, June 21, 1941. He was found with a crown of barbed wire around his head, and a cross burned on his chest by a burning iron.

Monsignor STUKELIS. We have records of that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Any evidence and testimony to support that?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, there are three other photographs in this same group. I would like to have the photographs identified by the monsignor and the description made a part of the record, if I may.

Mr. KERSTEN. So ordered.

(The paper containing four photographs and descriptive material referred to in part above and was marked Exhibit 11-A. See pp. 650-653.)

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you four photographs. Can you identify them?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman there are four other photographs. I would like to have the photographs which have been identified by the monsignor and the description made a part of the record if I may.

Mr. KERSTEN. So ordered.

Mr. McTIGUE. I show you four other photographs. Can you identify those photographs?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. I ask that they be marked and made a part of the record with the description.

(The four photographs referred to and the descriptive material were marked Exhibit 11-B. The priests are listed as Pudans, Jazeps; Lopatenoks, Antons; Apsenicks, Peteris; and Zuks, Janis. See pp. 650-653.)

Mr. McTIGUE. I show you photographs of various priests and clergy of the Catholic Church in Latvia, and ask you if you can identify them?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Yes. I know them. They are the four on the right hand side of the picture.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell me what happened to these Roman Catholic priests as evidenced by the testimony presented to the Archbishop's Court?

Monsignor STUKELIS. They were killed.

Mr. McTIGUE. I ask that these be marked and made a part of the record.

Mr. KERSTEN. So ordered.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. Monsignor, from your testimony and that of the other gentlemen who have appeared before this committee this morning it seems pretty evident what the Communists' theory of religion is and how they treat religion and leaders of religion whenever they have the power. Would you be able to give us an idea as to why many people in countries that are supposedly free from communism are Communist Party members and also members of churches? I am thinking specifically, for example, of a country like Italy that is 99 percent plus Catholic and yet has a very large number of Communist Party members. Can you explain the reasons behind the thinking of those people?

Monsignor STUKELIS. I think it is the poverty of the country.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you think poverty breeds Communism?

Monsignor STUKELIS. Maybe not the first reason. The first reason might be the power of the Communists there. They are organized there.

Mr. BENTLEY. Why do you think, then, in certain cases we have found evidence of actually ministers and religious leaders of one type or another collaborating with the Communists?

Monsignor STUKELIS. I do not follow you.

Mr. BENTLEY. In view of the known persecution by the Communists of all forms of religion, how can you explain the fact that in so many cases we do find religious leaders that seem to be collaborating with the Communists?

Monsignor STUKELIS. I think they do not know communism.

Mr. BENTLEY. They are ignorant of communism?

Monsignor STUKELIS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Don't you feel then that the facts that you and the other gentlemen who have testified this morning are bringing out concerning the true treatment of religion in these countries where the Communists have taken hold should be revealing to such gentlemen if they take the trouble to study the record?

Monsignor STUKELIS. That is true.

Mr. BENTLEY. And to know what the true facts are?

Monsignor STUKELIS. That is correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. To this extent I think your testimony and that of the other witnesses has been most illuminating. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. I want to thank you, Monsignor Stukelis, for the very important contribution you have made to these hearings in showing the persecution of religion, the clergy, the Catholic clergy, and also the Lutherans as you have referred to in Latvia.

The description of some of these episodes of torture and martyrdom of some of these clergymen reminds me of the persecution of the church in the early days of Christianity. It seems to me that in these countries the churches are undergoing persecution similar to those the Christians suffered under such people as Nero in the early days of Christianity.

It is a necessary thing that we know more clearly about Communist activity and its destruction of all spiritual life and of religion. Thank you, Monsignor.

Monsignor STUKELIS. I did not see myself personally, but I have records of these four priests.

Mr. KERSTEN. I understand. Thank you.

The hearings in New York are now adjourned to convene again in Detroit, Mich., at 10 o'clock Monday morning, December 7, in the Federal Building.

(Whereupon at 2:15 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Monday, December 7, 1953, in Detroit, Mich.)

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIC COMMITTEE,
Detroit, Mich.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a. m., in the Federal Building, Detroit, Mich., Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Bentley, Bonin, Madden, and Machrowicz.

Also Present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearings will come to order, please.

Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF ANTANAS BANIONIS, DETROIT, MICH.

Mr. BANIONIS. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name, please?

Mr. BANIONIS. Antanas Banionis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where do you live?

Mr. BANIONIS. I live at 1475 Junction.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where are you employed?

Mr. BANIONIS. General Motors Corp., Fleetwood plant.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you born in Lithuania?

Mr. BANIONIS. I was born in Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where in Lithuania?

Mr. BANIONIS. In the vicinity of Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you live in Lithuania?

Mr. BANIONIS. I lived there until 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you go to school in Kaunas?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes; the Technical School of Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. How old were you at that time?

Mr. BANIONIS. I was 18 years old.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you remember Memorial Day in November 1940, in Kaunas?

Mr. BANIONIS. In 1940, 2d of November, I was in the cemetery of Kaunas. It was Memorial Day. All people were going to the cemetery to put flowers and pray for relatives and friends at the graves.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many people were in the cemetery of Kaunas placing flowers on the graves that day?

Mr. BANIONIS. Approximately 18,000 people.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were they singing hymns?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were singing and praying.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened on that day?

Mr. BANIONIS. The Communist police surrounded the cemetery and started to arrest the people. The people resisted. Then they waited at the gate. They arrested the people.

Mr. McTIGUE. The Communist soldiers retired to the gates to await the people as they came out of the cemetery?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why did they want to arrest them?

Mr. BANIONIS. Because they didn't like this Lithuanian tradition of singing and praying at the cemetery.

Mr. McTIGUE. When they waited at the gates, did they arrest the people as they came out?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you among those arrested?

Mr. BANIONIS. I was arrested in the same way. I came out through the gate, was stopped by the Communist secret police and taken to a garage across the street.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were any other people taken there?

Mr. BANIONIS. About 50 people were in the same garage with me. They were arrested.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many people all told were arrested that day?

Mr. BANIONIS. I think about two or three hundred.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you were taken to the garage, along with 50 others, what happened then?

Mr. BANIONIS. We were waiting until the police cars came to pick us up to take us to the NKVD building.

Mr. McTIGUE. When the NKVD men came, how did they take you to the NKVD building?

Mr. BANIONIS. Three prisoners in one car and in the same car were three Russian soldiers with guns and bayonets.

Mr. McTIGUE. Three Russian soldiers were guarding three prisoners?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were among these prisoners?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you then taken to the NKVD headquarters?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened there?

Mr. BANIONIS. They put again in 1 room about 30 or 40 people, together, and started questioning them. They took one person at a time to another room for questioning.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you taken into the other room for questioning?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of a room was it?

Mr. BANIONIS. It was a simple room, like an office room, in the NKVD building. I was questioned over there, along with one secret policeman.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did they question you about?

Mr. BANIONIS. They asked me my life story. They started from my grandfather, grandmother, father, my relatives, everything up to that day, everything that happened.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did the questioning last on the first day?

Mr. BANIONIS. The first day was about 6 hours during the night, from 12 until 6 a. m.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you taken back to the main cell after this questioning?

Mr. BANIONIS. After this questioning, I was taken again to this same room where I was before.

Mr. McTIGUE. The next day, did the same thing happen?

Mr. BANIONIS. The next night they took it again. I was supposed to tell the same story again and again. They asked me many times to tell the same story.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did this questioning go on?

Mr. BANIONIS. This questioning did not last the same length of time. One night it would be 3 hours, 4 hours, and another might be maybe 2 hours.

They questioned us just at night. They got to a point of questioning 20 hours without a break.

Mr. McTIGUE. They questioned you steadily for 2 weeks, at night?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of information were they seeking?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were seeking to get information about my friends, my professors, my parents and everything that I knew about, and perhaps those people I might know who were resisting the Communists.

Mr. McTIGUE. After this questioning went on for a period of 2 weeks, did there come a time at the end of the 2 weeks, in the last day or two, where you were questioned steadily for 20 hours?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. I was questioned for 20 hours until the end of the 2-week period. There then came the longest and hardest questioning I have experienced in my life. I was sitting in my chair, my hands by my side, in a position that I couldn't move, even.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many NKVD agents were questioning you at that time?

Mr. BANIONIS. It was changed. There were three agents.

Mr. McTIGUE. They took turns during the 20 hours?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any food or water?

Mr. BANIONIS. No. When questioned, I never got food or drink.

Mr. KERSTEN. How old were you at that time?

Mr. BANIONIS. Eighteen.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go ahead.

Mr. BANIONIS. They let me smoke a cigarette. In that long time, sitting on the chair, I couldn't feel anything in my body. It must have stopped the blood in my body.

Mr. McTIGUE. You lost all sense of feeling?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. When they questioned you, did they ask you to sign a paper or a confession?

Mr. BANIONIS. They asked me to sign it at the last questioning, not in this 20 hours. In this 20 hours, they said I was lying. At one time I jumped from the chair and said, "I am not lying; I am telling the truth." They then started to beat me and then ripped my shirt.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they rip your shirt off?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have any scars from that?

Mr. BANIONIS. I have a scar.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you take off your coat, shirt, and undershirt and let us see the scar?

Mr. BENTLEY. What did they beat you here with?

Mr. BANIONIS. They beat me here with a gun. They hit me in the face a couple of times.

Mr. BENTLEY. When was this?

Mr. BANIONIS. In 1940. It was about the 10th of November.

Mr. BENTLEY. November 10, 1940?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Banionis, tell us exactly how you got those scars. How were those wounds on your left shoulder and your right shoulder inflicted? Tell us exactly how it was done. Was it done with a knife; was it done with a club, was it done by hand?

Mr. BANIONIS. By hands. By fingers.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you mean the NKVD agent, in ripping your shirt off, dug his fingers into your flesh and ripped off the flesh?

Mr. BANIONIS. They ripped the fingers in, together with the shirt.

Mr. McTIGUE. He dug his nails into your skin?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, into my body.

Mr. McTIGUE. He dug his fingernails into your body?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you describe those scars? How long are they?

Mr. BANIONIS. There was some blood. When I got up the next morning—

Mr. McTIGUE. Are they 5 or 6 inches long?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were as long as the scars.

Mr. McTIGUE. About 6 or 7 inches?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And there are how many scars?

Mr. BANIONIS. They have three on the left side, and one, just a little one, on the other side.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have any marks on your back or other parts of your body?

Mr. BANIONIS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they beat you with clubs?

Mr. BANIONIS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the wound bleed profusely?

Mr. BANIONIS. Just those ones on the left. They bled for about 2 hours, and then stopped.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they give you any medication?

Mr. BANIONIS. Nothing.

Mr. McTIGUE. They sent you no doctor?

Mr. BANIONIS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. After this happened, and after you were questioned steadily for a period of 20 hours, were you then returned to your cell?

Mr. BANIONIS. I returned to a separate cell, alone.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you returned to the cell, did they take you back again?

Mr. BANIONIS. Then I was a couple of hours in the cell. Then they took me again to the chief of the secret police. The secret police chief gave me a paper and asked me to sign it.

Mr. McTIGUE. He thrust a piece of paper before you and said, "Sign it"?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. He said, "If you sign this paper, you will go free. If you don't sign it, you will be shot down or sent to the prison, and maybe to Russia."

Mr. McTIGUE. What did the paper say?

Mr. BANIONIS. The paper said that I shall spy for the Communist government, against my professors, my relatives, my friends, and to watch all people who did not like the Communist regime.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you refuse to sign the paper?

Mr. BANIONIS. At first I refused to sign it. I said, "I can't do this job because it is a spy job. I am a student. I am working, too. I got no time to be a spy and I don't know how to do this job." I refused the first time to sign it.

Then they said that I should sign this paper. They tried to use moral power on me and started again to call me, you know, bourgeois, and so forth.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they beat you again?

Mr. BANIONIS. No, they didn't beat me.

Mr. McTIGUE. But they continued to ask you to sign it?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you sign it?

Mr. BANIONIS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then what happened?

Mr. BANIONIS. They took me to the cell, alone. After several hours there came one NKVD agent and took me with him to one separate room. He told me it would be better if I signed this paper. I asked if he could promise me that I would be let go free. He said, "I am sure you will be released."

I was thinking in the last several hours before this last questioning, what to do. The first thing I thought of was to get out away from the terrible questioning, from the beating and from the Communist secret police.

Mr. McTIGUE. You signed the paper to get out of there?

Mr. BANIONIS. I signed the paper, just to get out of there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were there other boys around your age who were picked up at the same time that you were picked up, who underwent the same kind of questioning and who signed the same kind of paper?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. I was going to the cemetery with my close friends who were living in the same apartment with me. There were four other boys. We were arrested at the same time and in the same way. We were questioned the same way, all of us.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they all sign?

Mr. BANIONIS. Two of them signed it. One didn't sign it.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to him?

Mr. BANIONIS. He never came back.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was never seen again by you or your friends?

Mr. BANIONIS. No, no more.

During the questioning in my apartment, they made a big search to find things against communism.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you live with your sister at that time?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were your father and mother?

Mr. BANIONIS. My father died in 1929. My mother was living with my brother in the country. I was living in the city, with my sister.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you returned from NKVD headquarters, and after you signed the paper, agreeing to spy on your relatives, your friends, and your professors, did you then carry out that assignment?

Mr. BANIONIS. When I signed the paper, they told me that next

Thursday I should come to a place to meet an agent who was going to give me information on how I shall spy.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was the NKVD agent you were to report to on Thursday for instruction?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you report to him?

Mr. BANIONIS. I reported to him. I met him. I didn't write any report for him.

He gave me some instructions as to who I was supposed to spy on.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did he say, briefly?

Mr. BANIONIS. He said that I should spy on, first, the professors in the classroom, what they are talking about, what they are thinking, what people they are meeting and how they like the Communist regime.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you to bring these reports in writing?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. I should bring the reports in writing and sign it with a name not really my name.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you received instructions from the NKVD agent, did you then start to report on your professors and your friends?

Mr. BANIONIS. At first I talked with my good friends who were arrested together with me. We made an agreement that we shall give such reports that nobody would be hurt.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you and your friends who also had been arrested and who had also signed the papers got together?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you not afraid that one of your friends might betray the other?

Mr. BANIONIS. We trusted each other, and we took a big risk of our lives. If someone told that we were spying, we might be arrested again by the NKVD and be sent to prison in Russia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Don't the Communists have in the schools people known as comsorg, who are students, themselves, and who are of the hard core of the Communist Party, as distinguished from students like you who are pressed into service?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is the Communist youth organization?

Mr. BANIONIS. So far as I know, in each school there was some such man, comsorg. He was watching the relationships in the school, the professors and the students. He organized meetings for the Communists.

Mr. McTIGUE. He attended your classes?

Mr. BANIONIS. No, he didn't attend the classes. Just sometimes when something happened in the classroom. When the people are singing national songs, Lithuanian songs, then he would be there for sure.

He would go to professors' meetings to watch over there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Would the NKVD agents from time to time come into your classroom and out of a clear, blue sky ask one of the students to accompanying them to police headquarters for questioning?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. Not just in my class, but in all the school that happened many times.

The secret police would come to the school and pick up a student for questioning in the NKVD building.

Mr. McTIGUE. Getting back to your own case, after you talked to the agent, did you then start to submit reports to him?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. I gave him such reports, for example, that my professor came in the class and was talking about the lesson. Not about communism or politics.

I gave such reports, you know. It just mentioned the daily work of the professor. Nothing about politics or anything that would be against the Communists.

Mr. McTIGUE. You just gave general reports that were not harmful?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. And did the other students with whom you talked, the other spies, do the same kind of thing?

Mr. BANIONIS. They do the same kind of thing.

Mr. McTIGUE. So, as a consequence, nobody was hurt by your reports up to this juncture?

Mr. BANIONIS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. But you can't say that other students who were impressed into service didn't submit harmful reports?

Mr. BANIONIS. I don't know about that, because it was very secret. I don't know. I didn't see those reports that the other boys were making.

Mr. McTIGUE. The other boys had special NKVD agents they had to report to regularly?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. They had to report regularly, too. There were many agents who were meeting those students. I was going alone from my classroom to this agent. Other students were going to another agent.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you students not afraid of each other? Were you not distrustful of what your fellow classmates might say or do? Was there not an air of distrust and suspicion in the classroom?

Mr. BANIONIS. We were very afraid. Just those of us who trusted each other, we were not afraid of each other, but we could not trust all of them.

Mr. McTIGUE. You reported, then, to the NKVD agent regularly. Tell us something about that.

Mr. BANIONIS. When I wrote the second report, it was of interest to my agent.

I gave him the report and I watched my agent. He went first to drink a beer in the restaurant.

Mr. McTIGUE. You followed the agent, yourself?

Mr. BANIONIS. I followed him myself, instead of his following me.

Mr. McTIGUE. You followed him to his room?

Mr. BANIONIS. To his house, to his home.

Mr. McTIGUE. And did you go up into the room?

Mr. BANIONIS. Not at that time, but after a couple of days I knew everything about my agent. He was before a student, and then he was a comsorg in another high school.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he a member of the Young Communist League before the Russians seized Lithuania?

Mr. BANIONIS. I didn't see his papers, but as far as I know, he was.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was his general reputation?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened after you followed the NKVD agent to his home, and learned where he lived?

Mr. BANIONIS. I learned where he lived, and who he was. After a couple of days, I took a bottle of whisky and went to him.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why did you take the whisky?

Mr. BANIONIS. Because I knew that he was a heavy drinker.

I took a bottle of whisky, and went to his apartment. He was surprised to see me; he did not expect me. I told him, "Listen, I am——"

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you and the agent sit down and have something to drink, together?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. I made myself like a drunk. I put some whisky on my clothes and I made just like a drunk man, and having a bottle of whisky, I gave it to him. He refused to drink at first, but then he drank with me, too. He was afraid that I had come to him——

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you two sit down and drink for a good part of the night?

Mr. BANIONIS. Maybe 2 hours.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you say to him after the 2 hours of drinking?

Mr. BANIONIS. I said, "You shall help me now. If you don't help me, I am going to report to the NKVD that you were drinking with me. You are an agent. You are an employee of the NKVD. You will be arrested and sent to the prison, too, along with me."

Mr. McTIGUE. Because he had sat down and drunk with you, and because you and he had sat in the room and were friendly?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. You have now succeeded in turning the tables on him and putting him in fear?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. The basis being that if you report him to the NKVD, because of this association, he would be in trouble?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. He was afraid.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now that you had the agent in your hands; what happened then?

Mr. BANIONIS. Then I break 2 or 3 weeks. I didn't go with my reports. I didn't meet him. I didn't give him any more reports. Afterwards, I was looking for somebody who told my sister—at my home I got many times telephone calls asking for me. One time I was at home, and the telephone rang. It said, "You are Banionis?" I said, "Yes, I am at home."

Then, there was no conversation. He just wanted to know if I was home.

Mr. McTIGUE. These are other agents, then?

Mr. BANIONIS. I don't know. I didn't know from the voice.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you continue to report on your schoolmates and your relatives and friends, even though you had the NKVD agent where you wanted him?

Mr. BANIONIS. Pardon me?

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you continue to submit reports on your friends, to this NKVD agent after you had done the drinking with him?

Mr. BANIONIS. One time I gave him the reports. Then I stopped the reports.

Mr. McTIGUE. You went to high school in Kaunas?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you also work?

Mr. BANIONIS. I worked in the railroad construction department of Kaunas, in the office, as a junior draftsman.

Mr. McTIGUE. You worked in the daytime, and went to high school at night?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were your hours, just for the record?

Mr. BANIONIS. From 7 o'clock in the morning until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. From 4 o'clock until 11 o'clock at night I was going to school.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had a pretty full day?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. I tried to keep busy.

Mr. McTIGUE. In June 1941, were you a witness to the deportations which started?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes; I witnessed the deportations. My friends and I were walking on the same street as was the police station that night, at maybe 11 p. m. We saw many trucks of soldiers around the police station and around the street. We hid in the garden and we watched it.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you afraid they were coming for you?

Mr. BANIONIS. The first time, no. About 2 or 3 o'clock at night the trucks started to leave the police station and go on search.

I then went home. I heard one truck coming at my house, but that truck went to another house, the third or fourth house. I was jumping in the garden and watching what was going on.

After an hour, maybe, they took the people from that house.

Mr. McTIGUE. You saw them take this family out?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was it a family?

Mr. BANIONIS. It was a family. A man, a woman, and two children.

Mr. McTIGUE. They put them in the truck and took them away?

Mr. BANIONIS. They put them in the truck. There were a couple of soldiers and one civilian.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they ever arrest anybody or deport anybody from the apartment house in which you lived?

Mr. BANIONIS. Nobody. Just one friend was missing, as I said before.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they have the occasion to arrest a painter in your apartment at one time?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why did they arrest him?

Mr. BANIONIS. They arrested him, together with me, the first time. In searching, they found the caricatures of Stalin. He had drawn Stalin like a dog.

Mr. McTIGUE. This painter was a caricaturist, and he painted a dog, with Stalin's head on the dog?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to him?

Mr. BANIONIS. During the search they found such paintings, you know. They didn't let him go out—this man didn't come out.

His parents came and tried to reach him in prison, but they said after a couple of weeks they could not reach him. He might be sent to Russia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he ever seen again?

Mr. BANIONIS. Never seen again.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the investigation started, did you continue working?

Mr. BANIONIS. I continued working, but on the 15th of June, 1941, I came to work and I missed my chief of office and assistant. They were two engineers. They were deported that same night, on the 14th and 15th of June.

Mr. KERSTEN. Railroad engineers?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were engineers in the office for construction work.

Mr. McTIGUE. They were construction engineers?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, construction engineers, from my department.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you found out they were missing, and when they no longer reported for work, what did you decide to do?

Mr. BANIONIS. I never slept at home. Sometimes I went to the country by train, or sometimes I slept with my friends. I knew that the Russians almost always took people at night. They made arrests during the night.

Mr. McTIGUE. They always came during the night?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were afraid in the night and not in the day?

Mr. BANIONIS. Not in the day. On the streets they didn't want to arrest. They did it in the homes at night.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do after that?

Mr. BANIONIS. After that I was hiding myself, most of the night time and waiting to see what would happen.

The students felt that they should start a war. We knew from the Russian speeches they were preparing for war.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you mean with Germany?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, with Germany. Then we just waited.

When the war broke out this morning, they were very happy. They were jumping and dancing, you know.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do then?

Mr. BANIONIS. The next day I joined the Lithuanian guerrillas in Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is the anti-Communist partisans?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you fight the Russians in those last days, with the guerrillas?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. I was in one group and was going to bring ammunition. The Russians started to shoot me, you know. The people ran into their houses. They were running away from the Germans through our city, through our capital, Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. Why were you originally arrested in November 1940?

Mr. BANIONIS. They picked me up from the cemetery, as one who organized the coming to the cemetery. They said, "You students are always organizing a demonstration against the Communists. You work against the Communists."

He picked me out—I don't know for what reason he expected me to be a spy. I don't know.

Mr. BENTLEY. When you were being examined in prison, were you questioned by Russians or Lithuanians?

Mr. BANIONIS. I was questioned by Russians and Lithuanians.

I couldn't speak so well in Russian. Then they gave me to the Lithuanians.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Lithuanian Communists?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. In addition to the scars which you have shown the committee, you were beaten on the back of the neck, I believe?

Mr. BANIONIS. I was beaten here [indicating] and hit in the face. He said, "You are lying." I said, "No." Then he beat me.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you beaten at any time with a gun?

Mr. BANIONIS. When I was going to the NKVD, the Russian soldiers stuck me with a bayonet, not too hard, in my back.

Mr. BENTLEY. During the questioning, were you beaten with a gun at any time?

Mr. BANIONIS. Just the one time, you know.

Mr. BENTLEY. When you were hit in the face, it was with the hand?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, just with the hand.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did they make any threats against your relatives, your family, during the questioning?

Mr. BANIONIS. No; they didn't ask so much about my relatives. Just around the school. The school was more important.

Mr. BENTLEY. During the time you were supposed to be turning in these reports, working as a spy for the NKVD, did you receive anything? Did you get any pay or did they give you food cards or anything like that?

Mr. BANIONIS. No, nothing.

The agent who I met, he was paid.

Mr. BENTLEY. I congratulate you on the way you turned the tables on this NKVD agent.

I suppose you gained the impression that basically they weren't very intelligent?

Mr. BANIONIS. This man was intelligent. I got him in my hands.

Mr. BENTLEY. He knew which side to play on.

Now, this family you saw deported one night, do you know why they were deported?

Mr. BANIONIS. I didn't personally know these people, but I knew they were employed some place.

Mr. BENTLEY. You don't know why he was picked up for deportation?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were just like all the other Lithuanians. I didn't know any special reason.

Mr. BENTLEY. When they were being taken off, were they allowed to take anything with them? Did they take any baggage or anything?

Mr. BANIONIS. Maybe a couple suitcases.

Mr. BENTLEY. I was impressed with what you said, that they always come at night to do these things, because, after all, when you think of Soviet actions, whether it is deportations or almost anything else, wherever they can they prefer to work under the cover of darkness, do they not?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. As far as the Soviets and the Communists are concerned, they always prefer to work where other people can't see their dirty deeds, or at a time when people can't see their dirty deeds?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were afraid to do anything in the light.

Mr. BENTLEY. That characterizes communism everywhere, doesn't it?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. The same methods they use now, and that they have used in other countries. I understand that from what I read in the newspapers.

Mr. BENTLEY. When did you leave Lithuania?

Mr. BANIONIS. I left Lithuania when the Russians came back.

Mr. BENTLEY. In 1944?

Mr. BANIONIS. In 1944. I was thinking about being a guerrilla, a partisan again but I talked with my friends and we left, because the Russians were too strong.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were there any partisans who stayed behind after the Russians came back?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. My good friends—I know many of my good friends, they were partisans. I knew they had ammunition and everything prepared to be partisans. My brother, I got my brother here in the United States, too. He came with me, too.

The last time, those last 3 days when we left Lithuania, he came to me and he told me, too, that maybe we should stay and go to the forests and fight for our country. But then we left Lithuania.

Mr. BENTLEY. Then you came to the United States in 1944?

Mr. BANIONIS. I came in under the Displaced Persons Act.

Mr. BENTLEY. I know that you are very happy to be here today.

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. I am very happy today, here, because I can tell everything. I am not afraid. You know, maybe some people are afraid. I could be afraid in another country. I tell the truth and everybody believes me.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am very glad to have you here today and hear your testimony. That is all.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Before you were arrested in 1940, were you engaged in any political activity?

Mr. BANIONIS. No. In Lithuania, I was just a Boy Scout.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were any of your family engaged in political activity?

Mr. BANIONIS. No. My brother was a Catholic priest.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is the one who is here in the United States with you now?

Mr. BANIONIS. No; he is still in Lithuania.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Have you been hearing from him?

Mr. BANIONIS. I got a letter from my mother in 1950.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You don't know where your brother is now?

Mr. BANIONIS. No. I don't know. Just one single letter I got through one relative, an American citizen.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know whether he is being permitted to engage in his church activities, now?

Mr. BANIONIS. So far as I know from the newspapers, from the Lithuanian newspapers, and from the Catholic priest, his church was closed in 1952.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that so far as you know, your brother, the priest, is not being permitted to engage in church activities?

Mr. BANIONIS. No; I don't think so, because he was being watched by the Russians, too, at the same time being in Lithuania.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. This difficulty in Lithuania was after the elections?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Those were elections that the Russians claimed to be free elections in a free country?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes; they claimed that.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. This was a time when Russia was telling the world that Lithuania was free and independent.

Who were the officers who surrounded the cemetery, the Lithuanians or Russians?

Mr. BANIONIS. It was the Russians and the Communist secret police agents.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. By Communist secret police, do you mean Lithuanian Communists or Russian Communists?

Mr. BANIONIS. There were many Russians in civilian clothes, too, and there were Lithuanians, too.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. This was all at a time when Stalin was telling the world that Lithuania was not controlled by the Russians, but by Lithuanians?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. At the same time they made a big lie.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Your arrest was taken care of by Russian officers, also?

Mr. BANIONIS. By Russian officers, and I was taken to the NKVD prison by Russian soldiers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And all of your investigation was conducted under the supervision of Russians?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. And the Russians watched how the agents did their jobs and sometimes they beat the prisoners, too.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was the occasion of this affair at the cemetery?

Mr. BANIONIS. It was the occasion of a memorial day in the cemetery.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You went to the graves of whom?

Mr. BANIONIS. We came to the graves of our friends or relatives. I didn't have yet relatives in this cemetery, but we were visiting the graves of our great people, like Dr. Basanavicius, and like Pilots and Darius and Gireenas.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. These people you mentioned were national heroes?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. Our national heroes across the ocean.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You say there were about 200 arrested at the cemetery at that time.

Do you know how they selected these 200 from the larger group? Was there any method they used in selecting them?

Mr. BANIONIS. They broke in the cemetery at first and took a couple of people. Then other people, they resisted. They didn't get to arrest them all because there were so many people.

Then they started to arrest at the gates as separate people came through the gates. Then they would take one and let some go.

They didn't pay any attention to who the men were they took. Those people were not merely students. There were employers and workers from factories. They had on dirty clothes. They were coming from their work and they went around to the cemetery.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They didn't select any particular group, but anyone they could get hold of?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know what happened to these 200 people?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were taken to the prison, all of them. Most people were afraid and they ran away. They jumped over the fences and ran on all sides, you know. There was shooting, too. They started to shoot. They started to shoot into the air.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Those 200 who were arrested, were they later released?

Mr. BANIONIS. Well, I don't know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were any of those friends of yours?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, those who were with me. Those I know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were some of them later deported to Siberia?

Mr. BANIONIS. There were many deported and many sent to the prison. Many came out after the war broke out.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You continued to be a student at your school, is that right?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you tell us anything as to what the Communists did with relation to student life? How was student life changed by the Communists taking over?

Mr. BANIONIS. The Communists looked toward the students to make Communists of them. They didn't like professors or teachers or all of the students who were university students. They were educated in Lithuania along democratic lines. They didn't like it. They paid more attention to the youth. They started to organize the Communist youth. They asked many times several students to be members of the Communist youth organizations. The students naturally resisted, and nobody wanted to be a member of this Communist youth organization.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did they do with the patriotic youth organization groups?

Mr. BANIONIS. They closed it. All the patriotic youth organizations. There was just the Communist Party in Lithuania and the youth organization.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Before the Communists came did you have school newspapers?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. We had it in the classes, but not political.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Just cultural?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened to the newspapers?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were all closed. Everything was closed and not allowed. They only allowed what was coming from the Communist Party or the Communist organization.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was there any change in the method of teaching or the subjects taught or in the way they were taught?

Mr. BANIONIS. The way they talked they just wanted to teach the Communist Party story and communism.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you have to study that? Was that compulsory?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. It was very important.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened if you refused to study communism?

Mr. BANIONIS. We just couldn't pass our examinations and we didn't learn anything more.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you mean the students didn't care very much to take those studies?

Mr. BANIONIS. No. Nobody.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You also were in Lithuania when these so-called free elections took place. Can you tell us more or less how those elections took place?

Mr. BANIONIS. The elections took place; everything was made like a theater.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Tell us what you mean by that.

Mr. BANIONIS. I saw that before election, the Russian troops, the regular army troops were sent to the country, to the country schools of the land. They were playing in theaters, like making music and sport numbers, and all that. I saw them. I knew they were watching the people, so that nobody could make any speeches or anything against this election, because the people didn't want to go to vote.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When they did go to vote they got a ballot?

Mr. BANIONIS. They got a ballot.

There were Russian soldiers and civilians going together and going to the homes. They carried the wooden boxes and went to the homes to have the people vote.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The Russian soldiers in this so-called free Lithuanian Republic brought the ballots to the house?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How many names were on the ballot? Did you have a choice of two or three candidates for an office?

Mr. BANIONIS. It was just the names of the Communists.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, every office that you voted for had the name of one candidate, the Communist candidate?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. Nobody else.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So you could either vote——

Mr. BANIONIS. Or not. It would be the same.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You didn't have a choice between two candidates?

Mr. BANIONIS. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You got a Communist candidate and you had a chance to vote for him or not.

Mr. BANIONIS. We were supposed to vote for the Communist.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened if you didn't like the Communist candidate?

Mr. BANIONIS. Some people, they tried not to drop the vote in, or do something.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. If you didn't like the Communist candidate, you just didn't drop the ballot in, or spoiled the ballot?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, but you should make that in secret, where they don't see that.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now, did the Russian soldier who brought the ballot have a chance to see how you were voting?

Mr. BANIONIS. He gave you the slip and you put a mark and dropped it in the box. Then, you didn't have any chance not to vote.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. This vote was in the presence of the Russian soldier?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, in the presence of the Russian soldiers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And if you failed to vote for the Communist candidate, the Russian soldier knew exactly what you did?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. Then maybe he would take you with him.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That was the Russian idea of free elections?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Before we proceed with the questioning, I would like to make a brief announcement.

We don't anticipate, and I don't believe there is any basis for fear of threats to any witness here by anybody.

As previously stated, some witnesses do request that their identity be not disclosed for fear of reprisals to friends or relatives behind the Iron Curtain, and we shall certainly fully protect them along that line.

That is the only anticipated danger which we believe will be completely overcome by this protection. However, so as to make absolutely sure, we have made contact with Police Commissioner Leonard, and I am informed that Police Commissioner Leonard will be happy to comply with any request from the committee for the protection of any witnesses. The Detroit police, therefore, will give any protection that might be necessary to any witness before this committee.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question?

Mr. KERSTEN. Certainly.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You also had an opportunity to see what change, if any, there was to the religious life. Can you tell us anything as to how the churches were affected by the Communists taking Lithuania over? From your own experience, that is.

Mr. BANIONIS. From the first day, the people went to school, they told nothing to the Russians. They didn't do anything in my circle—the people I knew. They had Communist meetings and church meetings at the same time, but the people went to the church meetings. The Communists held meetings to try to get the people to stop going to church.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What other action was taken by the Communists with relation to churches?

Mr. BANIONIS. So far as I know, they arrested many of the Catholic priests.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were there many of these Catholic priests arrested that you know of?

Mr. BANIONIS. I know a couple of names.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did they do anything with regard to the church property?

Mr. BANIONIS. They took it from the churches, you know. They have taken more from other people like the farmers.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did they try to make it as difficult as possible for the people to get to church?

Mr. BANIONIS. I can't tell you exactly, but every day they made it harder for the churches, but the people were going to the churches more than they had before.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is what I was trying to bring out. Despite all these persecutions and attempts to keep people from the churches, the people continued to attend church more than before.

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have been in the United States for about 4 years, now?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you tell us briefly what is your impression, the most important impression, you get as to the difference between life here and life in Lithuania under the Communists?

Mr. BANIONIS. Like darkness and sunshine.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you want to say anything further on that?

Mr. BANIONIS. I hope you will learn more about the Russian regime and communism. The people live in constant fear. It is difficult to tell exactly what it means to live under the Russians and the Communist regime. You should live for a couple months under the Communist regime. Then you can tell exactly. Sometimes it is hard to tell how you would feel by that time.

I remember now that I was questioned and I was turned against my friends, my professors, and such moral power they had there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You think there was some difference between the questioning you had there and the questioning you are undergoing by this committee?

Mr. BANIONIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. I just want to remark at this point, I imagine Congressman Bentley, you, as a representative in the American Embassy in Hungary, were able to observe firsthand and corroborate much of what this witness has described as living under the Communists to be.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am familiar with the impressions he mentioned; yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And I imagine, Mr. Machrowicz, your impression in dealing with Soviet atrocities, that the people of Poland have known, it is the same blueprint and same in Poland.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. It is exactly what happened in Poland and every country behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. BONIN. You said that arrest took place on November 2. What you stated was memorial day.

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BONIN. Isn't that All Saints Day in the Roman Catholic Church?

Mr. BANIONIS. All Saints Day is a memorial day.

Mr. BONIN. At which time all Roman Catholics throughout the world go to the cemetery and pray for the departed dead?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BONIN. And that is what you people were doing at the cemetery on this day?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BONIN. You stated that at the time you signed the confession, you were notified to make your reports to an NKVD agent, but you were supposed to use an assumed or fictitious name on these reports?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BONIN. Did you use a fictitious name?

Mr. BANIONIS. I used the fictitious name that the Communist agent gave me.

Mr. BONIN. That is somewhat along the same pattern that the Communists use in this country; they don't use the name they were born with; is that correct?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes; that is right. They do it the same all the way around the world where they have spies.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, the agents throughout the world use fictitious names?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BONIN. In your reports, after you signed this confession and your agreement to report on other people, it was your intention to turn in such reports that would not cause any harm to any of the people you reported on?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. I was very much afraid of doing anything to my Lithuanian friends.

I told my good Lithuanian friends, "Maybe you will be arrested, too, and you should be careful."

Mr. BONIN. Now, the wounds that you demonstrated to this committee, both on your left shoulder and your right shoulder, were they treated at all by any doctor, or were you given any first aid at all?

Mr. BANIONIS. No. Just myself. I washed it out with a little tea that they gave me for breakfast. The blood was running over my arm and my body.

Mr. BONIN. Did you ask for any medical treatment?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. I told them that I am wounded, but nobody cares. In the room where I was during the arrest, together with my friends, was 2 Russian soldiers, 1 standing by the window, another standing by the door, but they have not talked to us. When we asked them anything, they just stood there and did not talk to us. They just watched to see that we did not jump through the window or run through the door.

Mr. BONIN. These people who questioned you for hours at a time were Russians; is that correct?

Mr. BANIONIS. Russian and Lithuanians.

Mr. KERSTEN. Lithuanian Communists?

Mr. BANIONIS. Lithuanian Communist agents. The NKVD; they called them Cheka.

Mr. BONIN. That was just another name for the secret agents?

Mr. BANIONIS. It was the Russian name.

Mr. BONIN. After you signed this paper which they told you would make you free, you were no freer after you signed the paper than you were prior to the signing of it, were you?

Mr. BANIONIS. When I signed the paper, they freed me. They let me go outside of the NKVD building.

Mr. BONIN. Yes; but you were still not free, because you were still being spied upon, were you not?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BONIN. So no matter what way you turn with the Communists, you are still in jeopardy?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, in your opinion, do you believe any Communist can be trusted?

Mr. BANIONIS. No. I don't believe, because everything is built on the Communist methods where they are standing on the ground and they lie and do such terrible things.

Mr. BONIN. In December 1940, you were also in Lithuania?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Do you know whether or not the Communists endeavored to prevent the celebration of Christmas?

Mr. BANIONIS. Christmas, we celebrated at home. We made our Christmas trees. There was just one Christmas with the Communists when I left, and we were celebrating just in a family circle.

Mr. BONIN. Did they endeavor to prevent religious services in the churches on that day?

Mr. BANIONIS. I don't know the facts, but it was the same as a simple holy day, from the outside. In the churches, there were Masses and everything like Christmas.

There were no processions allowed outside the church.

Mr. BONIN. You were not permitted to have any processions?

Mr. BANIONIS. No, sir.

Mr. BONIN. They were prohibited?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Did they change any instructors in your school after the Russians took over?

Mr. BANIONIS. They changed a couple professors. A few professors came and Communist agents came in like a consorg.

Mr. BONIN. Were they Russians?

Mr. BANIONIS. They were Communist youth organization members, or Communist secret police agents. They were Lithuanians.

Mr. BONIN. They were Lithuanians?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. They picked up some very bad students for this position.

Mr. BONIN. For instructors?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes, for instructors.

For example, those who drank heavily, or who had prison records.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, they replaced educated instructors in your schools with individuals who either had criminal records or they were drunks?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. Just for the position of the political agents, but for the most part, they left the same professors in the schools, because they didn't have enough people to change them.

There were not so many Communists in Lithuania, and among the professors and teachers maybe there were 1 or 2 in all Lithuania. They left the same professors in the schools, but so far as I knew, they were preparing to change them later.

Mr. BONIN. They were prepared to make changes?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you recall when the Russian troops marched into Lithuania? What month and year was that?

Mr. BANIONIS. I saw for the first time the Russians on the 15th of June 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you know the date of the so-called free elections which were held?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. When was that?

Mr. BANIONIS. I don't remember, now, the date exactly.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What month?

Mr. BANIONIS. It was in July, I think. It was in the summertime.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In what year?

Mr. BANIONIS. 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is, within 1 month after the Russian troops occupied Lithuania, the so-called free elections were held?

Mr. BANIONIS. They made the elections.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Banionis, it was testified last week in our hearings in New York that in 1939 the population of Lithuania was 3,300,000, approximately.

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. MADDEN. And at that time there were only 1,750 Communists, that is, party Communists, in Lithuania.

It was also testified that in 1941—2 years later—that that figure of 1,750 Communists in Lithuania, rose only to 2,200, or an increase of 400 party Communists in Lithuania.

Mr. BANIONIS. I cannot tell you exactly the numbers, but I know that not many people joined the Communist Party.

Mr. MADDEN. But that was the testimony that was given in New York, and to your knowledge, is that just about what the figures were, at that time?

Mr. BANIONIS. I think that is about right.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, the Communists succeeded in taking over a country of 3,300,000 population with only 1,750 Communist members living in Lithuania?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right. I think maybe it was less, something like 1,700 who were really Communists.

Mr. MADDEN. And this increase of 400 in 2 years was made up mostly of Russian Communists coming into Lithuania?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes. And they made those Communist members, maybe just through force.

Mr. MADDEN. Do you recall the name of the NKVD chief of police who originally asked you to sign this oath; do you recall him?

Mr. BANIONIS. No. He didn't tell me. It was a secret.

Mr. MADDEN. Is it not a fact that when the church was having its services, that the Communist authorities would make it a point to have some kind of a compulsory meeting take place at the time?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. At the time the church services were being held?

Mr. BANIONIS. They had lots of meetings at the same time there was service in the church.

Mr. MADDEN. In New York, at our hearings last week, a Lutheran minister testified. I think he was from Estonia, regarding the same attitude of the Communists against the Protestant churches that you testified was taken against the Catholic church.

Now, did that same thing take place in Lithuania, that the Communists took the same persecution measures and same attitude of distinction against all churches, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish?

Mr. BANIONIS. I don't think they made exceptions. They didn't have any exceptions for any particular type of church.

Mr. MADDEN. It was for all types of religion?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. I have just a question or two, Mr. Banionis.

You have given us here a picture of what it means, particularly for a young man, an 18-year-old boy, to come in firsthand contact with the Communists. I just wish all students in colleges and high schools will know something about your testimony, as I know all good American students, the great overwhelming mass, are anti-Communist, too, but to hear these facts from one who experienced them firsthand, it is a good lesson for all of us.

Now, so that we may know how Communists operate on students, here is a book that I would like to show you, written in Russian. It is a textbook, and it is dated in the year 1952. I don't read Russian, but I have had it translated, part of it. The cover of it states, "For Non-Russian Schools," and I understand this is for use in such countries as Lithuania, Poland, and other occupied countries.

One story in this textbook—I believe it is a textbook for about 13- or 14-year-old children—one story is a poem about an individual, a boy by the name of Pavlic Morosow.

In this story, it is told, as the translated story read, how that Pavlic Morosow, this boy, came to court to testify against his father, because the father hid grain in the household, against the instructions of the NKVD, and here is the story and the picture, here, of the boy testifying against his father in the court, with a soldier with a bayonet standing behind the father and the son.

The story goes on to tell how the father is turned over to the executioner, and then how this boy is held up as a great young hero, a young Pioneer.

There is a statue to this boy in Moscow, glorifying the idea of a child, a young boy, turning his father over to the executioner.

Here is a picture of this boy testifying. Is that exactly the same thing that you experienced firsthand, that they tried to make you do to your relatives, friends, and professors?

Mr. BANIONIS. Yes; that is right; the same way they wished I would do. So far as I know, it was taught in the Communist youth organizations.

Mr. KERSTEN. You will notice that this picture and this story—this is all in Russian.

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. And this is what they are teaching young boys behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is what they tried to teach you?

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. The parents and the relatives don't mean anything?

Mr. BANIONIS. They don't mean anything. They make no exceptions.

Mr. KERSTEN. When you were living under the Communists, how did the people generally feel about this kind of teaching and this kind of activity?

Mr. BANIONIS. The people had a terrible feeling about that, and were concerned with what would happen to our nation when they started to teach such things to our young people.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you feel about the crime of Vishinsky, who spoke before the United Nations last December and said, "Why, the Baltic nations freely entered the Soviet Union"? How do you feel about that statement of his?

Mr. BANIONIS. I feel very bad about this.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you think it is true?

Mr. BANIONIS. I will give you an example. Communist politics is like a masked bandit going in to rob a bank, and when you stop him at the door and say, "You are a robber; you are going to rob the bank," he will say, "No, I am not the bandit. I just watch the bank. The cashier gave me your money and said, 'Take it; this is yours.'"

That is the way the Russian Communist politicians went in our country and in all the Baltic countries and in all Europe.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you for one minute believe, Antanas, that the Lithuanian people wanted to go into the Soviet Union?

Mr. BANIONIS. No; never. So far as I know from the Lithuanian story, we stopped the Russians first in 1919 and 1918.

Mr. KERSTEN. So the claim that the Russians are now making, that they are in the Baltic nations such as Lithuania because the people wanted them to go in, is false. As I understand it from you, the people want exactly the opposite; is that correct?

Mr. BANIONIS. The Lithuanian people wish to live free and independent.

They never wished to join the Russians or communism.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you saw that first hand.

Mr. BANIONIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

Are there any further questions? That is all.

We will now hear from General Cernius.

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF GEN. JONAS CERNIUS, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF LITHUANIA IN 1939

General CERNIUS. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you give us your full name, General, please?

General CERNIUS. My first name is Jonas, my last name Cernius.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where are you living now, General?

General CERNIUS. Now, I am living in Flint, Mich.

Mr. McTIGUE. In what capacity are you employed?

General CERNIUS. I am a tool designer in General Motors Corp.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you come to this country, General?

General CERNIUS. I came on April 17, 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. From where?

General CERNIUS. From England. I lived 9 months in England before coming here.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born, General?

General CERNIUS. I was born in Kupiskis, Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us something about your education.

General CERNIUS. I had my education in Kupiskis, in my birth-place; high school in Panevezys.

Then, in 1919, from high school I entered the Volunteer Lithuanian Army. I was graduated in the first promotion of the military academy

in Kaunas and fought as a lieutenant in the Lithuanian Army during the war of independence against the Russian invasion in 1919-20.

Later, when Lithuania was recognized as an independent state, I had an opportunity to continue my studies. I attended the University of Kaunas, Vytautas the Great.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, we might mention for the information of the reporter that it is very necessary to get the record correct on this, so you should interrupt whenever you don't know the spelling of anything.

General CERNIUS. My major was as an electrician. Then I was sent by the Lithuanian Government to Belgium, and in 1929 I was graduated as an engineer in Brussels, in Belgium.

Later, I returned to Lithuania. I was a captain in those days. I served in the Army sometimes. Then later, I was sent to a military college in Paris, France. The French Government admitted me. I was graduated as an officer in staff. In French it is called officer d'état major. I was a major. It was the grade of staff officer. Then I was graduated with this degree and received my second promotion and graduated from the war college in Paris.

I then returned to Lithuania and served in the Engineer Corps. Later, I was appointed in 1934 as commandant of the Lithuanian Military Academy.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is this something like our West Point?

General CERNIUS. Yes, it is the same.

Mr. McTIGUE. The military academy to which you were appointed commandant corresponded to the West Point of the United States?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Then, in the autumn of 1934, I was appointed as Chief of Staff of the Lithuanian Army. I remained in this position until the end of March 1939, when I became Prime Minister of Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were Prime Minister of Lithuania, General, was the Lithuanian Government asked to execute, or enter into a mutual assistance pact with the Soviets?

General CERNIUS. It was during my government.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you were Prime Minister?

General CERNIUS. When I was Prime Minister.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something about that, please?

General CERNIUS. If you will allow me to say the situation in the Baltic States and Europe in this corner—war started in 1939, September 1.

Mr. McTIGUE. When the Germans invaded Poland?

General CERNIUS. Yes; the Germans and Soviet Russia—Soviet Russia 17 days later, because Soviet Russia could not mobilize so quickly.

This was made in accordance with a secret treaty made by Ribbentrop as representative of Hitler, and Molotov, representing the Soviet Government.

Germany came from west to east, and Russia from east to west. Poland was crushed.

In this same agreement which was made between Germany and Russia on August 23, 1939—that is, 7 days before the war—in this agreement there was a secret protocol by which the Baltic States, including Lithuania and Poland, were divided by the so-called line of influence. In the course of this, Estonia and Latvia went to Russia.

Lithuania remained in German influence and Poland was divided into two parts.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is what the first secret protocol called for before the war?

General CERNIUS. Yes. This agreement was a green light to start the World War.

Now, when Poland was finished, the Soviet Government made the first treaty of mutual assistance with Estonia.

After a couple weeks, the same treaty was made with Latvia, and in the third place, I was, as Prime Minister, asked to come to Moscow for negotiations. They said so. We had a feeling this negotiation would be something very bad for Lithuania.

They promised neutrality—to respect our neutrality. All the Baltic people proclaimed themselves neutral from the start of the war, and Russia promised to respect our neutrality. However, we had the feeling that they would not respect that neutrality.

The situation for Lithuania was unsettled. In the north there was also a Soviet garrison installed in Latvia, and in Vilnius and vicinity there was the Soviet Army, and on the south there was also Russia. The latter was near Augustow.

We were uncertain from the north, from the east, and partially from the south. On the west side was Germany, but Germany was unfriendly in those days. Germany was a partner—in accordance with the secret agreement—with Russia.

Now, on September 28, 1939, nearly 5 weeks later than the first agreement, Ribbentrop had a second secret protocol. By the second secret protocol, the first agreement was little changed. In that, Stalin consented to give more of Polish territory to Hitler, but he took Lithuania—not all, but bigger parts of Lithuanian territory—for himself, but only some, Suvalkija, that part south of the Memunas River. Then this part would be in the influence of the Germans. Lithuania was divided in two.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was it in the second secret protocol that the Soviet paid Hitler a certain amount of gold?

General CERNIUS. That is in the third one.

Now, after the second agreement that placed Lithuania in such a situation in a circle, with Germany not friendly, Estonia and Latvia had Soviet garrisons installed, Poland was finished, and in such a situation the Government of Lithuania was invited to go to Moscow for a negotiation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you receive a telephone call from Moscow or a note?

General CERNIUS. Yes, a telephone call, and our minister said, "We have our representative in Moscow, Dr. Natkevicius."

Mr. KERSTEN. Let me interrupt at that point to ask this question: In New York, when former President Herbert Hoover was testifying, we showed him a photostat of a map of eastern Europe, including Poland and the Baltic States, the original of which was in the German Foreign Office. I have this photostat here, too, and I want to point out that it exactly corroborates your statement. This photostat—and I might state that I saw the original map in England and had this photostat made—bears the original signature of Stalin and the original signature of Ribbentrop, dated September 28, 1939. This was the final agreement to which you referred, which threw

Lithuania into the Soviet sphere, and divided up Europe for the final green light for World War II.

General CERNIUS. That is right, but Germany had taken a little part of Lithuania for Germany. Later, after some months, there was a third agreement. Then the Soviet Union paid compensation for Hitler.

Mr. KERSTEN. So the lives of these people were traded for the gold—Soviet gold—to Hitler.

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is the way these two dictators cut up Eastern Europe secretly between themselves, Stalin affixing his personal signature to this map, and Von Ribbentrop affixing his.

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

Mr. KERSTEN. Followed by a protocol agreement signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop.

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

Mr. McTIGUE. General, after the invitation from Moscow, did you go to Moscow?

General CERNIUS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened?

General CERNIUS. We had a Cabinet meeting at President Smetona's. He presided in this meeting. It was decided that it was better not to send the Prime Minister himself, but to send a delegation of three persons; namely, the chairman of this delegation, Minister Urbsys, the Minister of the Foreign Office of Lithuania, and my Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Bizauskas, and the representative of the Army, General Rastikis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did this commission, General, have the authority to execute the pact in Moscow?

General CERNIUS. They had the authority on negotiation, but they were not given such a paper to sign an agreement, because we suspected they would force them to do something very bad. So at the time, we only gave them authority for negotiation. They had no power to sign, at first.

When they came to Moscow, they gave a pact of mutual assistance, exactly the same text as that made with Estonia and Latvia, with some little difference.

Lithuania, or our delegation, could not accept. It was impossible to have a negotiation on such a basis because there was danger of losing the independence of Lithuania. Then the delegation returns to Kaunas to consult with the government. We met again and we elaborated some counter propositions. We said, "We feel we should do something because it is not possible to get out of this." We consented that the Soviet could send a military mission, but we wanted to avoid their installing a garrison.

They would install first 100,000 soldiers, an army.

Mr. McTIGUE. In Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. Yes; in Lithuania. After long negotiations, they consented to 20,000. They said they would not interfere with Lithuanian internal affairs; that they would respect Lithuanian independence; that they would not interfere with our cultural and economic life.

Then we mentioned in this treaty that they would respect the treaty of peace made in Moscow in 1920 when they renounced all pretension to this territory. In 1920, it was a completely separate people.

It was such a situation that finally they showed to our delegation—this is the first time they knew about this division. Now, I can tell about this secret agreement, but in those days we didn't know exactly. We had some feeling that something wrong was done between the Nazis and the Soviets, but not exactly.

Then our delegation was shown the map. They said, "All right, if you will not agree with us, you will be divided."

Mr. McTIGUE. They said, "Take it or leave it?"

General CERNIUS. Precisely.

Then the delegation came to Kaunas to consult. We met together to determine what to do. We had terrible pressure from all sides. We had been encircled. The Government took into consideration that for a small state like Lithuania, it was impossible to win by fighting. We had a feeling that they might be with us after the war—because the war had only started in those days—that they might be well-organized otherwise and Lithuania will again be able to win independent life, but temporarily, there was no other possibility and we should have this pact of mutual assistance.

So it met before Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania, and 1 year later, Poland. After signing this document—it was ratified—I had signed the ratification.

Mr. McTIGUE. You signed for the Lithuanian Government?

General CERNIUS. Yes, because according to our constitution, the Prime Minister is responsible.

If Russia would respect this treaty, then we would be in such a position that, well, France and Belgium and Holland, when the American and English armies passed through to fight, they could come in.

But it was different with Russia. When Russia came in, until now, we have no occasion when Russia should go out without forcing them.

They started to violate this agreement. First they started to interfere in our internal affairs.

Mr. KERSTEN. Which they, just a short time before that, had in writing promised not to do; is that right?

General CERNIUS. Yes. They had written it very nicely on paper, in this document which we signed.

Mr. KERSTEN. They had used very good words and promises.

General CERNIUS. Yes; very good words and promises.

Mr. KERSTEN. And right after they made those promises—

General CERNIUS. Yes. For some months they respected them. But when France was crushed, in Lithuania we had to look at the general situation of war. When France was crushed, then they sent ultimatum to Lithuania, but I had resigned at that time. They sent it to my successor, to Mr. Merkys.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did they send the ultimatum the same day France fell?

General CERNIUS. Yes; the same day that France was crushed. The first ultimatum for negotiation and for making a pact of mutual assistance, and then Poland was crushed. The second ultimatum—occupation and abolition of Lithuanian legal government, and install-

ment of puppet Communist government. That installation was made when France was crushed.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you continue as Prime Minister thereafter?

General CERNIUS. I resigned—I was 8 months Prime Minister. I resigned November 22, 1939. So the ultimatum was the second ultimatum when they come with their whole army. It occurred during the ministry of Mr. Merkys, who was later deported with his wife.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were Prime Minister from March 1939, until November 1939?

General CERNIUS. November 22, 1939.

Mr. McTIGUE. And why did you resign?

General CERNIUS. First, it was because the Soviets started to violate this treaty and since there was no other protest—the war was on, there was no help coming from anybody so the only way to show dissatisfaction was to change the Prime Minister. Maybe with a new person and a new face, they would do something better.

So, Mr. Merkys was made Prime Minister, but if you will read the record, it was the same.

For instance, General Musteikis, he was also Minister of Defense in Mr. Merkys's cabinet.

Mr. McTIGUE. You resigned, although a great many of the cabinet ministers stayed on?

General CERNIUS. Yes, they stayed. It was only to show that some thing happened, that Lithuania was not content, because they started to violate this pact. They started to make different accusations, that we had stolen some soldier.

Mr. McTIGUE. Kidnapped soldiers?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you resigned as Prime Minister, what did you do, General?

General CERNIUS. In accordance with Lithuanian custom, when I became Prime Minister, I should resign from the army. Then later, one day—November 23—I was again appointed to the army, but only because General Pundzevicius, the chief of staff, he was my successor, and he was in the position of commander of the First Lithuanian Infantry Division.

Mr. McTIGUE. The day after you resigned as Prime Minister—

General CERNIUS. I returned to the army.

Mr. McTIGUE. You returned to the army as commander of the First Lithuanian Infantry Division?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened then, General?

General CERNIUS. The events during Merkys's term, when they received the ultimatum. On June 14 or 15, 1940, this ultimatum, through which they occupied our country, came about. They occupied every village, every town, and every city. There was plenty of the Russian army.

Our President Smetona fled abroad. He came to the United States and died.

Then Minister Merkys was dismissed because he can do nothing with Russia, because he saw that Russia would violate the agreement completely. He dismissed—the President had appointed General Rastikis to make a new government.

Mr. McTIGUE. The provision government?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

I was invited to be Minister of Defense by General Rastikis.

I said over the phone that we could do nothing. I was not in Kaunas in those days. He said, "We will try to do everything possible."

There was installed the so-called puppet regime. The regime of Paleckis.

Mr. KERSTEN. He is the Communist puppet? He was at that time?

General CERNIUS. I knew him personally before, in Lithuania. He was sometimes invited to the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Kaunas. He was editor of a newspaper, but he didn't play the role of communism. But it seems he was a Communist.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was a secret Communist, and he is the present Communist dictator there, isn't he?

General CERNIUS. Yes. He was appointed by Russia. It was a disappointment.

Smetona said, "I cannot get people for government; Moscow tells me."

Mr. McTIGUE. You were the commander of the First Lithuanian Infantry?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. At this time were you permitted to go ahead with your command without interference?

General CERNIUS. One ultimatum was received by the government. The army received an order not to resist. It was a decision of government.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was June 14, 1940?

General CERNIUS. Yes, 1940. The situation of the war was such—you know what happened later. The Soviets became allied against the Nazis. Before they were partners and helped the Nazis. It was the decision of the government of Merkys to accept this ultimatum. He was forced to accept the ultimatum.

The army received an order from our superior not to resist. That meant that the Soviets should go through our country.

Mr. McTIGUE. Right after the ultimatum and while you were serving as general, were political commissars then assigned to your command.

General CERNIUS. Yes. There is the question of how the transformation occurred in the Lithuanian Army.

Mr. McTIGUE. This is after the seizure and before the election, is that correct?

General CERNIUS. The commissar was before the election. When Paleckis was there and later became Prime Minister.

They started to change the army, but not suddenly. It was little by little. First, they appointed a political commissar.

I was a commander of a division. A man brought me a paper, saying he was appointed as commissar in the same division. There was the instruction that I had no more power to give some order alone, without his signature.

There was installed the political commissar. There were some chosen of Lithuanian Communists, and later they were replaced by Russians.

Mr. McTIGUE. And who was in or about that time appointed chief of staff of the Lithuanian Army?

General CERNIUS. Chief of staff, Lithuanian Army—you see, the Lithuanian Army was until such a moment that there was created from Lithuanian Army a 29th Territorial Corps—for the Lithuanian Army that was created.

Mr. McTIGUE. The 29th of June?

General CERNIUS. No, I think it was in August. It was early in August. I cannot remember the exact date, but in August 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. The idea of the Territorial corps was to give the impression that the Lithuanian Army was still an entity?

General CERNIUS. Exactly. They said what the Lithuanian uniform would be, what the Lithuanian officer would be, and that the Lithuanian corps was to go somewhere very far.

In this corps, I was chief of staff. My first division I gave to General Pundzevicius.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who took over as chief of staff of the Lithuanian Army?

General CERNIUS. It was the XXIX Corps. It was not called the Lithuanian Army. It was the XXIX Territorial Corps.

Mr. MACIROWICZ. The XXIX Territorial Corps of what?

General CERNIUS. They didn't say, but they said it was Lithuanian territorial.

The commandant was Lithuanian and the instructions were given in Lithuanian. Only that the political commissar was Russia's.

The first commander in chief was Zematis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was he?

General CERNIUS. He was born in Lithuania. However, all the time he lived in Russia and was a Russian Communist. He is the same as Rokossovsky in Poland.

Zematis was appointed commander in chief of the Lithuanian Army, before creation of the corps.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then the point you are making is that the Soviet would train natives as they did in the case of Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. As in the case of Russia.

Mr. McTIGUE. And in the case of Poland?

General CERNIUS. Exactly. Poland and Bulgaria.

Mr. McTIGUE. They were educated and trained in Russia and then come the takeover, these men are sent in?

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

The chief of the political section, as much as I remember him, was Macijauskas. Also, a Russian colonel in the Russian Army, but born in Lithuania.

So that they have prepared in advance. They have some Lithuanians in Russia, and now they use this possibility to install them, because they were very obedient to Moscow.

Mr. McTIGUE. General, at about this time, or about June 21, 1941, the army was completely taken over?

General CERNIUS. No; in 1940. It was in 1940 when they took over because the corps was organized in August 1940. Paleckis was installed on June 15 or 16. Then, after 3 months, they have made this transformation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Completely sovietized?

General CERNIUS. Completely.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do then, General?

General CERNIUS. As most Lithuanian officers and generals, I was also in this territorial Lithuanian corps and I was appointed as acting chief of staff of this corps.

Mr. McTIGUE. By whom? Who appointed you?

General CERNIUS. Appointed by the Government, but with the consent of a Russian.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you stay in the army, then?

General CERNIUS. I stayed in the army until June 17, 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you remember what happened on maneuvers in June 1941?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened?

General CERNIUS. They met in June, June 15 or 16, 1941, and they arrested about 300 Lithuanian officers. The arrest was not so simple, but they sent them to maneuvers.

Later, the Russians return and the Lithuanians disappear. Only some of the officers escaped, and they told that they were encircled in the forest by tanks, with soldiers with bayonets, this army, and there was prepared a special car and they were deported.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many officers were involved?

General CERNIUS. About 300.

Mr. McTIGUE. They were surrounded by Russian tanks in the forest on maneuvers, and deported in cattle cars to Russia?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Finally, in June, for example, 1941, no Lithuanian officers commanded a division. And in staff all were replaced by Russians and half of the soldiers were also from Russia, installed to mix together.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your brother in that group?

General CERNIUS. Yes, my brother Michael was deported.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have you ever heard about your brother again?

General CERNIUS. No. Sometimes they escape and tell about the difficult situation in the slave camps in Siberia, but about my brother I have no news.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long after this incident in June, June 14, 1941, did you remain in your position with the army?

General CERNIUS. From June?

Mr. McTIGUE. Wasn't it after this incident in June 1941?

General CERNIUS. It was at night, on June 15, when the Russian colonel came to take my duties.

I have had orders to go to Moscow, as many Lithuanian officers.

They found some lie for deportation. They say, "You should go to Moscow, to complete your education," or something like that.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was the last thing ever heard of those people?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you start for Moscow?

General CERNIUS. No. I didn't go to Moscow. I go to Lithuanian forest and stay hidden.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you hide out?

General CERNIUS. On the 22d started the war between Stalin and Hitler.

Mr. McTIGUE. The 22d of June?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

So I return to my birthplace in Kopishtis, as I mentioned before, and there I worked in a mill, grinding flour, during the German occupation.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Germans occupied Lithuania, what happened?

General CERNIUS. Then the Soviets came again, who we knew by bitter experience, and many thousands of Lithuanians were going to the west. Some had tried the Baltic Sea by boat to Sweden, but finally they were sunk. The others tried through Germany, but they could not say to the Germans they go to the allies. They said they would go little by little.

I, for example, passed to America before the armistice.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You mean you surrendered yourself to the American troops in Germany?

General CERNIUS. Yes. I passed by as a civilian.

Mr. McTIGUE. You mean you surrendered yourself to the American troops in Germany?

General CERNIUS. Yes. I passed by as a civilian.

Mr. McTIGUE. You emigrated from Germany to England under the so-called "Westward Ho" movement?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Then, I was in a camp because I was a displaced person. I worked, together with the English authorities, and later that was changed so that the Americans would take the other occupation zone in Germany and this zone where I lived, it was the British zone.

Then it was said that I planned to go to England. The displaced person was not admitted in those days.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was before our Displaced Persons Act?

General CERNIUS. Yes. I lived in England with my son and wife. We were all three together. I got money to buy a ticket. I got a visa from the American Embassy, and I came legally into this country.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you now a citizen of the United States, General?

General CERNIUS. Yes, since the 10th of November, this year, I am a citizen of the United States of America.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. General, first of all, I would like to ask you this question: During the time that you were Prime Minister, were there ever any consultations between your Government and those of Latvia and Estonia, by trying to resist the Soviets?

General CERNIUS. At the start it was made as an entente cordial to proclaim neutrality.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. By entente cordial, you mean an entente between governments?

General CERNIUS. That we have many things that we have together. All these three Baltic States.

I sent General Rastikis to Poland and I charged him to assure Poland that they would have no danger from Lithuania, that Poland can completely denude its 500 kilometers of frontier and use its forces in other places.

We had some discussion in Vilnius, but for this we would not go to fight, but this question would be opened up later. General Rastikis was sent to Rydz-Migly. He assured that Lithuania presented no danger to Poland, and Poland could use all forces against the Nazis.

I invited the Polish Military Attaché, Col. Zoltek Mickiewicz, and I assured him also that he could say to the Polish Government that Lithuania will conserve neutrality and will present no danger of war.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am more interested in what conversations you may have had with Riga and Tallinn.

General CERNIUS. I don't know the Estonian who came to me, but he came to me to talk about this treaty of mutual assistance.

He said only that he would ask Finland to go together, and then maybe with all these countries, we could do something. But Finland said "No."

Later Finland was helped from the West and started to fight alone.

Latvia had not been consulted. They wanted to see what the Soviets would do.

At first the Soviets held the treaty. They didn't interfere in Estonian and Latvian internal offices.

Mr. BENTLEY. General, what I was particularly interested in, at the time the Russians forced you to sign these mutual-assistance pacts, there was no alliance, no understanding or agreement between your Government and Governments of Latvia and Estonia?

General CERNIUS. No. Russia accused us of having such an agreement, but it is not true.

Mr. BENTLEY. When your delegation went to Moscow to negotiate on the question of a mutual-assistance pact, who did they see in Moscow, and with whom did they negotiate?

General CERNIUS. They started to negotiate with Molotov, and later, in part, with Stalin, himself.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were told that when they returned?

General CERNIUS. Yes; they told me.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, during the time that you were Prime Minister, and before the Russians came in, in 1939, how active was the Lithuanian Communist Party?

General CERNIUS. You see in Lithuania, I am completely sure that the Communist Party in Lithuania was so weak that without Russian bayonets they could do nothing.

I have no example of where, without bayonets, could a Communist government be installed.

Mr. BENTLEY. There was a Lithuanian Communist Party?

General CERNIUS. In there, there was a Communist subversive party. By law it was not allowed.

Mr. BENTLEY. It was illegal?

General CERNIUS. It was not legal. However, they had some organizations in secrecy. Our Department of Security estimated about 1,700 members.

Mr. BENTLEY. They were illegal, but they were active, they tried to make propaganda and that sort of thing?

General CERNIUS. Yes; it was fellow travelers. They had an organization to help political prisoners, and so forth. They came under other names.

Mr. BENTLEY. General, I think in your testimony you have mentioned in talking about these mutual-assistance pacts—had there been a treaty, as far as you know, between the Soviet Union and Poland, earlier, along that line? Did you mention something about that?

General CERNIUS. This line of influence?

Mr. BENTLEY. Before the Soviet invasion of Poland, were there any treaties existing between Poland and the Soviet Union, that you know about?

General CERNIUS. Poland and the Soviet Union—there was a pact, maybe of nonaggression. We have mentioned this nonaggression pact also in this treaty of mutual assistance.

Mr. BENTLEY. I would like to bring out one point, General, which I think is very important: With regard to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, you had treaties of peace and later you had pacts of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, and in spite of the complete, pledged word of the Soviet rulers, all of those pacts were treacherously violated by the Soviets.

General CERNIUS. Exactly. Violated by the Soviets.

Mr. BENTLEY. And almost with no warning at all?

General CERNIUS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. General, what day is this, do you know? What is the date today?

General CERNIUS. This is the 7th of December.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know what that date means in this country?

General CERNIUS. I don't understand.

Mr. BENTLEY. General, 12 years ago, today, this country was treacherously attacked, without warning, by another dictator.

General CERNIUS. Oh, yes. Pearl Harbor, you mean.

Mr. BENTLEY. Yes. That is why I think it is particularly appropriate, Mr. Chairman, in hearing about the treachery and violation of treaties and unprovoked attacks, without warning, on the part of the Soviet against these three little countries.

I think it is particularly appropriate, as I say, that we recall that we in the United States have also been made the subject of unprovoked aggression, without warning, by totalitarian dictators, who always operate in such manner.

Mr. KERSTEN. I agree with you, Mr. Bentley.

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

Mr. BENTLEY. When you signed the pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, you signed that in Kaunas?

General CERNIUS. In Kaunas.

Mr. BENTLEY. Who signed on behalf of the Soviets?

General CERNIUS. Molotov.

Mr. BENTLEY. He signed in Moscow?

General CERNIUS. Our delegation signed, and Molotov, and in accordance with the Lithuanian Constitution, it should be approved—so-called ratification. Upon ratification, it should be signed by the President, and it should bear my signature.

Mr. BENTLEY. Who signed first, you, or Molotov?

General CERNIUS. I cannot say.

Mr. BENTLEY. The pact was first signed by you in Kaunas, or by Molotov in Moscow?

General CERNIUS. In Moscow.

Mr. BENTLEY. First in Moscow, and then sent to you?

General CERNIUS. Yes. It was then ratified. I signed only in ratification.

Mr. BENTLEY. It did not have to be submitted to your parliament for approval, did it?

General CERNIUS. It was submitted.

Mr. BENTLEY. And it was approved by your parliament?

General CERNIUS. Yes. The parliament knew that there was no other issue, in those days.

Mr. BENTLEY. After this was signed, General, you said very shortly the Soviet Union began to violate the terms by internal interference in Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

Mr. BENTLEY. Can you give us one or two examples of that?

General CERNIUS. First, they made different provocations.

As an example, they sent some soldier—they might go in a restaurant and make some noise or some trouble, and then the Lithuanian Government is accused of kidnapping a Soviet soldier.

Second, they have helped the Communist organization.

Mr. BENTLEY. How did they help the Communist organization?

General CERNIUS. They gave them money. They pushed them to have demonstrations, to push disorder, to go to fight with the police. If something happened, there was a big funeral to show that the Lithuanian Government performed persecutions, and so on.

Mr. BENTLEY. They assisted the Lithuanian Communist Party in its demonstrations?

General CERNIUS. Yes, and for subversive action.

Mr. BENTLEY. Those were the principal methods by which the Soviets first began to violate the treaty, and interfere in the internal affairs of Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, you spoke of this territorial corps, of which you were acting chief of staff at the time.

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was this formed after the so-called free elections?

General CERNIUS. Yes, after free elections—so-called free elections.

Mr. BENTLEY. The territorial corps actually, then, was part of the Soviet army, wasn't it?

General CERNIUS. Because Lithuania was incorporated.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is the point I want to bring out.

One more thing: Now, you said when these 300 officers were being deported to Moscow, or to the Soviet Union, or to Siberia, you were also ordered to go to Moscow and, instead of obeying those orders, you took refuge in the woods and hid?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. You stayed there until the end of the German occupation?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. But you didn't take any military part during the war?

General CERNIUS. I took no military part. I listen always to the Voice of America. It was very dangerous, but I listened and I talked for them. I believed in the hope that after the war all nations would be free, as promised in the Atlantic Charter. I believed in those days.

Mr. BENTLEY. During the time the Germans and Soviets were fighting, you didn't take any part as a soldier in that war at all?

General CERNIUS. A Soviet soldier?

Mr. BENTLEY. Or German soldier, either.

General CERNIUS. We resisted against German mobilization, because the Germans would mobilize. They would create a different organization of army. I told Lithuanians not to go. You see there was the special question that Lithuania would be free and independ-

ent. Under Germany we would not be free, nor under the Russians would be free.

Mr. BENTLEY. I was particularly interested, General, when you told how these people had been taken from Lithuania, or had been sent from Lithuania where they were born, by the Communists, to the Soviet Union for training, with the idea they would come back and occupy positions of power and influence in Lithuania.

That, of course, is a clear-cut pattern that has been followed in all of the other satellite countries?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. I can remember very well, for example, when I was in Hungary that the present Communist dictator of Hungary, Rakosi, although he was a native Hungarian, he was also a general in the Soviet Army, and had been for a great many years. He was one of the outstanding examples.

You would say, I suppose, that it is quite conceivable that today the Soviets are taking people from many countries they do not yet have under their control and are training them in Moscow, with the hope some day of using them in those countries if they have a chance to take them over?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And it is quite possible that they are even doing that with Americans?

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

I think that for these Americans who will not return, the 22, they will return when the Communists dominate the United States.

Mr. BENTLEY. The 22 American prisoners in Korea, who are supposed not to want to come back?

General CERNIUS. If they will not return.

Mr. BENTLEY. Maybe they are being held against their will.

General CERNIUS. They will be given some training for the domination.

If you look at the instructions in Russia, who is the enemy, it is all capitalist exploiters.

How will you look at the people in the foreign country when you come? You will look upon them as capitalist exploiters.

They talk and talk and talk to them, and prepare them for world domination.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, General. In view of your extraordinary first-hand knowledge of these events, I know your testimony has made a great contribution to these areas. Thank you.

That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You know that the Soviets and Stalin have proclaimed to the world that this incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was a voluntary act of the peoples of those countries and was very enthusiastically greeted by the people, and also that when this committee was formed, a Soviet publication had a very vehement attack, saying it was a foolish thing for this committee to try to pry into this because everybody in the world knows or should know that this was a voluntary act of those peoples.

Now, I would like to ask you a question: Did you, prior to the Russians' occupying Lithuania, notice any sentiment on the part of any

group of Lithuanians, welcoming an incorporation into the Soviet empire?

General CERNIUS. I would say that the truth is that all this declaration of the Baltic people in Lithuania—that they would go and not lose independence—that is the biggest lie possible in the world.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That is not true?

General CERNIUS. It is completely untrue. I think every Communist, some 1,700, maybe all of them would lie.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You mean even the Lithuanian Communists wouldn't welcome Estonian Communists.

Mr. KERSTEN. You believe the Soviet claim is completely false?

General CERNIUS. Yes. You see all this organization is based on the lie. If you will let me, I will give you a picture of how they make a declaration in the newspaper that "Army claims to be attached to Soviet Union."

One company was going through the street in Kaunas, and suddenly someone in a Lithuanian uniform comes on with a banner, saying, "We claim to be the 13th Soviet Republic."

Now, this innocent company is going behind. If you are standing at the side, then you look and they carry the banner, and behind them is going the army. They put it in the newspaper and nobody can say that it is false. If an officer says it is not true, he disappears in the night.

It is exactly as you have read about the American prisoners in Korea carrying banners as they go out of Korea, because they force them to do it with bayonets.

It is the same way with all demonstrations, there. The banner would have Stalin's face on it. It is false. They have violated the will of the people.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have had a lot of experience in making treaties with the Russians.

Do you personally see any hope for the liberation of Lithuania or any other country behind the Iron Curtain by means of treaties or agreements with Soviet Russia?

General CERNIUS. In today's situation, it is very difficult to say how Russia could give up and free some nation under Soviet grasp, but I think maybe it would be possible without a war.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you mean if the command in Russia changes?

General CERNIUS. You see it was Beria, before, who was very powerful. Who can say what happens next?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would you give any credence to any promises made by present Russian leaders?

General CERNIUS. Oh, no. Now, today, all that they do—if you held a bayonet against them, maybe they would do something, but if there is a possibility to violate, they will violate.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Former President Herbert Hoover testified before this committee Saturday, and his opinion was exactly the same.

That is all.

General CERNIUS. All the treaties have been violated with us, and the same is true with all other countries, so far as I know. They always accuse others of what they have done. They claim to be peace-loving people. They proclaim that to the world.

The first thing would be for people to go there and see them, but they have created the Iron Curtain. They teach in Russia that abroad

it is very bad, that there is exploitation by capitalists, and sometimes they use the press abroad. They only choose some phrases which are useful.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. General, I would like to read to you just two sentences of former President Hoover's testimony on Saturday, December 5, 1953, and ask you whether you agree with those conclusions.

President Hoover said as follows:

No one can read the directions and speeches of Lenin and Stalin and Molotov and ever believe that agreement with Russia has more than purely temporary value. There are occasions when I think agreements could be made which would be to their interests or to the mutual interests, but those are pretty rare occasions. Such agreements would last only just so long as it suited the Russians.

Would you agree with those words?

General CERNIUS. I would completely agree.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bonin?

Mr. BONIN. General, in your opinion, then, everything as far as the Soviet officials are concerned, is promise but no performance?

General CERNIUS. That is right. If it is useful for Russia.

Mr. BONIN. In addition to that, you would say all the fellow travelers and sympathizers are a threat in every country, today, if the Communists are successful in overthrowing the independent government?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

The Communist Party has special organizations. There are some officials in the countries who say they are Communists and others are in secret. Then they use other organizations. Sometimes they are very nice organizations. Sometimes they are very nice organizations. For example, religious organizations. But they are fellow travelers.

Decisions should be made in accordance with their actions. Communists use American dollars for propaganda.

I am sure, for example—many times when I lived in New York I heard it was possible to send a certificate to the occupied countries, to give some gift for your parents or your brother, and you pay money, here. What do they do? If you buy a cow for your brother behind the Iron Curtain, they will take the cow and maybe give them a cow, but the dollars will be handed to Russia.

Mr. BONIN. Under Communist control there are no freedoms of any kind, are there, as known by the free and independent nations of the world?

General CERNIUS. No freedom, no. As I understand freedom, no freedom. No democracy, as we understand democracy. There is no democracy. It is the most terrible form of dictatorship, the most terrible forms. They use the criminal element for executions and killing.

In mass execution which was in Lithuania, that is exactly what happened in Korea, as you now know. The same method.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Madden—

Mr. MADDEN. General, you testified regarding the Soviets coming into Lithuania and establishing military strongholds, or military bases. Did they do that from the standpoint of protecting Lithuania or Russia from Hitler, or did they do that in order to take over Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. They used the feeling of the Lithuanian people, first.

Then, in the same year of 1939, Hitler took Klaipeda, our Lithuanian union port. The people were not satisfied, you see. They used this sentiment. They say they will give some help. But, as we know the truth, they have an agreement made before to divide us.

Mr. MADDEN. The purpose of that was to infiltrate?

General CERNIUS. This map was not made by me, but this is exactly the way they had it installed. They would take the Lithuanian Army and install some garrison, not at the frontier, but a little past.

Mr. MADDEN. How many different garrisons or military strongholds did they install in Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. When Lithuania was occupied at June 15, 1940, I don't know exactly, but I would estimate about 200,000.

Mr. MADDEN. 200,000, at different military strongholds?

General CERNIUS. In different cities or villages or towns. All the country was occupied, after the ultimatum.

Mr. MADDEN. Now, this map you just had there, explaining the different locations, that is a correct—

General CERNIUS. That is correct about the first occupation.

Mr. MADDEN. That is a correct map and diagram, showing where the Soviet Government installed their garrisons, or their military strongholds, preliminary to taking over Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

Mr. MADDEN. And they made these military installations on the pretense that they were going to help Lithuania, or aid Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. Yes; through this pact of mutual assistance with Lithuania.

Mr. MADDEN. But, as a matter of fact, this so-called mutual assistance was the opening spearhead to take Lithuania into the Soviet orbit, and they thought that the Lithuanian people would consent to being absorbed in that way?

General CERNIUS. They are not sure about the consent, because the Lithuanian people never expected it, and when the Lithuanian people saw that there was a violation and when the President went, they started to fight in an underground.

Mr. MADDEN. And you can identify this map as a true and correct diagram, showing the locations of these garrisons?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. And it also shows the actual occupation, as to where they moved their armies into Lithuania, and also Latvia, in the north?

General CERNIUS. Yes. That was in 1940, this situation.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to have this a part of the evidence.

Mr. KERSTEN. The map will be marked "Exhibit 12 (Detroit)."

(The map was marked "Exhibit 12, Detroit." See map facing p. 654.)

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you exhibit 12, and ask you if you can state from your own knowledge that that represents the military situation—that is, the occupation of Lithuania, and the surrounding areas indicated there, by Soviet troops.

General CERNIUS. Yes. And this shows when they came in June 1940.

Before they had garrisons in Vilnia, Gaizunai, Prienai, and Alytus.

Mr. KERSTEN. I want to state for the record at this point, as previously stated, that this committee has no intention or purpose in any way to make any implication as to the borders involved between

the Baltic States and, for example, Poland, or any area in which there might be any question. The only question is the occupation by Soviet troops, and in introducing this map, it is so understood, as all these countries in common experience Soviet occupation and Soviet cruelty.

There are certain indications on exhibit 12 of what appear to be the occupation of Soviet troops. Are they true and correct, as you yourself recall them, in these areas?

General CERNIUS. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. And it is my understanding that that occupation was designed primarily to take over these areas, rather than only to use them in defense against the Nazis; is that correct?

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

Mr. KERSTEN. They were to assist in the Communist grab of these defenseless areas, and defenseless countries?

General CERNIUS. Exactly.

Mr. BONIN. May I just supplement Congressman Madden's observations: It appears as though the Russians followed the same identical pattern in North Korea.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think that is true.

Just one question to clear up a point: You stated in the beginning of your testimony that the Soviets claimed, in order to have a pretext for violating their treaties, that the Lithuanians had kidnapped Soviet soldiers?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What do you say about the truth of the Soviet claim? Was it true or false?

General CERNIUS. The claim is completely false. Lithuania had no interest in kidnaping. They would always say something disagreeable or not pleasant. They said that there had been kidnaping.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you know about the deportation by the Soviets of about 2,000 political and other leaders of Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. It was before election. I think it was in July 1940.

Mr. KERSTEN. What type of person was deported there?

General CERNIUS. Professor, teacher, political leader, priest—all people who had some leading influence among the people.

Mr. KERSTEN. So in order to bring about the so-called free and democratic election that New Times in Moscow wrote about in August of this year and that Vishinsky spoke about in the United Nations last December, in order to prepare for these elections, among other things, they first deported a large part of the political and other leadership, the cultural leadership, out of Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. Yes; they erased it. Maybe they were not all deported, but they were arrested. They were completely isolated. They arrested them, and nobody can ask where the men disappear to.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you know about that?

General CERNIUS. Well, I know. I know many people who had suffered.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were there at the time, in Lithuania?

General CERNIUS. I was in Lithuania at that time.

Mr. KERSTEN. This is just another one of the methods of their preparing for free elections, similar to what young Banionis told us about the Russian troops taking the ballot box out to the people to

see to it that they voted pro-Communist, under the pressure of Russian bayonets; is that right?

General CERNIUS. In some places, yes; but sometimes they also have Communist Party members. But, Mr. Chairman, they put only Communist Party candidates on the ballot.

Mr. KERSTEN. One list?

General CERNIUS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. If the people of Lithuania could have made a free choice at that time, in your estimation, what percent would have voted to keep the Soviets out?

General CERNIUS. I doubt that they could have 1 percent pro-Soviet.

Mr. KERSTEN. And all the time up to now, how do you think the people feel about that, even yet?

General CERNIUS. All of the people in all enslaved nations, they are anti-Communist to date.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, General. You have made a fine contribution to our hearings here.

We will adjourn at this time until 2:30, in this room.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p. m., a recess was taken, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:40 p. m.)

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Counsel, you have a witness, as I observe, whose identity has been protected, and the witness desires to remain anonymous. Steps have been taken to give her the protection of anonymity. We wish, in every way, to protect the witness from any possible danger or possible reprisal on the part of the Soviet Union, or Communists, against anybody behind the Iron Curtain. Is that correct?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

This is a witness, Mr. Chairman, who insisted on this procedure. Of course, we like to have our witnesses appear in public. In this case, we requested that the witness be masked, but the witness insisted she be put behind a screen where she couldn't be seen.

We are abiding by her wishes in this respect.

Mr. KERSTEN. That being the case, the committee will accept those conditions. I will swear the witness.

Just raise your right hand, please: You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF AN ANONYMOUS ESTONIAN WITNESS

The WITNESS (through interpreter). I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, Miss Interpreter, will you speak up as loudly as you possibly can, please, so that we might all hear you?

Mr. KERSTEN. Miss Interpreter, will you please stand up and raise your right hand.

You do solemnly swear that you will truly interpret from such foreign language as is related to you into English, so help you God?

Miss MALLE NORTMAN. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Madam Witness, why are you afraid to testify in Detroit, in the heart of America, on the events that happened to you while you were in Communist-occupied Estonia?

The WITNESS. I am afraid to testify because I still have my father and my mother and my brothers in Estonia. And also, when you look at the map, you can see that Detroit is close to Canada, and Canada is close to Alaska, which is right next to the U. S. S. R., so I am still afraid.

Mr. McTIGUE. Madam Witness, were you born in Estonia?

The WITNESS. Yes; I was born in Estonia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall the night of July 1, 1941?

The WITNESS. Yes. The morning.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you arrested?

The WITNESS. Yes; I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. By whom?

The WITNESS. By six men. Four of them were Russians and two were Estonians, from the Estonian-Russian border.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you married at the time, Madam Witness?

The WITNESS. Yes; I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your husband's occupation?

The WITNESS. He was a minister.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any children?

The WITNESS. Yes; I had two sons.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your husband a clergyman, a minister of the gospel?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you live on an island off the Estonian mainland, Madam Witness?

The WITNESS. Yes; I did.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you and your husband and your children were arrested by the Soviet, where were you taken?

The WITNESS. To a forced-labor camp, Harku.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you taken by ship?

The WITNESS. I was taken by bus to Romassaare and from there by ship to Haapsalu, and from there by train to Harku.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many women and children, approximately, were taken to this camp?

The WITNESS. Eight hundred women and children, approximately.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were men also taken?

The WITNESS. During the night the train was taken apart and cars with men—all boys about 13 years old—were taken away.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you separated from your husband at that time, Madam Witness?

The WITNESS. That was done on the ship, already.

Mr. McTIGUE. They were separated aboard ship?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you ever seen your husband since that time?

The WITNESS. Never after that.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you arrived at the prison camp, what happened?

The WITNESS. When we arrived at the camp, it was 4 o'clock in the afternoon. We were not given anything to eat and as the children were very hungry, the forced laborers who were there before gave away their rations for our children.

Then we were taken to a barracks which were surrounded with wire nets, fenced, and they didn't have any furniture in there; no beds, either.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did the women and children sleep?

The WITNESS. There were just women and children.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did they sleep?

The WITNESS. On the floor. I didn't finish, yet.

We didn't have anything ourselves because we all had children, and the clothes that we could pack in the 20 minutes they gave us for packing, were with our husbands, who were taken away from us.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did these women and children have to eat?

The WITNESS. In the morning at 6 o'clock they got tea, and about an inch-thick piece of bread. That was for the whole day, as far as bread was concerned. The children got cereals. For lunch we had soup made out of cabbage leaves—the outer leaves, because the inside were taken to the market.

At night we got tea, again, and the children got cereal.

Mr. McTIGUE. Madam Witness, what kind of work did you and the other women who were confined in this Soviet prison camp have to do?

The WITNESS. We had to work in a swamp cutting peat.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long, every day?

The WITNESS. From 6 o'clock every day in the morning until 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and then from 2 o'clock until 5 o'clock at night.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long, Madam Witness, were you and the other women in this prison camp?

The WITNESS. They were taken there in July. They had to be ready to go every day, because we were supposed to be taken to Russia. Finally, we were taken away in the middle of September, but I have forgotten the exact date.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you and the other women in the camp before you were freed, or before you escaped?

The WITNESS. Just about 2½ months.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you freed by the advancing German Army?

The WITNESS. Our escape was influenced by the advance of the German Army. In nearby Tallinn they were fighting already, so they couldn't take us on the boat that was supposed to take us to Russia, so they took us back to Saaremaa.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were your children sick at this time, at the time they were in the camp?

The WITNESS. At the time my children were very sick. They were passing blood. The weaker of the twin boys I have couldn't walk any more.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you were returned to the island of Saaremaa, where you home was, what did you find in the headquarters of the rectory where you once lived with your husband?

The WITNESS. In my home they had installed the Red corner. Do I have to enlarge on that?

Mr. McTIGUE. What do you mean by the Red corner?

The WITNESS. This is a Red club where they have Red slogans on the walls and pictures of their leaders and the youth are supposed to come there to learn their doctrines; also, they had installed an executive committee of the Communist Party in my home.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they refuse to permit you to enter your former home?

The WITNESS. The afternoon I was brought back I went in there and stayed overnight, but the next morning the Red militia came in and chased me out, saying that "For such as you, enemies of our state, we don't have place here."

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do then, Madam Witness?

The WITNESS. I took my children by the hand and walked along the road and didn't know where to go because I was afraid to go to the younger members of my husband's community. I was afraid to harm them. Finally, I went to an elderly couple who lived in an old house and they gave me shelter.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a day when the Communists fled the island?

The WITNESS. The night the Germans came in they knocked at my door and it was a great relief for me because they were nice to me and they caressed my children, because they had children back home themselves, and they told me we had a right to live again and I could go back to my home, although I couldn't keep all of it because the German Army had to use part of it.

Mr. McTIGUE. Madam Witness, do you recall the occasion soon after the Communists fled when more than 80 bodies or corpses were found in the basement of the NKVD headquarters?

The WITNESS. The German colonel who lived in my home, the head of the unit who came into town, took me to the basement of Hoffman.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is that?

The WITNESS. The house belonged to a Dr. Hoffman who had fled and the Russians had used it as a headquarters for the NKVD.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you asked to help identify some of these bodies?

The WITNESS. Yes; I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many bodies were found?

The WITNESS. There was more than 80 found, but I can't say exactly how many.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you identify any of those bodies?

The WITNESS. I recognized the secretary of the community of Mustjala.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could you identify or did you identify any women?

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, Miss Interpreter, as I understand the question, the question is only whether she could identify the sex of the individual; not any names. Could she identify the sex of the individual, men or women?

Miss NORTMAN. She recognized one women. She had one breast cut off.

Mr. McTIGUE. Madam Witness, can you describe generally the condition in which you found the remaining bodies?

The WITNESS. I could tell that they all had their hands tied behind their backs with wire and their faces looked like they were boiled or burned in hot water, but I didn't see any bullet wounds, and I can't tell their exact condition because they had started to deteriorate. It was very hard; very horrible.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you a resident of Detroit?

The WITNESS. Yes, I am.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are there any questions, gentlemen?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Madam Witness, do you have any idea why you were selected among others to be sent to this deportation camp?

The WITNESS. I think because my husband was a clergyman.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is it true, then, that those who were selected for the labor camps were mainly families of the clergy, the professors and teachers?

The WITNESS. In our group there were several families of clergymen, also doctors' wives. One of them had a baby 6 days old and she was taken away from the hospital. But there were also farmers' families and artisans, because if they belonged to the National Guard, that was supposed to be a very grave error against the Russian State.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do I understand one woman who was still in the hospital with a child 6 days old was taken out of the hospital with a child and removed to this labor camp, is that correct?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened to your children?

The WITNESS. After we got back home, my children were at the hospital for a while and now they stay with me.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They escaped with you?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. I just want one question.

In this camp to which the witness was taken, were there only Estonians, or people from other countries?

The WITNESS. There were some Swedish nationals from the island Ruhnu in this camp, but they were Estonian citizens.

Mr. BENTLEY. It was just a camp for Estonians, then?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. I have no questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin?

Mr. BONIN. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is all, Counsel?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. I want to state that anybody who in any way attempts to uncover the identity of this individual in the vicinity of this courtroom or hearing room, I, for one, as chairman of this committee, will wish to recommend to the committee the possibility of contempt of Congress for anybody who violates this order.

I will swear our next witness.

Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF AN ANONYMOUS LATVIAN WITNESS

The WITNESS. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you live in Detroit, Mich.?

The WITNESS. Yes; I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why are you afraid to testify in the open at these hearings?

The WITNESS. I am afraid because I have some relatives in Latvia and that is why I would not like to be known.

Mr. McTIGUE. You have relatives in Latvia?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is your husband in Latvia?

The WITNESS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Latvia on June 13 and June 14, 1941?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTEAGUE. When the deportation began?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you in Latvia?

The WITNESS. I was in Riga.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were your brother and sister arrested for deportation on June 14?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you find out about their arrest?

The WITNESS. These people living in one house, they came to us and said our brother was taken to Siberia. They were arrested.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you then go looking for your brother, Madam Witness?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you go looking for him?

The WITNESS. First I went to the railroad station in Riga. It was announced the trains would not go out from the passenger station, but from the flag station. I started to look around, but one day we couldn't find them. On June 15, I went again to the station, and on the steps I saw already many people looking around. There were many Chekas around, and they didn't let the people inside of the fence in the station.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you get inside the fence?

The WITNESS. There were difficulties. First I asked them and then I started to lie to them. My brother really had two children and I said I didn't know what to do with the children because the children were also supposed to go away. Finally, the Chekas said they would let me go inside.

I got inside the fence in the station.

Mr. McTIGUE. You fooled the NKVD agent to letting you into the freight yard where the cattle cars were being loaded with men for deportation to Siberia?

The WITNESS. Yes.

There were hundreds of cattle cars and thousands of people there. There were women, men, and children crowded in these cars.

Mr. McTIGUE. The year is June 14, 1941.

Were the children being separated from their mothers and the husbands from their wives in the freight yard? Were they being put onto separate trains?

The WITNESS. They were separated already in the cattle cars. The men were in one car and the women in other cars. I saw some children together with the women, but separated children I didn't see. Some said that the children were taken away, but the children's cars were not in the yards, but I couldn't see the children's cars separately. I saw women who said that their children were taken away. In some cars, together with the mothers, I saw some children, too.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you finally find your brother's cattle car?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Or the one in which he was put?

The WITNESS. Yes. After about a half hour. I was looking and going along the track. I was calling in each train my brother's name and the people inside, they called back.

After a long time looking, at last I found my brother.

Mr. McTIGUE. You went from boxcar to boxcar?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Yelling out your brother's name?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Finally you came to the boxcar where he was?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he able to speak to you?

The WITNESS. He came up in a little while. I saw the car was overcrowded and he didn't get easily to the window. The windows were barbed wire and they were small. When my brother came to the window I said, "How is it?" He said it was awful inside because it was awful hot. It was summertime and there were about 70 or 80 people in this car and he said to get some air the people took turns, each for a little while under a small window to not get suffocated.

Mr. McTIGUE. These 70 men——

The WITNESS. I can only say that approximately. The big cars were overcrowded, with 70 people.

Mr. McTIGUE. The car was so small that the men had to take turns breathing at one small window?

The WITNESS. Yes. When I asked how he felt he said he only worried about his family. He said that the children were out of the town with their grandmother.

So my brother's worry was first for them not to get the children.

Mr. McTIGUE. He wanted to be sure that the children would find shelter and a home before he was taken away. Is that what you are saying?

The WITNESS. Excuse me. I didn't understand.

Mr. McTIGUE. He wanted to be sure that the children would have some kind of a home?

The WITNESS. Yes. He wanted not that we give the children out for the Chekas. He said first we would have to keep them somewhere out of the town and not to give them to the Chekas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you stay there talking to your brother until the train started to roll?

The WITNESS. No. He said then I have to go to his wife. His wife was separated in another car and now I started again on the women's cars and I went along again and I asked for the name. I saw many women who were crying and asking for water and bread and they were throwing out some papers and letters that I couldn't take because the Cheka was near me and I couldn't take any of the letters and papers. They shouted out some numbers I could call. I only saw the miserable people in the cars.

At last I found my sister-in-law in one car, also overcrowded with women, and the window, as I recall now, had two small boys and one little girl, and they were crying out, "Please, water."

I had with me when I came to the station some food, but the Cheka didn't allow me to take it in. I had only a small package with me and I gave them that in the car and then came my sister-in-law to the window and she was just broken down and she put her hands through the wire and she asked me to take care of her children.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were her children in the car?

The WITNESS. No; her children were at home because they were not together.

MR. KERSTEN. She was separated from her children?

THE WITNESS. Yes.

Then in this same car I saw a woman whose children were taken away. She was crying and asking, "Oh, God, help me to get back my children." She was just in a nervous breakdown and she was crying. That was the one woman who I knew her children were taken. I remembered the children were ill or something, and they were taken to another car so as not to be together. In many cases, we know later that the children were taken away. That is one case where I know they were taken away from the parents.

MR. McTIGUE. Is this the last you saw of your brother and sister-in-law?

THE WITNESS. Yes. That was the last time.

MR. McTIGUE. Have you ever heard of what finally happened to them?

THE WITNESS. I only heard about my brother. It was in the year 1947. I don't know how she came home, but she said to our relatives still in Latvia that she met our brother in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia.

MR. McTIGUE. Was she in a Soviet prison camp there?

THE WITNESS. I don't know—my sister-in-law she said she hoped they would be together then, because when they were arrested they thought that only underway they would be separated, but later they would be together.

My brother saw one letter while he was on the border of our country. It was a letter some people mailed us. He said he didn't meet his wife, that the train with the women was sent away one day before in another direction and now they will go in a different direction, so he didn't know anything about his wife any more.

MR. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have.

MR. KERSTEN. Mr. Bentley.

MR. BENTLEY. I have no questions except I would like to comment that I think the fact that we have had to take these precautions for these last two witnesses shows how far-reaching the arm of Soviet communism can be, even in this country.

MR. KERSTEN. Mr. Bonin?

MR. BONIN. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

MR. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden?

MR. MADDEN. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

MR. KERSTEN. I have just this question: How many people were involved in this mass deportation, as near as you can tell us?

THE WITNESS. We lost in the year 1941 about 40,000 people, but in this one night they took maybe 15,000 or 18,000.

MR. KERSTEN. About 15,000?

THE WITNESS. Yes, or more.

MR. KERSTEN. Among all the people that you knew and saw there, will you state whether or not they were all good people or were they criminals?

THE WITNESS. None of them were criminals. They took not only the educated and the rich people, but also workers. I know one worker family was taken who had nothing to do with politics, and poor people who had nothing to do with politics. This was just one deportation, the biggest.

MR. KERSTEN. In other words, these were all good Latvian people?

THE WITNESS. Yes.

MR. MADDEN. These children who were in the cattle cars, do you know what became of them when they reached the prison camps, or reached Siberia? Were they separated from their mothers or did they remain with their mothers when they got up in Siberia?

THE WITNESS. That is different, how they come. I read a letter which came to Germany—I don't know which way—to my friend, and I read it myself, and her mother was taken and she had three brothers, and when she wrote the letters she said, "I am alone only with Mia." That was the youngest child of hers. She was alone with one child. I have heard many things, but that is what I read myself.

Then I would like to tell, after the Russians let up, after the big deportation, on the 13th and 14th, and the Russians had to leave our country the 1st of July, after 2 weeks, when the Russians were out, it was fine. One cattle car of dead children was at the station. I didn't see it, but I spoke to people who saw it.

MR. MADDEN. Saw a cattle car with dead children in it?

THE WITNESS. Yes. That car was somewhere pushed away and when they had to go out they forgot it or something, so they had about 20 dead children in there, all small, from 2 years and so on.

MR. MADDEN. That is all.

MR. KERSTEN. Just this one further question, Madam Witness: As I understand it, you were able to get into the freight yard and get next to these cars and you saw your relatives, is that right?

THE WITNESS. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. Now, how did you get out of there?

THE WITNESS. First, I went again to the Cheka, the chief. I went back and said, "Can I not take some water back to the people?"

He said, "No; you can't. You go quickly out."

So he didn't allow me to speak, and the Chekas pushed me out of the yard.

MR. KERSTEN. He pushed you out, then?

THE WITNESS. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. In other words, when you were requesting some water for the cars, and he refused you, then he pushed you away from the cars?

THE WITNESS. Out of the yard.

MR. KERSTEN. This information that you got from someone there who said that he saw a car with some dead small children in it, this was in Latvia?

THE WITNESS. This was in Latvia.

MR. KERSTEN. I might state for the record, for whatever it is worth, we shall try to produce a witness to whom I talked and spoke with who said that a similar thing occurred in Lithuania, a car full of dead children.

THE WITNESS. But I didn't see it. I heard it from people whom I believe.

MR. KERSTEN. That is all the questions?

I will make a similar statement, here, that anybody who violates the anonymity of this witness deliberately, I will, myself, recommend that they be prosecuted for contempt of Congress.

MR. McTIGUE. We had, Mr. Chairman, two more witnesses today. One of the witnesses was coming from Windsor, Canada, but there has been a slight delay in connection with his permit and as a consequence, we won't be able to hear him until tomorrow.

Is Mr. Armalis in the room?

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

**TESTIMONY OF ADOLFAS ARMALIS, GRADUATE STUDENT,
UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT**

Mr. ARMALIS. I do, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. As far as the two previous witnesses are concerned, you have interviewed them and you know something about their background. You also know their identity, do you?

Mr. McTIGUE. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. From your investigation, can you state whether or not there is every appearance of credibility from your examination and interrogation of these witnesses prior to their coming to this courtroom?

Mr. McTIGUE. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind, Mr. Chairman.

I want to reiterate again that every effort was made in their cases to persuade them to testify in open session. Every effort was made to persuade them to testify with a mask on, or some other form of concealment, but they insisted on testifying behind screens. It was their idea, and not ours.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, they want no portion of their identity known, insofar as it was capable of being kept anonymous; is that right?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is exactly right, Mr. Chairman.

What is your full name, please?

Mr. ARMALIS. My name is Adolfas Armalis. I live in Detroit.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your occupation?

Mr. ARMALIS. Graduate student, University of Detroit.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mr. ARMALIS. Berlin, Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you live in Lithuania at any time?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right. I lived about 2 years in Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many years did you live in Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. In total, about 19 years, 18 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you living in Lithuania when the Soviets seized the country?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right. I lived there.

Mr. McTIGUE. What village or city in Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. When the Russians moved into Lithuania, I was a last-course student at teacher's lyceum in Siaulaii.

Mr. McTIGUE. How old were you when the Soviets invaded Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. Sixteen years of age.

Mr. McTIGUE. In what month and what year was the invasion or the seizure?

Mr. ARMALIS. They invaded in June 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you attending school at that time?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you belong to any organization at that time?

Mr. ARMALIS. I belonged to the Boy Scout organization and just associations of students, young students of high school.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Soviets seized Lithuania, did you continue to go to school?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened at the school after the Soviet occupation?

Mr. ARMALIS. Well, they let us continue our studies, but they changed the courses. They put in new courses. For instance, Soviet Constitution, Soviet history, Soviet geography, and they dispelled religious classes.

Mr. McTIGUE. We had testimony here this morning, Mr. Armalis, concerning the fact that certain school students were required to spy on their fellow classmates and their relatives and friends by the NKVD.

Were you ever in that position?

Mr. ARMALIS. No; I was not.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you know that that happened?

Mr. ARMALIS. Well, I heard of one case, the Communist Youth. One student. He was forced to spy. At the same time, he was a friend of ours.

I think he was a very good boy of ours. I don't know what he did for the Communists and for NKVD.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were any of your relatives deported from Lithuania or were they arrested?

Mr. ARMALIS. They were assigned to be deported during the first deportation, but they got notice, I think, through the Lithuanian underground, and they escaped that night. They weren't present. But they were deported for a second time during the second Russian occupation in 1948. My father, my mother, and my grandmother. She was about 72 years of age. Only a sister remained in Lithuania. She was not deported because she was studying to be a nurse and she was left.

Mr. KERSTEN. The other relatives you mentioned were deported?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Your father and your mother?

Mr. ARMALIS. And my grandmother.

Mr. KERSTEN. And your grandmother?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have you heard from your father or your mother?

Mr. ARMALIS. Well, I got a few letters while I was in Italy. I got the location. I checked on the map. I found they were located at Irkutsk.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you get this from them or from others who had information?

Mr. ARMALIS. I got it from them. Directly from my mother. She lived together with my grandmother, and my father was separated. I know my mother's and my grandmother's. My grandmother died, I think, just the same year. When I got the second letter she was already dead.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is that the last you have heard from your folks?

Mr. ARMALIS. Then I got a letter in the United States. When I got the address, when I came to this country, I wrote directly to my mother and I think I got only one letter from her. She was still there. I think she was almost blind, and since then I didn't get anything.

Mr. KERSTEN. This is Siberia that you refer to, is it not?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your uncle arrested at one time in Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. He was arrested during the first occupation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why?

Mr. ARMALIS. He was a principal of a grammar school in a little village. He was a reserve lieutenant in the Lithuanian Army. Just before election, he and others, former employees and officials of Lithuania—not in the Lithuanian Government, but in the city council, they were arrested all together. That night when I heard that somebody—I think after that there was some explanation that Communists—they didn't want to arrest people in the presence of other people. Just publicly. They put the Lithuanian flag in the cemetery one night and after that all that group, with my uncle, they were arrested and since then we haven't heard anything about them. That was provocation. The Communists did that so that they can get some kind of accusations. That happened just before elections.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you mean the Communists raised the Lithuanian flag in the local cemetery and then charged your uncle and other persons with having done it and arrested them?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. And they were deported?

Mr. ARMALIS. They were imprisoned.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you heard anything?

Mr. ARMALIS. We haven't heard anything about that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall the night of June 13, 1941?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes. I was, myself, arrested that night. It was about 11 o'clock at night. I was visiting my girl friend. That was about 11 o'clock. Where I lived, that house was in close location with Russian stores.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was this in Kaunas?

Mr. ARMALIS. No; that was in Siauliai.

They took me and made some shots in the air—a lieutenant with four guardsmen—they were regular army—regular Soviet Army. And then they called—they called that militia. One militiaman. He took me just by foot to the central headquarters of NKVD in Siauliai. I entered that room where the chief of NKVD was. The director. When I approached him he said, "Just three steps back from this table."

I made this three steps. He said, "Three more." I was close to the wall. He asked me questions. He asked for my student booklet. I showed him that. He asked where was I and what was I doing at that time. I said, "Well, I was visiting my girl friend."

I was asked her address. I gave him an address. Then he asked me, "Who are your parents," and I gave the names. "What is their location? Are they farmers?" I said, "Yes." "How much land do they own?"

I said, "Thirty-four hectares," but four hectares were taken off. That was about 10 acres, according to the new nationalization—how would I explain it—nobody can have more than 30 hectares. Around 75 acres. They have 10 too many and the 10 were cut, taken off, and given to some other workers. I don't remember who had that.

Then he told me, "All right, that means your parents are Kulaks."

Mr. MACHROWICZ. A Kulak is a rich landowner?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right. I think I said something that he wasn't rich, or something. I don't remember.

He called another guard and said, "Don't release him until you have my permission."

I was put in a room where there were a couple other officers and there was a special separated place. There was a bench. I sat on the bench. Then after about 3 o'clock, I laid down. But I didn't sleep. I just noticed that before entering that headquarters, there were very many NKVD's and I noticed that really they are not from Siauliai, but from other cities, from other locations.

At that time, when I was laying on that bench, I just noticed that they were doing something in a hurry. They were using telephones, many of those officers were working inside, outside, talking, all dressed up, having guns on their sides, and about 8 o'clock in the morning I had my final examination to get my degree to be a teacher.

I noticed through the window—that headquarters and my teachers' building was in front. I knew that my friends were going to take that last examination. I asked that officer who was on guard, I said, "How about me? When can I get out?"

They said, "You can't get out because you are here according to special information by the chief, by the director of that NKVD." Nobody can release me.

About 15 minutes afterward, they came and entered. One NKVD captain. I don't know him. I never see him in that headquarters—not in headquarters, but around that place. I asked him in Russian, because I spoke Russian—I asked him, "Well, *Tovarisch*, how about me? Why am I here?"

He said, "Why are you here?" I said, "I am a student. Right across the street is my school and I am coming to be a teacher. I would like to pass my final examination."

He said, "Where is your booklet? Do you have any documents taken by anybody?"

I said, "Yes; that man has my documents."

He approaches him, asks for the booklet, brought my booklet and said, "Okay, young boy. Just get out of here as soon as you can."

And I left that building, running out.

I went to my school, and I found that three of my instructors were taken out from home. And then I took my final examinations, I got my degree, and about 2 o'clock we got notice that there is a train full of people in the central railroad station, but not on that spot where usually trains are supposed to be, but about four or five hundred yards on the left side.

All the students went to visit—we are trying to find out—even to see our teachers, and see what is the situation.

About 20 of us went there and found the train. That train consisted of many boxcars—freight cars, I would say.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many would you estimate?

Mr. ARMALIS. There were at least 20, 20 boxcars, but I can't say exactly. Maybe a little more.

Then there were people approaching. There was a fence. Those boxcars had little windows. Only 1 window, or 2 windows. I don't remember exactly. They had special bars of wood and some of iron. There were people screaming, shouting, crying, making all kinds of

sounds. Women especially. Children. And on each boxcar—by each boxcar, at least one NKVD. He had his rifle, his pistol, and his map and compass.

Mr. KERSTEN. What date was this, do you remember?

Mr. ARMALIS. That was the 15th of June 1941.

Well, passing a few steps along that fence, I noticed two NKVD's whom we as students knew before. They used to come to our court and play volleyball with us. Their headquarters, as I mentioned, were not too far from our school. Even now I remember their names. There was Karpenko and Barabanov.

I just shouted to them. They approached me—one of them approached me. He said, "Hello, Adolf." He said, "Is there anybody of your family in those cars?"

I said, "No; but there are my teachers." and I knew that a very good friend, a rich businessman, with all his family, was there.

I said, "Listen. May I go in through that fence and find them?"

He said O. K.; go fast. He said, "Da; go fast."

Mr. KERSTEN. "Da," meaning Russian for "Yes"?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes. He said, "You may go." And I tried to find those teachers and that family.

Finally I found that family, but I didn't find the teachers. I haven't found any teachers of my school. I think they told me something to give notice to their daughter—the father said that his daughter is still in town. She wasn't caught that night. I think he said to tell her to watch. Then he asked to try to find anybody from their house, anybody who would have any kind of food, or just to contact anyone of their relatives or any neighbors, to bring them anything to eat.

Well, I didn't find anybody, but one woman from a fence asked me, she said, "O. K., young boy, bring that sugar." There was a teapot full of sugar. "Bring that to my boxcar. There is some of my family in there."

I took the pot and ran it over to the boxcar.

They gave me a string. I put it on the pot, and they tried to get it in the boxcar. As I mentioned before, there were bars across the windows, and that pot can't get through. I brought the pot back.

In one boxcar I think a woman asked me to bring water. I ran back to the fence and asked if anybody had anything where I could get some water, and somebody—I don't know where he got it from—got a special military canteen. I poured water and brought that. By the same system, they took that water inside.

I spent about 20 or 15 minutes along those 4 or 5 boxcars. Not further, because there was another guard and I don't think they would permit me.

Then, suddenly came one lieutenant or an officer, and he talked to one of the guards and looked over at me. I just saw that they were approaching me, and I knew that it was time for me to get out from this place and run away.

People were coming in groups, and that mass of people every time gets larger and larger, and they began to shout and shout in such harsh words at the guards.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are now talking about the people who were left behind?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is it true that there were guards stationed around this area so the people couldn't come up to the cars?

Mr. AMALIS. There was a fence before the tracks. On the tracks there were boxcars. The fence was about 20 yards from that train. People were leaning on that—about 3 or 4 or 5 lines of people were leaning toward that fence.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there guards preventing the people from going right up to the cars?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right. The guards were coming up closer to the fence when those people began to shout against them.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, these were apparently the relatives?

Mr. ARMALIS. Relatives and neighbors; that is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. From whom these people in the boxcars had been torn; is that right?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes, sir.

In a short time I heard a whistle and the train moved away from this location.

When the train moved out from Siauliai, I remember, I think it remained for another day, but they changed the location every 6 hours. In every location people approached, and it happened the same.

Then I and other friends, as I was in good contact—we have the same idea, the same understanding, that here is something happening where we have to be organized and, "Well, let's have a meeting."

I went with other fellows to a friend who was very active and we had a conference. We said, "Let's wait," because we felt there would be a war and had to be ready. We decided to be organized, have assembly, and to find as much as we can of guns and rifles, mostly rifles, any kind.

Before, there was a store of guns and there was some connection where some of the fellows got guns.

I wondered what happens to my parents, that if here people are deported, I said that I just knew my parents must expect the same fate.

Then, in a couple days I left that city and with other guys by truck I got to where my parents lived, on that farm.

I then joined another group of my former friends, where I used to spend my summer vacations, and they had some ammunition and some guns, and we were ready. We had just decided we don't have to attack the Red army when they are in groups but only small groups, fleeing Russians, and to collect guns, because we didn't know how long it would last. In about 1 week the Germans were moving into Lithuania. I think that was June 22, 1941. We then heard on the radio that guerrillas had taken our ex-capital, Kaunas, and our new government was formed.

At the same time, Germans were already in Siauliai, when last-minute torture occurred in my village, just before the Communists fled that village. There were five persons jailed. One was a police officer, a former police officer, one an agronomist, and a former mayor of that little town.

Mr. KERSTEN. What town was that?

Mr. ARMALIS. Papile.

Next morning I heard that fleeing Communists—they were jailed in just a little cell, and they didn't even have time to open the door and shut those people inside. They shot all those people through a window. Only one was left alive.

This man still lives in Canada, that is, the former mayor. He was shot through his face. I think he had 3 or 4 shots, but his teeth were shot, and right through the chin that bullet went.

Mr. KERSTEN. He survived?

Mr. ARMALIS. He was the only one.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were these five people in custody, at the time?

Mr. ARMALIS. They were in custody, in jail.

Mr. KERSTEN. Of the NKVD?

Mr. ARMALIS. NKVD and Communists. There were NKVD and Communist members there.

That was last-minute killing. We had a funeral. I participated with other guerrillas. I was an honor guard.

Then we collected guns, mostly guns from dead Russians, and we hid those. We had special wide bands which we wore so that the Germans would understand that those people were not against them. They gave us special bands, and we got from our police, too, certificates that we were Lithuanian guerrillas, partisans, as we were called at that time, Lithuanian patriots.

The heaviest guns we returned to the Germans because there was such martial law, but rifles, grenades, pistols, we hid ourselves because we didn't know what the future would be later, what was coming later.

Then came Germans, fleeing Russians and Communists, who were taken in custody, and they were sent to central recruiting stations and they were prosecuted and there were trials. I didn't participate.

I would like to mention one point: During the period when I was at school—in 1941, February 16, our independence day—we went to church and after holy mass we sang our national anthem.

After we left church a quarter of our students were taken. Three students from high school, where I was a former student—

Mr. KERSTEN. This was in February 1941, under Communist occupation?

Mr. ARMALIS. Under the Communist occupation.

They were arrested by militia outside of the church. Only one of them came back. I don't know anything about three others, about their fate. And also, once during the constitution lesson—I think it was the first week—it was in September 1940 when we had our constitution lecture. I, and three other guys, being in the bathroom—that was the last hour, because we had 6 days and six 1-hour classes every day. We decided not to go to class and we told the other guys, and everybody agreed, except only one guy. He went to that class.

And after that, the next day, I and another guy, but not the third, were called by Komsorg, and the director of our school. They told us, "This last time." We didn't say we skipped it. We just tried to fool them, and said we didn't know it was scheduled.

They said this was the last time, and if anything happens like that, "You will be expelled from the course," and they would lower our conduct grades to C minus and put us on probation.

I think that Komsorg helped me, because in 1938 I was with him in high school. We were buddies in the same high school, and he knew me. But he was expelled from that school. I don't remember the reason, but I knew him in 1940 when he appeared in our school as a Komsorg. You know what his duties were.

Mr. McTIGUE. I think we have had testimony on that.

After the German occupation of Lithuania, Mr. Armalis, what did you do?

Mr. ARMALIS. During or after?

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Soviets had retreated and evacuated Lithuania and the Germany Army had occupied Lithuania, what did you do?

Mr. ARMALIS. During summer vacations I spent time on my father's farm. Then I enrolled as a student, and after the Germans tried to get us into the army, I left my university and went back to my father's farm. I was there until the Russians, for the second time, invaded Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you then go?

Mr. ARMALIS. I joined a well-established guerrilla band. It was a full regiment of guerrillas. We had good communications, well-trained officers. I then participated in, I would say, actual combat against the Russians and Communists, against Soviets.

Mr. McTIGUE. With the guerrillas?

Mr. ARMALIS. With the Lithuanian guerrillas.

Mr. KERSTEN. When was this?

Mr. ARMALIS. That was since 1944—June until October 1944.

Mr. KERSTEN. This was after the Germans were driven out again; is that right?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right. During the time they were being driven out. They were still in Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thereafter, did you leave Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. I and 3 other guerrillas were trapped in 1 house. The front was about 4 miles away. There was a river, and on one side there were Russians, and on that side was no-man's land, and behind it about 5 miles there were Germans. We were just exactly on the other side of that river, where we had our mortars, our artillery, and just in foxholes. I was there in foxholes for about 3 weeks.

Then we got notice, through communications of our headquarters, that the Russians were ready for a move. We retreated. That was about 10 o'clock on the 4th. We went to one farmer and we asked to stay all night, and he said all right. They brought a door from a barn and put it in a room, put straw on it, and the four men fell asleep.

We were about 40 yards from, not a highway, but just a road. About 12 o'clock midnight, I would say after a couple hours of sleep, we heard somebody knocking on the door, and silhouettes and shadows walking around that house. Then we heard the Russian language. They said in Russian, "Landlord, open the door."

When we went to that room that night, around us were Germans and Ukrainians in the German Army. They were around that location. We thought that this really was white Russians or Ukrainians in German uniform, asking to have the door opened, and we didn't worry very much.

After the second time, they knocked on the window and knocked on the door. Then somebody said, "Listen, you are the youngest. Go and look. It might be that they are Russians." I was just in short pants. My submachinegun was hanging on the wall; my hand grenades were in a bag under the bed. In our outfit, one has a rifle and the third has a pistol.

I jumped from the bed and went to the window. I put my face on the window and a Russian came up at the same time. We looked at each other, face to face. I saw his figure, his rifle, his cap. I just jumped back to the wall and said to the other fellows, "Russians."

Everybody jumped from the bed. Nobody could find shoes. We were really nervous.

On that road, about 40 yards from there, there was a mass of the Red Army moving. They were talking. I just heard voices. They were calling each other by name, and artillery was moving by horses and the infantry was passing by. But those men, the first one I faced—there were about 10 or 12. They were working about our house and knocking on the doors and windows, asking to have the door opened.

Before we got our shoes, and got all dressed, I took my submachine gun, left off the safety, putting the magazine in. I had about 300 bullets. I distributed them to one fellow who had a pistol. Those bullets fit that pistol. We just decided not to get close to the window. They would put matches up and see who was inside. The poor men were jumping, and not knowing what to do.

The Russians didn't wait too long. In about a half hour they brought a Lithuanian woman. She spoke Lithuanian and said to that landlord—and that landlord and three children and a woman, they were crying and praying to God, and saying, "Now, in the last minute they will burn our house. What can we do?"

I said, "Just be quiet. Don't say anything."

Then that woman outside called and said, "Listen; don't worry. They are Russians. They won't do anything wrong to you. Just open the door and let them get in, because maybe there are some hidden Germans and guerrillas." That is exactly what there was. There were about four guerrillas.

Then, at that same time, that mass passed by, but those 12 or 14 Russians still surrounded our house and were walking around. Three took a light machinegun and put it close to the barn. There was woods about 20 yards from that house. They made a little retreat. Others were still walking and the woman was asking to open the door.

Then we noticed that the mass passed by, and we suddenly told the landlady, "Listen. Let those Communists get through the kitchen and we will try to escape through the road where the Red army just already passed."

It just happened so. Our guns were ready, and we were just lucky that she put a lock on there. We struck a match, opened the lock, and we escaped. There was no shooting from our side or their side. We escaped about 200 yards.

Then on October 4, there was one already frozen. He was without shoes. I had a leather jacket and, not a T-shirt but an undershirt—what I could find, that's all. But he was without shoes and just a jacket. We escaped through the woods and, at the same time, we noticed two lights. Somebody was striking matches and smoking cigarettes. We talked among ourselves. We said, "Listen, you are without shoes. Go find what is there." He went there. He came back and said, "There are two Russian patrols, smoking cigarettes."

Then we made a circle around and just not too far from that house where we slept—

Mr. KERSTEN. Let me ask you this: How long after that was it that you left Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. That was still in Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you leave Lithuania after that?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long after that?

Mr. ARMALIS. This was my living, continuous living. This is how I left. The Russians were already ahead.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you go to from Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. I was taken, as all refugees, mostly, across the German border, into Little Lithuania, which was under German occupation.

Then, I got into Germany. Well, I got in some kind of labor group.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you remain in Germany in this kind of occupation until after the war was over?

Mr. ARMALIS. Would you repeat that question, please?

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in Germany until after the end of the war?

Mr. ARMALIS. No, in Germany and Austria, until February 1945.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then what happened?

Mr. ARMALIS. Then from Innsbruck, in Austria, I met some Franciscan fathers, and escaped into Italy.

Mr. KERSTEN. This is before the war ended?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you emigrate from Italy to the United States?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was that?

Mr. ARMALIS. December 10, 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman, except for one comment: Mr. Armalis is again taking an examination, but under somewhat different circumstances. He had a final examination at the University of Detroit at 3 o'clock today. I think he has to return at 5 o'clock.

Mr. ARMALIS. No, I had two finals. One is for Air Force ROTC.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was good enough to make haste down here at 3 o'clock in order to be on hand to give this testimony.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Armalis, when was this guerrilla band first formed?

Mr. ARMALIS. It was formed during the Russian occupation.

Mr. BENTLEY. In 1940?

Mr. ARMALIS. It was 1940, and a little before, I would say.

Mr. BENTLEY. And you left it in October 1944? That is when you got out of Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know if there are any members of this guerrilla organization that stayed behind?

Mr. ARMALIS. Where?

Mr. BENTLEY. In Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes. We were persuaded to remain in Lithuania, and to be like hawks. Our name was Hawks. That means we have to stay in the woods, to have communications, not to do anything against the Red army, not to execute but really to catch Communists

each night and go back to the woods. We really had hopes of a better political situation. We were hoping that Great Britain or the United States would land in our port and take over.

Mr. BENTLEY. When you left Lithuania, other members of your organization did stay behind in Lithuania?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes; three friends of mine—they were in Lithuania. I forgot to mention when I got the letter from my mother, she said one of them died in a hospital. The second took a course in the Russian language, and the third went to find a better job, from the farm, into town, in the city.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is the three members of your organization who are still there?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. I have just one question: How did you finally get out of that house? They came in one door and you went out the other?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right. They all entered through the door of the kitchen. They opened the door and came in. When we heard the sound of Russians already in the kitchen, we just opened that door, striking matches, pulling that lock, and escaped, two by two. My submachinegun was still open, but we hadn't heard any shots from the Russians.

Mr. MADDEN. You cleared out through the woods?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many members were there of your family before the Communists came?

Mr. ARMALIS. There were four. Father, mother, grandmother, and sister.

Mr. KERSTEN. You had a sister?

Mr. ARMALIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Your father, mother, and grandmother?

Mr. ARMALIS. And grandmother.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was your sister older, or younger?

Mr. ARMALIS. She was younger.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was she deported?

Mr. ARMALIS. No, she is still in Lithuania. I think so, but I don't know.

Mr. KERSTEN. She didn't get out?

Mr. ARMALIS. She didn't get out. When the parents were deported, she was left alone, because she was studying to be a nurse at that time.

Mr. KERSTEN. What date were your father and mother deported; do you know?

Mr. ARMALIS. When I got the letter in Italy—that was in 1944—they were already deported.

Mr. KERSTEN. You don't know exactly when?

Mr. ARMALIS. No, I don't know. A couple of letters I got from home, from my parents' home.

Mr. KERSTEN. They were deported in the second occupation?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes, after a couple of years of the second occupation had passed already.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Communists came for a year, and the Germans were there until 1944, and then the second Communist occupation. Then it was during that time that your parents were deported?

Mr. ARMALIS. Yes. I think it was 3 years until they were deported.

Mr. MADDEN. Did you ever hear any more from any of those people in that cattle train when you went down there that afternoon?

Mr. ARMALIS. No; I did not.

Mr. MADDEN. Nobody in your hometown ever heard anything from them again?

Mr. ARMALIS. Nothing at all.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many people would you estimate were in those cattle cars, and in the train?

Mr. ARMALIS. I think at least 40.

Mr. KERSTEN. In each car, you mean?

Mr. ARMALIS. The people I talked to in those cars.

Mr. KERSTEN. In those cars, or on the whole train?

Mr. ARMALIS. I can't estimate for the whole train.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many cars?

Mr. ARMALIS. About 20 that I saw.

Mr. KERSTEN. We thank you, Mr. Armalis. Your story corroborates stories that we have heard before.

We will adjourn at this time to reconvene at this place at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene in room 1018, Federal Building, at 10 a. m., Tuesday, December 8, 1953.)

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIC COMMITTEE,
Detroit, Mich.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a. m., in the Federal Building, Detroit, Mich., Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Bentley, Bonin, Madden, and Machrowicz.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel; and Constantine R. Jurgela, of counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order, please.

I will state at this time that we have had with us yesterday, and previously in New York, Mr. Jurgela, who has been of counsel with regard to Baltic matters and Lithuanian matters.

Mr. Counsel, we have the first witness, here.

Will you raise your right hand, please? You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF AN ANONYMOUS WITNESS

The WITNESS. So help me God.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very brief statement as far as this witness is concerned. He insisted on being anonymous. He insisted on not having his identity known.

As a consequence, he has put on a mask. It was at his insistence that this procedure was adopted.

Mr. KERSTEN. I might state that, as previously stated, the committee will do everything within reason to protect any witness concerning whom there is reasonable ground to believe that there is danger of reprisal by virtue of his testimony.

From your investigation and from your conversation with this witness, is that the situation?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Chairman, might it not be proper to make a note in the record that the committee does have in its files the correct name and address of this witness and of previous witnesses whose anonymity was preserved yesterday, for our own records?

Mr. KERSTEN. I think that is very proper, Mr. Machrowicz.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Witness, are you a resident of Detroit?

The WITNESS. Of Dearborn.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why are you afraid to testify in open session of the committee without a mask?

The WITNESS. Because I have relatives left in my own native country.

Mr. McTIGUE. You have relatives there?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall June 16, 1941?

The WITNESS. June 26, it was.

Mr. McTIGUE. June 26, 1941?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened on that date?

The WITNESS. On that date, it started about 11 o'clock, or before noon. We were locked in the barracks.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before proceeding, will you tell us where you were born?

The WITNESS. In Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Proceed with your story.

The WITNESS. That day we were locked in the barracks and there were two barracks. At noontime, I noticed another one——

Mr. McTIGUE. You were taken to a forced-labor camp, were you not?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where was it located?

The WITNESS. It was near the capital, Kaunas. It was located 26 or 27 miles from Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many prisoners were confined in that camp?

The WITNESS. Five hundred; a little bit more or less. I would say 10, more or less.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were they all Lithuanians?

The WITNESS. Most of them were Lithuanians. There were a couple Polish and Russian soldiers, but the Russian soldiers were released on Sunday when the war started.

Mr. McTIGUE. There were Lithuanians and some Polish soldiers?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were these people who were confined here guilty of major offenses or minor offenses?

The WITNESS. I don't know exactly, but I could say only about 60 percent in that camp were criminals, and 40 percent were political prisoners. In this camp were people sentenced to not more than 3 years to serve in the labor camp.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of work did you and the other prisoners have to do in this camp?

The WITNESS. It was the manufacture of peat.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were sent to work digging peat, were you?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. In the swamps surrounding the camp?

The WITNESS. A couple days I was turning over the peat to dry in the sun, and I put them together into big piles. We built piles of this peat to dry.

Mr. McTIGUE. How old were you at this time, approximately?

The WITNESS. Approximately 18 years old.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the age of the prisoners, the political prisoners?

The WITNESS. The political prisoners, from 16 years old, or 15 years old, one was, to 75, or 80, even.

Mr. McTIGUE. They ranged from 15 years of age to 75?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you or any of the other prisoners given any kind of special punishment if you didn't happen to meet your work quota, or otherwise displeased the camp administrators?

The WITNESS. If you did not meet your workday, or the norm, what you were supposed to do, you were given less food.

If you were sick—not so sick that you should lie in bed, but like you had on your hands swollen places from working, or on the feet, you were punished by being sent into a room without a window, only a frame of iron window, which didn't have any glass or screen, and in that room you were naked and left for 2 or 3 days and in that camp there were many mosquitoes. I would say that was a terrible punishment.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you placed in that room?

The WITNESS. No; I wasn't. I came into the camp on the 22d of June. I was 5 days working and 4 days not working. We were locked in before the massacre.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, did the massacre about which you are to submit testimony happen shortly after June 22, 1941?

The WITNESS. That was on Thursday, I am pretty sure.

Mr. McTIGUE. It was approximately the 26th of June, to the best of your recollection?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us what happened on that day, please. This was after the war with Germany started?

The WITNESS. Yes. On June 26.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us what happened, please.

The WITNESS. At noontime, we noticed—I can't recall now—1 or 2 soldiers. They came around sneaking and looking at what was going on in the camp. So after 15 minutes or so, they disappeared.

In another hour or half hour, the thing I heard was shots and they started shooting from the side of the forest. We all dropped on the floor and started to hide.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, let me go back for a moment. The Russian soldiers came in and took the prisoners out in the yard, did they?

The WITNESS. I come to this point—I mean, that is how it all started.

After the soldiers left, 2 soldiers or 1 soldier was looking around, only, and they disappeared.

After a half hour or 1 hour, we heard only the shots. We were in the barracks and we dropped on the floor. They kept shooting.

Mr. McTIGUE. Into the barracks?

The WITNESS. Into the barracks, because nobody was outside. Then the fire stopped. The thing I saw was a group of soldiers coming out of the forest. We were forced to come out of the barracks.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were then taken out of the barracks?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many of you?

The WITNESS. In that barracks were about 380 people or 400.

We were taken out to the yard. There was a big fence around with three wires. With hands up, we were ordered to stay still in there.

Then the soldiers brought out another man, what I would call privileged—not privileged, but they had to do something with machines and so on—helping hands.

Mr. McTIGUE. Trusties?

The WITNESS. No; I wouldn't say trusties, but just like mechanics and other things. They were in another barracks because they had to go earlier to their work and they had it a little easier, I would say.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many of them were there?

The WITNESS. Forty or fifty.

Mr. McTIGUE. Three hundred of you in the main barracks and about 40 in the other barracks?

The WITNESS. Three hundred eight in the main barracks and 40 or 50 in another barracks.

They were lined in front of the fence.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was anybody taken from the administration barracks?

The WITNESS. I will come to this point, too.

Then they ordered these employees and their wives and kids to come out.

Mr. McTIGUE. The employees of the camp?

The WITNESS. Yes. They were brought out to the yard, behind the fence. Then there was a barn, like a farmer's. They had a small farm in there and they took care of that. They brought these men, too, in front of the fence.

After this came an armored car and another car—I don't remember now, a couple cars, another kind—I don't recall what kind they were.

They started to talk to prisoners. They talked with the employees and then he turned around and talked to us. In the meantime, they shot the employees and their wives and kids.

Mr. McTIGUE. They shot their own employees?

The WITNESS. They shot their own employees and their wives and kids.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who did the shooting?

The WITNESS. Russian soldiers.

Mr. McTIGUE. Didn't the employees protest beforehand and say that they were Communists, that they were employees and so forth?

The WITNESS. I don't know if you could find in the Russian dictionary a word which would be described as a protest. There is no protest at all.

Mr. McTIGUE. I stand corrected on that. I am sorry.

In any event, they did shoot the employees?

The WITNESS. They shot the employees' families, and even the dogs. There were two dogs and they shot them.

When the commander told to other guys, or fellow prisoners—he ordered the soldiers to come and search us. I don't know what for they search, but it seems for the weapons. But they could see very good that we were prisoners and didn't possess any weapons. Nothing.

After the search, he ordered the soldiers to come out. I was at that time close to the gate. I knew the Russian language and I wanted to hear what they talked about.

Other guys said, "We are Communists; we are by mistake here. We are impressed by the Smetona, or the earlier regime."

Mr. McTIGUE. By President Smetona?

The WITNESS. Yes. They said, "Maybe they overlooked our files, or something, but we should be released," they said.

I think he didn't care what they said, and he said, "Massacre them."

Mr. McTIGUE. Shoot them?

The WITNESS. Shoot them.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they shoot them?

The WITNESS. So I started to go back. After the first shot, I dropped down on the ground. And all the shooting lasted about—I can describe it as minutes, but to me it seemed like a long time. It might have been very short. I would say between 15 minutes and a half hour.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did they mow these people down, with sub-machine guns or with rifles?

The WITNESS. I forgot to mention that point.

When he said, "Shoot them," and the soldiers start lining—like here was a fence, they started lining up the machineguns. They lined them up, the soldiers, and they started shooting.

I was withdrawing, at the time, back. It happened to be my luck, I laid down—right in here was some kind of small hill that is supposed to be for flowers.

Mr. McTIGUE. A kind of a mound?

The WITNESS. Yes. I laid just behind that mound.

After that shooting almost stopped, I heard the Russians among themselves arguing. One I heard saying, "I can be sure that they are 25 percent alive." And I heard a couple shots. I don't know to which direction they were fired. So they decided to go and look around to search; see who is alive. They came in sight and asked the people who are alive to stand up.

And can you believe me, about 3 or 4 guys stood up. I was lucky, I say. I was young, and the nerves I could hold.

Mr. McTIGUE. Just take your time, Mr. Witness.

Mr. KERSTEN. How far out of the city of Kaunas was this place, Mr. Witness?

The WITNESS. About 27 miles it is.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is there some name?

The WITNESS. Pravieniskis.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many people were involved in being shot at there, the victims?

The WITNESS. As I know—I mean, after the Red Cross investigated, they found that with the injured, there was alive maybe about 30.

Mr. KERSTEN. I mean, how many were killed, all told?

The WITNESS. 470 or 480.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many would you judge, of those 470 or 480, were children or youths?

The WITNESS. Youths, I would say the most prisoners put by the Russians were between 17 and 23—25 years old.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there any younger than that there?

The WITNESS. One I remember was 15 years old.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many women were there, do you know?

The WITNESS. There were no women except the employees' wives.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many wives of employees?

The WITNESS. Four or five.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many employees?

The WITNESS. About seven.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were these seven employees Lithuanian Communists?

The WITNESS. Yes; they were Communists, some of them. Some of them, I wouldn't say they were Communists, but the chief and his assistant, they were real Communists, and they were desperate men.

Mr. KERSTEN. That chief and his assistant, were they shot?

The WITNESS. That I forgot to mention. You see, when the fighting started from the forest, before everything started, and the wheels started to go around, we saw the chief running away through the woods. He ran away. But later on he was imprisoned and sentenced to death.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you mean after the Communists left?

The WITNESS. When the Germans took over.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were telling us, Mr. Witness, before, that the Russian guards said that all who are alive, stand up. You said some stood up.

What happened to them?

The WITNESS. Just plainly, they shot them. Now, I can recall one man who was the barber in the camp—that means a privileged man, again—and he had a tattoo on him. Here was Stalin, here was Lenin, here was a Red Star, and he said, "I would die for Lenin and Stalin," you see.

They said, "You would die not for that, but—"

There are some women here so I cannot tell. They said, "You would die for 'that,'" and they shot him.

In the camp would be betrayers, but even these should go through all the thing without any exception. After they finished looking, and I didn't hear any steps or any Russians speaking—

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you lying still on the ground?

The WITNESS. I was lying still on the ground with my ears plugged and I didn't move at all.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you lie there on the ground?

The WITNESS. I can't describe it in hours, but I would say it lasted about 45 minutes or 1 hour.

After that search, I didn't hear any soldiers talking or walking around. Only one thing I heard was complaints from other fellows who were real badly hurt. They used to shoot with those dum-dum bullets, you see, and some even were asking to be finished off because they couldn't stand the pain.

After I heard other people talking around, I didn't feel my hands. I thought I lost my hands, but even without that, I wanted to live and see what happens further.

Then I turned my head a little bit and I looked around to see what was going on. I saw one soldier standing in front of a fence and I turned around and I saw a terrible picture of dead fellows, or dead prisoners.

That one soldier, or guard, I would call him, he stood there until it started to get dark. Some fellows who were lying close to the corners of the barracks and wanted to escape, he shot them. He didn't shoot anyone who didn't stand up or start to move, but those who started to escape, he shot them.

Before dark he himself got scared and he started shouting for his comrades, but no answer came, so he shot a couple shots into the air and again shouted, "Here is a Russian," but still he got no answer.

He told us, "You lying here who are alive, I will go and see where my commander is. I will bring him back. We will look over your files and bring back to Kaunas."

When he turned around and made a couple steps, all who were alive stood up and ran away. I ran away into this swamp. There were places with squares, with walls built up to let water from one square to another. I spent all the night in the swamp.

In the morning we noticed one plane circling around the camp and he kept going out and dropped something from the plane onto that small city of Pravieniskis. That was a village or community, Pravienskis was.

Then I saw one guard coming from the Pravieniskis city into these barracks, and he saw us. He called and told us we can come to the camp and get some food if we want, and there was nobody around.

Mr. McTIGUE. You returned to the camp then?

The WITNESS. I was returning to the camp. When I came close to the camp, on the corner where the fence ended, I looked to the picture. I couldn't stand up. When I came I looked at that terrible sight, and on the side were lying 3 or 4 Russian soldiers. They were shot, too. I presumed why they were shot was the argument about those 25 percent alive that they mentioned.

I turned around and I went home.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were all the people there dead, the boys and the old men?

The WITNESS. I didn't see, but when the Red Cross came in there the second day they said they found still alive badly injured people.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they find any United States citizens among that group?

The WITNESS. Yes. I used to sleep in a room with four United States citizens who were in the United States for some time, and they came back, built up a textile factory. I mean, they made their living.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall who they were and where they came from in the United States?

The WITNESS. No; I don't know exactly where they came from in the United States, only what I read in the papers, that Dosdantas, he was from Boston. I only read in the papers that he was from Boston. I didn't know exactly where they came from.

Mr. McTIGUE. What papers did you read that in?

The WITNESS. I think that was in the Lithuanian paper.

Mr. McTIGUE. And who were the others that you can recall?

The WITNESS. I know the names. His son was a good friend of Strimaitis. Then there was Garsva and Strimas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Witness, when did you leave Lithuania?

The WITNESS. On July 6, 1944. I left my hometown, Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, except to point out that the account given by this witness is very strikingly parallel to an account of testimony I heard last week given by an American GI who escaped a similar fate in a North Korean prison camp. The two instances are strikingly parallel.

I have no questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I don't know whether you explained, Mr. Witness, just what these people who were in this camp and were massacred, what were they charged with, or were they charged with anything?

The WITNESS. As I mentioned, 60 percent were criminals; 70 percent or 60 percent. I don't want to underestimate or overestimate.

Another 30 percent were what they consider political, but to be a political prisoner in there, you have to wink or to close not the right eye.

Like I, or other ones——

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What were you charged with?

The WITNESS. I don't know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you recall any overt acts that you performed with which you were charged?

The WITNESS. I was only near the place where there was an argument about communism, among another group of fellows who seemed to be Communists. I was invited to the prosecutor's office to sign a slip that I will be held under his supervision in prison No. 1. That is all that I know.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I might say that during the Washington hearings, this committee was able to obtain a photostatic copy of an actual warrant showing the offenses these people were charged with, and one, for instance, was charged with singing non-Communist songs in public.

The WITNESS. That is enough to make you a political prisoner.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, if you are caught singing a patriotic Lithuanian song, you are subject to the death penalty?

The WITNESS. Well, they can do even that.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were these people in the camp all Lithuanians, outside of the four Americans that you spoke of?

The WITNESS. They were American citizens, but they were Lithuanians.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They were Americans who had returned to Lithuania?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Outside of them, were there other nationality groups?

The WITNESS. I saw two men, they were in the Polish Army. When they retreated from Poland—I mean, when war started with Germany and they were retreating, they came to Lithuania, but I don't know why they were in there, you see, because to find out from the criminals and other persons, that is a very hard job, because no one will tell you the truth and you can't believe everything that they say. So I wouldn't know why they were there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You referred in your testimony to the fact that these people were shot with dumdum bullets.

Now, some who haven't had experience in World War I or World War II may not know what a dumdum bullet is. Will you explain what a dumdum bullet is?

The WITNESS. Yes. A dumdum bullet is—for example, if you were shot through the shoulder, somewhere in this part and the bullet comes out on the back, it opens all your flesh.

If the bullet goes through your head, you will be sure to lose half of your skull.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Isn't it true, Witness, that a dumdum bullet is a bullet with a flat head instead of a sharp head, and it explodes in the body and remains in the body, thereby causing greater suffering?

The WITNESS. I don't know. I haven't seen the dumdum bullet. I saw only the result of the dumdum bullet. I don't know how they explode or where they explode.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I have had experience with dumdum bullets and I know what they are. The effect of a dumdum bullet is to create much more agony and torture.

The WITNESS. I saw the people without half their skull and with a plain, open back. You could see the lungs, and coming through your stomach—I mean, that was something terrible.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The only purpose for using a dumdum bullet would be to cause more suffering and torture. Is that correct?

The WITNESS. I don't think you could cause any more suffering and torture to that man. There was no reason to use those dumdum bullets because they intended to kill and massacre and that is what they did.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Witness, you said you spent the whole night after this massacre in the peat pits?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Then, in the morning, you say you returned to the camp?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. And you also stated that you saw four dead Russian soldiers.

The WITNESS. Yes, sir, I saw it.

Mr. BONIN. Were there any other Russian soldiers around there at that time?

The WITNESS. No. I say I came just to the corner and I looked at that terrible picture, or sight, and I couldn't stand it. I turned around and went home.

Maybe I made a mistake. Maybe I could have been more useful if I had stayed in there. I saw everything, and maybe I could have helped the Red Cross and those who were interested in that thing, but that is the first time I have ever testified to this thing. This is the first time in my life.

Mr. BONIN. You witnessed all the people who had been killed there?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. And then you decided to return to your home in Kaunas?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Did anyone follow you, or did anyone come after you at all?

The WITNESS. No, there was nobody to follow me, because when I went in that morning, I stopped by a farmer to get milk. I got the milk. When we were going back home, one farmer asked us to help to dig a grave for the killed Russian soldiers. There was a truck turned over with 19 or 20 soldiers killed.

So we decided to help him to dig that grave. In the meantime, we were passing the German soldiers, already. One German officer was wondering why we were without hair. He stopped and asked the farmer if they are Russian soldiers. He said "No." He asked if we are from here, from this place. He says "No." So pointing to one man, he says, "He is from this place?" He says "No." The German took him.

Another one they took him, and then, I don't know why, but when the German soldier pointed to me and the farmer asked if I am from here, he says "Yes," and so I stayed in there.

From that point, I didn't want to help him—I mean, I apologized, I can't help, because I didn't want any trouble, and then I went alone, home.

MR. BONIN. In other words, that massacre took place just before the Germans started coming through there?

THE WITNESS. Yes. The Germans were behind, already. I think on Tuesday or on Wednesday, the Germans were in the temporary capital, Vilnius.

These soldiers massacred in that prison. I don't know who they were, but they were retreating.

MR. BONIN. Do you mean the Russians were retreating?

THE WITNESS. Yes.

MR. BONIN. That is the reason, then, there were no Russian soldiers around the day that you were able to get to the farmhouse and then eventually back to town?

THE WITNESS. No, there were no Russian soldiers at all. I met only German soldiers in there.

MR. BONIN. Thank you very much.

MR. MADDEN. You stated that after the massacre, after the shooting, the prisoners were lying down on the ground, most of them killed, and the Russian soldiers hollered, "Those that are alive, stand up," and 4 or 5 stood up?

THE WITNESS. Yes.

MR. MADDEN. Did you hear some shots, then?

THE WITNESS. Yes, sir. I forgot to mention, near me was lying a man who moved—I mean, I didn't see what happened, but I felt the steps of the soldiers and I heard a terrible shouting or crying of the man who was, as I later noticed, bayoneted. They bayoneted not one of them, but many of them. I could see only from the wounds that near me were about 3 or 4 bayoneted. They were still alive and were bayoneted.

One man who had an open back—and he wasn't bayoneted. He was left for torture.

Now, I recall, he was asking me to go to his father and mother in his hometown and to tell them that he was shot and to give his regards to them, and after maybe 5 or 10 minutes, or 15 minutes—I don't know—he died.

Those who weren't killed, but were badly injured, they weren't finished. Those who were not shot or injured, they wanted to kill them, only, because the other ones who were injured, they were crying or asking for them to finish them. They didn't.

MR. MADDEN. Did some of these executioners use small trench-digging shovels?

THE WITNESS. What for, trench-digging shovels?

MR. MADDEN. To split their heads?

THE WITNESS. As I say, I didn't see. I was lying on the ground, my face down, with a mouth full of sand, and I didn't see that. I don't know if they were doing this.

MR. MADDEN. That is all.

MR. KERSTEN. You were not charged, yourself, with any regular crime which would place you in this group, is that correct?

The WITNESS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. You say there were some people ordinarily charged with crime and who were criminals, and others who were not?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you were among those not charged with a crime?

The WITNESS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. A so-called political prisoner?

The WITNESS. Well, what I would call political.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Germans came in right after the Communists retreated, is that correct? It was after the Communists had gone?

The WITNESS. I mean, I wasn't there. The Red Cross came a day after the shooting.

The help came on a Friday from another small town, Rumiskis.

Mr. KERSTEN. Except for a few soldiers, the majority of these people were civilians, were they?

The WITNESS. Yes, they were civilians.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were in Lithuania during the elections of June or July 1940?

The WITNESS. Yes, I was, during the elections.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in Kaunas, at that time?

The WITNESS. Yes, I was in Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. From your experience there at that time and later, would you say that the Lithuanian people in any way wanted the Communists to come in and the Soviet Union to take them over?

The WITNESS. I can state only one thing. The parliament was elected after one night. The deputies saw their pictures hanging on these signs, on the walls and other places; that he was a deputy. He didn't have a chance to learn by himself from the officials or something that he was elected; only by reading the sign he found out that he was a deputy.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, my question was as to the people. Insofar as you know, what was the feeling or will of the people as to whether they wanted to go into the Soviet Union or not? That is my question.

The WITNESS. No one wanted to go into the Soviet Union.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you ever see anybody there, or talk to any ordinary citizen, who was not a Communist, who wanted to go into the Soviet Union?

The WITNESS. I didn't see any of them.

Mr. KERSTEN. At any time you were there?

The WITNESS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is all, Mr. Witness. Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is Mr. Brazeika in the room?

Mr. KERSTEN. You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF JONAS BRAZEIKA, DETROIT, MICH.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you understand English?

Mr. PADALIS. No, he doesn't.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will we have to use an interpreter with him?

Mr. PADALIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Jurgela, will you act as interpreter for this witness?

Will both of you stand up?

(Both the interpreter and the witness arose.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Jurgela, you do solemnly swear that you will truly translate from Lithuanian into English such answers as this witness gives to you, so help you God?

Mr. JURGELA. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now will you translate the oath to him: You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BRAZEIKA (through interpreter). I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state your full name?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Jonas Brazeika.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are you from Lithuania?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. From Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. What part of Lithuania are you from?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. From Ukmerge.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in the room, here, as the last witness testified?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Yes, I was here, too. I was sitting here.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you understand what he talked about?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Very little. Very little.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you tell us whether or not you were among a group of several hundred people, most of whom were shot in a prison camp at Pravieniskis, on or about June 26, 1941?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Yes, I was there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you among those at the camp who were shot?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Yes, I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you shot?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Yes, I was being shot at.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you bayoneted?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. They bayoneted me.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you take your coat off and show us.

Is that where you were shot?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Here I was shot through. The bullet came out here (indicating under the armpit of the right arm). Here was the bayonet wound (indicating the right elbow).

They were in a hurry. They had no more time to shoot.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you were shot and after you were bayoneted and after you were apparently left for dead, did you escape, as did the anonymous witness who testified just before you this morning? Did you escape into the woods?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I escaped when no single Russian was left around. It was 12 midnight.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, we have heard most of this story from the anonymous witness. We have put on this witness to corroborate the testimony.

Mr. JURGELA. The witness just told me, point to his right-hand finger, and said when he was in prison his right-hand fingers were broken. Some instrument was put between the fingers and broke them. They were torturing him. These two fingers are bent as a result of this wound [indicating the bayoneted elbow wound] and this finger was broken [indicating the middle finger of the right hand].

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Brazeika, what were you charged with when you were arrested and sent to this prison camp?

MR. BRAZEIKA. I do not know what they charged me with. They also brought some papers, showing that I had been a volunteer in the Lithuanian Army, that I had fought against them at Daugavpils, and they found in my reservist certificates that I had been a volunteer in the army.

MR. MCTIGUE. I want to leave this for the moment.

MR. JURGELA. He was a volunteer in 1919.

MR. MACHROWICZ. Twenty-two years before the massacre.

MR. MCTIGUE. I want to leave this incident for a moment and go back to the time when you were arrested in Kaunas, in the fall of 1940. Do you remember that?

MR. BRAZEIKA. I do remember.

MR. MCTIGUE. After you were arrested, what happened to you?

MR. BRAZEIKA. What happened? We used to be in such a chamber [motioning with both hands] and prisoners used to scribble on the walls, that, "The next day I'll be taken out to be shot."

At midnight they used to come in and remove some prisoners. They used to tie their hands behind their back. They used to take out 10 men from 1 cell, 10 men from another, at midnight.

MR. MCTIGUE. Did there come a time, Mr. Brazeika, when you were put to work as an orderly or assistant of some kind in the basement of NKVD headquarters in Kaunas?

MR. BRAZEIKA. I was an orderly of Colonel Caplikas in the Lithuanian Army.

MR. MCTIGUE. I don't think the witness understood my question. Let me rephrase it:

Mr. Brazeika, were you assigned to a job in the NKVD headquarters?

MR. BRAZEIKA. I was made to work in the prison.

MR. MCTIGUE. What kind of work did you do?

MR. BRAZEIKA. I used to saw the wood and used to toss out the corpses through the window, straight into a parked truck.

MR. MCTIGUE. Was one of your jobs to remove the corpses from the NKVD headquarters every day?

MR. BRAZEIKA. Not from the headquarters. From that cellar where the people had been tortured to death. In the cellar.

MR. MCTIGUE. How many corpses did you remove every day?

MR. BRAZEIKA. I cannot keep the count. I can't say definitely.

MR. MCTIGUE. Would you say it was 10 or 20 or 30 or 40? Have you any idea?

MR. BRAZEIKA. In a day, about 50; not every day.

MR. MCTIGUE. Some days you say 50, and other days not quite 50?

MR. BRAZEIKA. Less than 50 some days.

MR. MCTIGUE. Mr. Brazeika, did you have occasion to witness—

MR. BRAZEIKA (interposing). Some days I did not work at all at that. I just cut wood.

MR. MCTIGUE. Did you have occasion at any time to witness NKVD tortures on other people?

MR. BRAZEIKA. Yes; I worked there. I have seen it.

MR. MCTIGUE. How did you happen to see it?

MR. BRAZEIKA. They themselves used to point out, and say, "See, that same thing is going to happen to you. It is going to be like that to you. Look at it."

MR. MCTIGUE. And you can testify that you actually witnessed some of these tortures?

Can you tell the committee what they consisted of, what they were?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. They used to tear up fingernails. They cut up their noses and the ears. They used to beat the soles of their feet. You know, it is a long time ago. I have lost some memory. My memory suffered, you understand. A lot of it has gone.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have.

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I have to think about it to remember.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you know any of these people who were being tortured?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. No; I did not know them.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you mean in all these bodies you took out, you never saw anybody you recognized or knew who they were?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. No; I did not know any of them, but I used to recognize whether they were a priest or a friar. You know the friars, the monks. I would recognize the priests. They were dressed as priests, and I could recognize that. I could recognize from their clothing.

Mr. BENTLEY. How had they usually been killed, by torture or by shooting, or how?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. By tortures. I have seen several times also, the hangings.

Mr. BENTLEY. How many people would be hanged at a time?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. One at a single time.

Mr. BENTLEY. Where was this done?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. In the cellar, in the prison.

Mr. BENTLEY. How were they hanged? Were they dropped, or strangled, or how?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. They stood up erect and then they would pull a rope. I have seen them pull the rope, and the man was dead.

They used to close the door during the hangings, and we could see only through the loose boards. We could see part of the scene.

Mr. BENTLEY. And these people who were killed, the ones that you can recognize, were some people who were priests?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Yes. I would recognize the priests, more or less. I could also recognize people who were probably students or officials. There used to be individual workmen. You could see by their clothes.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were present, or you were able to see some of the tortures that were going on; is that correct?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Yes; I have seen it. I used to work there.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were these interrogations or were they just torturing them for the fun of it, or what?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. They used to be brought out from interrogations. They used to be interrogated first, driven to prison, and then from the prison taken down for torture.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, during the interrogation, what were they trying to find out or have them confess?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I could not hear the interrogation. They were brought here to the prison. They used to tell me, "We have been interrogated today."

Mr. BENTLEY. I am trying to find out what the questioning was developing.

Mr. BRAZEIKA. These people did not tell me that.

Mr. BENTLEY. Then, as far as you know, you just knew of the tortures, but you didn't know the reason?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I could only say what they asked me.

Mr. BENTLEY. Let's have that.

Mr. BRAZEIKA. They brought out my reservist's certificate. They would say, "Why were you working at the headquarters?" They said, "Why couldn't you transmit information to us?"

That is about all. Then they placed a lamp above my head. I was pushed into a corner, and then they slammed the door against me. I could neither stand erect—I could only stand in the crumpled position. I could not actually sit down, and this heated lamp was above my head until I fainted. And when I recovered they asked me, "Well, aren't you cold now?"

Mr. BENTLEY. I think that is all. We have had, unfortunately, too many similar experiences.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bonin?

Mr. BONIN. How old are you now?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I am 58 years old. I have a passport.

Mr. BONIN. What is your occupation at the present time?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I work in a cemetery. I am a grave digger. For the Russians I did that work, too. Such is my fortune.

Mr. KERSTEN. It seems to me the grave diggers are the only ones who survived these occupations.

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I worked with the Communists, the other grave diggers.

They pulled my hair, like this [indicating]. I have no peace with them.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. What was your occupation in Lithuania?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I used to be a farmer. I received land, and I worked my own land. I received the land as a former volunteer.

Mr. MADDEN. When these Russians would come in to take the prisoners out to be shot each night, or the nights they would come in to take 10 or 20, or whatever it was, would they tell the prisoners what they were going to do with them?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. No. They didn't say anything. They just took them out.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. BONIN. The NKVD headquarters were in Kaunas; is that correct?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Do you mean the prison?

Mr. BONIN. You were taken from the city of Kaunas out to the prison camp, 28 miles away from Kaunas?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Yes. I was taken to Pravieniskis, later from Kaunas.

Mr. BONIN. Then the bodies you removed were actually removed in this prison camp 28 miles away?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. In the prison of Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let's get the record clear here, if I may. I think I can probably clarify it, Congressman. The tortures and the bodies, concerning which the witness has testified, occurred in the prison in Kaunas.

Mr. BRAZEIKA. In the prison at Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did the tortures that you have testified about occur, and where were the corpses you referred to removed from?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. They used to bring many corpses from Kestutis Street and some were tortured in the prison.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just a minute. Now, I'll ask this question: You testified a little while ago that you worked in prison, and in this work you delivered some bodies, some corpses, out of the prison where you worked.

State whether or not this was in Kaunas.

Mr. BRAZEIKA. In Kaunas, in Mickvicius Street.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long were you in that prison in Kaunas, as near as you can tell us?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. I could not say for sure. About 6 months.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where was it you received these bayonet wounds in the elbow and the shoulder?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. In Pravieniskis.

Mr. BONIN. Where is that, now?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Beyond Kaunas. There is a railroad station. I worked in a peat field, there.

Mr. KERSTEN. How far from Kaunas was that?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. How far, I couldn't say exactly. That I wouldn't know. How many kilometers, I wouldn't know.

Mr. KERSTEN. It was outside of the city of Kaunas, is that right?

Mr. BRAZEIKA. Beyond Kaunas, in the forest.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mr. Witness.

That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Professor Padalis, do you solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF PRANAS PADALIS, DETROIT, MICH.

Dr. PADALIS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state your full name, please?

Dr. PADALIS. Pranas Padalis.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are a resident of Detroit, are you?

Dr. PADALIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is your occupation?

Dr. PADALIS. I am professor of economics, University of Detroit.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you hold degrees?

Dr. PADALIS. I am a doctor of economics.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are a Ph. D.?

Dr. PADALIS. A Ph. D.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the University of Detroit is a Jesuit university in the city of Detroit?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes; it is.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long have you been there?

Dr. PADALIS. Since 1948. The fall of 1948; I have been teaching.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you receive your doctorate?

Dr. PADALIS. In Kaunas. At the university in Kaunas, Lithuania. Vyautas the Great. It was the University of Vitautas the Great.

Mr. KERSTEN. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. PADALIS. The 2d of November 1948.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are you presently a citizen, Doctor?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes; since last February.

Mr. KERSTEN. When did you leave Lithuania the last time?

Dr. PADALIS. The last time I left Lithuania on the 8th of October 1944.

Mr. KERSTEN. And from that time in 1944, until 1946, where were you?

Dr. PADALIS. I was in Germany—in Austria, first, then in Germany, then in June 1945, I left for Paris and then I stayed there in Paris until I came here to this country.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were born in Lithuania, were you?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Dr. PADALIS. Raseiniai.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in Lithuania when the Communists came in in June 1940?

Dr. PADALIS. 1940, the 15th of June.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you there continuously until 1944?

Dr. PADALIS. That is correct. I didn't leave the country.

Mr. McTIGUE. Professor, let me ask you this: Were you one of the leaders in the Lithuanian anti-Soviet underground system?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes. I was one of the organizers, and later on, one of the leaders. I was a member of the Committee for Lithuanian Liberation, all the time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in the room this morning when the two witnesses testified as to the massacre at the Pravieniskis prison camp?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you happen, of your own personal knowledge, to know anything of that?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes. When we started our revolt in the morning, on the 23d of June, we received information—

Mr. KERSTEN. That is the year 1941, is it?

Dr. PADALIS. 1941. We had information from headquarters of our military command, while I was there, too—I think it was Friday afternoon.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you say "military command," you are talking about the guerrilla command?

Dr. PADALIS. The guerrillas. We had a political committee and the military committee, too.

It was led by the military committee, but I was there, too, present at the headquarters during the revolt which we started in Kaunas.

We learned that at the camp of Pravieniskis people were killed by the Soviet armed units, or NKVD. That, we couldn't get straight, but anyway, people were killed en masse. Then we sent several trucks and cars and I went myself, to check what happened, there, or what was happening there, because we don't know whether it was over or not, because the Red Army troops were still around Kaunas.

Then, on the way to Pravieniskis, we met two cars bringing wounded prisoners from Pravieniskis. One of them, I remember very well, was an American citizen Dosdautas, whom I knew personally, and whose son was at the headquarters with me, too. He was a young boy fighting with us.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that the same one that our anonymous witness testified to?

Dr. PADALIS. Exactly the same. His son is living in Chicago, now.

Then I came back and thought the shooting was over. There may have been some left alive, but I did not see them. Then I came back. The rest went to check the other camp and they made pictures and we took wounded people to the hospitals, and they almost all died

there, because they lost so much blood during the night that they couldn't be saved.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, let me go back a moment, Professor. How did you happen to be one of the leaders in the underground in Lithuania? How did it start? How did you get into it?

Dr. PADALIS. I won't be specific, of course. I won't give the names. I won't involve the fifth amendment, but I do realize—

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, Dr. Padalis, it is possible some of those people might still be there and you want to protect them?

Dr. PADALIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. I want to assure you that it is not necessary for you to name anybody whom you think should be so protected. We would like to have you give as much of the facts as you think will be safe to give.

Dr. PADALIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was teaching at the University of Vilnius. I was an instructor in economics. I was a young man, yet, 27 years old, at the time. One Sunday after the Mass, one Lithuanian officer approached me.

Mr. KERSTEN. When was this, Doctor, can you tell us that?

Dr. PADALIS. It was in the second half of October 1940.

Mr. KERSTEN. It was a few months after the Communists took over?

Dr. PADALIS. About 3 months after they invaded.

He said, "You know, Doctor, you don't know me, but do you know such-and-such a person?"

I said, "Yes; I do know him." He was a very good friend of mine.

"He didn't want to contact you because the police may know that you know him personally. Therefore, please trust me. I was at the Mass, now, with you, and I saw you receiving, publicly, communion." That is what I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, you went to communion.

Dr. PADALIS. He said that he trusted me and they were going to start a resistance movement and he wanted to know if I would see that person whom I knew. Of course, I talked for a while and I asked him to let me wait 1 day and then I agreed the next day and I went to see that man in a little forest near Vilnius. I became a member of the organizational committee of the resistance movement.

We planned to keep alive the hope of the Lithuanian people that they would be liberated. Secondly, we wanted to give them as much information as possible about the events in Lithuania, because the press, there, was only the Soviet press, the Communist press. They didn't get true or reliable information about what was happening to Lithuania, and what was happening abroad, especially.

Then we decided to have an underground press informing our people how they should behave and what was happening, especially abroad.

Third, we decided to warn those who were ruthless servants of the Communist Government—being Lithuanians themselves—that they would be executed if they didn't stop exterminating and persecuting their own people, their fellow Lithuanians.

There were three objectives at that time. Later on we added the fourth one, and the main one, to organize an uprising or revolt. That was our theory, listening to the foreign radio, especially the BBC from London, that there was something happening and that some-

thing was in the air, and we began organizing small military formations throughout the country.

Should I elaborate on some facts, about how the Soviet Government took our movement extremely seriously?

Mr. McTIGUE. Before you get into that, Professor, could you give us the organizational structure of the underground system, without revealing anything that you don't want to reveal?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes. It may be paradoxical, but we copied the organizational structure of the Communist Party.

Mr. KERSTEN. You had to cope with that, so you had to meet it.

Dr. PADALIS. We just followed the organizational setup because the Communist Party in many countries was an illegal party and organized in small cells comprising from 3 to 5 members.

So we did the same thing. We organized small units comprising not more than three. Not five. Not more than three. Then in large cities—first in small villages, there the resistance organization started. Then in Kaunas and then in other parts of the country.

We established the contacts that I think I shouldn't talk about, because still there is an underground movement on a much larger scale still going on and underground activities are an event, today, in Lithuania, and I think maybe the organizational structure is still the same. However, there are more in the forest today than at that time. We were more in the cities, especially in large cities.

We didn't start military activities of any kind, as we wanted to wait until the moment opportune to start our revolt. We did liquidate some traitors. There were some traitors, but very few.

We did not touch the Soviet Red Army at all, but only Lithuanian traitors.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your procedure for liquidation, briefly.

Dr. PADALIS. We established a secret military court made up of three members. It was not known to anybody except the commander of the military staff. I didn't know myself who served on that military secret court. Then the court chose the military staff, got information on each traitor, one who was a Lithuanian who persecuted his fellow Lithuanians, especially.

Then the court collected all the evidence proving that because of his activities, Lithuanians were killed or were arrested or were deported; that he was denouncing them; that he was acting as a traitor.

Then he would be sentenced to be punished or to be killed.

Mr. McTIGUE. In accordance with the findings of the court?

Dr. PADALIS. I would say some were executed by our special group. One group was a very small group organized to execute the orders or the sentence of the court.

Mr. McTIGUE. To carry out the sentence of the court.

Now, that sentence might be carried out in any fashion, or anywhere, I presume?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes. That is what I meant. As silently and as quietly as possible. I would say in the American Indian style. Quietly. They would disappear. Nobody was caught. Some in the provincial part of Lithuania were executed and the secret police did not learn who did the job. I never did myself, and I had nothing to do with it. I was political adviser to the military staff. That was my function. I collected political information on the basis of radio

broadcasts from BBC, mainly, or Germany, too. Then I contacted some of our former statesmen who were not arrested, yet. I asked for their opinions, and then I presented my estimation of the situation to the military staff. That was my task.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you know if this underground is functioning at the present moment in Lithuania in much the same fashion?

Dr. PADALIS. Oh, yes. In the same fashion on a much larger scale, and it is today more of a military movement than in 1940-41. They have regular military formations. They have training schools in the forests. They have their commanders and they act throughout the country. They have formations throughout the country, but mainly in the forests. Now, their centers of action are in forests, and we have quite a few in the large forests of Lithuania. Their hiding places are in the forests, at this time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is there some sort of liaison setup between the various courts?

Dr. PADALIS. The NKVD knows more than I am telling. The fact is that the Soviet NKVD's 3 divisions fought in 1946 and 1947 in several places against the underground formations. Three divisions were assigned to liquidate the garrisons.

Since the beginning of the second occupation, according to their estimation—because we had some contacts—over 30,000 men were killed fighting as guerrillas. During the second one.

We lost during our revolt in 1941, from June 23 to June 26, in 3 days, over 5,000 killed and 7,000 wounded. About 12,000 casualties were estimated throughout the country.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you were one of the top leaders in the underground in Lithuania, did you continue your teaching duties at the university?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes, I did.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us something about how you functioned as a teacher under the Soviet organization, and under the surveillance of the NKVD agents and yet managed to administer the underground?

Dr. PADALIS. Everyone who was a member of the Committee for the Lithuanian Liberation tried to remain in a legal situation. That means employed by the Soviet Government. There was only one possibility, then, to contact people and to organize our movement.

When the Soviet Government was established after the so-called elections, they began sovietizing our universities. Many professors were dismissed from the university. I remained on the faculty because I was young and I didn't take any active part in politics before they came. I was just a bookworm, maybe.

There were some objections against me, but since my father was a poor peasant—that means my background was also acceptable to them—they thought they could reeducate me, and among many who did stay on the faculty, I was one, too.

They appointed the prorector, what we call the vice president—a director of the party, Bolovas, and then they appointed an agent of the Communist Party by the name of Kopylov. He was an official agent of the NKVD at the university. Especially the prorector made the ultimate decisions with regard to the curriculum, as to the teachers, and the organization of the university. The rector of the university was a titular head in the beginning, but later on there was quite a

strong, stubborn patriot, and he regained some of his power later on, and he did protect the faculty and the students.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you say there was an NKVD man appointed as the effective head of the university?

Dr. PADALIS. Not effective head.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was in an important position?

Dr. PADALIS. A very important official position.

Mr. KERSTEN. So the NKVD moved right in on education, too.

Dr. PADALIS. On education and he was an official agent of the NKVD.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you present at the committee session yesterday?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you hear our witnesses testify—I think it was Mr. Banionis—to the fact that he was required by the NKVD to spy on his professors?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you present then?

Dr. PADALIS. I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were a professor at Vilnius University. Did any students spy on you?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes, they did. The NKVD assigned two spies to every class—secret ones, from the students. I think the methods are known already. It was testified how they engaged those spies. I knew that there were spies. All professors did know, because that is the system of the Soviet Secret Police, to have spies, at least two in every office, in every hospital, everywhere, where people are in groups.

Now, once I was told by this student whose name I won't give, after one class when I was leaving the university—it was at night—he waited for me and he said, "Doctor, I am a spy. Please don't criticize, don't ridicule the Soviet regime, and the Soviet economy."

I was teaching the planned economy and I did criticize in the beginning. Then he warned me. He said, "There is another one and I have to give the information because the other one whom I don't know will give the information to the police about your lectures."

Then once I quoted—we had to use the textbook sent from Moscow. Only those textbooks. The books published in Lithuania during independence or in other western countries, they were dismissed from our seminar libraries, and they were not available to the students in the library of the university. We got the texts and we had to follow them and just interpret everything favorably to the Soviet economy.

Once I quoted Stalin's statement which he made to the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1939. That was before the last one last year.

He stated that during the last decade, which means from 1929 to 1939—because in 1929 was initiated the Soviet planned economy—the first 5-year plan—during the period of two 5-year plans, the Soviet economy, in manufacturing industry, made progress of 800 percent, while at the same time the United States manufacturing industry made progress of only 30 percent.

I commented. I quoted him and I commented. "You know, if you have a dog house and you build a small family house, you make a progress of 1,000 percent. If you have a living house and you increase its value, you have an improvement of only 50 percent. That is

the difference between the Soviet manufacturing industry and the United States manufacturing industry."

After my lecture, I was called by the rector of the university and he got the statement in his hand quoting what I said. He only warned me. "You know, you are a young one." He studied at the university before the Communists came. He just graduated the year before they came. And he knew me. He said, "You know, I should inform you to the secret police, but because the spy was so good that he informed me. However, if you continue criticizing, you will be the professor, but you will disappear."

I realized myself that there were two spies in my classroom, and in all of them. The professors were controlled very closely by the NKVD. We were instructed by the Commissariat of Education in Moscow, which controlled all the universities in the Soviet Union that we should criticize the capitalist economy, that we should predict the collapse of it, because of crisis and frictions, those business waves, and we should foresee and try to convince people that the planned economy is the perfect system of economic organization. So we had to do it, of course, and later on, we were more careful.

But one thing maybe I could bring out, that the basic force during the occupation was not economic, engineering or medicine, but Marxism and Leninism.

Every student had to take 6 hours every week for 2 semesters, the course in Marxism and Leninism. From Moscow were sent two professors—I am afraid to give their names, now. I will have to spell them—Kusnecov and Bulin. They were professors in Marxism and Leninism, and to them were assigned eight instructors and they taught all students, but in Russian. The students understand, and they did sabotage their lectures. They even ridiculed Marx, Lenin, and even Stalin. There were many brave students. All the youth hated the Communists.

I remember that one morning Kusnecov came to the class. He saw a crucifix between the portraits of Stalin and Lenin with an inscription "Oh, Lord, do once more hang between two evildoers." That is the translation and maybe not a very correct one.

Then quite a few students were arrested from that class, but it was in June already.

MR. KERSTEN. June of 1941?

DR. PADALIS. June of 1941, when we expected something to happen, because even the Communist leaders began telling in closed meetings of the Communist Party, and some high functionaries, that the war with Germany was imminent. They did admit it.

MR. MCTIGUE. Did your underground system have some advance information on that?

DR. PADALIS. We didn't have very reliable advance information, but we did get some information through our channels in foreign countries. We got some, but nobody knew exactly. We expected it. We knew that a war was planned to be called in the middle of May. It didn't start. We got confused, but we continued our preparations for revolt.

Now, may I come back to our activities? One, I think, is of some significance.

MR. KERSTEN. As I understand it, Doctor, your statements here will not be useful to the Soviets in any way and will not endanger

anybody. We want to have it very clear that we don't want you to do either of those things.

Dr. PADALIS. I do understand that, Mr. Chairman, and I don't want to endanger anybody in Lithuania, but these facts that I am revealing are very well known to the Soviet secret police as well as to the Soviet Government.

When we decided to prepare the revolution, reprisals against the Soviet Government, we began collecting arms, or getting arms of various kinds. We did have them in the very beginning—people did hide arms and weapons from the secret police after the country was occupied by the Soviet Union. However, we were all ordered to turn in all guns to the Soviet police. However, many did not. We were short of guns. In the beginning of 1941—I won't give the date, the exact date, there was organized a theft of 500 hand grenades in one police post in a village. I didn't participate in the action, itself, of getting those hand grenades, but I was asked to take care of them. I did keep those 500 hand grenades and capsules in the room which was at my disposal—I won't be specific on it—that was at my disposal for more than 2 months.

The Soviet police found out about this theft only later and I have an order, which I did see after our revolt, because the NKVD fled in a hurry and left almost all documents, which we got.

I remember seeing this particular document, because we were interested in how much they knew about our activity and organization, because many they did arrest. Many did disappear. But yet, they suspected, they were not sure who were the leaders of the underground movement.

Now, this order, which is translated into English, the copy of which I think is available—I saw it in Kaunas after our revolt. This order was issued on April 7, 1941, by the Commissar of State Security in Lithuania, by the name of Gladkov, and this order states the best recognition of our underground movement and how it was taken very seriously by the Soviet Government. May I quote it very briefly, some parts?

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Dr. PADALIS. The order starts:

It is established that counterrevolutionary organizations existing on the territory of the L. S. S. R.—Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic—as well as individuals among the counterrevolutionary elements, are collecting and striving to procure weapons and cartridges in order to organize armed struggle against Soviet rule.

Now, this order also states:

On the 5th day of April this year, the theft of 500 hand grenades and some capsules was discovered in the militia warehouse of the city board of Vilnius.

They were stolen prior to the 5th of April, but they didn't discover it for a long time. They did arrest eight policemen.

Mr. McTIGUE. These are the 500 hand grenades over which you had custody?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes, that is correct, and they were put to use during the revolt.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us without revealing any secrets in that respect, how you were able to conceal 500 hand grenades?

Dr. PADALIS. I kept them in the most simple place, I would say. In a high oven that was covered by large ornaments. It would be called the heating unit in the building. I would like to say that even my friend, my closest friend, did not know about those grenades. I knew and those who got them. Nobody else knew, with whom I was in contact.

Mr. KERSTEN. We will adjourn at this time until 2 o'clock and we will ask Dr. Padalis to return at that time.

Dr. PADALIS. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2 p. m., Hon. Alvin M. Bentley, presiding.)

Mr. BENTLEY. The committee will come to order. The witness will continue his testimony.

Dr. PADALIS. I would like to bring up the order issued by the commissar of the State security police, Mr. Gladkov, which I would like the committee to put in evidence and say that I saw the original document, itself, in Lithuania, and to my best knowledge it is available in the United States.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I ask that this be received into evidence, Mr. Chairman, and marked as exhibit 13 for identification.

Mr. KERSTEN. We will take it up later.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you finished?

Dr. PADALIS. I would like to add that the Soviet Government, after it learned about the seizure of those grenades and the seizure of some other weapons, got so scared that the same chief of the State security police issued on the 7th of April another order, in which he states that all the police units, all the army units, all the auxiliary police units, should prevent any Lithuanian revolt on the 1st of May, which was going to be celebrated in 1941.

Then I saw, myself, on the streets, the armored cars, even tanks, patrolling the city, on the 1st of May.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you through reading from the document that has just been introduced into evidence?

Dr. PADALIS. I think so.

Mr. McTIGUE. If you are through, we would like to have it marked.

Dr. PADALIS. It is published in the Lithuanian Bulletin, July-December 1949, page 25 through page 31.

Mr. McTIGUE. Just enter the pages which were referred to.

Dr. PADALIS. Pages 25 through 31.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could you extract those pages from the bulletin? Do you have an extra bulletin?

Dr. PADALIS. The Lithuanian Bulletin, July-December 1949, pages 25 to 31.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you take them right out? Is that all right with you?

Mr. BONIN. I wonder if it would be permissible to let the reporter copy that report and return it to you.

Dr. PADALIS. That would be perfectly all right with me.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then we will just make it a part of the record, no exhibit.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

[Extract from Lithuanian Bulletin, vol VII, July-December 1949, Nos. 7-12].

* * * * *
The NKVD transmitted secret instructions to its county branch offices which then alerted the precincts. A sample order is reproduced below:

* * * * *

"Strictly Secret—Very Urgent

"To:

All Chiefs of County Branches and Precincts of the NKGB of the L. S. S. R.
Chief of the City Board of the NKGB for Vilnius
Chiefs of SPO, KRO, RO
Chiefs of Investigation and Department III

In person, to comrade-----

in the city of-----

"Comrade MERKULOV, Commissar of Third Rank and People's Commissar of State Security of the U. S. S. R., by his order No. 0038 of March 22, 1941, has ordered that the operations waged by our organs, in liquidating armed bandit groups and in detaining counterrevolutionary insurgents and other members of anti-Soviet formations, must be waged according to a predetermined plan, experienced operational collaborators must be assigned to lead the operations of liquidating armed formations, and (armed) forces must be deployed with precision during the period of operation, etc.

"It was decreed in the aforesaid order that in all instances where an operation had failed, a diligent investigation must be conducted in order to hold the guilty to the strictest responsibility.

"Under the conditions of work of the NKGB in Lithuania, this order is of utmost importance and every Chekist must apply himself to its execution with exceptional seriousness.

"Under our working conditions, whenever in waging an operation we meet with an armed enemy, the problem of preparing for the operation acquires a signally important bearing; but, as noted in that order, our collaborators do not apply themselves very seriously to the preparation of an operation and, in consequence thereof, operational plenipotentiary of the NKVD of the L. S. S. R., Stanislavovich, was killed during the operation of October 29, 1940.

"The circular order No. 673/N/4 of March 24, 1941, promulgated by the People's Commissar of State Security of the U. S. S. R., concerning the problem of conducting investigations, once more stresses the necessity of forming a well-developed operational plan in liquidating cases, etc.

"In executing the order No. 0038 of the People's Commissar of State Security, the NKGB of the L. S. S. R. on March 31st, 1941, by an order No. 0016, provided for a series of practical measures to ensure the successful execution of operations.

"Nevertheless, certain county branches violate the People's Commissar's order No. 0038, the circular No. 637/N/4 and the order No. 0016 of the NKGB of the L. S. S. R.

"In carrying out operations, they do not fix plans providing for all the measures necessary to the successful execution of an operation; they do not sufficiently instruct the members taking part in the operation; they assign inexperienced collaborators to lead the operation, etc.

"I ORDER YOU IN PERSON:

"1. Immediately acquaint all operational personnel (and take their acknowledgment thereof in writing) with Order No. 0038 of the NKGB of the U. S. S. R., the circular No. 673/N/4 of the NKGB of the U. S. S. R., and the directives indicated in my Order No. 0016 of March 31st, 1941, and discuss the same in minutest detail at operational consultations.

"2. I forewarn once again that every operation must be conducted according to an adequately preconceived written plan; the plan must be approved either by myself or my deputy and, in counties, by the Chiefs of county branches; plans of important operations must be submitted for approval to me or my deputy. Only an experienced collaborator may be assigned to lead an operation, and operational personnel must be instructed in the minutest detail regarding the plan.

"3. Chiefs of SPO, KRO, and Investigation, in revising the materials supplied by County Branches of the NKGB prior to seeking sanction [That is, a warrant. *Translator.*] for arrests, must review the plans submitted for an operation

and for an inquest. In authorizing an arrest, the Chief of Department 3 must require plans for conducting the operation from departmental chiefs.

"4. I again warn all chiefs of branches and precincts that operations must be conducted exclusively according to a predetermined and well-thought-out operational plan, and that the operation itself must be thoroughly prepared."

"Parties guilty of violating the above orders and who irresponsibly apply themselves to the preparation and execution of an operation, shall be called to account by me.

"By the 7th of May, inform me by a special report of the results of your work in executing the hereinabove order.

"PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY OF THE L. S. S. R.

SENIOR MAJOR OF STATE SECURITY /GLADKOV/

"April 2nd, 1941. No. 31."

BOLD DEFIANCE: RUSSIAN ARMS SEIZED * * *

As soon as the Russians applied themselves seriously, spurred by Comrade Gladkov's threat of reprisals, to the surprising phenomenon of armed resistance on the part of Lithuanian farmers defending their supply of daily bread, they noted that they were much too preoccupied with their thankless punctilious compilation of their "daily" and "Five Day" summaries. Something serious was afoot—besides their own preparations for genocide. The country was refusing to bow and was showing defiance.

Within 5 days after dispatching his threatening order No. 31, Comrade Gladkov was forced to dispatch two additional top secret orders on April 7, 1941: a circular order to Chiefs, and a formal order read to "operational personnel." Both of these orders dealt with the disclosure of arms seizure, and are reproduced below.

"Strictly Secret. Very Urgent."

To

All Chiefs of County Branches and Precincts of the NKGB of the L. S. S. R. Commanders of Frontier Units.

Chiefs of KRO, SPO, Part I, Department 3 and Inquest Part.

Chiefs of Departments III of the Worker-Peasant Red Army and People's

Commissar of the Interior of the L. S. S. R.

Commanders of NKVD Railway Units and Operational Points.

Comrade -----

City of -----

"It is established that counterrevolutionary organizations existing on the territory of the L. S. S. R., as well as individuals among the counterrevolutionary elements, are collecting and striving to procure weapons and cartridges in order to organize armed struggle against Soviet rule."

"Especially energetic activity in this direction has been noted recently in connection with preparations for the First of May Day.

"The counterrevolutionary element is sending its agents to work in military warehouses, in the People's Commissariat of the Interior, Highway Departments, and other places where arms are to be found, in order to seize them or, at an opportune moment, to seize the warehouses, and they also purchase weapons from organization members and ordinary persons.

"On the fifth day of April this year, the theft of 500 hand grenades and as many capsules was discovered in militia warehouse of the City Board of Vilnius."

"It is quite clear that this seizure of hand grenades was perpetrated in consequence of criminal negligence in arms accounting and guarding by militia workers, and because of the presence of counterrevolutionary element in the militia personnel, which flagrantly perpetrated counterrevolutionary activities.

"Accounting for and guarding of arms, especially in the militia, remains on a wholly unsatisfactory level, and the enemy is taking advantage of this.

"Together with this, it must be noted that, in seizing weapons from the enemy, the NKGB personnel does not pay proper attention to the control of arms-accounting and security.

"The seizure of arms from the counterrevolutionary element and from the inhabitants in general, usually proceeds with impermissible tardiness, and the results are extremely insignificant. The seizures are carried out perfunctorily and singly.

"On the other hand, we know that the counterrevolutionary element on the territory of the Lithuanian S. S. R. possesses large numbers of weapons.

"These arms were left during the liquidation of the former Polish Army in Vilnius, during its internment in Lithuania, during the liquidation of anti-Soviet organizations such as the Sauliai [The National Guard], etc. All this could easily have been checked and determined, both through the network of agents in the archives.

"In the past, weapons were sold at the arsenals. The records of sales could likewise be easily verified in the archives and the identity of persons who have purchased such arms could be established.

"Attaching special importance to the problem of locating and recovering the weapons, and of safeguarding the same,

"I order:

"1. You personally must estimate the extent of knowledge had by the operational personnel and the network of agents regarding arms seizures, must focus the attention of the entire operational personnel of the NKGB and the NKVD by personally and daily leading in this task.

"2. Through experienced agents, take measures to locate the arms stolen in Vilnius and to apprehend the criminals, without giving publicity to the matter.

"3. In closing any agency cases, formular cases, etc., special attention must be paid to arms seizures, keeping firmly in mind the fact that the counter-revolutionary element which is organizing combat against the Soviet rule is attempting to procure and amass reserves of weapons, and that it actually possesses such arms.

"4. Serious attention must be paid to this phase of work in conducting interrogations, especially of counterrevolutionary and insurrectionist formations, spies, terrorists, diversionists, etc.

"5. Explore all archives of police warehouses, accounting archives relative to the issuance of arms to individuals, the surrender of arms by internees, etc.

"6. Report to me daily regarding the number of weapons seized, on the proper forms which are supplied to you separately.

"In connection with the forthcoming May Day celebrations, serious attention must be given to the problem of arms seizure, the inspection and guarding of arsenals, increased security, the reexamination of warehouses containing combustible materials in the Bureau of Highways and other organs. The inspection must be conducted with complete diligence and seriousness, and a proper protocol must be drawn up by you, personally.

"PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY OF THE LSSR

"SENIOR MAJOR OF STATE SECURITY /GLADKOV/

"Kaunas, April 7th, 1941. The copy is authentic: /—/

: "SEMYOKHINA, Codification Secretary."

A person who is now in the United States and who had much to do with the "theft" of the 500 hand grenades and capsules some time prior to April 5, 1941, informs us that a number of innocent Lithuanian policemen had paid with their lives for their "negligence." The Russians never learned of the identity of the "counterrevolutionary elements" who had stolen into the arsenal—and later put the hand grenades to good use. The time has not yet come to reveal the complete story. But the second, formal order of comrade Gladkov is reproduced below in order to illustrate the inner operations of the NKGB in similar cases.

"Strictly Secret

"ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY OF THE LSSR FOR 1941

"No. 0017 Contents: Concerning arms accounting and security in the organs of the NKGB and NKVD.

"No. 0017

April 7th, 1941.

"On April 5th of the current year, the theft of 500 hand grenades of the 'Mills' type and of two cases of grenade capsules was detected in the arsenal of the Militia Board of the City of Vilnius.

"It is quite clear that the seizure was perpetrated by the counter-revolutionary elements with a view to waging armed combat against Soviet rule. This theft took place because of the exceptionally criminal attitude of militia collaborators toward accounting for and guarding arms. The storage place, in which the grenades were stored, was not guarded, not sealed, and only the keeper of the storage place and the janitor were aware of the existence of this arsenal.

"Despite numerous local instructions to put in order the system of arms accounting and security, County Chiefs of the NKGB and militia precinct com-

manders attach no special importance to this matter. Inspection of the accounting and guarding of arms is entrusted to ordinary collaborators who at times do not pay serious attention to this task.

"I ORDER:

"(1) Comrade State Security Major SHAROK, Chief of the NKGB Board for the City of Vilnius, immediately to take all measures for locating the seized grenades and to apprehend persons who have taken them.

"In executing this task, to mobilize the maximum number of collaborators, by releasing them from other duties, until the grenades shall have been found and the persons who seized them apprehended.

"(2) To create a special group of operatives for the detection of these criminals, made up of:

"1. State Security Major comrade—BYKOV

"2. State Security Major comrade—SHAROK

"3. Department Chief comrade—GERASIMOVICH

"4. Senior Operational Plenipotentiary comrade—NOGINOV with the head quarters in the City of Vilnius.

"Leadership in the task of detection is assigned to comrade BYKOV, who is to relieve the indicated comrades from other duties.

"(3) Supervision of tracing throughout the republic is assigned to State Security Captain comrade CHERNONYBOV, Chief of the KRO [Counter-Intelligence Department].

"(4) All heads of Operational Departments of the NKGB, chiefs of NKGB County Branches and precincts, and commanders of NKVD railway units and operational points, shall take all necessary operational and agency network measures for the tracing and recovery of the weapons, as specified in my directives given at the operational consultation of April 5th, 1941.

"(5) Without delay, to conduct repeated inspections of the status of accounting for and guarding of arms in the organs of the NKVD, NKGB and Militia. Also, to check on the execution of my previously issued directives on this problem by ordering the following comrades to proceed for this task to their respective posts of assignment:

"1. To Kretinga—State Security Lieutenant comrade MILOVZOROV, senior operational plenipotentiary of the KRO of the NKGB.

"2. To Taurage—State Security Lieutenant comrade YERMAKOV, senior operational plenipotentiary of RO [Intelligence Department] of the NKGB.

"3. To Raseiniai—State Security Captain comrade CHECHEV, Deputy Chief of the NKVD Prisons Department.

"4. To Siauliai—State Security Lieutenant PLOTKIN, operational plenipotentiary of SPO of the NKGB.

"5. To Panevezys—State Security Sergeant comrade LOVKOV, operational plenipotentiary of SPO of the NKGB.

"6. To Ukmerge—Comrade TODES, Chief of SPO of the NKGB.

"7. To Utena—State Security Lieutenant comrade CHVANOV, section chief of KRO [Counter Intelligence Department] of the NKGB.

"8. To Trakai—State Security Junior Lieutenant ZAKHAROV, chief of the Investigation Part of the Political Department of the NKVD.

"9. To Kedainiai—comrade VOLFSON, Chief of the Non-Political Prisoners Guarding Division of the NKVD.

"10. To Vilkauskis—State Security Lieutenant comrade STEPANIAN, operational plenipotentiary of KRO of the NKGB.

"11. To Marijampole—comrade MIRSKY, senior operational plenipotentiary of the SPO of the NKGB.

"12. To Alytus—comrade MILVYDAS, Deputy Chief of KRO of the NKGB.

"13. To Sakiai—State Security Junior Lieutenant comrade KHARITONCHIK, senior investigator of Investigation Division of the NKGB.

"14. To Lazdijai—State Security Sergeant comrade YERIGO, senior operational plenipotentiary of KRO of the NKGB.

"15. To Telsiai—comrade FEIGELSON, operational plenipotentiary of the NKVD.

"16. To Mazeikiai—comrade KUBLUKOV, Part Chief of Department II of the NKGB.

"17. To Zarasai—State Security Sergeant comrade LIKHVINTSEV, Part chief of Department II of the NKGB.

"18. To Svencionellai and Svencionys—State Security Sergeant comrade KUZMIN, Part chief of Department III of the NKGB.

"19. To Birzai—State Security Senior Lieutenant comrade BABSKY, Deputy chief of the Cadres Department of the NKGB.

"20. To Rokiskis—State Security Lieutenant comrade VASILYEV, Part chief of AKHO [Administrative Supply Department] of the NKVD.

"The inspection of the status of arms accounting and guarding in the City of Kaunas is assigned to comrade KHOLEVO, Deputy Chief of the Secret Political Department (SPO).

"The inspection of the status of arms accounting and guarding in the City of Vilnius is assigned to comrade BYKOV.

"The inspection of the status of arms accounting and guarding must be carried out by the above-named comrades. Local commissions formed under their leadership, with the participation of County Chiefs of the NKGB and NKVD, must draft proper reports.

"(6) Comrade KHOLEVO, Deputy chief of SPO of the NKGB, must submit his report on this matter by April 9th, 1941.

"State Security Senior Major comrade GUZEVICIUS, People's Commissar of the Interior, must be informed that the NKGB proposal made in February regarding the accounting and guarding of militia weapons and regarding the transfer of all surplus weapons to the UVS [Ordnance-Supply Administration], has not yet been complied with by the organs of the militia.

"The NKVD is requested to authorize the Chief of URKM [Administration of Worker Peasant Militia] to regulate this matter without delay by transferring, within 3 days, to the UVS warehouses all surplus arms, leaving sufficient weapons as specified in the cadre tables, and providing reliable guard and accounting, to be concentrated in the URKM.

"I warn the Chiefs of county branches and precincts of the NKGB that I shall hold to judicial responsibility all noncompliance with my directives of March 4th and with those given at operational consultations on April 5th.

"Once again I direct the attention of chiefs of the county branches and precincts of the NKGB to the need for assuring proper control of the accounting, guarding and use of arms in the militia organs, Board of Highways, and elsewhere. You must personally inspect, without delegating the task to any one else, and all abnormalities must be reported to me immediately.

"Security Major comrade SHAROK, Chief of the NKGB City Board in Vilnius,—check on how the NKVD committee appointed in February had performed its task of arms accounting and guarding, and hold to responsibility all persons who attend to this matter superficially.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY OF THE LSSR
SENIOR MAJOR OF STATE SECURITY /GLADKOV/"

SECURITY FOR MAY DAY

On the same day, comrade Gladkov projected his security measures for the May Day exercises. Instead of thinking that all decent Lithuanians would endeavor to stay home, far from the loudspeakers gushing Russian blasphemies, his warped mind visioned trouble—he imagined that the missing 500 hand grenades might be put to use.

"Strictly Secret. Very Urgent."

To

All chiefs of county branches and precincts of the NKGB of the LSSR, commanders of frontier units, chiefs of KRO, SPO, Part One, Department III and Investigation, Chiefs of Departments III of the worker-peasant Red Army, and People's Commissar of Interior of the Lithuanian SSR. To Chiefs of NKVD Operational Units and Posts on Lithuanian railways.

To comrade -----

In connection with the forthcoming international proletarian festivity of the 1st of May day, it is proposed that you immediately prepare a detailed plan for ensuring state security during the 1st of May Day festivity and transmit same to the People's Commissariat of State Security.

For the consideration of this matter, you must call, without delay, a consultation of representatives of the NKVD, Militia, Departments III of the Army, fire prevention service, chiefs of prisons and commanders of the NKVD Troops (where such are stationed); propose to the above-named organizations—to each according to its own line of work—that they draft concrete plans and submit the same to you by April 15th, 1941.

Upon receipt of such plans from county localities, you must draft a general plan for the entire county.

Responsible persons must be designated by the NKVD, Militia, etc., for each phase of the task.

The general plan must be transmitted to use prior to April 20, 1941.

In planning operational measures for the 1st of May festivity, the following basic problems must be borne in mind:

(1) Strengthening the protection of industrial establishments, defense installations, warehouses, railways, and other transport—to forestall diversion, fires, catastrophes, etc.

(2) Ensuring and strengthening the protection of arms, combustible and poisonous materials, multiplication equipment in establishments and offices, seizing the same from unauthorized persons.

The entire operational personnel of the NKGB and the NKVD must pay special attention to the necessity of mobilizing all of our forces for the detection of arms and, upon encountering, the seizure of them from the counter-revolutionary element.

(3) All along the NKGB lines of work, ensuring the inspection of elaboration by the agency network and of the formular files, and the liquidation of *activists*, especially those involved in terrorism, espionage, and insurrection.

Along the NKVD lines of work—organizing the inspection of the passport system and its reinforcement, especially in the frontier areas, towns, cities, etc.

Searching of hotels and overnight sleeping places in order to trap persons in hiding.

(4) Concluding arrangements with the command of military units regarding assignment of the necessary forces for this task, and, on the eve of and during the May Day festivities, strengthening the patrols in cities, towns, etc.

(5) Organizing night inspections of street passersby and establishments, in order to preclude the dissemination of counter-revolutionary appeals, the raising of flags, and the like; for this purpose, mobilize all collaborators of the NKGB, NKVD, and Militia, and, furthermore, the necessary number of Communists and Komsomols to be provided by the Party committees; also utilize tested agents.

(6) You personally should organize proper protection and order at the parades, demonstrations, and entertainment affairs in connection with the May Day festival.

(7) Reinforce to the maximum effort the operational work through the network of agents, directed toward complete disclosure and liquidation of various counter-revolutionary formations and individuals who carry on hostile activities against our Party and Soviet rule.

It is necessary to discuss jointly with the NKVD all problems concerning the protection of industry, agricultural inventories, cities, and inhabited points, and to instruct Party Ukoms (County Committees) and county Executive Committees to enlist Communists and non-Party *aktiv* (fellow travelers actively engaged in Party work but not carried on the Party rolls of members) in performing this very important work.

According to agency data, the counter-revolutionary organizations made up of former members of counter-revolutionary parties, former officers, policemen, officials, and manufacturers, have extended their activities for the disruption of May Day festivities and to obstruct the participation of the working people in the observance and organization of their revolutionary celebration.

All these enemies of the people, recruited by the clergy, are seeking accomplices among the "have-beens" and are organizing their hostile work.

No doubt, the people's enemies will attempt during the May Day observances to use most acute forms of struggle, such as terrorism, diversion, etc. They will attempt to disrupt, to create panic, and thereby to mar the dignified observance of the May Day.

According to the information at our disposal, the people's enemies will attempt to resort to terror and diversion during the ceremonial sessions in theaters, clubs, etc., or may try to set theaters, factories, and establishments on fire, and to disseminate counterrevolutionary leaflets and, if possible, to organize counterrevolutionary demonstrations. Counterrevolutionary, terrorist, and spying elements might be brought in from abroad.

The Party and the Soviet Government have placed on our organs especially honorable and responsible duties—to safeguard state security.

We must undertake immediately all measures in order that the working people may safely observe their international proletarian festival.

We must nip in the bud each and every manifestation of the people's enemies.

We shall be able to achieve this objective only if we expand and reinforce to the maximum our agency-operational work in the direction of liquidation of the formations of spies, terrorists, diversionists, insurgents, and various other counterrevolutionaries.

Regarding the preparations for May Day, inform me by special reports every three days.

Beginning with April 27th, 1941, report every two hours on each date.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY OF THE LSSR

SENIOR MAJOR OF STATE SECURITY/GLADKOV/

"7" day of April 1941

No. 16

Kaunas"

"MOBILIZATION FOR DEFENSE OF THE STATE"

Comrade Gladkov received for his approval various plans elaborated by his apparatus in the counties. Imagining all sorts of trouble, he and his Russians fearfully prepared for May Day—which used to be devoted to tree planting in the former days of freedom and was to mark the observance of the revolution brought on the Red army bayonets to a defenseless Lithuanian democracy. With his staff busily engaged in drafting daily and 5-day summaries of accounts regarding the counterrevolutionary elements, Gladkov probably intended to use May Day mobilization as a test of his apparatus in preparation for the first great genocidal operation. At any rate, he scared the Russian invaders by issuing the following order:

Strictly Secret

ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY OF THE LSSR FOR YEAR 1941

No. 0024 Contents: Operational duty is declared for state defense during the days of the May Day festival.

No. 0024

25th day of April 1941, Kaunas.

During the days of the 1st of May festivities, the counterrevolutionary element in Kaunas and throughout the territory of the LSSR will attempt to stage opposition by organizing diversionist and terrorist acts, and local anti-Soviet manifestations.

In order to assure State Security and to provide determined operational measures in the event of necessity.

I ORDER:

1. The entire operational personnel of the Narkomat of the NKGB of the LSSR and of peripheral organs is deemed mobilized as of the 29th day of April through the 3d day of May, inclusively.

2. State Security Lieutenant comrade IVANOV, Chief of Part One of the NKGB of the LSSR, to place outposts in accordance with the chart of locations approved by me, on April 30 (the ceremonial session in the City Theater) and May 1 (the parade and demonstration); the operational personnel of the Markomat (People's Commissariat) is to be assigned in compliance with this order.

3. Comrade TODES, Chief of SPO (Secret Political Department), and State Security Captain comrade CHERNOYOROV, Chief of KRO (Counter Intelligence Department), to provide the reinforced servicing, throughout the days of May Day festivities, around the principal industrial and transportation installations in conformance with order No. 0015 of March 5, 1941, of the NKGB of the U. S. S. R. For this purpose, the SPO and the KRO are to form special operational groups composed of:

THE SPO

1. Part chief, State Security Lieutenant—comrade SHEPELV.
2. Deputy Part Chief, State Security Junior Lieutenant—OVSEYENKO.
3. Operational plenipotentiary—comrade DEMBO.
4. Deputy operational plenipotentiary—comrade TSELKOV.

THE KRO

1. Part chief, State Security Lieutenant—comrade GAVRILIN.
2. Deputy part chief, State Security Lieutenant—comrade MESHALKIN.
3. Deputy Part chief, State Security Lieutenant—comrade GOGODUKH.
4. Senior operational plenipotentiary, State Security Lieutenant—comrade RODIONOV.
5. Chief of Secretariat, State Security Junior Lieutenant—comrade MASKIN, to provide Officers on Duty at the Norkomat and Departments of the NKGB of the LSSR throughout the dates of April 29 through May 3.
6. Commandant of the NKGB of the LSSR—comrade VILIMAS, to place the Kommandantura personnel on barracks status from April 29 through May 3, after providing a reinforced guard over the Narkomat.
7. Chiefs of the City Board for Vilnius, county branches and precincts of the NKGB of the LSSR, and commanders of railway units and operational points, in conformance with my circular No. 16 of April 7, are to report every 2 hours regarding the progress of the festivities by telephoning to the responsible Officer on Duty at the NKGB of the LSSR, dialing telephones 20432, 20763, 20773, 22857, reporting every event without delay.
8. The following automobiles of the departments of the NKGB of the LSSR are placed at the disposal of the responsible Officer on Duty throughout the days of festivity:

1. Auto machine No. 0078
2. Auto machine No. 0084
3. Auto machine No. 0090
4. Auto machine No. 0089
5. Auto machine No. 0067
6. Auto machine No. 0073
7. Auto machine No. 0060
8. Auto machine No. 0085
9. Auto machine No. 0083

The location chart of operational service outposts of the NKGB of the LSSR servicing the solemn gathering at the theater, the parade, and the roster of Officers on Duty at the Narkomat and departments, are contained in the enclosed supplement.

Enclosure:

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY OF THE LSSR
SENIOR MAJOR OF STATE SECURITY /GLADKOV/

Dr. PADALIS. It was stated in Soviet propaganda that the revolt was made in Germany and it was a part of the German preparation for war.

Our revolt was organized and initiated entirely by our underground movement. We had no contact in any way with the German Government. On the contrary, when through spies, the German Government learned that we were going to revolt, the German spies announced to the NKVD our leading members.

Then, the second thing, we couldn't control our groups in the more remote areas of the country, and they started revolting on the 17th of June, when the mass deportations from Lithuania began.

In several towns and cities they revolted. Quite a few of them were killed and some escaped to the forests, and quite a few NKVD men were killed.

Our government, which was formed in secrecy in April, already, it was my task to contact the respective members of the provisional government in the case our revolt succeeded. It was a complete surprise to the German Government and the German Government ordered the military commandant of Lithuania not to have any relations with our provisional government. Secondly, not to help in any way the operations of the provisional government, but on the contrary, to restrict our activities as much as possible.

Our government, in which I served as Deputy Secretary of Commerce—

Mr. McTIGUE. This is in the provisional government?

Dr. PADALIS. In the provisional government; yes. (continuing)
Was suppressed by the German Government on the 5th of August 1941.

Before that, the German authorities tried to persuade us to remain in office as the occupational administration of Lithuanian under German control. We refused to be quislings, and then the government, against its will, was suppressed by the German occupational authorities, by the German General Commissar in Lithuania.

Then after that, we went into the underground against the Nazis and we continued fighting against their occupation, against their efforts to mobilize our youth during the German occupation, until the Russians came back.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you ever on the Gestapo blacklist?

Dr. PADALIS. Oh, yes; I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you know that?

Dr. PADALIS. We had our spies in the Gestapo, or our agents in the Gestapo. Otherwise, the underground can't act. Always there is counterspying on the part of the underground movement.

I was informed that I was on the list of persons to be arrested by the Gestapo, and that I was No. 1 to be arrested in Vilnius.

When they came to arrest me, I was not in my apartment.

Mr. McTIGUE. You got advance warning?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes; I had advance warning. I had three addresses. That is the practice of the underground people, to have as many addresses as you can. One address was in Kaunas. They came to arrest me in Kaunas, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the 16th of March 1943. One of the guerrillas came on a motorcycle to Vilnius and warned me.

I left my apartment at 8 o'clock at night and three Gestapo men came at 12 o'clock, exactly at midnight. I was in the same building, but in a different apartment. I saw when they came to arrest me. They didn't find me, but they did find one student who was living in my apartment, a young man. He didn't tell them where I was and they took him, together with 72 other persons arrested in the same night, to the concentration camp of Stutthof, near Danzig.

In the first 2 weeks, 10 of them were executed in camp. Some survived and this man was taken to that camp, instead of me, and today he is in the United States safe and with his family. He is living in Rochester, N. Y.

Mr. KERSTEN. This would certainly seem to completely dispose of the Communist charge that your underground resistance was Nazi-inspired in any way.

Dr. PADALIS. That is what I wanted to make clear. It was against the Nazis, too.

What we wanted, we wanted to confront the invading Germans with a sovereign government of the independent Government of Lithuania. We did succeed, and since they were at war against the Soviet Union, they didn't want to touch us immediately and they wanted us to collaborate with them. We refused, and then we went into the underground, because they wanted to mobilize SS legions—infamous SS legions. We refused, and they didn't succeed.

They arrested 72 leaders that night and continued arresting more people and deporting them to the concentration camps in Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then the underground resisted the German impressment scheme. That is the involuntary servitude of Lithuanian men in the German Army.

Dr. PADALIS. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that the first bone of your contention with the Germans?

Dr. PADALIS. I don't understand.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that the first difficulty that you had with the Germans?

Dr. PADALIS. The first one, but not the only one. The provisional government attempted to liquidate all the collective farms established by the Soviet Government during the first occupation. Then the Communist cooperative organizations and all the Communist economic institutions—the Germans didn't let us execute this order or decision of the Government. All the establishments and organizations set up by the Soviet Government remained intact.

Then, we opposed it, too.

The third thing, we did oppose the extermination of the Jews, which they started at the very beginning, after the Germans invaded our country. We sent a memorandum, protesting against the extermination of the Jews in Lithuania, and they then felt very deeply hurt by this protest which they didn't accept, that we protested against the extermination of the Jews, and we had to sign so-called political affidavits with the Gestapo.

The Gestapo called all the former members of the provisional government and ordered them to sign the affidavits, according to which we had to promise not to take any part in political life any more.

We tried to refuse. The Gestapo told us definitely that if we won't sign, then we will be immediately arrested and taken to the extermination camps.

Then, they imposed very heavy deliveries on our farms. They began colonizing our country, throwing out the farmers from the best farms and colonizing and putting in their German people. We opposed that, too. There were many reasons for our conflict with the German occupational administration.

Mr. McTIGUE. Getting back to the anti-Soviet underground movement, have you any further amplification of the matters you have already told us, Professor?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes.

I would like to ask also to put in evidence a detailed memorandum, regarding underground movement in Lithuania, which was sent to Moscow, by the secret police in Lithuania. It is also translated—I saw the document myself, in Lithuania—and it reveals many facts, even many details which, of course, are known to the Soviet Government today, on the underground activities in Lithuania from April to the day of our revolt.

Mr. KERSTEN. With regard to this, what you have in front of you is an English translation?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You saw the original document?

Dr. PADALIS. I saw the original document.

Mr. KERSTEN. Can you tell us the circumstances of seeing it?

Dr. PADALIS. After we revolted, the NKVD in Kaunas left immediately their headquarters. We seized the place and the documents were not burned. Therefore, all those documents we found and we were very much interested in finding out how much they knew about our activities, and we found quite a few documents.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you there on this occasion?

Dr. PADALIS. I was not there on this occasion, but I saw them later.

Mr. KERSTEN. You yourself did see them?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you see them?

Dr. PADALIS. In Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you remember the occasion of your seeing them?

Dr. PADALIS. It was established in the anti-Bolshevist museum by the provisional government.

Mr. KERSTEN. In what language were they written?

Dr. PADALIS. Russian.

Mr. KERSTEN. They had all the appearances of being the original documents?

Dr. PADALIS. Oh, yes, with numbers, signatures, and everything.

Mr. KERSTEN. Picked up in the NKVD headquarters, when they fled in advance of the Nazi invasion?

Dr. PADALIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what you have there is a true and correct English translation of this Russian memorandum?

Dr. PADALIS. Yes. I was present when the translation was made, too. It is in the Lithuanian Bulletin, vol. 5, September-October 1947, commencing on page 6, to the end of page 24.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is a memorandum pertaining to what?

Dr. PADALIS. To the underground activities in Lithuania from the 14th of April—it was a report written by the secret police, sent to Moscow, covering underground activities between October 1940 and the spring of 1941. That is correct, because in the beginning of this report, it is stated—

Mr. KERSTEN. What is the title of that report in that bulletin, so that it can be properly identified?

Dr. PADALIS. "Detailed memorandum regarding counterrevolutionary leaflets spreading on the territory of Lithuania SSR."

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Reporter, I think that should be handled as an exhibit. That is my feeling on the matter, rather than incorporating it.

Mr. McTIGUE. I think so.

Mr. JURGELA. I made those translations from Russian into English. They have been in my possession for several years.

One is a memorandum by the NKGB.

The NKVD in February 1941 was split into 2 commissariats. One was called the NKVD, the Commissariat of the Interior; the other became NKGB, that meaning state security.

There are two reports. One is the complete report, covering the period of October 1940 to about January or February 1941. The other is, then, an unfinished NKGB report covering the later period. It had never been finished.

Then, there is also an NKGB order of June 21, 1941, ordering infiltration of Lithuanian resistance units, and citing instances of resistance and the blundering of NKVD troops.

During the shooting, they shot their own soldiers.

That document is reproduced photostatically in Russian, and an English translation.

Also, there are two letters on the NKVD stationery of Moscow, with various resolutions entered by NKVD officials in Lithuania, ordering the deportation, and so on.

All those documents will be produced in evidence in Chicago, but the photostatic reproductions and translations are available in this issue.

Mr. KERSTEN. I don't think we should have the photostatic reproductions put into the record. That is of the Russian, if the originals are available, as I understand they will be. Is that correct?

Mr. JURGELA. I still say the translation is here.

Mr. KERSTEN. I haven't referred to them. I should think the translations should follow the originals, so that one is next to the other, don't you think so?

Mr. McTIGUE. Let's go off the record for a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. KERSTEN. The witness can give us any authentication of these documents here, but the documents will be furnished in Chicago.

I think when you have the originals available, they will be introduced there, and then following the translations.

Sufficient reference has been made to the translations so that they can be picked up.

Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Dr. PADALIS. Maybe I could make a final remark with regard to the revolt: We started the revolt, the committee did. After we took over the radio station in Kaunas on the first day of our revolt, we proclaimed independent Lithuania, and we gave the names of the members of the provisional government, and we appealed to people to revolt immediately the same day, and the revolt spread throughout Lithuania. It was to a great measure a spontaneous revolt by the people themselves. That is, these were not organized in advance, at all. We had just our points of strength throughout the country, but then all the people joined.

Then I would like to state that the workers who were supposed to be happy under the Soviet regime did take a very active part in our revolt, and they did defend the factories in which they worked, because the Soviets tried to burn them down or dynamite them. The workers defended the factories which they didn't own, and in which they worked, for the independent Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KERSTEN. I have just a couple of questions: You were present in Lithuania during the entire first year of Soviet occupation?

Dr. PADALIS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. And during the time of the so-called free elections, in which the parliament that was claimed to have been rigged, voted the resolution of the incorporation into the U. S. S. R.

What would you say, Doctor, as to whether or not it is true that the Lithuanian people desired in any way to be incorporated into the U. S. S. R.

Dr. PADALIS. It is not true, Mr. Chairman. We were occupied by the Soviet armed forces, which were followed by the Soviet police, and the puppet government was established. The elections were announced

on the 5th of July, and were held on the 16th and 17th of July, just in about 2 weeks, I think, and I think the chairman knows very well that there was present only one list of candidates containing exactly the number of members to be elected. We had no choice. All the candidates were appointed by the Communist Party, and then it was just a mockery.

There is a fact, I think of importance: We were voting 2 days. On the 17th of July in the morning, the Soviet official agency, Tass, in the London Press, announced the results of the Lithuanian elections. The polls were closed, only at 8 o'clock at night.

MR. KERSTEN. In other words, they had their announcements ready before the results were ready, is that right?

DR. PADALIS. Before the elections were finished or before the polls were closed.

MR. KERSTEN. Did you have any experience in your work with the underground resistance in the treatment by the NKVD, or by the Russian troops, of the bodies of partisans when they were dead? That is, for example, when they were brought into town, or any such thing?

DR. PADALIS. Not during the first occupation.

MR. KERSTEN. These things occurred in the second occupation?

DR. PADALIS. In the second occupation, that is correct.

MR. MACIROWICZ. I want to congratulate Dr. Padalis. I think it was a complete and excellent statement.

MR. KERSTEN. I think, Dr. Padalis, that in your present capacity as a professor at the University of Detroit, and as an American citizen, and as a former Lithuanian, formerly a Lithuanian citizen, I think you have made a real contribution to the cause of freedom.

DR. PADALIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

MR. KERSTEN. Mr. Vitins?

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. VITINS. I do.

MR. KERSTEN. Will you tell us your full name, please?

TESTIMONY OF VERNERS VITINS, GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.

MR. VITINS. Verners Vitins.

MR. MCTIGUE. Where do you live now?

MR. VITINS. Grand Rapids, Mich.

MR. MCTIGUE. By whom are you employed?

MR. VITINS. Kent County Abstract Office.

MR. MCTIGUE. In what capacity?

MR. VITINS. Abstractor.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were you born in Latvia?

MR. VITINS. Yes, sir.

MR. MCTIGUE. When and where in Latvia?

MR. VITINS. My birthday is the 13th of January 1903, and in the District of Liepaja.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were you educated in the schools of Riga, Latvia?

MR. VITINS. Yes, sir. I finished at the University of Riga, with a masters degree in law.

MR. MCTIGUE. Did there come a time when you were appointed prosecuting attorney in Riga?

MR. VITINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. What year was that?

Mr. VITINS. From the year 1926 to 1929.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were prosecuting attorney in Riga, did you have occasion to investigate and prosecute Communists?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something about that, please?

Mr. VITINS. According to Latvian criminal laws, Communists who belonged to the Communist Party have been accepted as criminals.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify the year in which you were the prosecuting attorney in Riga?

Mr. VITINS. Between 1926 and 1929.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, you are going to tell us about the activities that you engaged in as prosecuting attorney?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir.

According to Latvian criminal laws, Communists who belonged to the Communist Party have been accepted as criminals because the Communist Party was outlawed in Latvia. The reason was that those people who belonged to the Communist Party, that belonged to the Third Internationale, which was liquidated during the last war, and replaced by the Cominform, in the Constitution of the Third Internationale, as far as I remember, I guess those are the points 713, it is said that the aim of the Communist Party is to seize the power for the proletariat in the whole world.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me interrupt you, if I may.

During the period 1926 to 1929, did you prosecute certain Communists—

Mr. VITINS. That is what I am telling.

Further in the constitution it is said that the duty of every one of the Communists is to advocate or to help to overthrow the local government. So we accepted all the Communists—I would compare, like here in the United States, a gang of gangsters, and we prosecuted them, and we punished them and sent them to jail.

As a prosecuting attorney, I had to bring before the bench the evidence that those people really belonged to the Communistic Party.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the period that you were prosecuting these Communists, as you have just mentioned, can you tell us anything about their methods of infiltration?

Mr. VITINS. They have a strategy which has never been changed, and they have tactics which are changed, depending on the circumstances under which they are working. In the infiltrations, they tried to get key jobs.

There have been two kinds of Communists, one who obtains the job himself—but the majority of them didn't do that. They just advocate. Somebody else, usually a pretty stupid man, who was the doer, but the counselors have been those.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you mean they operated through groups?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Riga, Latvia, in June 1940, when the Soviet marched in?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you remember Mr. Vyshinsky being present in Riga, on or about that time?

Mr. VITINS. There came a man the next day, after the Soviet Army arrived in Riga, named Vyshinsky, and he started right away with an address to the population, from the Soviet Embassy.

In a compulsory way, we all had to go on the streets in a demonstration. I listened to his speech through the loudspeakers. He promised that no one would be touched, that he came to Latvia to protect us—he didn't say against whom—and that everybody personally would be secure and protected, and their property as well.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in the square, below, as Vyshinsky was addressing the Latvian Nation from a balcony above?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify the balcony?

Mr. VITINS. From the Soviet Embassy. I can't remember the street now, where it was, but it was a big, wide street. Now, the whole procession had to pass. It was a very long demonstration. When they passed—when they came in from a certain factory, Vyshinsky himself shouted out the slogans. He said, "Long live Free Latvia." "Long live Latvia's House of Representatives," and so on. And suddenly this same voice shouted in the Russian language, "Ubiraites svoloch."

Mr. McTIGUE. He shouted something in Russian?

Mr. VITINS. Yes. He said it. If I said "scoundrel" it would be a hundred times too mild.

Some people sat on the fence next door, and they started to cry, "We would like to join the Soviet Union," and it appears to this day that the slogan should be really very friendly. Those slogans which asked for annexation appeared about a month later.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, there was somebody jumping the gun?

Mr. VITINS. Yes. That was not the correct day for those slogans.

Mr. KERSTEN. We had testimony in Washington from Mr. Berzins about this same incident, after this remark made by somebody who jumped the gun, and Vyshinsky remarked back something. Did you hear that, too?

Mr. VITINS. That is what Vyshinsky said. The same voice told that. There are ladies here and I am afraid it is not quite a literal expression.

Mr. McTIGUE. We had a great deal of testimony also in Washington and in New York concerning the deportations in Latvia.

Can you tell us anything about your experience—

Mr. KERSTEN. Just one second. I think it should be made a matter of record at this point—pardon me, Mr. Counsel—you have referred to Vyshinsky as having come to Latvia and as having spoken from the balcony of the Soviet Embassy.

Would you be able to identify Vyshinsky?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see him on this occasion, or hear his voice?

Mr. VITINS. No, I didn't, but I saw his pictures in the papers.

Mr. KERSTEN. At that time?

Mr. VITINS. In Latvia I saw him when I passed the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. KERSTEN. You did see Vyshinsky at that time?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, you saw Vyshinsky in the capital of your country, Riga, in June of 1940?

Mr. VITINS. June 1940, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How did that Vyshinsky that you say in the flesh compare with the pictures of any other Vyshinsky?

Mr. VITINS. He is now the man who is persona grata in the United Nations.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, the Vyshinsky who took over your country, and who was followed by the events that have been testified to, here, is the same one now being harbored in New York, in the United Nations, is that right?

Mr. VITINS. Yes. To each country was sent from Moscow a special conductor who conducted the forced annexation to the Soviet Union. In Latvia, Vyshinsky; Lithuania, Dekanozow; and Estonia, Zhdanov.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you present in Riga, Latvia, during the time the mass deportations were inaugurated?

Mr. VITINS. Not when the mass deportations were. Then I was hiding, myself, in the woods.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us how you happened to go to the woods?

Mr. VITINS. One morning the house mistress, who was a former houseowner, came to my apartment and said, "Last night there have been people from NKVD and checked very carefully all entries regarding you in the housebook." Each house had to have a special housebook, where all the inhabitants should be in.

It was the sign to me that the time had come.

I said to my wife, "I am leaving." I ran away from Riga, about 100 miles south, and started to live in the woods.

The same night, they came to arrest me and didn't find me. Then they started mass deportations. Unfortunately, I did not take my family, including my 3-month-old baby.

Mr. McTIGUE. They took your wife and child?

Mr. VITINS. And my mother, 70 years old.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you ever heard from them?

Mr. VITINS. No, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. How old was your child?

Mr. VITINS. Three months.

May I add to what I mentioned about Vishinsky: I want to point out the action was very carefully planned what should be done every day. The whole annexation. It was very carefully planned, and the plans were already made in the Soviet Union and he came over only as a conductor.

Mr. KERSTEN. What connection do you make between that Mr. Vyshinsky and your wife and child?

Mr. VITINS. He was responsible for all deportations. I would say, if I had the power, I would accuse him right away for manslaughter.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you repeat that?

Mr. VITINS. I would accuse him for manslaughtering.

Mr. KERSTEN. Slaughtering men?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean murder, don't you?

Mr. VITINS. Yes. There are millions who have been killed. When you stay, like me, in the woods and get the news that your family and the people who are closest to you are deported, then you feel it not only with your brains but with your whole body that something is wrong. And you have no one who protects you. There are animals who are protected. We haven't been protected. At that time we

cried to the League of Nations. All Baltic states had been members. We didn't have any reply. I am sorry.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me go back for a moment, if I may. You were prosecuting attorney in Riga for the period 1926-29?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir. I have been elected as a judge in Leipaja.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your tenure as judge?

Mr. VITINS. Between 1929 and 1939.

Mr. McTIGUE. And after 1939 in what capacity were you?

Mr. VITINS. I have been called back to Riga and obtained a new job. I was Director of the Department of Courts. It would correspond here—we didn't have just the same name of the job, but it would be like Deputy Attorney General.

Mr. McTIGUE. It would correspond to Deputy Attorney General of the United States?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Russian seizure of Latvia what happened to the judges? What happened to the judicial system at Latvia? We haven't had any testimony on this score as yet. Can you develop some testimony along those lines?

Mr. VITINS. I shall try, sir.

First, they appointed a puppet government. The government was made in the Soviet Embassy. I was told that the maker was Vyshinsky.

We had a man who took over as a Secretary of Justice. I have the picture of him here.

The first deed that he did, together with the newly appointed Secretary of the Interior, is that he went to the two prisons which are in Riga, opened the doors of the prisons and let out the criminals.

All together in Latvia we had about 17 prisons, not too many imprisoned people.

He put the imprisoned people in key jobs. What was the reason? They praised the Communist regime. They said, "Stalin is the man. He picks the right people for the jobs. We are those. That is a good regime."

Mr. McTIGUE. Are these what they call the people's judges?

Mr. VITINS. No, not quite.

Mr. McTIGUE. I'm sorry. Excuse me.

Mr. VITINS. About 2 months after the elections, most of those people had to go back to the prisons and have been replaced by people who came straight from Moscow, but they did their jobs, they had done their jobs, they had praised them and it was a help to Soviet annexation.

Mr. MACIROWICZ. You said they put in prisoners. Now, you had a number of political prisoners. Would you say these were the political prisoners or just ordinary criminals like thieves and bandits?

Mr. VITINS. I shall give you two examples: For instance, the president of the circuit court in Riga, it was a pretty big court, they appointed a man by the name of Franzmanis, who has been punished by the Latvian courts, 4 years in the correction house, because he had stolen horses. He had nothing to do with the policy.

Mr. MACIROWICZ. They put horse thieves in?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

I spoke with the next one. He was a sheriff from one city in the eastern province. He had been punished in the Latvian courts as a thief, with one and a half years in prison, and he was a sheriff.

Now, the next thing they did, they started to agitate for the elections. In each working place, they appointed a special committee. It should have been elected by the Communist Party, but it wasn't, so we had to assemble all the people who worked in the Department of Justice. It was a big, new building, in Riga. We were surprised when the chairman of the newly appointed communistic committee was nobody else than the stoker of the building. He was a bad stoker, but he was a stoker. He didn't have any idea how to run the courts. Now, he was the chairman of the committee.

That I saw with my own eyes.

I was told that in many other places it was exactly the same.

Now the propaganda for the elections.

One day there came a newly appointed Secretary of the Interior, Vilis Lacis, to the Ministry of Justice, and I had a talk with him. He said, "I assure you that if you like, you can go to the Ministry of the Interior and give as many lists of candidates as you will." Our House of Representatives had 100 members, and we were later surprised when they admitted only one list, made up in the Soviet Embassy. Many of them had Russian names, and I was told there have been people who even haven't been Latvian citizens.

There was another group who gave in another list. Those people have been arrested.

I shall show to you, if you have an interest, here is a picture of the man who was the head, this attorney. He was an attorney at law. He was the head of the second list which had been given voluntarily in, in balancing the candidates for the elections. This man is the first one who was arrested and nobody saw him again.

The activity of the group was immediately stopped, and so we had only one list of candidates.

So if somebody says there were free elections, it is not true. There were none.

Mr. KERSTEN. This book you refer to is what?

Mr. VITINS. It is a history of the Ministry of Justice and it is an official education from the Ministry of Justice.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you get it?

Mr. VITINS. I bought it in Germany, as a displaced person, from a widow of a court commissioner.

Mr. KERSTEN. It was printed in Latvia; was it?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you recognize it?

Mr. VITINS. It is an official edition from the Ministry of Justice.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the picture to which you referred has a name under it. Which name is what?

Mr. VITINS. Atis Kenins.

Now, what they did next in the court. We had a nice courtroom for the supreme court, and in the front of that there was an inscription, "One justice, one law for everyone."

The first thing they did was to cover that. I shall show in the picture where it is, and why, because I heard with my own ears, when the communistic prosecutor who came from Moscow later said, "In

socialistic countries there is not 1 law, 1 equity, and 1 justice for everybody. That is only for the people from factories and farms, but not for anybody else. That is here. On this place there was an inscription [indicating].

Mr. McTIGUE. That was obliterated?

Mr. VIRINS. It was covered. It was covered with cement so no one could read it any more.

Mr. KERSTEN. There was one law for the Communists and their sympathizers—

Mr. VIRINS. And another law for all other people.

Probably a couple days after Vyshinsky's first speech about freedom and security, one morning came to me one lady and she said, "My husband last night is arrested." He was prosecuting attorney from the appeals court. His picture is here.

Right away I called the newly appointed Secretary of Justice and told him. He said to me, in a very cold voice, "It is no business of yours."

I said, "Yes, but his wife is here and she is crying and what can we do, now? She doesn't know where her husband is."

He said, "That is no business of yours and let her go where she likes."

We tried to find out where her husband would be. We didn't find out.

Next was arrested another one, the president of the appeals court.

Here is the prosecuting attorney who had been arrested the first, and here is the president who was arrested, second, from the Ministry of Justice. That happened 2 days after Vyshinsky spoke about the protection of freedom.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us how many judges were arrested and deported?

Mr. VIRINS. Including the mass deportations, there have been deported from Latvia, killed and arrested, 157 judges. We had 291.

I shall explain that according to our court system, at the same time on the bench had to be three judges. We did not have any jury, but three judges had to be on the bench at the same time. So the number of judges, it may be a little too great for a small country, but you must divide it by three.

All together it would be 54.13 percent of the judges have been liquidated during this 13 months of communistic regime.

Mr. McTIGUE. Deported?

Mr. VIRINS. Deported, arrested, or simply killed.

When I got the news my family was deported, I wanted to go and report myself to the police. I tried to think as well as possible in those conditions, and I changed my mind. When I came back from the woods and the Germans had been there, then one colleague who was in the same position, who reported himself, we found his body, killed, in a prison yard.

Mr. McTIGUE. One of the judges?

Mr. VIRINS. He was a prospector.

Now the elections. We had to participate. In my apartment there came the agents three times in those days. They said, "Why don't you go and vote?"

My wife said to me, "You must go. It is very dangerous to abstain."

I went. The election room was arranged in a way where there was no secrecy. Everybody could see what you did. There was but one list of candidates, and you couldn't do anything.

I am glad that my predecessor here at this table told about the Tass article, where they told about the elections in Lithuania.

I heard about it at 12 o'clock at noon, the last day of the elections. The results of the elections from all the Baltic States. They had still about 12 hours to vote, but the results had been published.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did this announcement come from?

Mr. VITINS. From Moscow, sir. From Tass. That means the Soviet Telegraph Agency.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, Moscow announced the elections in the Baltic States on the noon of election day, long before the election concluded?

Mr. VITINS. On the last election day.

Mr. KERSTEN. On the noon of the last election day, many hours before the election was closed?

Mr. VITINS. It was 12 hours before.

They told about the elections in all the Baltic States. The percentage was very high, about 99, or something like that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was there ever, incidentally, a card issued for your arrest?

Mr. VITINS. Not for mine; but I wanted to point out that the whole action of occupation has been very carefully prepared.

I found a good friend of mine, living here in Detroit. I would not like to mention his name, because the members of his family are behind the Iron Curtain. And when the Germans have pushed the Russians out, and one man from the German police who has liquidated all the NKVD, he brought to him the card, the NKVD card. The card is printed in the Soviet Union and not in Latvia, and the card is signed on the 15th of July—that means not a full month after Vishinsky said, "You are protected and secure," and he is put on the list to be arrested.

And what is his crime? That he is an officer in the home guards, and that is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is that the card that you have in your hand?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is the original card?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

Then when the Communists arrived, the first to arrive in the Ministry of Justice, was among—I would say a boy, who took over the whole prison business. Immediately they arranged one block from the prison houses, and they started to guard it—the Soviet soldiers started to guard it and they started to put in there those people who had been in the night arrested.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you here when Professor Padalis testified on what happened in the schools in Lithuania, particularly, as to the spying by the students.

Mr. VITINS. I am sorry. I wasn't here, but I can tell you something.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you any information about what happened to the schools?

Mr. VITINS. They first tried to ruin in the children the idea of God. The teachers had to start doing that, even from kindergarten.

I am sorry I didn't take it with me, but I have a passage from an official order, how to teach this to the children from kindergarten. It is approximately in this way: "You have been told that there is a God. There is no God. Now shut your eyes and pray, 'Dear God, give me some candies.' Now open your eyes. Have you got it? You didn't get it. Now, close your eyes again and pray, 'Dear Uncle Stalin, give to me some candies.' Now, open your eyes. Here you are. Every one of you has some candy, and you see there is no God, but there is Uncle Stalin."

Now, that is an official extract from the orders, how to start to teach this important thing in the schools.

When such a small boy or girl came home, he said to his mother, "Mother, there is no God."

The mother understood immediately what was going on, and she said, "Wait a little. You will grow up. You will understand there is God."

The next morning he comes back to the school, and he says, "My mother says there is God."

And what happened? In the next night the mother is going to be arrested, and the boy never sees his mother any more.

That was the way it was.

MR. MCTIGUE. I have no further questions.

MR. VITINS. If I could add something about the people's courts: They appointed the people's courts after the annexation. They discharged all judges, and now the whole jurisdiction was in the hands of the people's judges. They should be elected, and they never have been elected. They have been simply appointed by the Communist Party.

There was one case where a man was appointed as a people's judge, who couldn't sign his name.

MR. KERSTEN. Do you remember his name?

MR. VITINS. I am sorry, but I don't. He was from an eastern province, and I can't remember.

Then, once the people's judges have been called for a meeting. I happened to be there, and for a couple of hours I got in. Then the prosecutor, a Communist, said, "We shall never have the same equality and the same laws for everybody, only for the proletarians"—that means for the peasants. "After the election we have no more proletarians. We will have no more classes and now everybody is rich." Actually, everybody becomes the beggar.

But they said everybody was rich because he is a partner, and everything belongs to the states. The same rights have only the peasant and the worker.

MR. BENTLEY. Your testimony has been very interesting. We will try not to hold you up too long, because I realize you have to get back to Grand Rapids tonight, but I want to ask you this: While you were prosecutor, and later judge, in the courts in Riga and, as such, were very much concerned with Communist activities in Latvia, where did the Communists try to infiltrate? Was it into your labor unions, your professions, or what part of the country were they trying to concentrate on?

MR. VITINS. As far as I could see, it was the trade unions, and especially factories, because according to the communistic teaching, com-

munism can be established only where there is industrial proletariat. In agriculture, they tried to turn it into industry.

Mr. BENTLEY. How much success did they have in this infiltration?

Mr. VITINS. They did succeed. We really persecuted them, but they were underground, as they are everywhere. We couldn't prosecute them when we didn't have the evidence. We knew them. Our police knew, but we couldn't get evidence.

Mr. BENTLEY. To a certain extent they did successfully infiltrate your trade unions?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did they try to infiltrate other professions?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir. I told you one example from the Palace of Justice. That was a man who was a stoker and he appeared to be a Communist. I didn't care about his education, but he was skilled as a Communist.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did they ever have enough strength to threaten the Government?

Mr. VITINS. No. They tried to do it once in Estonia in the year 1924.

Mr. BENTLEY. We have had testimony about that.

However, the numerical strength of the Communist Party in Latvia was very small, wasn't it?

Mr. VITINS. We had, all together, I would say, around 1,000 Communist Party members.

Mr. BENTLEY. Out of a population of how many?

Mr. VITINS. Two million.

Mr. BENTLEY. Then, you might be willing to say that except for the fact that the Russians came in, the Communists in Latvia would never have been in a position to take over the country?

Mr. VITINS. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. There was no danger?

Mr. VITINS. No, never.

Mr. BENTLEY. They infiltrated the trade unions, but that is about as far as they ever got?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

When the Communists came in and, at first, tanks appeared on the streets of Riga, just the people from the mobs came out.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, I want to ask you one more question: All the time that you were investigating Communist activities in Latvia, what evidence did you discover, if any, of Soviet support for these activities?

Mr. VITINS. They had some money support. They tried to do that through the international banks. That is the banks who have international banking operations, and international trade.

There was one bank which had trade with the Soviet Union and they did it through this bank. Or, even through the Soviet Embassy. We had evidence that from the Soviet Embassy, in many cases, the people got some support.

Mr. BENTLEY. You found direct proof that the Soviet Embassy in Riga was financing and supporting the underground Communist movement in that country?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, we did, in some cases.

Mr. BENTLEY. And that, of course, I am sure you would say, would be common practice of Soviet Embassies and diplomats wherever they may be located?

Mr. VITINS. As far as I know, from the communistic tactics, they are exactly the same, whether in Latvia or in the United States of America.

Mr. BENTLEY. On the part of Soviet support and financing for Communist movements, whether they are legal or illegal?

Mr. VITINS. The financing belongs to the communistic tactics, and it depends just on the circumstances which are important for them today.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you find any direct evidence of Soviet diplomats in Latvia, who had been actually engaged in espionage?

Mr. VITINS. Yes. We asked those people to leave, and that is all.

Mr. BENTLEY. You did find such evidence, that Soviet diplomats had been carrying on such activities?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. The same thing would be true, undoubtedly, of not only Soviet but also any diplomats or consular personnel from occupied Communist countries, today? Do you see what I mean?

Mr. VITINS. I understand. I would say yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. You would say the presumption would be yes?

Mr. VITINS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Mr. BONIN. The NKVD card that you had here for the arrest of that anonymous person, we can assume, then, that they also have lists of other people throughout the world that would be arrested in the event that the Soviet was successful in taking over the country?

Mr. VITINS. That is right, sir. But the NKVD never has had a court, as we understand it.

Mr. BONIN. But lists are prepared of people who shall be arrested, deported, or murdered?

Mr. VITINS. Or murdered, that is right.

Mr. BONIN. And these lists are prepared in Moscow?

Mr. VITINS. That is one evidence. I don't know where the others are prepared, but that card was prepared in Moscow. I don't have more of them. That is all I have.

Mr. BONIN. Well, we had some other testimony to that effect, too.

Mr. VITINS. I only wanted to point out that the whole annexation and the whole thing was prepared, before. Therefore, Vyshinsky got angry when someone gave the slogan ahead of time, and that is a second evidence.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you mark this as exhibit 13, Mr. Reporter.

However, I direct, Mr. Reporter, that when you have the opportunity, that the pen-written name after the numeral "1" and some Russian language, be covered over so far as the record is concerned, and that the name be not in the record but that the balance of the card may be. Would you mark it?

Mr. VITINS. I would like to have it back.

Mr. KERSTEN. We would like to make a photostat of it and return it to you.

(A photostatic copy of the card will be marked "Exhibit 13," Detroit, see p. 654.)

Mr. VITINS. There is one other thing I would like to show you, in the book, to indicate how horrible the deportations have been. That is the picture of the supreme court.

Now, I shall show you who has been deported from those people.

This man. This man. This, this, this and that. This man. That man. This man. Here, this, this and this.

Mr. KERSTEN. So out of a total of 19, 10 out of 19 were deported, of your Supreme Court of Free Latvia?

Mr. VITINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have also stated that you had some kindergarten instructions at home?

Mr. VITINS. Each kindergarten everywhere got the same instruction.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have them here?

Mr. VITINS. I have them in Grand Rapids. They are printed in one booklet, and I don't have the booklet, here. What I told you, that is the contents of that.

Mr. KERSTEN. This witness, Congressman Bentley, I want to say, has provided some very helpful information to the committee, extraordinarily helpful, and I think you are to be congratulated for producing him, here, as well as other witnesses here that Mr. Machrowicz has also produced.

You have made a fine contribution to our hearings, here.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mrs. Tarvainiene, will you come forward, please?

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you raise your right hand?

Mr. JURGELA. I have been sworn before.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF MRS. KAZIMIERA TARVAINIENE, DETROIT, MICH.

Mrs. TARVAINIENE (through interpreter). I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you please state your name and address?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Kazimiera Tarvainiene.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is the address, please?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. 4208 McKinley Street, Detroit, Mich.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. In Siauliai.

Mr. McTIGUE. In which country?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. In Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Lithuania when the Soviet occupied the country?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, I lived in Telsiai.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were your sons arrested?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes. He was arrested. He spent 7 months in prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many children did you have?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. I had three. I had five children. Two had died prior. Two were sons and one daughter.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were your sons arrested by the Soviets?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. The Soviets.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were both of them arrested?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Both were detained. One was tortured to death and one died here last year.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you live in Telsiai?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Republic Street.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that right across the street from NKVD headquarters?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes. Across the street.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could you see NKVD headquarters from your home?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes. Clearly.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could you see your sons being led in and out of the NKVD headquarters?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. At night. I have seen him being led at night. I could not sleep. I watched, and I have seen him.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your son's name and why was he arrested?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. His name is Zenonas.

Mr. McTIGUE. How old was your son?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. He was 20. By the time he was tortured to death he was 21.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why was he arrested?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. For failing to heed the orders to join them, the Communists.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your son a Boy Scout or a member of any Lithuanian youth organization?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. He was a Boy Scout. He did not belong to any other.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was a Boy Scout?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, a scout.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were other boys arrested with your son?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, there were.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall what happened the day before the Germans came to Telsiai?

Mr. KERSTEN. Is the witness volunteering something?

Mr. JURGELA. The witness is showing a publication in the Lithuanian language which is entitled, "Žemaiciu Kankiniai," meaning "Samagit martyrs."

The tragedy of the Rainiai Forest, June 24-25, 1941, published in Telsiai in 1942 by Žemaiciu Žeme, meaning the Samagite Land, or Country.

[She points to a list on page 3 which contains a number of names and bearing crossed marks in front of some of the names, and those are the Boy Scouts.]

Mr. McTIGUE. Is her son's name on that list?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, it is sixth from the bottom of column 12. It says, "Tarvainis, Zenonas."

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall what happened on June 24, 1941, which was the day before the Germans came to Telsiai?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Before the German entry, all the inhabitants of Telsiai were ordered to leave the town. We were told to move about 3 kilometers away from the city.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall seeing your son being led out of NKVD headquarters by NKVD agents and Russian soldiers, on that day?

Mr. TARVAINIENE. The last day, no; I had seen him about 1 week prior to that date.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you see your son on or about that day, the day before the Germans came in; did you see your son being led out of NKVD headquarters, with other Boy Scouts and with other prisoners, taken in the direction of Rainiai Forest?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. No, I have not seen that. When they were taken to the forest, I was not present there.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Did somebody tell you that your son was taken to the Rainiai Forest?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. On Monday, my daughter had seen him still being present in the prison there, and, of course, when the prisoners were led out of the jail, he was taken with the other prisoners. This was on Monday, and he was tortured to death on Wednesday.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Did you later on go out to the Rainiai Forest to identify the body of your son?

Mr. TARVAINIENE. Yes.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Were there other bodies there?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Seventy-three corpses.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Were they young men, youths, Boy Scouts?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes. Eighteen to twenty years old, and there was a teacher among them. He was an older man, but otherwise, they were all young men; Scouts.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Was your son tortured?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes.

Mr. MCTIGUE. What did they do to him?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. His mouth was reined.

Mr. MCTIGUE. What do you mean by that?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Like they bridle a horse; reined.

His hands were tied in the back.

Mr. JURGELA. This picture is not of her son, but her son was bound like in this body. All bodies carried this taped mouth. And hands were tied in the back, all of them.

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. When I found my boy, his mouth was still taped and his hands were tied.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Have you a picture of your son?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Have you a picture of your son at the time of his death?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. In this picture of the scene of Rainiai Forest, my son's body is the third one from that tree, and the two bodies lying on the side of the picture are the bodies of the Russian soldiers. Their own soldiers.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you mark this?

(The photograph was marked "Exhibit 14-A" Detroit. See p. 655.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Is this picture which the reporter has marked "No. 14, of Rainiai Forest," showing the body of your son as you saw it on that occasion?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, that was taken there.

Mr. KERSTEN. Can you point to the body of your son?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. [Witness indicates.]

Mr. KERSTEN. Is that a true picture of the scene that you saw on this day?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. That is the picture. That is the way they were lying.

Mr. JURGELA. The witness wishes to say that she has two pictures of the boy before he was in prison. This picture was taken in the prison, and there is also the photograph of the other boy who died last year, who was also imprisoned by the Soviets.

Mr. KERSTEN. Does the witness have other pictures before her there, of the forest and the massacre?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. I notice a number of pictures lying before the witness there, photographs which appear to be similar to exhibit 14-A, bodies lying in the forest. Can you tell me whether there are other pictures of the Rainiai Forest massacre there?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Pick them out.

Would you hand them to me, please? Do you know who took these pictures that you have handed to me?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. The man's name is Budginas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see all the scenes that are identified on these photographs?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Oh, my God. I found my son there.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, you did see the scenes that are represented on these photographs; is that correct?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, Jesus, Maria, I have seen all of those scenes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do these photographs truly picture the scenes that you saw?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, truly, truly. These were brought by me from Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. I will ask the reporter to mark all of these.

(The pictures were marked Exhibits 14-B-14-K, Detroit, see pp. 656-665.)

Mr. JURGELA. She also has a picture of the funeral, showing her alongside the coffin. Where my finger points, that is her walking beside the coffin.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you mark the last one, please?

(The photograph was marked Exhibit 14-L, Detroit, see p. 666.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Mrs. Tarvainiene, we should like to put those photographs into the record and when they have been photographed for the purposes of the record, the originals will be returned to you.

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, sir, as long as you will return them to me. Before I die, I would like to have those pictures.

Mr. KERSTEN. They will be returned to you within a few days.

Mr. JURGELA. The witness explains that she has other pictures, including her own boy and the other Boy Scouts in that prison who were killed.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you, Mrs. Tarvainiene, notice wounds on your boy's body?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. I, myself, washed off the blood and all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were there bullet wounds on his body?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. There was a bayonet wound from the point on the forehead and it came out in the rear and there were also two wounds on the left side of the head and there were two bayonet wounds on the chest, just above the stomach, one on the left hip—two wounds on the stomach, two wounds on the left hip. Of course, the body was badly beaten, including some bumps on the left of the head and his hands were scalded with hot cabbage soup. There were heaps of cabbage there, because all of those bodies had been scalded by boiling cabbage soup.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have just one question. I would like to ask the witness if she knows why we have asked her to recall

so many terrible things, if she knows what our purpose is in asking her to recall these tragic events of her own life, what the purpose of this committee is in asking her to tell us these things?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. What can I know?

Mr. BENTLEY. I wish you would tell her, Mr. Interpreter, that it is only by bringing these tragic things out that we can know from her testimony and the testimony of the other witnesses who have been here, expose the true nature of what the Communists really do, that we feel we are serving a purpose by telling the people of the free world the truth behind these bestial actions and that is why we have asked her to go through this painful ordeal, that we know it will be of value to other people in the still remaining free countries of the world.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Machrowicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. No further questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bonin?

Mr. BONIN. No further questions.

Mr. JURGELA. The witness says that these martyrs of Telsiai prison had written on an aluminum plate their last will and testament. In Lithuanian it consist of two and a half pages.

Mr. KERSTEN. May we have that again? We didn't hear that.

Mr. JURGELA. The witness states the martyrs of Telsiai prison wrote their last will and testament on an aluminum plate in the prison and they said they on June 23, 1941; it was in cell No. 10.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see that?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, I did; yes, I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is the writing that is in the book before you the same as what you saw in this prison?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, everything the way it has been written there. Everything.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Interpreter, is that a lengthy thing?

Mr. JURGELA. To interpret now?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. That last will.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many pages is it?

Mr. JURGELA. It is roughly two such pages, because here is an introduction.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. JURGELA. I have never read it.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you look it over and give us the sense of it?

Mr. JURGELA. It is very poetic.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Put the whole will and testament in the record, as well as you can. The translation.

Mr. JURGELA. They had seen that the war had started; they had heard bombs exploding and they considered these the long-expected swallows of hope.

We 13 political prisoners, victims of bolshevism sitting here in Telsiai prison, cell No. 10, hopelessly are awaiting, hopefully expecting freedom like reindeers thirsting for the waters of spring. Our land is being abused by Asiatics. They are torturing the true patriots of Lithuania. They have placed them into dank dungeons of prisons in association with the traitors. Today, on the 23rd day of June 1941, in the morning, our faces were gladdened, our hearts are buring with new fire, when we have seen the bomb bursts destroying the military objectives of the Bolsheviks in Telsiai.

The sadistic superintendent, Kabaila, who had persecuted us for a long time and punished us by not allowing us to leave the cell for natural needs and who 3 days ago had beaten us in the lavatory, on the face, now his ears are

down. The chief politruk of the prison, behind Vaitekus, who had intended to carry article 58—that is the Soviet penal code—to Berlin, now is running around like a madman and with a black bacon face. Now he is silent.

The political prisoner Tarvaini, from the prison of the former church, and our Elta—that is Lithuanian Telegraph Agency—is announcing through the thick walls the glad tidings. The cuckoo bird—meaning the Russians, here—has his wings clipped, the traitors are running East en masse. Kaunas is free—apparently they heard that through some radio or something—already decorated with national flags. We are congratulating each other with a free Lithuania Today, June 24, 1941, a beautiful sunlit morning, through steel gates of the window, we see the blue lake of Mlastis. In excellent spirits, we are awaiting the end of Bolsheviks, having learned from our best guard, Visagorskis, about our new government—and 13 signatures follow.

So apparently this prison guard was the one who notified them that there was a war on.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is the name of the one referred to as the one tapping on the cell, her son?

Mr. JURGELA. I don't see his name here. The names all carry numbers.

Mr. KERSTEN. It would appear from the content, he was not among the 13, but he was in an adjoining cell.

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. My son was in cell No. 5.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is Tarvainis referred to in the body of the article, her son?

You read a name off and you said that was her son. You said something about somebody tapping.

Mr. JURGELA. His name does not appear here.

Mr. KERSTEN. In the yellow-covered book, you read, as you translated, the name of somebody who was tapping on the cell.

Mr. JURGELA. Oh, yes. It mentions her son. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, I am asking the witness, does that refer to her son?

Mrs. TARVAINIENE. Yes, that is my son.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are there any further questions?

I want to say at this point that it certainly appears from this evidence here quite conclusively that these 73 victims who include this young man, and her son, when in the grasp of freedom were apparently taken in the forest and most brutally and sadistically murdered.

I have had a considerable amount of evidence—that is, statements made to me by other witnesses, over in Europe, testifying to this most heinous, official Communist act, that has ever come to my ears, the murder of these boys, high school students among them.

Thank you for coming here and thank you for your courage in telling this story. We hope that your son did not die in vain.

Now, sir, do you speak English?

TESTIMONY OF JUOZAS MILIAUSKAS, WINDSOR, CANADA

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. I speak, but not very well.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you understand English?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. I understand, but I am not strong.

Mr. KERSTEN. Raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. So help me God.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your full name, please?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Juozas Miliauskas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where do you live?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. In Windsor.

Mr. McTIGUE. Windsor, Ontario?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your address?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. 242 Cadillac Street.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where are you employed; by whom?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. By Dominion Forge & Stamping Co.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. In Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. In what year?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. 1916. The 20th of June.

Mr. McTIGUE. In what town or village?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Geisteriskiai.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your occupation while you were a youth in this village you have just mentioned?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. I was a cabinetmaker.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in this village in Lithuania, or in the Soviet-occupied Lithuania?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall a day on or about June 22, 1941, while you were at work in your shop?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes, sir. That was on Sunday.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was a Sunday?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. What do you remember about it?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. I remember when the Russian army went away and then came the German Army. Between that time, I did see an army truck, a Russian army truck. In the army truck was about 6 or 7 NKVD soldiers and about 3 civilians.

Mr. McTIGUE. An army truck was passing through this village and passed by your shop?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Not by my shop. By the village.

Mr. McTIGUE. But you were in the village and saw the truck?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And the truck had on it 3 NKVD men and 3 civilians?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. It was about 7 NKBD soldiers and 3 civilians. The civilians were priests.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then tell us what happened, please.

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. They bring them to the Budavone Forest.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you know that?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. I saw.

Mr. McTIGUE. You saw them take them into the forest?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes, because it is not too far from my home.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened, then?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. It was about a half mile.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened, then?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Then we heard shooting. After about 2 hours I go to visit my neighbor and I see about 10 or 15 farmers standing by the forest and talking and they see me and call, "Come in and see what happened." When I come in, I see those three priests were murdered.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you know the three priests?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who were they?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. It was Priest Balsis, Priest Dabrila, and Priest Petrika.

Mr. McTIGUE. How were they killed? Were they shot?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. They were shot and killed with bayonets.

Mr. McTIGUE. And bayoneted?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes. Through the chest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Bayoneted through the chest or shot through the chest?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes and their hands were tied on the back.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was there anything else about the bodies that you recall?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. The Priest Balsis, he was cut at the tongue.

Mr. McTIGUE. He had his tongue cut out?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall or do you remember whether any of the other priests had the skin flayed off their backs or peeled off their backs?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. I don't remember for sure which one, whether it was Priest Dabrila or Priest Petrika: from his back with the knife was cut pieces like belt, three pieces from the back. From the neck to more than the middle back.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you mean that his skin was ripped from the back of his neck down to the waistline?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. In one single piece?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. About the width of a belt?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. No, three pieces. Not one piece. About 2 inches wide.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you recall anything else about it?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. No, I don't remember any more.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They were Catholic priests?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. They were all from your village?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Priest Balsis was from our village, and the other two were guests. They lived together.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you recall the name of the parish, the church from which Father Balsis came?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS. Lankeliskiai.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was that the name of the church?

Mr. JURGELA. The church or hamlet.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was the name of the church?

Mr. MILIAUSKAS (through interpreter). St. Francis Church.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Andrus Valuckas we plan to hear at a later date.

I want to say at this time, before we adjourn, that the evidence produced at this hearing required certain unusual arrangements, as is obvious, and we—I think I speak for the members of the committee—we appreciate the cooperation of the press, here in Detroit, under these rather difficult arrangements. One of the functions of our committee, I believe, is that the people of the United States shall have some under-

standing of what happens to people under communism. These witnesses have related this with their own lips, and we appreciate the courtesy and cooperation of the press, here in the city of Detroit.

After I make the announcement of the adjournment, there is another short statement I would like to make, and the gentlemen of the press may be interested in it.

At this time, the hearings in Detroit are adjourned to Chicago, Ill. The first of our hearings will be in Chicago on Thursday of this week, December 10, at 10 o'clock, in the Federal Building. The hearings are now adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4:20 p. m., the hearing adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., December 10, 1953, in the Federal Building, Chicago, Ill.)

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIC COMMITTEE,
Chicago, Ill.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a. m., in room 209, United States courthouse, Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Bonin, Madden, Dodd, and Machrowicz.

Also present: Dr. Kluczynski.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel, and Constantine R. Jurgela of counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order.

Since these hearings opened on November 30 in Washington with a statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, we have heard from the representatives of the free governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, who are still recognized by our Government.

In addition to that, former President Herbert Hoover, and the only living member of the Latvian Cabinet in 1940, have testified concerning the tremendous progress these three countries made during their 20 years of independence.

Mr. Alfreds Berzins, former Minister of Public Affairs in Latvia, indicted Soviet Ambassador Andrei Vishinsky as one of the top murderers of our times who has gone unpunished, and additional evidence concerning Mr. Vishinsky's activities in the takeover of Latvia and the brutality and atrocities which followed was heard in Detroit.

We have invited Mr. Vishinsky to appear before the committee, and we have offered him the opportunity to be heard in defense of these charges at any time convenient to him.

I might add that Mr. Berzins, as a result of his testimony against Mr. Vishinsky, received three telephone calls threatening his life, and has been under the protection of the New York City Police Department since last Thursday.

We believe that at these hearings today we will develop evidence concerning the takeover of Lithuania and some of the important events which followed.

I should point out that this series of preliminary hearings is designed to bring out eyewitness and personal experience testimony from people who escaped the Communist terror. We are learning also the methods and the manner in which the Soviets stole the life, land, and energies of the 6 million people in the Baltic countries, imposing there the pattern later followed in the other countries of Eastern Europe now behind the Iron Curtain.

At this time, I want to say that one of the members of our committee, Mr. Fred Busbey of Illinois, had intended or had planned to be

here this morning, but, because of temporary illness, it is impossible for him to be here today, and I believe also impossible for him to be here tomorrow. I believe he will continue with the work of our committee as the hearings continue after the first of the year.

I also want to point out that Congressman John Kluczynski, one of our colleagues, is here with us this morning. Congressman Kluczynski from Chicago, we are very happy to have you with us.

Mr. KLUCZYNSKI. Thank you.

Mr. MADDEN. I thought maybe it might be well to mention that another purpose of this committee, along with the mission that Congress authorized it for, is to overcome and let the people behind the Iron Curtain, as well as the people in the free countries, know that the Communist propaganda, including the speeches made by Mr. Vishinsky, that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were not countries that volunteered, as they would have the world believe, to enter the Soviet orbit. Our testimony has revealed in Washington and in New York and in Detroit that the Soviet leaders, through their criminal acts of massacre, murder, and prison camps, forced the people of these three countries, as well as all of these subjugated Baltic countries, to come into the Soviet orbit, and it is not true that there was any volunteering or consent that the people of these Baltic countries are today under the iron heel of the Communist tyrant.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is certainly true, Mr. Madden. The speech made by Mr. Vishinsky last December and all of his speeches have always stated that these three countries willingly came into the Soviet Union; that they wanted to come into the Soviet Union, and that since that time they have been happy peoples and countries. The overwhelming evidence before our committee is that these three countries before being taken over were happy, prosperous countries. Since that time they have suffered great destruction, many of their people have been murdered, and the exact opposite is true of the claims of the Soviet.

General Rastikis.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. STASYS RASTIKIS, FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, LITHUANIAN ARMY

Mr. KERSTEN. You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Mr. RASTIKIS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Take a chair, please.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Stasys Rastikis.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is S-t-a-s-y-s?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you spell your last name?

Mr. RASTIKIS. R-a-s-t-i-k-i-s.

Mr. KERSTEN. Presently are you living in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; now temporarily.

Mr. KERSTEN. You and your wife?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; me and my wife.

Mr. KERSTEN. When were you born, General?

- Mr. RASTIKIS. September 18, 1896.
- Mr. KERSTEN. In Lithuania?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. In Lithuania; yes.
- Mr. KERSTEN. You are a Lithuanian?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; I am a Lithuanian.
- Mr. KERSTEN. In the year 1939, were you in the Lithuanian Army?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, I was.
- Mr. KERSTEN. At that time what was your position?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. I was commander in chief of the Lithuanian Army.
- Mr. KERSTEN. Now, Lithuania is one of the three Baltic nations, countries, on the Baltic Sea, just northeast of Poland, is that correct?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. North from Poland.
- Mr. KERSTEN. How long had you been a military man, General, at that time?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. About 25 years.
- Mr. KERSTEN. You were a professional soldier?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. I am.
- Mr. KERSTEN. At that time you had a family, didn't you?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.
- Mr. KERSTEN. How many children?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Three daughters.
- Mr. KERSTEN. And in 1939 how old were they?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. 1939 or 1941?
- Mr. KERSTEN. Well, how old were they, say, in 1941?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. In 1941 they were 11 years old, 4 years old, and the third one, about 12 months old.
- Mr. KERSTEN. The reason you mentioned 1941 is because that is when you saw them for the last time, is that right?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.
- Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state, General, whether or not some time in 1939 you, together with others, were called to Moscow?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.
- Mr. KERSTEN. Was there a commission, a Lithuanian commission?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. A delegation of the Lithuanian Government.
- Mr. KERSTEN. How many members of that delegation were there?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. There were altogether, four.
- Mr. KERSTEN. Were you one of the four?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.
- Mr. KERSTEN. Could you name for us the names of the other three, please? Take your time because I believe the names may be a little difficult.
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Mr. Urbsys.
- Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell that?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. U-r-b-s-y-s.
- Mr. KERSTEN. What was his capacity?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. He was at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania.
- Mr. KERSTEN. Who were the others?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. Mr. Bizauskas.
- Mr. KERSTEN. Spell that.
- Mr. RASTIKIS. B-i-z-a-u-s-k-a-s.
- Mr. KERSTEN. And what was his position?
- Mr. RASTIKIS. He was at that time vice premier of our Government?
- Mr. KERSTEN. And who was the third?

Mr. RASTIKIS. The third was I.

Mr. KERSTEN. There was a fourth, was there not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who was the fourth?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That was our Minister in Moscow, Dr. Natkevicius.

Mr. KERSTEN. Spell that for us.

Mr. RASTIKIS. N-a-t-k-e-v-i-c-i-u-s.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was he the Lithuanian Ambassador to Moscow?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Ambassador to Moscow; yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you and the other three you mentioned go to Moscow?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you had others with you from Lithuania, did you not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, assistants to your delegation?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you remember the date that you went?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't remember exactly but about the 2d or 3d of October.

Mr. KERSTEN. 1939?

Mr. RASTIKIS. 1939.

Mr. KERSTEN. And from where did you take off for Moscow? Where did you leave from Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. From Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. By train or plane?

Mr. RASTIKIS. By plane.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who was the President of Lithuania at that time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Mr. Smetona.

Mr. KERSTEN. It was at his knowledge and upon the decision of your Government that your delegation went?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Briefly tell us the purpose of your visit at that time.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir. Mr. President, I speak not so well English.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think you meant to say Mr. Congressman.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. Maybe you will allow me to tell in my own language, Lithuanian.

Mr. KERSTEN. We understand. Do the best you can.

Are you going to speak in Lithuanian now?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think we better go as far as we can in English.

Mr. RASTIKIS. I will try.

Mr. KERSTEN. If we do have to go into Lithuanian, we will do that, but I think we are getting along pretty good.

Is it true that pressure was put on the Lithuanian Government by the Soviets that resulted in your delegation going to Moscow?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; that was true.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did word come from to your Government about the necessity of you going to Moscow?

Mr. RASTIKIS. From Mr. Molotov through our Foreign Minister, Mr. Urbsys. He was at that time in Moscow.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is U-r-b-s-y-s. Now, when you arrived in Moscow, where did you go?

Mr. RASTIKIS. We were in the Hotel National near the Kremlin.

Mr. KERSTEN. How much of a trip was it from the Lithuanian capital to Moscow?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't remember exactly, but maybe 6 or 7 hours.

Mr. KERSTEN. What time of the day did you arrive there?

Mr. RASTIKIS. We arrived in the afternoon in Moscow.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then what did you do?

Mr. RASTIKIS. We were in the hotel and about 11 o'clock——

Mr. KERSTEN. At night?

Mr. RASTIKIS. At night. We received a call from the Kremlin that our delegation must come to the Kremlin. It was too late and we believed that it was so late at night, about midnight.

Mr. KERSTEN. You thought it was pretty late for a call at the Kremlin?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. But at any rate, you were called to come there?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How did you get to the Kremlin?

Mr. RASTIKIS. NKVD had, at that time, many cars near our hotel and we have to take these cars of NKVD.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you enter then through the Kremlin gate?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then, tell us what happened from then on.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. First, we were in a room of the secretary of Mr. Molotov. Molotov was, at that time, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. We had to wait a pretty long time in his room.

Mr. KERSTEN. When you say "we" do you refer to yourself and the three other members?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, the whole delegation.

Mr. KERSTEN. Oh, yes, the whole delegation.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Later, we came into the room of Mr. Molotov and we saw over there with Mr. Molotov, Mr. Potemkin and Pozdniakov.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did that comprise the Soviet group?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; just those three men.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, when you were ushered into Molotov's room—first, as Congressman Machrowicz suggests, will you identify Potemkin?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Potemkin was at that time with Foreign Affairs, but before he was a representative of the Soviet Union in Paris, in France.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes, and what about Pozdniakov?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Pozdniakov was the representative of the Soviet Union in Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was the Soviet Ambassador to your country; was he not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. To our country.

Mr. KERSTEN. I see. How many of your delegation got into Molotov's room?

Mr. RASTIKIS. All four.

Mr. KERSTEN. The four?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You and three others?

Mr. RASTIKIS. And three others; yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. But the expert and the secretary——

Mr. RASTIKIS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. They remained outside?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, tell us, in your own way, General, taking your time, what the talk was after you got into Molotov's room?

Mr. RASTIKIS. At first our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Urbsys, told Molotov about the purpose of our delegation, that we came in the name of the Lithuanian Government to see what the Russians wanted from us, and that our delegation was sent by the Government of the Lithuanian people.

Mr. Molotov told us a pretty long story about what the Russians wanted at that time from the Baltic States, especially from Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did he say?

Mr. RASTIKIS. He said that nobody knows what will happen after the war which began in Germany and Poland, that the war will be pretty large, and that Russia or the Soviet Union now had an agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany, but later it may be that the Germans will be an enemy of the Soviet Union, because of that, therefore, the Soviet Union had the intention to have its military bases or the bases of the Red army on the territory of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, just to interrupt a moment. Before this time the Soviet Government had entered into a solemn agreement, had it not, with Lithuania, and also Latvia and Estonia, renouncing forever any claim whatsoever against the Baltic States, and pledging against any kind of interference by the Soviet Union into the Baltic States, including Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, Lithuania was a completely independent nation at this time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. I believe that was testified to by our Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, a week ago Monday at Washington during these hearings.

Now, how did Molotov go on?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. He wanted first a pact between Lithuania and the Soviet Union, a Mutual Security Pact, and second, to have in many places of Lithuania, of the territory of Lithuania, the Soviet groups, or the groups of the Soviet Army.

He said that during the talks between him and Ribbentrop, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, that it was agreed that Lithuania is now under the influence of the Soviet Union.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, the Nazis and the Communists had agreed to that without in any way consulting the Lithuanian Government?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. And that we cannot hope for any help from the side of Germany, and that we must agree that it is necessary for us to allow the Soviet Union to have their troops, military troops, military bases, on our territory.

Mr. KERSTEN. General, was this the first information that you had, and apparently that the other members of your delegation had, about any agreement between the Nazis and the Communists?

Mr. RASTIKIS. We knew at that time that an agreement had been made between Germany and the Soviet Union, but we didn't know everything——

Mr. KERSTEN. About its contents?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. And we know nothing about that, but it was in the appendix to this agreement, to these documents concerning our States, the Baltic States, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Now, we know that.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now you know it?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. But at that time we knew nothing about that. We felt that maybe there was something wrong about us, but what it was exactly—we couldn't know—what it was exactly we couldn't know at that time.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Our Minister, Minister Urbsys, answered Molotov that if it would be necessary to sign an agreement, a mutual security pact, that is one side of the story, but about the presence of the foreign troops, military troops, troops of the Red army on our territory, it is un-understandable; we couldn't understand that a quite independent state could have such troops in their own territory, especially when these troops were quite of another kind than our troops.

I mean the Red army and the Lithuanian National Army. The kind of these armies—how do you say it?

Mr. KERSTEN. Are very different?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Pretty different, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go ahead.

Mr. RASTIKIS. But Molotov insisted that we did not have a chance, that it meant that we must understand that Russia must have their troops, and we must understand Russia, and that we have no other way—just this one way—to allow the Soviet Union to have these troops in our territory, in the territory of Lithuania.

This first meeting in the Kremlin, in the room of Molotov, was just general discussion between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Urbsys.

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, do I understand you correctly then to say that Molotov told your delegation that it had no choice——

Mr. RASTIKIS. No choice.

Mr. KERSTEN (continuing). But to agree to Soviet troops being garrisoned in Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go ahead.

Mr. RASTIKIS. The first meeting ended about 1 o'clock——

Mr. KERSTEN. In the morning?

Mr. RASTIKIS. In the morning, yes, about 1 o'clock. Then we went back to our hotel, and the next day, about the same time, about 11 o'clock in the night, we were invited to come to the Kremlin again, this time in the same room, where Molotov, Potemkin, and Pozdniev were present, but there was also Stalin himself.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, where was this? Where, in the Kremlin, was it? In Molotov's office?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, in Molotov's office.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right.

Mr. RASTIKIS. And Stalin told us that we must be, that we must understand that we have just one way, and that we must agree to

what the Russians want, and that we have no hope from the German side, because Mr. Molotov agreed that Lithuania is already in the influence sphere of the Soviet Union. Mr. Urbsys said that he don't believe that the Germans did so, but Stalin——

MR. KERSTEN. You mean that Urbsys said he didn't believe that the Germans had agreed to this?

MR. RASTIKIS. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. What did Mr. Stalin reply?

MR. RASTIKIS. Then Stalin told the story about how it was to happen.

MR. KERSTEN. What did he say?

MR. RASTIKIS. He said that during the second trip to Moscow, which was in September 1939, that Mr. Ribbentrop finally agreed that all the territory of Lithuania, excepting part of our territory near the German border, will remain under Soviet influence; and one part of our territory, the west part of our territory, which is a small part, but one of the best parts of our country, that will belong to Germany; not under the influence sphere of Germany, but will belong to Germany, and that the Russians and the Germans agreed about this problem.

All of us, Urbsys, Bizauskas, and I, and all of us, we could not believe that all of our territory is already divided into two parts.

MR. KERSTEN. How did this information given you by Stalin affect you and the other members of the delegation?

MR. RASTIKIS. The effect was very bad, because we saw that now we have not lost yet our independence, but—I mean, the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany has already divided our territory without our knowledge, and that it is, maybe, something more about the rest of our territory, which must be belonging, as an influence sphere, an influence zone to the Soviet Union. We could not believe that, but Stalin declared that it is the truth, and that Germany will no help us alone, and we must agree with all this what the Soviet Union wanted from us:

First, the mutual security pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania; and, the second, to have a number of troops of the Russian Army in our territory.

Especially the second problem was very difficult for us. Mr. Urbsys asked Stalin and Molotov how many troops they wanted in Lithuania. The first number was 75,000, but a little later they said: No, maybe 50,000 Red soldiers on our territory. I must say here that at that time our Lithuanian Army had about 30,000 soldiers.

MR. KERSTEN. May I ask you here when Urbsys and your delegation were protesting, did Stalin say anything directly to him that you recall?

MR. RASTIKIS. Oh, yes, yes. Mr. Urbsys spoke pretty long; Stalin was nervous because of his long speech and he said: You young men sit down and be quiet. You don't understand what is happening in the whole world.

MR. KERSTEN. You don't understand what?

MR. RASTIKIS. You cannot understand about what is now happening in the whole world and we have protected you against Germans, against Ribbentrop.

MR. KERSTEN. And at that particular time Urbsys was talking about the independence of Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, about the independence of Lithuania and about the dividing——

Mr. KERSTEN. The division of your country?

Mr. RASTIKIS. The division of our country, of our territory.

Mr. KERSTEN. Without your knowledge?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, the division between the Nazis and——

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, and then Stalin told a story about his conversations between Stalin and Molotov, on one side, and Ribbentrop on the other.

Ribbentrop wanted first that the line or the border between the spheres of influence, the Russian and German influence spheres could be along the River Daugava.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. D-a-u-g-a-v-a. But Stalin said: We didn't agree with that. Then the second proposal of Ribbentrop was the north border of Lithuania or the border between Lithuania and Latvia.

That means that Latvia and Estonia will belong or will be in the Russian influence sphere and the whole of Lithuania into the German influence sphere.

The Russians did not agree with this proposal either. The third proposal of Ribbentrop was the river Nemunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. N-e-m-u-n-a-s. That means that one part of our territory will belong to Russia and the second part, the west or the southwest part——

Mr. KERSTEN. This was the Soviets and the Nazis haggling back and forth over the division of this area, is that right?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. But the Russians did not agree with Ribbentrop's proposal either. And they agreed, the Germans and Russians, that one part, the west part of our territory will belong to Germany and the other part will be in the Russian influence sphere.

Mr. Urbsys and another member of our delegation could not believe that we are already divided but Stalin told us that it is so, it is so. This time, or that night—or, the second meeting was ended between 1 and 2 in the morning, early in the morning.

We came back to our hotel and then to our Legation, the Lithuanian Legation, we told between us what we have to do, that we cannot agree with such proposals or such dictate of the Russians, and Mr. Urbsys decided to send two members of our delegation to Lithuania, to Kaunas, and to ask, first, to inform our Government about what we heard from Molotov and Stalin and about what we can do. Second, to ask the Government what they will do and what they say to us what we have to do. The 2 men or 2 members of our delegation were Mr. Bizanskas and I, and the second morning, early in the morning, we went to Lithuania by plane from Moscow, and at the same day, in the office of our President of Republic, was a meeting of our Government. We informed about all what we heard in Moscow and the Government had a long discussion and after these discussions it was decided that Lithuania is in a very, very bad situation: that we are now between 2 enemies, between the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany; that we are already divided between 2 of these countries and

that we must do something to ease our position and that we can sign the agreement pact—mutual security pact, but we should continue the parleys longer about military bases.

Mr. KERSTEN. Concerning the military bases, the Soviet bases that would be allowed in Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Soviets—not we, but Soviet.

Mr. KERSTEN. I understand. They insisted—

Mr. RASTIKIS. They insisted to allow it, but, in fact, it was a dictate—not allow, but must.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, it was a dictate?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. Then, the next day, we came back to Moscow and in the evening, about 11 o'clock at night, we received a call from the Kremlin. We went to the Kremlin. Stalin was not present at that time, just Molotov and Potiomkin. Molotov was very angry because he knew that we were in Lithuania and he said, he asked us—not us—but the Minister, Urbsys—"Mr. Minister, what is new over there, especially in Germany?" Mr. Urbsys would just say that the news is very bad. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs knew already at that time what Stalin told us about the agreement between Molotov—between Stalin and Ribbentrop was through.

Then came Stalin and showed us a map of the general staff of the Red Army, and that map showed the location of the new military basis of the Soviet Army. The Soviets wanted to have the Russian military bases all along the river, along the German boundary; at many points in Lithuania.

They wanted, first, 50,000; then they wanted 35,000; and then 25,000 Red troops, and they stated that the least they must have would be 25,000; that is the least number.

Mr. KERSTEN. Soviet troops?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Soviet troops: yes. But during the conversation, and at the end of the meeting, they agreed to 20,000 troops.

Mr. KERSTEN. Twenty thousand troops?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. And Mr. Urbsys protested, but he could do nothing. That is all, and he must agree with them.

Then there was the second question about communistic propaganda in our country, at that time, when we will have Russian troops in our territory. Molotov, and especially Stalin, said that it will not be propaganda; that it would not come in as propaganda in our country, and if the Lithuanian Communists—we had at that time a very small number of Lithuanian Communists, but if the Lithuanian Communists wanted to do any propaganda, that "we can help you and our troops will help you, too."

Mr. KERSTEN. So, Stalin solemnly promised, or, rather, promised—

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; several times during this meeting.

Mr. KERSTEN (continuing). That the Communists in Lithuania—

Mr. RASTIKIS. Will not act against our country.

Mr. KERSTEN (continuing). Will not in any way have pro-Communist propaganda?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. That even the Red troops will help stop them?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; that they will help our position. Of course, we didn't believe such declarations.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. RASTIKIS. The third question was about Vilnius, the capital of our territory, because at that time the capital of Lithuania was occupied by the Red army.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, finally, an agreement was signed, a mutual assistance agreement?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is that correct?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. It was declared that we had no other way, and that we must agree.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean, there was no choice?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; there was no choice for us. There was no choice; yes. And Molotov and Urbsys signed three documents. That was on October 10, about 1 or 2 o'clock, early in the morning, in the office, or in the room of Molotov, and with Molotov there. Three documents, the mutual——

Mr. KERSTEN. Assistance pact?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Assistance pact; yes. The first, apparently was that; and then there was an appendix to this pact, a secret appendix to the pact, about the number of troops in our territory, and the third document was a map.

Mr. KERSTEN. Showing the military bases?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, no; the boundary. The boundary between Lithuania and White Russia. This was signed by Molotov from the Russian side and by Urbsys.

Mr. KERSTEN. For Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. For the Lithuanian side; yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Reporter, will you mark this, please?

(The document was marked "Exhibit 15-A." See map facing p. 666.)

Mr. KERSTEN. General, I will show you a photostat of a map, which has been marked "Exhibit 15-A" for identification. There has been testimony concerning this map in our hearings before, I believe, and I also believe that Former President Herbert Hoover testified about it.

I will ask you to look at that map, which you have looked at previously this morning.

And I will point to you what purports to be Stalin's signature and also Ribbentrop's signature.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; I see it.

Mr. KERSTEN. I will ask you whether or not this map was in accordance with the agreement that was arrived at between the Nazis and the Communists that affected this area?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, yes. That is, yes. That is quite clear.

Mr. KERSTEN. I will offer this map at this time into the record. I think it should be a part of the record.

Now, General, the agreements that you testified to, the mutual assistance agreements, I believe they are already in the record, from Washington, as I recall, guaranteed noninterference in the internal affairs.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Of Lithuania.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, yes, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Except that it provided for the military occupation by the Soviet troops of certain bases; is that correct?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; just bases.

Mr. KERSTEN. And when did the Soviet troops first go into those bases; do you know?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What month, or when was that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That was at the end of October 1939.

Mr. KERSTEN. Within a few weeks after the agreement?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; after the agreement, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that was in the fall of 1939?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what happened in June of 1940, the following year?

Mr. RASTIKIS. June 1940, I was at that time not in the active service of the army, in the reserve, but I knew something about that. The 4th of June 1940, Russian military bases began to make some difficulties and some provocations with our security officers of the Lithuanian Army, especially officers of the Lithuanian security police, or political police.

At last, on June 15, 1940, our government received an ultimatum from Moscow that Russian military bases in Lithuania are not safe and that the Lithuanian Government must agree to change their government; second, to allow to march into Lithuanian territory more troops of the Russian Army; and third, that our Minister of Interior Affairs, General Skucas—

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. S-k-u-c-a-s, and the Director of Political Police of Lithuania, Mr. Povilaitis.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. P-o-v-i-l-a-i-t-i-s; he must be charged and taken to court.

Mr. KERSTEN. Charged with what?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That they acted against the Communists and that they did these provocations with the soldiers of the Russian military bases.

Mr. KERSTEN. At this point I notice Congressman O'Brien coming into the room and I ask him to join us.

Mr. RASTIKIS. The ultimatum received in Moscow by our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Urbsys, at midnight, between June 14 and 15, and until 10 o'clock of June 15 the Lithuanian Government had to answer yes or no.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was this ultimatum pertaining to a change of government? Will you state whether or not Moscow had prepared a list of names for the new Lithuanian Government.

Mr. RASTIKIS. No; at that time we knew nothing about such a list from the Moscow side.

Mr. KERSTEN. Later on was there such a list?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Later, yes. But not at that time, at the time of the ultimatum. And at that time, on June 15, a large number of new troops of the Red army was concentrated on our border between Lithuanian and the Soviet Union, about two armies, the eighth and the eleventh armies of the Red armies.

Our Government had a meeting during all the night and early in the morning it was decided that we have no other way; we can change the Government of Lithuania; maybe Moscow will agree with a new man

in Lithuania, of Lithuanian patriots, of course, and that our President of the Republic, in protest of this ultimatum, will go abroad, our President of the Republic, Mr. Smetona.

Early in the morning I was invited to the office of the President of the Republic where took place the meeting of the government, and it was offered to me to build a new government.

I wanted not to agree, because——

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean it was offered by President Smetona and other Lithuanians——

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN (continuing). That perhaps a new government might be more satisfactory to the people in Moscow.

Mr. RASTIKIS. To Moscow, than the first one.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right.

Mr. RASTIKIS. First, I wanted not to agree, but at least I saw the situation was very, very bad, and that this was no time now for long discussions, and I agreed.

But after several hours, when Moscow knew already that a new candidate for the new Prime Minister of Lithuania had been set up, and our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Urbsys was still in Moscow, and Mr. Molotov himself said to him that the Russians were not satisfied with my candidate for the new office and that Mr. Dekanozov——

Mr. KERSTEN. Dekanozov was a Soviet official?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, a Soviet official, former Soviet Ambassador in Berlin.

Mr. KERSTEN. And he was one of Beria's men, was he not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. In the NKVD?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened to Dekanozov since that time, do you know?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Later, first Dekanozov was the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, to Germany.

Mr. KERSTEN. I mean recently.

Mr. RASTIKIS. To Germany?

Mr. KERSTEN. We believe he was liquidated; is that your understanding?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't know exactly, but he was leader, the NKVD chief in Transcaucasia. I don't know what has happened later with him.

Mr. KERSTEN. What does Moscow say about Dekanozov?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That Dekanozov would come to Kaunas and give you help to build a new Lithuanian Government.

Mr. KERSTEN. So the NKVD moved in to help build a new Lithuanian Government?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; in such a way my mission was ended. On the same day Dekanozov by plane came to Kaunas, and with the rest of our Government, the Lithuanian Government, later the dictator Dekanozov and Pozdniakov.

In 2 days there was built a new Cabinet, a new Communist Cabinet.

Mr. KERSTEN. A new government?

Mr. RASTIKIS. A new government.

MR. KERSTEN. Tell me this, General: Was there any member of this new Communist government selected by the choice of the Lithuanian people?

MR. RASTIKIS. Oh, no, oh, no, sir.

MR. KERSTEN. It was a list completely dictated by Moscow, was it?

MR. RASTIKIS. Completely dictated from Moscow, to Mr. Dekanozov and Mr. Pozdniakov from the Soviet Ambassador.

MR. KERSTEN. Did you or President Smetona, or any member of the legitimate Lithuanian Government have any ability to change that?

MR. RASTIKIS. No.

MR. KERSTEN. Who was the head of the new Communist government?

MR. RASTIKIS. The head of the new Communist government was Paleckis.

MR. KERSTEN. He is still the Communist puppet in Lithuania?

MR. RASTIKIS. Yes; he is still at the present time.

MR. KERSTEN. After the Communists took over, what happened to you then?

MR. RASTIKIS. The Red army, two armies—two Red armies which I mentioned already—the eighth and the eleventh—occupied the whole territory of Lithuania.

MR. KERSTEN. About when was that?

MR. RASTIKIS. June 15 of 1940. One week before June 15 I came back to the Lithuanian Army. Our Government was still yet at that time and I got the post of Chief of General Staff—General Staff, Academy of General Staff—school.

MR. KERSTEN. That would be like a military school.

MR. RASTIKIS. Military school; military academy.

MR. KERSTEN. Like our West Point in the United States, a military school for officers.

MR. RASTIKIS. Yes; for officers.

MR. KERSTEN. You were taken out of active military—

MR. RASTIKIS. But it was before the Russians came to our country.

MR. KERSTEN. Yes.

MR. RASTIKIS. I stayed a short time in the army together with other officers—Lithuanians, other patriots—but later they put me in the reserve together with other officers who were not satisfied with the new order in Lithuania. Later on I was without a job and I got the information from another Lithuanian who had information from the Russians in NKVD that it is preparation for my arrest. I got, several times, such information, and after long discussions with my wife, I decided to go into the woods.

MR. KERSTEN. Into the woods?

MR. RASTIKIS. Into the woods, yes. I go in February of 1941—in February 1941. My wife and my children, three daughters, stayed in Kaunas, and at that time when I was in the woods the NKVD came to our home. First, they arrested my wife, but it was a home arrest—at home—and they looked for me that I will come back, and after several weeks the arrest was over, but in May 1941 my wife was arrested again and put into jail, into prison in Kaunas, and our three daughters, without parents, stayed by our grandparents. On the 14th of June 1941, just 1 week before the beginning of war between the Russians and Germans—

Mr. KERSTEN. The Communists were still in control in Lithuania on June 14?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. Just 1 week before the beginning of the war between the Russians and the Germans, they took all my children, my daughters—one 11 years old; the second one 4 years; and the third between 11 and 12 months old—all my children, without parents, without father or mother, and deported them to Siberia.

Mr. KERSTEN. To Siberia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, to Siberia. I did know nothing at that time.

Mr. KERSTEN. But you later ascertained this?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, but later I——

Mr. KERSTEN. You found this out?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Found it out, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, I do want to go back into that document, but before I do, I want to ask you when did you return to Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Just in the first part of the war between the Russians and Germany. Just in the beginning of the war between the Russians and the Germans.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, did you get out of the country in this period between February and June, or were you hiding in the woods?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, first, I was hiding in the woods in the west part of Lithuania; near the Lithuanian-German border.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. RASTIKIS. But, several weeks later, it was too hard over there, because the Communists were looking everywhere for me.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were near the top of their list, weren't you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, yes, and in March of 1941, I had no choice. I could not stay any more in our fatherland, in our country, and I had to go through across the border into Germany.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. RASTIKIS. I was in Germany until June 22, until the beginning of the new war between the Russians and the Germans, and then, just in the beginning of the war, I came to look for my children and my wife in Kaunas. I found my wife. She was liberated by our partisans in Kaunas, but I didn't find my children.

Mr. KERSTEN. There was, in Lithuania, existing during this period, and up through the retreat of the Communists——

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. A Lithuanian partisan organization.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, or an activists' organization.

Mr. KERSTEN. An activists' organization?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Composed mostly of young patriotic people?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; of young patriotic people.

Mr. KERSTEN. That had no connection whatsoever with either the Nazis or the Soviets?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, no, no, nothing.

Mr. KERSTEN. We have already had considerable testimony about this partisan organization?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. To the same effect.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you say they liberated your wife?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. They liberated her in Kaunas, and in some other places in Lithuania, they were liberated, and among the liberated prisoners was also my wife. She was sentenced already for deportation but the Communists——

Mr. KERSTEN. Had to leave too quick?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Had to leave too quick; yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. You got back into Kaunas, and when you got back there, I will ask you if you came into possession of any documents at that time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you mark this as an exhibit.

(The document was marked "Exhibit 15-B." See p. 667.)

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you what has been marked as "Exhibit 15-B," and ask you if you recognize this?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; this is a document which I find after the Communists was away.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is this?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That is the decision for my arrest, and in jail.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is this a Russian-written document?

Mr. RASTIKIS. It is a Russian-written document, and some places it is Lithuanian translations.

Mr. KERSTEN. And is this the original NKVD arrest warrant for you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. This came out of the NKVD headquarters at Kaunas; did it not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; and I find that other people find something also.

Mr. KERSTEN. Similar things?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Similar things; yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, the NKVD had to run so fast that they left a lot of their documents behind?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, I will direct your attention to a paragraph of this warrant that reads, in part 58-1, paragraph A——

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Of the Soviet criminal code——

Mr. RASTIKIS. Of the criminal code; yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are you familiar with that paragraph?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it you are charged with a violation of this paragraph?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is the penalty for a violation of that paragraph?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That is only death.

Mr. KERSTEN. Death?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. That was on file in the NKVD headquarters, is that right?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. After you got back in the country?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. I will make this a part of the record, without objection. Now, this is the original document——

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir, this is the original document.

Mr. KERSTEN. For your arrest?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Subsequently, or later on, after the end of World War II, you were in a D. P. camp in Europe, were you not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, in Germany.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where was that, General?

Mr. RASTIKIS. In Germany.

Mr. KERSTEN. I see here a translation of that part of the Soviet criminal code that was referred to in the warrant for your arrest, 58-1-A, which reads in part as follows:

Treason toward the Fatherland, that is, activities of citizens of the Union of the SSR's, for harming the military power of the Union of SSR—

and I suppose SSR means any one of the captive nations of the Soviet Union?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN (continuing):

to state independence or territorial integrity such as sabotage, divulging the military, desertion or flight abroad, are punishable by the supreme penalty, death by shooting and confiscation of the entire property—

And so forth?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, would you state where you were in DP camps in Germany?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I was in two DP camps.

Mr. KERSTEN. When you were in one camp, did you receive a visit from some people?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That was Scheinfeld in Bavaria; in the south part of Germany, in the American occupation zone.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was your wife with you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And had you seen your children from the time you were in Lithuania that you were telling about in 1941, up until this time, 1946?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, I didn't.

Mr. KERSTEN. You stated that they were deported to Siberia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you had not seen them at any time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. Had you heard from them up to this time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Not up to this time.

Mr. KERSTEN. When you were in this DP camp, did you receive a visit from some people?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. From whom?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That was in 1946 or 1947; I can't remember exactly, 1946 or 1947.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. RASTIKIS. At that time two men from the Russian NKVD came to our DP camp—

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in the American Zone?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. Two men came to our DP camp, to me and to my wife they brought 3 letters from my old daughter and 6 pictures

of my daughters and my wife's mother in Siberia and they persuaded me and my wife to come back to the Soviet Union——

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean they tried to persuade you?

Mr. RASTIKIA. Yes; to come back to Lithuania. The letters from my daughter, one letter was from Siberia; the second one was from Lithuania already. I cannot believe whether it was or not.

Mr. KERSTEN. From the writing on it, it was——

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; from the writing. And the daughter asked me in the name of another sister, because the third one was already dead in Siberia, and in the name of my wife's mother, that we must go back; we have to live in the Soviet Union and in some places of these letters I believe they were not written by my daughter but were dictated.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you have those letters with you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I have them with me; yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you show them to me, please?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; I can. Here are three of them.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you three letters. As I understand it, these are the original letters brought to you by an NKVD agent when you and your wife were in Germany?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. The letters are in the handwriting of your daughters and, as you said, part of them appear to have been dictated?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you six pictures. These are pictures of your daughters, two of your daughters, and one picture contains a picture of your two daughters and——

Mr. RASTIKIS. And my wife's mother.

Mr. KERSTEN. And your mother-in-law; is that correct?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do these pictures purport to be pictures of your daughters in Siberia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And I show you the other three pictures, and these appear to be pictures of your daughters walking in the streets of the city?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Of the city in Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. In Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Back in Kalnas?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; in Kalnas.

Mr. KERSTEN. And these pictures, from these pictures it appears that your daughters appear to have grown somewhat?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Just one, my daughter, my daughter, my mother-in-law, and that is a cousin.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Jurgela, can you, without too much difficulty, give us a translation of one of these letters so we can——

Mr. MACHROWICZ. May I ask the witness which daughter wrote the letter and how old she was at the time she wrote it.

Mr. KERSTEN. Could you tell us, General, which one of your daughters wrote the letter?

Mr. RASTIKIS. The first one—the oldest one.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is her name?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Laimute.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is the date on that letter?

Mr. RASTIKIS. March 27, 1948.

Mr. KERSTEN. How old was she at that time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. She was 15 years old.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is it satisfactory with you if I have Mr. Jurgela give us a running translation of this?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. RASTIKIS (through interpreter):

DEAR DADDY AND MOMMY: We have an opportunity to write a letter to you. We three of us live together, Babune—

meaning grandmother—

Meilute, and I. All of us are in good health except it is very unpleasant. Aldute—which is short for Aldona—

died after sickness.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was Aldona one of your children?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. That was the youngest daughter?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, the youngest one.

Mr. KERSTEN. Continue.

Mr. RASTIKIS (through interpreter):

The grandparents, both of them, had already died.

That means my father and my wife's father. They were deported to Siberia, too.

Meilute has grown quite big, but she is still crying quite often when her feet hurt. I, too, have changed entirely. Both of us are studying in school. Meilute is in the first grade and I am in the seventh grade. We are studying well.

We would wish so much that this letter should reach you. All of us are yearning for you and we would like very much to see you. We see you quite often in dreams and we are thinking that other children here have their daddy and mommy and we don't have that. We shall ask God that this letter would reach you and we would wish very much to receive from you even a short letter.

Babune—

that is the grandmother—

is already quite old. We are studying in school. Life is very hard. There is no one to perform the chores.

We receive some assistance from the government but it is not sufficient and quite frequently we must experience hunger.

Dear daddy and mommy, we wish so much to see you. We wish so much again, like in the past, to live together. You, too, probably frequently think about your daughters. So many years have passed since we had not seen each other and it is high time for us to meet but that depends on you.

Nevertheless, we think that you have not forgotten and that it is high time for all of us to return to our homeland and to live like other people live.

We are expecting and longing for an answer from you. If you would know how difficult it is here for us to live, then you would of necessity help us, because there is no one from whom we should expect more help than from you and we shall believe that you will help us necessarily. Then we would live as in the past. We are waiting for the hour when we should meet again. We send you our photographs and we do not think that we could not meet. Nevertheless, we should meet soon and we shall await that hour. All 3 of us are writing and all 3 of us are thinking about it, that we should meet as soon as possible. We shall await for an answer from you and a great meeting.

We kiss you, both of you, many, many times.

Very much longing for you.

Dated: March 27, 1948.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is there a place on the letter, Mr. Jurgela, indicating the place from which it was written?

The INTERPRETER. No. It seems as if it has been cut. I have read the entire text, whatever was in the writing.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state, General, whether the other letters from your daughters in Siberia are similar?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Similar, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. I will return these to you, unless the members think there is any necessity for putting these in the record. My own thought is that the translation will be adequate.

Mr. McTIGUE. Off the record.

(A discussion was had off the record.)

Mr. KERSTEN. So these letters from your daughters were brought to you, and the pictures, by NKVD people while you were in the DP camp in Germany; is that right? We have decided to return these to you and mark for exhibit the translation of the letter read into the record, 15 c.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what did they tell you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. They told me if I will decide to come back to my country and live there, I will live together with my daughters, maybe with other relatives who were deported to Siberia; I will receive maybe a very good position in government, or especially in the Red army, and I will be very lucky like the other peoples in the Soviet Union.

At least, as I did not agree, and my wife, too, they told me I would regret it in the future, that I had decided so.

Mr. KERSTEN. That if you did not go back you would regret it?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How much time did they spend with you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. They spent with me about 2 hours, I think. I have as a witness my brother, who was during these conversations between my wife, me and these NKVD men present, because my brother was at that time in the same DP Camp as we were.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, these were NKVD persuaders; is that right?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. And I suppose they had the permission of the American authorities to go in there; is that right?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, I don't think so.

Mr. KERSTEN. Oh.

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't think at that time, because the Russians had repatriated Russian staffs in the Russian Zone of Germany, but these men who were in our camp, I think that they came there not officially, and without permission of the authorities.

Mr. KERSTEN. Apparently secretly?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, I think so.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you recognize any of them?

Mr. RASTIKIS. One of them I recognized from the old times, but the second one, I didn't know him.

Mr. KERSTEN. And was your wife with you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what was the decision of you and your wife after these talks?

Mr. RASTIKIS. First my decision, and the decision of my wife was that I and my wife could not come back, because we knew that we would not be in Lithuania, but in Siberia, like a lot of the other patriots, but they tried to convince us that we were wrong.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean they tried to persuade you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; they tried to persuade us that we were wrong, and if I don't believe that they told me the truth, I could permit my wife to go to Lithuania alone without me, to meet our children, to see how they had a very happy life over there, and after that maybe my wife and my children together would persuade me also to come back to Lithuania.

My wife asked them if maybe they couldn't get the children back to Germany and they answered "No," that that was impossible.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did you and your wife finally decide to do?

Mr. RASTIKIS. We finally decided to stay here.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is, in Germany?

Mr. RASTIKIS. In Germany; yes.

In Germany, and not to go back, because we knew very well what it would mean to go back for such people like my wife and I.

Mr. KERSTEN. What, in your mind, did it mean, or would it mean to go back?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I think that they would first use me for some propaganda with other displaced persons from Lithuania, to come back, and later when I would no longer be useful to them they would maybe delice, like in this document that you showed me.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean like this death notice?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; because the Communists never forgot all the things that happened in the past.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bonin has a few questions, I believe.

Mr. BONIN. General, you were a member of the delegation that went to Moscow to enter into the Mutual Assistance Pact; were you not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONIN. As a matter of curiosity on my part, during the conversation with Molotov, Potomkian, and the other Russian officials—did they entertain you at all? Was there any entertainment by the Russians to your delegation?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Entertainment? Directly, no: not directly, but indirectly, and in all this atmosphere it was so. For instance, one time Molotov said:

If you will not sign such a pact you will see what will happen with you. And, for instance:

You cannot wait for any help from Germany, because the Germans now are our friends, and you are in our hands, your future is now in our hands.

But personally for us, for the men of the delegation; no.

Mr. BONIN. But during the course of your conversation did they serve your delegation with any vodka?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No.

Mr. BONIN. They did not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No; just after the mutual-security pact was signed, after that there was a little small party, but after that, not before that. Before that at no time was there such entertainment given, like vodka.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, everything was absolutely serious?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONIN. Prior to the time of the signing of the mutual-assistance pact?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; very serious.

Mr. BONIN. Then after the pact had been signed——

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONIN. Then, there was a small party?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONIN. And, I assume that there were toasts to Stalin; is that right?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No; it was not toasts to Stalin, but it was in such order in Moscow, that during such reception or such party—the host was Molotov, and a small toast or a short toast to everyone, to all of the guests. They were quite short, and, at the end of the party, at then at the end of the party, there were two pretty long speeches. First spoke Molotov. Then he was answered very shortly by the president of our delegation, Mr. Urbsys, and then a pretty long speech by Stalin himself.

Mr. KERSTEN. Stalin was there; was he?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; Stalin was there, and Stalin, during his speech, stressed several times that this pact will not have any role in the internal matters of Lithuania; that we have not to be afraid that the Communists will——

Mr. BONIN. Harm the Lithuanian people?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. Therefore, your delegation had to succumb to the dictates of Molotov and Stalin and the rest of the delegation?

Mr. RASTIKIS. We had to; yes.

Mr. BONIN. And, as a result of giving in, your country was taken over by the Russians?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONIN. Now, from your experience, and having been in the presence of Molotov and Stalin and the other high officials of the Soviet Government, would you put any faith or reliance at all upon any of the agreements that those people make?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, sir. Regarding my experience with the Russians, I don't have any such thing now at the present time, and I think I will have never.

Mr. BONIN. You will never have any confidence in any of the agreements, pacts, treaties, or otherwise, that the Russian officials enter into?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; I don't believe in it.

Mr. BONIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. KERSTEN. I want to say at this time that I think we are very fortunate in having on this committee, members who are experienced in dealing with Communists. We are fortunate to have with us a former chairman of the Katyn Forest investigating committee, Congressman Ray Madden. His close associate in that same investigation on this committee, is Congressman Machrowicz, of Michigan. There is also Congressman Tom Dodd, of Connecticut, who had wide experience in the Nuremberg trials. Also, Congressman Al Bentley, who lived with the Communists in Hungary, as a member of the American mission. Also, Congressman Bonin, who has had much experience with the Communists, and also Congressman Busbey, and

I think it may be particularly pointed out here, that in Poland, the Soviet occupation which was exposed by Congressman Madden's investigation was of great help in disclosing the true face of the Communists.

I would like to suggest that Mr. Madden ask some questions at this time.

Mr. MADDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, General, so much testimony has been offered before this committee regarding the practice of the Kremlin and the NKVD having all their interrogations or their questioning at night. These third degree inquisitions at 1 o'clock and 2 o'clock in the morning continued until dawn.

Do you have any reasons why the leaders of the Kremlin, do most of their business with people outside the Russian sphere, in the early hours of the morning? Have you anything to say about that? Do you have any opinions on that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir. I can say something. For instance, all the questionings of our political prisoners in Lithuania during the first occupation by the Bolsheviks in Kaunas and other prisoners of Lithuania, all these questionings took place always at night, during the whole night, and the next day, for instance, it was not permitted for the person to sleep and another night during the whole night, too, the questioning goes further.

Or, for instance, in the diplomatic sphere at the Kremlin in Moscow, during the talks with diplomats, I think that they have some purpose and this purpose is this: That they want to depress the interior force of a man, to make him tired, without sleep, and in such a position to get from him more than he would give to them if he would be in a strong position with sleep, and so forth.

Mr. MADDEN. In other words, you say that whether it is a diplomat or a prisoner, their resistance is lower in the early hours of the morning?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir; I said so.

Mr. MADDEN. When Stalin and Molotov stated that these bases must be established in Lithuania, that was nothing more than the opening wedge for the military of the Soviets to take over the country?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. In my opinion that was, as we know from the history of the wars of Troy and Greece, the same method.

Mr. MADDEN. The same as the Trojan horse in Greece?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, the Trojan horse in Greece.

Mr. MADDEN. Your experiences with the broken promises of the Kremlin was the Number 1 reason why you didn't return to Lithuania at the invitation of these letters that were supposed to have been written by your daughters?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. Of course, you did not know at this particular time that you have narrated in your testimony a replica of the atrocities the Soviet had inflicted on Poland and other countries during 1939 and 1940.

You didn't know about the Katyn massacres during that time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, we didn't.

Mr. MADDEN. You didn't know then?

Mr. RASTIKIS. We didn't, at that time; no.

Mr. MADDEN. It was revealed by the Katyn congressional committee that in the fall of 1939 and in the spring of 1940 there were 150,000

prisoners taken out of Poland and out of that 150,000, 15,000 officers and government officials, were placed in 3 camps and massacred during the spring of 1940 by the NKVD of the Soviets?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. You didn't know that at that time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. At that time we didn't; no.

Mr. MADDEN. You didn't know that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No.

Mr. MADDEN. So Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia were merely the same victim of Soviet criminality and barbarism that was inflicted upon Poland and the other Baltic countries that were forced under the heel of the Soviets?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Machrowicz.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. General Rastikis, early in your testimony you referred to the fact that Molotov told you that he and Ribbentrop had already previously agreed on August 28, 1939, on the division of the sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Are you sure you meant August 28, 1939, or did you mean September 28, 1939?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I think it was September or August—I don't know exactly. I don't remember exactly, no. I must say that it was during the second trip of Molotov to Moscow. I don't know exactly.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. To put these events that you have related in proper historic background, it is true, isn't it, that Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Using that as a basis, would you say that this agreement was prior to the invasion of Poland?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Now, you helped me. Now I can say quite sure that it was not August but September—the 28th of September 1939.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you would like to correct that to September 28?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, I would like to correct it, not August but September.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Poland was attacked on September 1 and in 2 or 3 weeks was overrun by the Nazis?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Immediately after that the Nazis delegated Ribbentrop and the Soviets Molotov to enter into a mutual agreement between the Soviet Communists and the German Nazis to divide Eastern Europe among them?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And the result of that agreement was the map which was offered here in evidence?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And only a week after that, on October 2 or 3, you were called into Moscow?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. First it happened with Estonia, then with Latvia, and at last with Lithuania.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. At that time an agreement was entered into, mutual assistance agreement, between Lithuania and Russia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In October of 1939, I believe you said, and about the 10th it was finally signed?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, October 10.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How long did that agreement last before the Russians invaded Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. From October 1939 until June 15, 1940.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. About 8 months?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that the solemn agreements entered into by the Soviet government with Lithuania did not last any longer than 8 months?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Eight or nine months.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. As a matter of fact, that agreement was only a renewal of an agreement made about 7 or 8 years before that, isn't that right?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. So that Russia, not on 1 occasion, but at least on 3 occasions entered into agreements with Lithuania guaranteeing them their political integrity and—

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And violated them all?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now, you say that Dekanozov came to Lithuania in June 1940, to supervise the taking over of Lithuania, isn't that right?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Actually, isn't it true that the first so-called new "free" cabinet under the Soviet occupation—

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean "free" in quotation marks?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Yes, naturally—was actually dictated by the Soviets in their Embassy in Kaunas?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Can you tell us in that first cabinet how many Communists were in that cabinet and how many non-Communists?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I think that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Michiewiczzaus—he is now here in the United States. Then, the second one, Minister of Finance, Galvanraustas, lives now in Madagascar.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. These two were non-Communist?

Mr. RASTIKIS. These were not Communists—not Communists. Then the Minister of War of National Defense, General Vitkauskas, now he is a Communist. He is a general in the Red Army, but at that time I think he was not yet.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. All together, there were how many non-Communists?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Three.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And how many Communists?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't remember how many, but they had more ministers than we had during the independence in our government, but I don't know the number.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Prior to that, what percentage of the Lithuanian population would you say were Communists?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't know. We had about 3 million population and the Communists, maybe about 1,000 or 1,200.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. One thousand out of three million?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Outside of the general who turned Communist, what happened to the other two non-Communists in the First Soviet cabinet of Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. One of them, Mr. Galvanauskas, had to fly to Germany—

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you mean he had to leave Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In order to escape arrest and deportation?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And the other?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Mr. Mickiewicz stayed in Lithuania, but his position was very uncertain.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The reason I asked you that, General, is because it seems to be the general pattern of the Soviets in occupying these countries, whether it was Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, or any other, that in the first cabinet they always put in a few non-Communists.

Mr. RASTIKIS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And you testified that that happened in Latvia and Estonia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And those were soon liquidated or disappeared?

Mr. RASTIKIS. They all disappeared, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. As a matter of fact, I think in Latvia they appointed a professor head of the Latvian Soviet Friendship Society.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I just want to bring that out for the edification of some of our so-called American friends of the Soviet, that they should remember that they are used as long as it is necessary and are later liquidated.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Surely.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened to Mr. Paleckis, the head of that Government, is he still that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, he is still there.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He is a Lithuanian, is he not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But isn't it true that he spent practically all of his life in Soviet Russia prior to the time he took over the Cabinet?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, that is not true. He did not spend all of his life in Soviet Russia, but he was a reporter in Lithuania.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was he known as a Communist?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Not quite a Communist, but very near to a Communist, very close to a Communist. From the morals side he was not a good man, and he made several journeys to Soviet Russia during the independence of Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. So he was Moscow-trained?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, he was Moscow's friend, maybe not a Communist at that time, but I believe at that time he was already a Communist.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now, in connection with that letter, or those letters which you received from your daughters, there are several things that intrigue me about these letters.

They seem to be like an ordinary letter that a daughter would send to a father, and yet I notice that nowhere in the letter does she refer to the fact as to where she is living.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you have any indication as to where she was?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes. During the war, when the relations between the United States and Soviet Russia were not so bad, during the last war, some of our people who were deported to Siberia could write letters to relatives in the United States, and during the war, I think in 1943, I received here through the consulate, our consulate in the United States, not a letter, but just a message. From what source it was, I don't know, that our children were in Siberia near the Chinese boundary.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But, in this letter, she did not indicate she was at any place in Siberia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, nothing about that.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Does the NKVD have anything to do with the mails, with the operation of the post office in Russia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. The same as with all other departments?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Didn't it occur to you that it was rather strange that a letter by your daughter should be delivered to you by the NKVD? Why didn't she go through the regular post office channels?

Mr. RASTIKIS. For me, it is clear, that these two men who came to me, they wanted to have some arguments in their hands that they can say is the truth, and they have the original letter of my daughter, that my daughter wanted to go.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is it true that a daughter, a girl 15 years old, if she wants to communicate with her father, ordinarily she would not go to the NKVD for assistance in writing the letter, would she?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, sir; I don't think my daughter went to the NKVD, but I think that the NKVD went to my daughter to give such letter.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In the letter, she says in part: "We have changed considerably since you saw us," or words to that effect?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you have any idea as to what she meant by that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't think that my oldest daughter, that she changed in her mind. I think maybe physically they changed.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Now, what has happened to Mr. Urbsys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs who accompanied you to Moscow?

Mr. RASTIKIS. When the Communists took over Lithuania in 1941, Mr. Urbsys and the Former Prime Minister, or the last Prime Minister, were deported to Russia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Did you, to your knowledge, or anyone else, ever hear from them since then?

Mr. RASTIKIS. First, before the Germans came, I heard from other people that Mr. Urbsys and his wife were in Ukrainia, in the city of Tambow.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you spell that, please?

Mr. RASTIKIS. T-a-m-b-o-w, in the eastern part of Ukrainia.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Were they in a prison camp?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No; they had just one time every week to see a committee or to report to a committee, and they had some work with translations into the Franch or from the French into the Russian, but I don't know exactly whether that is the truth or not.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. But they were deported from Lithuania, were they not, anyway?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. What happened to the Vice Premier?

Mr. RASTIKIS. He was deported, but later.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What happened to the Ambassador to Moscow, Natkevicius?

Mr. RASTIKIS. He died in exile.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He died in exile?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. All three of those men who were your companions on this trip to Moscow have either been exiled or died?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Doesn't it seem strange inasmuch as that was their fate, that Russia would want you to come back? You had good reasons to believe, did you not, that a fate similar to theirs, or worse, would await you if you came back?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You had no reason to expect any other fate than that of their's?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You know, do you not, General, that a very similar situation occurred in Poland when Russia invaded Poland; that they invited 14 Polish leaders to Moscow?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes; I know the story.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You know that 14 people have disappeared?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. And not one has been heard from?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. These are the facts that lead you to believe that no faith or credence can be given to any agreement made by Soviet Russia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Is that right?

Mr. RASTIKIS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. I don't know whether I mentioned Tom Dodd was one of the American prosecutors in the Nuremberg trials and who has also had great experience with dictatorship.

Mr. DODD. You have been asked a couple of questions as to whether you would place any reliance on any agreement or promise that the Communists make, and you said that you would not. I take it that is the result of your experience with the Soviet, and particularly when they forced themselves on Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. Did you have a different idea before these things happened to you and to Lithuania? Did you think before you were called to Moscow that the Communists would keep their promises?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, sir; but the main point was that we knew at that time that the war was just to begin—that was the beginning of a new war—and our purpose, the purpose of the Government of Lithuania,

or of the leadership of the Lithuanian people, was, in some way, to stay during these bad times of war, and maybe not to be quite independent but to stay, maybe to make some little concessions but to stay.

Mr. DODD. All right; that is interesting.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Our situation was very difficult over there in East Europe, between Germany, Hitler's Germany, and the Communist Soviet Union at that time.

Mr. DODD. Well, that is what I wanted to get at. You were really in this position, were you not, you people in Lithuania; you didn't really believe the Communists would keep their word anyway?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No.

Mr. DODD. You were caught between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. The only hope you had, I expect, was some world force—the League of Nations then, or some combination of decent nations—would keep these people from attacking you or occupying you; isn't that right? Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I did not quite understand you.

Mr. DODD. Well, what I am trying to make clear and it seems to me to be important is that you people in Lithuania really didn't believe the Communists would keep their word at any time?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. That was as true after they had occupied you as afterward?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. You were caught between the Nazis, on the one hand, and the Communist Soviets on the other?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. The only hope for you was to make some concessions, or more important, that some stronger force in the world would help you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No, the force in the free world was not strong enough to help us.

Mr. DODD. And that was your only hope, that some stronger force would help you?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. DODD. That is the same hope you have today?

Mr. RASTIKIS. The same hope I have now, with the United Nations.

Mr. DODD. That is all.

Mr. MADDEN. There is one thing more; you testified something earlier which struck me as rather significant. You say in this meeting on October 3, 1939, I believe it was Stalin that told you: Well, that maybe Germany will later be the enemy of the Soviet Union.

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. Who was that, Stalin or Molotov?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Stalin, but Molotov agreed.

Mr. MADDEN. That this was October 3, 1939, only 1 week after September 28, 1939, when the Soviet Russians and the Germans had agreed to a division of Eastern Europe and to cooperate as friends?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MADDEN. So that even with Nazi Germany, the Russians never had any intentions of keeping their agreements?

Mr. RASTIKIS. No.

Mr. MADDEN. Because within a week after signing their agreement with Ribbentrop, they told you that some time soon they and Germany would become enemies?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, that was on both sides.

Mr. MADDEN. I think you are right; neither the Nazis nor the Communists had any intention of keeping their promises.

Mr. RASTIKIS. That is right.

Mr. MADDEN. Do you recall, General, at the time of the ultimatum something was said about the relations—that is, the diplomatic relations of Lithuania—with any foreign powers? Do you recall anything about that whether or not some of those diplomatic relations would have to be canceled?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't know exactly, sir, because I was not in the Foreign Office of Lithuania, but I think that another government—

Mr. MADDEN. Was there something pertaining—

Mr. RASTIKIS. Were informed, but at that time we understood that from Great Britain or from the United States or from France, we could at that time have nothing at all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, Lithuania was very largely a Catholic country, was it not?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. About 85 percent?

Mr. RASTIKIS. More.

Mr. KERSTEN. Even more?

Mr. RASTIKIS. More.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did they have relations with the Vatican?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did anything happen to that?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Our legation at the Vatican stands yet, at the present time, too.

Mr. KERSTEN. No; I mean by the Communists?

Mr. RASTIKIS. By the Communists; maybe the first step of the new government in Lithuania, Paleckis' government was to put away the representative, the legation of the Vatican, away from the country.

Mr. KERSTEN. He was the papal nuncio?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was there something done about the Lithuanian currency right away and the Russian ruble?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes, the Lithuanian currency, we call it litas—

Mr. KERSTEN. Was the ruble substituted for the litas?

Mr. RASTIKIS. I don't know, exactly. I am not an economist, but I think 1 to 10.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was the ruble introduced into Lithuania?

Mr. RASTIKIS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what about the border guards? Were they substituted?

Mr. RASTIKIS. By NKVD.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, the Lithuanian border guards were substituted by NKVD.

Mr. RASTIKIS. NKVD; I must just say that the border guards were formed not from Lithuanians but just from Russians and NKVD, and the NKVD has its own troops as border troops. As such troops, the NKVD troops and the Russian troops stood on the border.

Mr. KERSTEN. General, you have contributed a great deal and have thrown a lot of light on many questions. Thank you very much. Will you wait here? You can take your seat back there but we would like to have you come back after lunch. There may be 1 or 2 things we would like to ask you.

Mr. BRAZAITIS is a very short witness that we would like to have now.

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Jurgela, you have been already sworn as an interpreter?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF JUOZAS BRAZAITIS, FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER OF LITHUANIA—Through interpreter

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. Juozas Brazaitis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. In Lithuania, in the county of Marijampole.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you live in Lithuania?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. Until July 18, 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the provisional government of Lithuania?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. The provisional government of Lithuania had been proclaimed by the guerrillas, by the insurrectionists, against the Soviet occupation, on June 23, 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the tenure of the provisional government?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. Six weeks, until August 5, 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you serve as head of the provisional government at that time?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. I was Minister of Education and Acting Prime Minister.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have occasion while serving in that capacity to appoint a commission to investigate the so-called Red terror, dealing with atrocities, the gathering of records and related matters?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. Yes. On July 9 the Government decided to form a committee called the administration of cultural activities and education, and appointed as their representative Juozas Senkus, who is presently living in England.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was Mr. Aleksandras Merkelis also a member of that commission?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. Yes. Juozas Senkus appointed Mr. Aleksandras Merkelis to direct the Museum of Red Terror.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Merkelis was the director of the Museum of Red Terror, is that correct?

Mr. BRAZAITIS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Are there any other questions?

The INTERPRETER. The witness said he would like to present his statement for the record, in Lithuanian.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, the witness has a statement that he would like to present for the record, and I move that that statement be made a part of the record.

Mr. KERSTEN. It is so ordered.

(The statement referred to is made a part of the record and accompanies the transcript.)

[Translation from Lithuanian]

TESTIMONY OF JUOZAS BRAZAITIS REGARDING THE LITHUANIAN RESISTANCE TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION IN 1940-41

Having enslaved some nations, Soviet Russia asserts that they accept the Communist regime of their own free will and that they voluntarily join the Soviet Union. The earliest assertion of this tenor was made regarding Lithuania and the other Baltic nations.

I wish to testify that this is not true, inasmuch as the Lithuanian people were opposed to the Soviet occupation, were against the Communist regime imposed upon it; were opposed to the Communist Diet's decision to incorporate Lithuania into the Soviet Union. This determination of the Lithuanians germinated the Lithuanian resistance—at first a passive resistance manifested by individual acts of opposition; later it developed into an active organized resistance and the insurrection which had embraced the entire nation.

I

Passive resistance had developed as follows:

1. It first came into the open by boycotting the elections engineered by the occupant. The July 14, 1940, elections of "the People's Diet" were boycotted. Even though the Soviets during the first month camouflaged the real objectives of the occupation and of the Diet to be elected, and did not allow any talk of a sovietization or of an incorporation, nevertheless, only 15-18 percent of the voters took part in the elections. The supreme committee of the elections was compelled to state in its official communique that there had been people who had torn up the ballots and stamped them under their feet.

A similar boycott affected the January 1941 elections to the Supreme Soviet. When people did not come to vote, soldiers had to proceed to villages in certain places of Lithuania (at Marijampole) to round up the people from their homes and to make them vote, or to carry the balloting urns to the villages and to collect the ballots in that manner. People did not go [to the polling places] and secreted themselves. There were people who openly refused to cast the ballots.

In August 1940, the Communist Party cell of students of the University of Kaunas convoked a students' meeting to elect the student council, a sort of a student parliament. The students demanded that new candidates be added to the list presented by the Communist Party. The Communists refused and demanded that the list presented be put to a vote. The majority of students raised their hands in opposition. Then the Communists made threats. Indeed, MVD cars arrived shortly, and students escaped through the windows.

2. Passive resistance manifested itself also by boycotting the political parades on such occasions as the Soviet holidays of November 7 or May 1. University and high-school students were most inventive when they were compelled to take part in such demonstrations and to carry the pictures of Stalin or other Soviet leaders. There were a great many instances where pictures disappeared on the route, or marchers remained stubbornly silent when ordered to shout in praise of Stalin, or they shouted lustily some patriotic Lithuanian slogan. Rector Mykolas Birziska of the University of Vilnius received a warning from Moscow regarding such sabotage by students.

3. Decrees directed against religion or national patriotic ideals were not obeyed. Ordered not to observe Christmas or Easter holidays, most of the students failed to attend classes on those days. There was one characteristic incident: Students of the girls' high school in Vilnius attended the class; however, when the female teacher entered the classroom and looked at them, the girls understood the teacher's feelings and the entire class burst into an uncontrollable loud sobbing that expressed the young heart's protest. These are but several examples of passive resistance prevalent among urban population and youths.

4. In rural areas, most notable was the farmers' resistance against the so-called Red supply trains, that is, parade of carts delivering collectively the compulsory grain taxes—with bands and red banners in the van. These were to be political parades. The villagers deliberately sabotaged this parading method which compelled the farmer to express his alleged joy. I know of a fact that had occurred in Marijampole. Of the 30 loaded carts scheduled to put in an appearance on the appointed date, only 3 carts arrived, and these 3 carts, adorned with banners and escorted by a band, paraded through the city to the amusement and jeers of the bystanders. The rest of that village farmers brought their grain quotas the next day, when there was no parade.

5. On the other hand, both the youth and the adults demonstrated their religious and national feelings. On All Souls Day (November 2) in 1940 the believers made their traditional visits to the cemetery in greater numbers than ever, and they sang religious hymns by the soldiers' graves. It all ended with mass arrests, even of children. Churches were attended even by those who had not usually attended. Religious rites were at the same time national rites, thereby anti-Bolshevik.

In August 1940, the Ministry of Education convoked at Kaunas a congress of all teachers. The objective was to reeducate, to indoctrinate the teachers. The congress was to listen to Russian and Soviet songs by Red army personnel. Then the attending thousands demanded a Lithuanian program. In the absence thereof, the participants sang Lithuanian folksongs and thereafter dispersed.

National sentiment was demonstrated throughout Lithuania on February 16, the Lithuanian Independence Day, by the raising of national colors—at least on trees.

A great many demonstrations of resistance were followed by interrogations and new arrests. Prisons were filled. Nevertheless, the spirit of resistance was not quelled. Having first evinced itself during the elections of the People's Diet, it became universal especially after the People's Diet was used as a tool in annexing Lithuania to the Soviet Union.

II

1. Active resistance began with the founding of underground organizations. At first, these were of a strictly local character. However, since October 9, 1940, centralization was initiated, and the Lithuanian Activist Front was formed to lead the underground struggle.

In the early part of 1941, the Lithuanian Activist Front correlated practically all of the underground organizations and directed their activities. It had collaborators in the armed forces, police, post office, hospitals, and other Government institutions.

The mass deportations of June 14 seriously affected the organization's network. Most seriously hit was the supreme command—just a few days before the insurrection.

2. The Activist organization aimed in the first place, at rationalizing the resistance operations, in order to protect the population from the NKVD provocations. Secondly, to aid and shelter the prosecuted. Thirdly, to maintain liaison with the free world. Finally, to organize an insurrection when suitable time should arrive.

The Activist Front issued secret instructions to protect the populace, in the event of war, from the terror of the Red army personnel and of the local Communists, and to take over the local administration. At the headquarters, in Kaunas, plans were made for the seizure of the city, for the proclamation of the reconstitution of the Lithuanian state, the formation of a government and for the transfer of administrative functions throughout the country to that government.

It was aimed to place the warring countries before an accomplished fact—that they should encounter Lithuania not as an occupied area or a part of the Soviet Union, but as an independent country. Warsaw, too, had planned an anti-German insurrection with a similar end in view.

3. *The insurrection.*—Armed clashes with the Soviets had taken place in different parts of Lithuania prior to the signal to rise in arms. However, the general insurrection began June 23 (1941).

Late on June 22 a detachment of the Lithuanian Activist Front seized the post office and disconnected all Soviet telephones. Early the next morning the radio station and radiophone were seized. At 9:30 a. m. the populace of Lithuania heard over the radio the proclamation of an insurrection, the news of the

formation of a provisional government, and the national anthem whose strains they had not heard for a long time. National flags were raised all over the countryside, regardless of the Red Army on the march. While the radio was broadcasting without an interruption the insurrection communiques and songs, stubborn fighting went on around the radio station itself. The Bolsheviks attempted to blow up the radio station. It had been defended successfully.

A Soviet Army retreating from the German frontier approached Kaunas on June 24. There was a danger that this army would occupy the city of Kaunas and convert the city into a defense point. The entire insurrection plan would thus be foiled. Therefore, the main force of the insurrectionists were thrown into battle in order to bar the Soviet army from crossing the river and occupying the city. Kaunas was protected from the invasion, and resistance pockets of the Red Army men and Communists were eliminated.

On June 24 the Government took over the principal offices of administration in Kaunas and Vilnius, even though bullets were still flying in the streets. The objective was attained; the cities were in Lithuanian hands and public order was maintained. Thus, the van of the invading German forces, which reached these places 48 hours later, faced an accomplished fact.

Fighting went on simultaneously in other cities. Units of the former Lithuanian Army, incorporated into the Soviet forces, likewise revolted at Vilnius and Varena, and these units succeeded in remaining in the country.

It is estimated that 90,000 guerrillas had taken part in the insurrection. The political and moral victory was gained at the cost of 4,000 killed casualties.

4. *Differing treatment of the fact of insurrection.*—The German press maintained discreet silence about the insurrection. Molotov was the first to speak up on the Soviet side; he voiced threats toward the Fascists of Lithuania. Nevertheless, he had thereby acknowledged and publicized the fact of the insurrection. A couple of days later Lozovsky, Molotov's deputy, told the press conference that the insurrection in Lithuania had been directed not against the Soviets but against the Germans; that, nevertheless, these efforts of protection from the Germans had been naive.

The Lithuanian people interpreted the insurrection as the expression of the nation's will to be free and to spare no lives in gaining the liberty. This was a reply to the Soviet propaganda to the effect that the Lithuanians had allegedly of their own free will renounced their independence and joined the Soviet Union. To use the recently uttered words of President Eisenhower, this was the reply by deeds and sacrifices, not by empty words.

5. *New resistance.*—The Provisional Government soon became convinced that the Germans would not tolerate its existence. Therefore, it undertook measures to create new facts which would be difficult for the occupying power to erase. Namely, to select people for the administrative offices, particularly the persons best fitted for the educational institutions, who would be able to resist the new occupant in the future. On July 9, 1941, Administration (Board) of Cultural Activities and National Education was formed. Its task was to disseminate truthful information regarding the Government's activities and to collect the materials regarding the Bolshevik mismanagement to Lithuania. J. Senku was appointed administrator of this board. He invited Aleksandras Merkelis to assist him in this work.

On August 5, 1941, the Government was compelled to discontinue its functions. The Germans closed down the Lithuanian Activist Front. Since that time, the national will of Lithuania is again being expressed in underground activities.

The facts whereby I illustrated the resistance of the Lithuanian people during the first Soviet occupation, can be easily verified through testimony of their witnesses and, in part, by the evidence published in the Soviet and Lithuanian press.

Mr. KERSTEN. You may be excused.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Merkelis, please.

Mr. KERSTEN. You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MERKELIS. I do.

**TESTIMONY OF ALEKSANDRAS MERKELIS, GREAT NECK, N. Y.,
FORMER DIRECTOR OF MUSEUM OF RED TERROR—Through in-
terpreter**

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your name, please?

Mr. MERKELIS. Aleksandras Merkelis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mr. MERKELIS. In Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you appointed as director of the Museum of Red Terror?

Mr. MERKELIS. Yes, I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. When?

Mr. MERKELIS. On July 12, 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. In your capacity as director of the Museum of Red Terror, was it your job to gather documents that were left behind by the Soviets, when they were fleeing the German Army, and also to investigate certain atrocities and brutalities, with a view to gathering documentary evidence to that end?

Mr. MERKELIS. Yes. That was my basic duty.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where is your residence at the moment, Mr. Merkelis?

Mr. MERKELIS. Great Neck, Long Island, N. Y.

Mr. McTIGUE. I will direct this question to you, Mr. Jurgela. You were sworn previously in this hearing and it will not be necessary to swear you again. I will ask you a question later on, and in that connection I want the record to show that you were at one time Director of the Lithuanian-American Information Service?

Mr. MERKELIS. Well—

Mr. JURGELA. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. During what period?

Mr. JURGELA. Since between June 1944 and August 1951.

Mr. McTIGUE. In your capacity as Director, have you had occasion to translate from time to time certain documents from Russian into Lithuanian?

Mr. JURGELA. From Russian and Lithuanian and Polish into English.

Mr. McTIGUE. Into English?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you, Mr. Merkelis, a document which purports to be an original document written in Russian and ask you if you can identify that?

Mr. MERKELIS. Yes, I can. I understand the Russian language and I had picked up or received this document from the former NKVD office in Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. In which country or city?

Mr. MERKELIS. In the county and city of Siauliai.

Mr. McTIGUE. I ask this be marked for identification as exhibit 16-A.

(The document was marked "Exhibit 16-A." See p. —.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Again, I hand you a document which purports to be a copy of the original Russian document marked "Exhibit 16-A" and ask you if that is the English translation of the exhibit which has just been identified as 16-A?

Mr. JURGELA. I have not proofread this translation, but I understand that is a copy of the translation originally made by me and published in a certain issue of the Lithuanian Bulletin.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that an English translation of 16-A which I have just identified and made part of the record?

Mr. JURGELA. I had no chance to compare it, but my understanding is that it is so.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to read this document into the record at this time since it has been entered as an exhibit, but I would like to read from page 5 of the English translation of the Russian document which has just been entered for identification and made a part of the record.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Counsel, as I understand it, this is a translation of a Russian written document, the original of which we have here before us, identified as exhibit 16-A, which the witness has stated he picked up in the former NKVD headquarters in Siauliai. In other words, it was left behind by the NKVD in their flight from Lithuania, is that correct?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right.

Mr. McTIGUE. The document is marked "Strictly Secret." It is entitled "Instructions—Regarding the Manner of Conducting the Deportation of the Anti-Soviet Elements From Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia."

In the upper right-hand corner of this document there is a rubber stamp entry on page 1 in Lithuanian and Russian LSSR County Committee of NKVD, city of Siauliai, and the date of receipt.

Mr. KERSTEN. Is that an NKVD original stamp, Mr. Jurgela?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes, it is. One half is written on the lefthand side, which is in Lithuanian and on the right side—in Russian; and these entries are made in Russian.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have studied and are familiar with this document, too?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes, I am.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, this is a Soviet deportation order for the people of Lithuania?

Mr. JURGELA. Those are instructions for the briefing of personnel which will execute this operation.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, how they are to deport the people?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right.

Mr. McTIGUE. I would like to read, Mr. Chairman, from page 5 of this document. It is entitled "Manner of Separating Deportee from his Family." (Reading:)

In view of the fact that a large number of the deportees must be arrested and placed in special camps and their families settled at special points in distant regions, it is necessary to execute the operation of deporting both the members of his family as well as the deportee simultaneously, without informing them of the separation confronting them. After having made the search and drawn up the necessary documents for identification in the home of the deportee, the administrative workers shall draw up documents for the head of the family and place them in his personal file, but the documents drawn up for the members of his family should be placed in the personal file of the deportee's family.

The moving of the entire family, however, to the station should be done in one vehicle, and only at the station should the head of the family be placed

separately from his family in a railway car specially intended for heads of families.

While gathering together the family in the home of the deportee, the head of the family should be warned that personal mail articles are to be packed into a separate suitcase, as a sanitary inspection will be made of the deported men separately from the women and children.

At the stations the possessions of head of families subject to arrest should be loaded into railway cars assigned to them, which will be designated by special operative workers appointed for that purpose.

Mr. KERSTEN. Counsel, I will ask Mr. Jurgela this question. Did you follow this translation in the original Russian document?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes, I did. That appears on page 7 of the original and the last paragraph appears on page 8.

Mr. KERSTEN. As read by counsel, is that a correct translation of this Russian Communist written document for instructions in the deportation of families?

Mr. JURGELA. It is the correct translation, and I would like to point also that the original carries some heavy red-pencil notations, apparently made by the operators in Siauliai.

Mr. KERSTEN. By NKVD operators in Siauliai?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes, underscoring major points.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all I have.

Mr. BONIN. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. We will adjourn at this time until 2:15.

(Whereupon, at 1:20 p. m., the committee recessed until 2:15 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:45 p. m.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order, please. Is Canon Petraitis present?

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Canon PETRAITIS. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF CANON ANTANAS PETRAITIS, ONE OF SMALL HANDFUL WHO SURVIVED CHERVEN FOREST MASSACRE (THROUGH INTERPRETER)

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your name, please?

Canon PETRAITIS. Antnas Petraitis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Canon PETRAITIS. In Lithuania, in the village of Jokubaiciai, in the county of Raseiniai.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you a resident now of Chicago, Father Petraitis?

Canon PETRAITIS. Yes. I only live with a good friend of mine, a pastor.

Mr. McTIGUE. At the time of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in June of 1940, where were you located, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS. I was a pastor of the parish of Erzvilkas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time approximately 1 year later in April of 1941 when you were arrested by NKVD agents, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS. On April 6. That wasn't a year later. About 10 months later.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were you charged with?

Canon PETRAITIS. When I was detained, I did not know what for, and later it became clear that I am charged with antirevolutionary activities.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you taken to prison, and, if so, where?

Canon PETRAITIS. I was taken to the prison in Taurage, and held there 2 days, and I was interrogated there.

Mr. McTIGUE. By whom?

Canon PETRAITIS. By the Russian NKVD.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long?

Canon PETRAITIS. I was interrogated 2 days and 2 nights.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened after that?

Canon PETRAITIS. They took me to Kaunas to the Security Building.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened there?

Canon PETRAITIS. There I was interrogated for a full month; interrogations continued for 48 hours at a time, and more. And they were using torture.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of torture?

Canon PETRAITIS. I was beaten on ear with a paper blotter, with a marble blotter.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You were beaten on the ear with what?

Canon PETRAITIS. I was beaten on the ear with a heavy paper blotter.

Mr. KERSTEN. Paperweight?

Canon PETRAITIS. Paperweight.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you knocked unconscious?

Canon PETRAITIS. When I couldn't anything, they wanted me to confess some activities whereof I had no knowledge. They used to kick me with their feet and then they said: You confess; you had better confess now because at a later time you will confess anyway and you will talk more than necessary.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did they want him to confess to again?

Canon PETRAITIS. To confess that I had assisted and led those people who had tried to cross the frontier into Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did those beatings and interrogations last at this time?

Canon PETRAITIS. For a moment. However, I was unconscious from April 12 to 30.

Mr. McTIGUE. From April 12 to April 30, is that what the father testified?

Canon PETRAITIS. I was unconscious. I was beaten into unconsciousness.

Mr. McTIGUE. From when to when?

Canon PETRAITIS. From April 12 to April 30.

Mr. McTIGUE. Does the father mean he was unconscious for that period, throughout?

Canon PETRAITIS. I could not recall the days. I did not know where I was or who I was. I saw myself being a child sick with measles and the torture proceeded as follows:

At 12 at night they called me for interrogation.

They had prepared several protocols containing confessions of all kinds. When I read the protocol, then I saw that I had confessed nothing and that I was guilty of nothing. Then they said, "If you will sign, you will talk even more. I advise you in a friendly manner,

and I wish to be a man toward you. You will live free. You will work for our benefit. You write a pamphlet that you renounce religion." When I said I would not write a pamphlet, he said, "Write at least an article for the newspaper. You will get a good job. You will be able to return to your parish, if you wish, and you will sign a paper that you will spy upon your friends and others who are opposed to Stalin." When I said, "No; I am not prepared for that kind of work—my conscience does not permit it," then he got very angry and he struck me on the ear. He rang a bell, wrote a brief note and said, "Take him over there."

Then I was led down to the cellar, in the same cellar where my cell was located, but I had not seen that though—where they used tortures. The room was fairly long but not wide. There was a table of this width, more or less.

Mr. KERSTEN. Indicating about 2 feet.

Canon PETRAITIS. Yes; about 2 feet. They laid me on that table. They turned my shirt collar up and they turned down my pants toward the ankles. Then I saw that they held something like what they call a banana in Lithuanian—a police stick, and they struck. I heard them count to 19 in Russian. It was very painful to me and at first I felt hot and then I don't know any more. Then, when I awakened, I was facing the lights—lamps—blue lights and I thought to myself that I was in America. I had visited America several months in 1936 and had been operated on in America for tonsils, so I thought, "They are removing my tonsils again" or some sort of reminiscence. I thought these were the doctors around me. Then it got dark in my eyes and I felt short of breath, and I didn't know anything at all again.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were struck 19 times, Father, approximately?

Canon PETRAITIS. I heard them count to 19, and then I didn't hear anything further.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then did you regain consciousness, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS. Then I did recover consciousness and I felt them put some anodium of volerian in my mouth, and then they gave me something to smell that affects the nose—I don't know what it is called. Then I recovered.

I saw light again, and I understood where I was, and again they told me to sign that sheet of paper and another paper in blank. They said, "You sign at the bottom."

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you sign the paper, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened then?

Canon PETRAITIS. And then they swore at me. Is it necessary to use the Russian curse words?

Mr. KERSTEN. No; I don't believe so.

Canon PETRAITIS. And the last part of it was that they would tear out my testicles, and I didn't feel anything further; I fainted.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, right on that point, while I do not mean to embarrass Father Petraitis in any way, I think that we probably should have some amplification of that testimony, since it is the kind of thing that is almost unbelievable, so far as people in this country are concerned.

Now, what did they do at that juncture, exactly?

CANON PETRAITIS. They seized my testicles in their hand and crushed them.

MR. MCTIGUE. Did you faint thereafter, Father?

CANON PETRAITIS. I was totally unconscious.

MR. MCTIGUE. How long were you unconscious?

CANON PETRAITIS. I regained reasoning power in the cell I was lying in, but I did not know who I was. I did not realize that I was a priest. I was remembering my childhood somehow.

Then I felt that someone was coming up, and they moved my arms up and down and my legs, and then I began to understand, and then I remembered that the same female doctor who used to give shots into our back said, in Russian, of course, that you insulted him too much.

MR. MCTIGUE. I didn't get that.

THE INTERPRETER. It is a Russian expression that you have overdone it.

CANON PETRAITIS. After all, a man of 45 is not a man of 20, and they tied my hands with a soft rag this way, my right arm pointing toward my left shoulder, and my left arm pointing toward my right shoulder, because, somehow, quite unconsciously, my legs were itching, and I wanted to scratch my legs.

MR. MCTIGUE. What happened thereafter?

CANON PETRAITIS. Then they picked me up by my arms, and leading me into the corridor for a walk, because I could not walk by myself, and then when I was able to get around by myself, then they took me again to the second or third floor, half carrying me, and they told me to write the date, the year, the month, name, father's name, and the last name.

I still did not know what year it was, whether it was winter or summer. So, when they told me, I wrote the date they told me.

MR. MCTIGUE. Did you sign the confession, Father?

CANON PETRAITIS. No, it was not a confession.

MR. MCTIGUE. Proceed, please.

CANON PETRAITIS. I signed my last name, but I could not remember my first name. Somehow I was thinking of Casimir. I don't know, and when they saw that I could not remember, so they made this sound, and said, in Russian, "You see, it helped."

MR. MCTIGUE. What happened thereafter, Father?

CANON PETRAITIS. And, after that, they transferred me to the prison.

MR. MCTIGUE. What happened in the prison, Father?

CANON PETRAITIS. From the prison they took me twice over to the security building for further interrogation, and they told me, "Talk. Say everything, or it will be even worse for you than what you have experienced already." I told them that I have nothing further to say beyond what I said already, and I shall say nothing further to you, and don't ask me any further.

Then, he said, one of his assistants there—there were 2 of them, and he called the guard. Two men entered.

MR. KERSTEN. Will you talk more to the loud speaker, so that we can get your translation. Bring it closer to you, please.

CANON PETRAITIS. Thereupon those 2 men answered: "There is no point in wasting our time here. He is a determined man. Lead him away and finish with him." They led me to a garage, the former garage in Lithuanian times, in the same building.

MR. MCTIGUE. What happened in the garage?

CANON PETRAITIS. In that garage, it was empty except there was a certain board, like a board they have in school. That board had been like an old churn, very uneven. That board has been very uneven and there has been a lot of blood below it.

THE INTERPRETER. He means the blackboard.

CANON PETRAITIS. There were 2 men standing with rifles by the door and 2 other men entered and 1 of them had a pistol in his pistol case at his side. They told me to stand in front of that blackboard.

The one who had this pistol case drew his pistol and handed it to the man who had no gun and said: "Finish him off."

I was certain that they were going to shoot me so I made the cross sign; I crossed myself, and then they laughed, and they said: "Here's a fool. Do you think that you would chase away the bullets by making a cross sign?"

I said nothing; I just crossed my arms and he fired. But he missed. Whether he shot above me or where, I don't know. So the other man who did not shoot laughed: "Ha, the fool, the people's enemy. The people's enemy, his hands shook"—meaning the soldier who shot. "Give me that gun", he said, "I will hit him here. That is how he is to be shot" [indicating the point between the eyes], and he raised his left arm and placed his arm with the pistol on that, and aimed at me and he fired, and he missed.

Then the first one laughed: "Why didn't you hit the target? Why did your hand shake?"

So one of them said: "Here is the devil. He is very lucky. Let him live a little longer."

And they brought me back into the cell, pushed me into the cell, but he did not close the door, and they talked to each other.

One said: "Tomorrow night at 12 o'clock, you come back, and we will finish that ceremony with him."

But there I could not know when it was daylight or night time or how much time had passed because there was no window in the cell, and I was still waiting for them to come to shoot me.

Then they let me smoke a certain cigarette. When I puffed several smokes, the tobacco was good but there was some taste like medicine, not medicine, just not pleasant. I puffed once more and I said, "Oh, no, I will not smoke." After a moment, I felt so happy, that there was no doubt in my mind, it seemed that everyone was so friendly—such good friends, but it was for a very brief moment because I did not smoke. Then I asked him for more smokes so they said, "We gave you a whole pack." I said, "I cannot smoke these. They make me vomit—I don't like the taste," and I wanted to drink very much after that smoke. So I asked them to give me the Lithuanian cigarette called Vilkas, but they did not give me. I did not smoke these other cigarettes any more.

Whether it was day or night, I do not know. Later on, the same woman doctor who had earlier, gave me a shot in the back. Very soon, in 3 maybe 5 more minutes, I felt again so happy. It seemed that I have no enemies here and friends who wish me everything—a very foolish feeling. Then they led me away. However, it lasted very short and it passed away. They led me upstairs. They talked to me and they looked at each other and shook their heads. They asked me, "Don't you feel a headache?" I said no. They shook their heads

again, and said, "Do you have the doctor's paper?" So the other said, "Yes, there is one in that folder." They looked at it. They shook their heads and said nothing. They began interrogating me again. I said that I know nothing further and I would say nothing further. So they whispered to each other and shook their heads all the time. Then they returned me back to the prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you confined in prison, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS (through interpreter). I was in prison until June 22, 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened on June 22, 1941?

Canon PETRAITIS (through interpreter). In the evening when it was so quiet in the prison, some dull explosions could be heard like shots. The guards disappeared from the corridors—the hallways.

And the prisoners——

Mr. KERSTEN. Where was that prison?

Canon PETRAITIS. Kaunas.

Mr. MADDEN. You had started to say something about the prisoners.

Canon PETRAITIS. There were military among the prisoners.

Mr. MADDEN. What was it you said, now?

Canon PETRAITIS. There were officers among them, colonels, and others, so they said, "We must liberate ourselves, we should break down the doors, otherwise they will execute us."

Mr. MADDEN. Who said that?

Canon PETRAITIS. The military among the prisoners, the imprisoned army officers.

There were different opinions regarding that, but it was decided that we should wait a little. And then at night, probably it was 12, but we had no watches. We heard the greatest noise, and there were Russian NKVD men speaking in the hallways.

Then they began to break down the doors, beginning at one end of the corridor, breaking them down with axes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who were breaking down the doors?

Canon PETRAITIS. The NKVD men. And the prisoners had to leave 1 by 1 from the cells.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were they taken?

Canon PETRAITIS. And so our turn came at our cell, and they did the same thing. Two men pointed their bayonets at me from both sides, and they led us downstairs into buses. They loaded three buses, it seems, and they took us away from Kauna in the direction of Ukmerge. Not far from Ukmerge the Germans began to bomb the retreating army, among whom we also got mixed up.

So the NKVD men left the buses and they retreated into ravines alongside the road, and they pointed machine guns and automatic guns at us and said, "Whoever leaves the bus will be shot."

So the Germans strafed the column with machine guns, and the top of our bus had been strafed, but we were not touched.

Mr. MADDEN. Just a minute. The Germans were chasing the NKVD men who had the witness as a prisoner, with others, is that true?

Mr. McTIGUE. They were strafing the column and in this column were the NKVD men with the prisoners.

Canon PETRAITIS. The Germans could only see the retreating troops, so they bombed and strafed them with machine guns and this particular bus was hit by their machine guns.

They dropped some bombs ahead of us, but none of them hit us, so we proceeded on our way again.

We were taken to Vilnius, and in Vilnius we were taken into the yard of the Security Building, but the building had already been bombed.

Then, there, they put some more men into our van, about 4 or 5 more prisoners, Lithuanians, and they took us away. They took us that way, packed tightly in a bus toward Minsk. Not far from Minsk, one bus went out of order, and they charged the chauffeur that he had performed sabotage, and he had warned them, the Russians, that the transmission box was out of order so that the bus could not proceed very far; that attention in the garage was necessary. But they charged that he was a saboteur, and they led him away to be shot. He begged, and he said that he had children, and he asked them to spare his life. The man fell to his knees. He tried to kiss the legs of this NVKD man. The man kicked him right in the face, and his face was blood-splattered, and at that moment, he shot him; two shots in the head.

Later, they stopped some army trucks. They removed the soldiers from the army truck, and transferred the prisoners there, and at night they brought us to the prison in Minsk. They placed us in the Administration Building's guardrooms. Toward the morning, the Germans began to bomb the city.

Mr. McTIGUE. Minsk is in Russia?

Canon PETRAITIS. Yes. They had some guns, anti-aircraft guns on the roof of that prison, and they fired at the Germans, and it seemed that the Germans bombed us, and two bombs hit the building we were in. All we could feel, there was a stench, and the ceiling began to fall. There were four cells in that building, so it looked like all of the prisoners had been killed, and more than a dozen NKVD men, and our cell was in the extreme corner and it was not destroyed.

One hour later, we were led away from this cell, and we saw that the entire building had been destroyed except that corner, and we were transferred to the real prison where there had been a great many prisoners, and we were kept there during the day until the night.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened the next night?

Canon PETRAITIS. The next night it was dark, because all the lighting system had been destroyed. The prisoners were led into the yard, and were lined up. While we stood there in the yard, they led out about—11 or 12 men were led out of the prison. They took them through the gates and then we heard the shots. They were executed on the spot. And our men noticed that one lady was taken past. That was the wife of General Prankonis. When they were executed, they led us into the streets, and they told us to form a column of four and to start running.

There were a great many dead people in the streets, and for a distance of about 10, maybe 12 miles, at times, they told us to start running. There had been quite a few prisoners, maybe 6,000 people, maybe 5,000.

Mr. McTIGUE. You say that in this column, Father, that you just described which started or was formed in Minsk, that there were approximately 6,000 people?

CANON PETRAITIS. Approximately that many. There were soldiers among us and so they are accustomed to counting and when we saw a column marching uphill, and then go downhill, we could see the end of the head of the column, so they said it was approximately 6,000 people.

MR. MCTIGUE. Where did these 6,000 people come from that were put into the line of march you are just starting to describe, Father?

CANON PETRAITIS. Oh, there were all sorts of people. There were just about 100, maybe 115 Lithuanians; the rest of them were Poles, Estonians, Latvians; there were Russians, Ukrainians, and Polish-Ukrainians.

MR. MCTIGUE. What I am trying to establish now, Father, is where this column was formed.

CANON PETRAITIS. This column was formed in the yard and when the head of the column moved out, they took out more prisoners from the regular prison building.

MR. MCTIGUE. The approximately 6,000 prisoners then came from this prison that you have just described, Father?

CANON PETRAITIS. The prison was overloaded with prisoners brought from other places. It was a four-story building. There was hardly air enough to breathe.

MR. MCTIGUE. When the column started then, from this prison in Minsk, what happened?

CANON PETRAITIS. I must mention that there were also a great many women there, and even children. When we marched about 10 or 12 miles, the older people began to complain that they could not march any longer. One of us, a Lithuanian major, Apulskis, told them, "I am an old man. You leave me here." So the Russian said so politely, "Oh, very well, Major, you just go here to the forest." As soon as he crossed the ravine, he got two shots in the back.

From that time on, we continually heard those individual pistol shots and after each shot there was one prisoner less.

One scene I will not forget until die. There was one woman with a boy 4 or 5 years old, not more than that. She was arrested quite recently because both she and the child were dressed well. The boy began to ask for food and water, and, of course, nobody could give him anything. People began to disrobe; some people were nearly naked because they were trying to shed their clothing and there could be no talk of any food being carried with them.

MR. KERSTEN. That was in the month of June, was it not?

CANON PETRAITIS. In June. We were taken away during the night of June 24th to 25th.

MR. KERSTEN. 1941?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes. That mother carried her child and other people helped her to carry the child. She carried this child. She was so hot—warm. She was either a Pole or Ukraine because she spoke both Polish and Ukrainian. As much as I could remember, she was a resident of the Polish-administered Ukraine. I saw that that woman was removed from the column with the child, and I thought to myself, "Well, at least they had mercy on her with a child." And I said, "May the Lord be praised that child will not suffer any longer." but then I heard voices behind me. I turned around and saw two NKVD and one was handing the pistol to the other and said, "Here,

shoot them." So the other man apparently did not want to do that and so he said, "Well, you can do that." The other man said, "No, but the NKVD commander ordered you." So he took the pistol, hid it behind his coattail and jumped across the ravine and that woman was standing in front and the child was hugging his mother.

He approached more or less the distance from that chair above to here.

Mr. KERSTEN. That would be about 15 to 20 feet, would it?

Canon PETRAITIS. About that.

Mr. KERSTEN. Go ahead.

Canon PETRAITIS. And he aimed the pistol at the mother. The child understood there was something wrong and he yelled, "Mother," and hugged his mother. Two shots were fired.

The mother fell, and the child was still hugging her. The child fell on top of his mother. So he came up and lifted the child by the collar, and he fired two shots into the back of his head, and he tossed the child on top of the mother and left them there.

Two weeks later when we were returning, I saw the same scene, that same child with the mother.

Mr. McTIGUE. You saw their bodies?

Canon PETRAITIS. Yes, they were still there. Some time later, probably around noontime, they picked some women, there were 16, when I saw them lined up. They were all pregnant, and men who could hardly understand such things could realize that. They just fired the automatic rifles and all of those people were mowed down.

Just before that I heard them say that the women could not reach their destination, they could not walk, so they were left there.

Then during the night they did not march us. They kept us on a certain lawn, and placed machine guns all around us. They kept us there in a clearing in the forest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any food or water during the course of this march, Father.

Canon PATRAITIS. No, nothing, no bread. We were not permitted to stand up. Whoever tried to raise himself was shot down, and people who happened to be laying in a pool of water, they just had to lay in that pool of water.

And, at dawn, in the morning, we were all aroused, and then the march continued again.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was this the morning of the second day of the march?

Canon PETRAITIS. Yes, the second day. They took us back to the same highway, and we had seen a great many executed people lying in the ravines beside the road. Apparently other prisoners had been led over the same road before, old prisoners, because they were dressed in rags and very emaciated. And, when we reached the huge forest, the morning of doom began. When the column was marching, they would just look around and motion for the man with their finger to come out, and then you would hear a shot, and the man is dead. They always said "March into the forest," and as soon as the person turned, they shot him in the back of the neck.

All of us Lithuanians got mutually acquainted by that time after we had spent some time in the single cell in Minsk.

When the sun had risen fairly high, some Lithuanians were taken from our column. That was Zdanivious and Bitinas. They said

"Goodbye, men," and they were shot. And, there was a Polish officer with his wife, and he was tired. He was in prison a long time, since 1940. So, he said he could not walk any longer. He was weak, and he fell, and his wife remained by his side. So, the young NKVD man told them "I advise you to go on. I would not advise you to stay." She did not leave her husband. She would not leave her husband. She embraced him and stayed there. Then when we passed some distance, we heard shots. There was a female scream, and those who were marching in the rear of the column, they saw how both of them had been thrown into the ravine, and there was another Estonian. A great many people had been shoeless, and this man was barefoot, and you know how those highways are out there, sharp stones. They are paved with stone and gravel, and so his soles were cut through. He knew that he was going to be shot, so he knelt down and walked on all four. So, one man said, "Well, I had better go and finish him off." So the other one said, "Oh, no, no. We will see how long he can continue that way." Then, of course, he could not walk fast, so he began to lag behind. So one man seized him by the collar, and then there were two shots, and he was tossed into the ravine.

When we passed that forest they did not shoot any more people on the road to Cherven. The Cherven prison was overfilled with prisoners so they told us to lie down in the courtyard.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many days, father, did it take you to reach the Cherven prison?

Canon PETRAITIS. That was the next day, I think; about 2 days, because they took us out at night; we marched during the day and night, and just a few hours short of 2 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. So you now have been marching for 2 days with this continual slaughter going on?

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many miles would that be?

Canon PETRAITIS. I cannot say; about 150 kilometers. I couldn't say exactly, myself, or less, maybe. I can't say that.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is that in miles, approximately, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS. About $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers to a mile; you know better.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is approximately 90 miles?

Canon PETRAITIS. Eighty or seventy; I don't know. And people were so thirsty and tired, so they asked for water. So they brought one barrel of water, some dirty water. So only a few people could get a drink. Then they said: "Well, wait until about 11 and 12 o'clock tonight. Then we will give you a real good soup."

We did not understand what that soup meant. Cherven was bombed by the Germans in the evening but the bombs did not hit the prison.

At dusk we were aroused in the prison courtyard and they began to separate us into two groups.

Mr. KERSTEN. At that time, can you estimate about how many people were left out of these prisoners?

Canon PETRAITIS. Those prisoners who were taken out from Minsk, except for children—as I said, except for children, they began to separate us into two groups. There were Russian soldiers among them; not so many, but a great many Russian young men, so they asked these young ones——

Mr. KERSTEN. Just one moment. I was wondering if you can tell me about how many prisoners there were at the time you are now talking about, approximately?

Canon PETRAITIS. Well, as I said, there were probably around 6,000, except those people, of course, who had been shot on the way.

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, I was wondering about how many had been shot; therefore, how many were left is my question.

Canon PETRAITIS. Here, I will tell you. You see, when they started separating us into two groups. In one group there were these citizens, and the criminals, and those who wanted to enlist in their army, and the criminals. In the courtyard of Charven, at night, the Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, the Poles, and Ukrainians were split, put into another group. And I know there were three Jews from Latvia. One told me he was from Latvia and he was the friend of the other. Of this, our second group, they split the people again in two parts. Some were placed by the fence and the others were lined up against the prison wall. Then, when we were grouped, they formed us into a column and we were marched out and the others remained in the prison yard. There were some very noisy trucks placed around the prison; they were making very much noise and we were led, already, outside of the prison. Then there was a mass of army moving by and a mass of civilians, too. So I heard them say, and others who understood Russian, "It is inconvenient here. People are passing here."

Mr. KERSTEN. What was that?

Canon PETRAITIS. "It is inconvenient here. People are passing here."

Mr. McTIGUE. Who said this?

Canon PETRAITIS. The NKVD men were talking to each other.

Mr. MADDEN. What did they mean by that?

Canon PETRAITIS. They apparently intended to shoot us down there and that is why all these motortrucks—truck motors were making that terrific noise.

Then we were formed into columns and marched out of the city, about 3 or 4 kilometers, 8 men in a line, and they told us to link our arms together, 8 men in a line, and they marched us that way. Then they stopped us for a while and they said, "Close in together tightly."

Mr. MADDEN. How many were in that group?

Canon PETRAITIS. You see, who could count them? But I could speculate there may have been eight or nine hundred men, but who could say the whole number.

Then they fired and some of the men were down. They were firing this way [indicating], the column was standing here, so you see, they were firing cross ways from both sides. And there was a light machinegun opened from the rear.

One man who holding me from the back, and he was shaking.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was what?

Canon PETRAITIS. He was shaking, and he was struck, and he crumpled down.

When these men began to fall down, this fire began to injure their own men. There was an open space made in the mass—

Mr. McTIGUE. You mean the NKVD men were caught in their own crossfire?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes, they were wounded. They didn't intend to, but they wounded each other, when our men fell down and made a gap.

So then we heard them yell, "Don't shoot, stop shooting, you are shooting your own people."

And they stopped, and they told us: "Those of you who are alive, stand up and march out," and the rest, the wounded and the dead, remained behind.

As to those who were wounded, some NKVD men were left behind and the wounded were finished off either by bayonets, or those short trench shovels, to cleave their heads—mostly by those trench spades or shovels.

MR. MADDEN. Trench shovels?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes. Then they marched us ahead and told us to lie down in the road. It seemed to me that less than one-half remained from the original group.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were there still women and children in this line of march?

CANON PETRAITIS. No; there were no women there, except that women were brought slightly ahead of us on board of a truck.

I don't know how many women were there. They brought them by truck, and they executed them, and they were screaming a lot.

MR. MCTIGUE. Did this execution take place up ahead of your column, Father?

CANON PETRAITIS. A little to the side, on the lawn.

MR. MCTIGUE. Proceed, please.

CANON PETRAITIS. And so, when we lay down, they opened fire from both sides again into the mass of lying people, and the people flopped down, and they began to crawl into the ravines, and so the bullets were again crossing this road.

And while we were lying down, an armored truck came up from behind and it stopped. It was a regular army truck.

MR. MCTIGUE. Was this an army truck or an army tank?

CANON PETRAITIS. I am not a soldier and I do not know, but I heard the others say it was an armored truck. It was proceeding on those wheel tracks.

MR. MADDEN. It was a caterpillar truck?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes. So, the chauffeur said, "How can I ride through? There are people lying on the road." So I heard the orders of the NKVD commander, "Go ahead."

So I heard the motor start. The truck started moving, and we could hear these noises, and whoever was struck by those wheels—

MR. MCTIGUE. Did this tank run over the column of men who were lying in the middle of the road?

CANON PETRAITIS. Straight on the people, over the people. The driver did not want to go.

MR. MCTIGUE. And it crushed everybody who happened to be lying on the road in front of it?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes; it crushed them like pancakes. You can understand what happens. So, when he passed away and over them, he continued on, and they opened fire again, and later, those who were not wounded also were lying down, and we heard them say, "Those who are not wounded, get up." Very few got up. And those of us were marched ahead again, and some NKVD men were again left

behind to finish off those wounded with the bayonets and with the trench shovels. There were a number of us. My brother was in that column, too.

After that shooting when we were told to rise again, I saw that my brother was alive. He got up too.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He got up?

Canon PETRAITIS. He got up; then they marched us again about 30, maybe 50 or 60 meters, but there were only 50 or 40 of us, between 40 and 60, a small group of us left. I must note here that there was a very interesting thing.

They marched us this way: Here is one NKVD man standing [indicating]; here is another soldier, and in the second group, it was accompanied by trained dogs. The idea was that no one should escape, that dogs should overtake the men.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many dogs were there, do you remember that?

The INTERPRETER. May I translate this first?

Mr. KERSTEN. All right.

Canon PETRAITIS. It was a surprising thing. They kicked those dogs and the dogs would not go after people. So they said it was a surprising thing that they would not go after men. The entire column was encircled by these NKVD men and every second line of those NKVD men had the dogs.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, the dogs were more humane than the NKVD men?

Canon PETRAITIS. Whether it was blood or shots, I don't know, but they were trained dogs. They were not afraid of shots. Not one of them took after the men so they kicked those dogs and they were yelping.

Then, our group of 40 to 60 men was marched about 50 meters ahead again and they told us to lie down. Then the NKVD men, all of the men crossed over to one side of the road and they told us that whoever will raise their head will be shot at. Then they opened fire just from one side this time. Then a great many people began to rise as long as there were soldiers only on one side and they wanted—they tried to escape. Then I heard them say, "Now we will shoot the ducks."

Mr. McTIGUE. D-u-c-k-s?

Canon PETRAITIS. Yes. As long as a man is rising, they opened fire and the man falls down. My brother, at that time, jumped up, crossed the ravine and fell.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your brother was killed at this juncture, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS. No, he was not. He was wounded, and he escaped in the end. He had died in Germany in 1948.

Then they stopped shooting, and nobody was getting up, so they said, "Now we must make a check to see that no one is alive." I thought to myself I was not wounded at all, and I thought it is terrible if they will start bayoneting me; I would rather they shoot me. So I decided that I will rise and run and if they will shoot me down, at least they will not cleave my head. When I rose to run, I was able to run about 10 meters without being fired at because there was a ravine. Then, you see, those men were standing there on the road killing off the wounded on the other side. So I heard them being ordered to lie down and they opened fire on me. I don't know how it was—

Mr. KERSTEN. Just when was that? What time of day was it; day or night? Have him tell us when that was.

Canon PETRAITIS. That was at night.

Mr. KERSTEN. What time?

Canon PETRAITIS. Around 2 o'clock, because when I was running—

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean 2 o'clock in the morning?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Ask him.

Canon PETRAITIS. Two in the morning. The light was coming up. I was running and—I don't know what the English expression of it is—like a whole swarm of bees bullets were on all sides. Just like a swarm of bees the bullets were singing.

And they missed. Just before I reached the forest there were fallen tree branches, and my feet got mixed up and I fell down. Then I didn't run, but I seized the grass with my hands, and I moved that way, inched my way about 30 meters slightly to the side.

They kept firing, still in the same direction that I had been running, as I could see branches falling down to the ground.

I moved away about 30 meters or so, and then I got up and ran again into the forest. I got into the forest and entered the swamps.

There I met 3 Poles, 1 Polish officer and 2 soldiers, and that was the next day, the next morning.

Later on I met, in their company I also met my brother. His left arm was bandaged. One Pole tore up his underpants and bandaged his arm. In 2 weeks his arm got well. It did not get poisoned or anything.

We lived about 2 weeks, or 9 or 10 days in the swamps there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you go from there, Father, in the final episode of your escape?

Canon PETRAITIS. In the forest we had nothing to eat, but we used to suck those pine needles and grass, and a little water. It was soft grass.

We could not enter the dry woods, because the woods were full of Russian soldiers, and they were shooting at us. We heard them say they intended to march us farther on to the other side of Berezina River, but you see, the Germans were threatening to encircle them, so they shot us down. They wanted to shoot other people down, but they were afraid to die themselves.

But the Germans did not complete that closing. So we had to stay for a long time in the swamps.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you finally reach safety, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS. In the month of July, I should say around the 5th or the 6th day of July.

Mr. McTIGUE. Of what year?

Canon PETRAITIS. 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you emigrate to the United States, Father?

Canon PETRAITIS. In 1944, when the Germans were retreating and the Bolsheviks were coming back. I did not want to stay in that hell again.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you immigrate to the United States?

Canon PETRAITIS. In 1949, on September 11.

MR. MCTIGUE. I want to go back for two questions. How long did this march from Minsk, the prison in Minsk, to the forest of Cherven take?

CANON PETRAITIS. About 2 days; not quite 2 days.

MR. MCTIGUE. Two days?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes; and nights.

MR. MCTIGUE. Two days and two nights?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes.

MR. MCTIGUE. How many people—men, women, and children—were in the column when it started from Minsk?

CANON PETRAITIS. We had no chance to count them.

MR. MCTIGUE. Approximately?

CANON PETRAITIS. About five or six thousand.

MR. MCTIGUE. How many were left after the final shooting in the Cherven Forest when Father Petraitis escaped?

CANON PETRAITIS. That is difficult to say. After all, they did not escape in a single flight of Lithuanians. I know 11 men escaped; 6 of them are dead now.

MR. MCTIGUE. Out of how many Lithuanians?

CANON PETRAITIS. About 115 of them, but there were others—at Minsk there were others—and we do not know how many were there.

MR. MCTIGUE. Would you say, Father, that at the end of this death march, and at the time you escaped, that there was only a handful remaining alive?

CANON PETRAITIS. Just a small group.

MR. MADDEN. How many about?

CANON PETRAITIS. I would be afraid to state under oath.

MR. MADDEN. Approximately?

CANON PETRAITIS. I know 11 Lithuanians that I know of. Well, if we should accept certain proportions, maybe about 100.

MR. MADDEN. One hundred?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes.

MR. MCTIGUE. That is all I have.

CANON PETRAITIS. Not more than that.

MR. KERSTEN. In this entire group of five to six thousand, were there many women and children or just a few?

CANON PETRAITIS. Mostly men; mostly men. I couldn't say the percentage of women.

MR. KERSTEN. I don't know that I want the exact figures because I know that under those circumstances it would be impossible to state, but can you give us some idea as to how many women and children there were?

CANON PETRAITIS. I think that about 1,000 were women. The children, those little ones, I have seen one of them, and I have seen another boy. I heard somebody crying in the rear.

There were a few real small children and those—the teenagers, 12 or 13 years old—there were more of those, and that Lithuanian who crumpled beside me, he said that he was 17 years old.

MR. KERSTEN. Would you say that the casualties—the deaths among the women and children—were at a greater rate than the men or not?

THE INTERPRETER. I didn't get the first part of the question.

MR. KERSTEN. Was the rate of casualties among the women and children about the same or more than the men?

CANON PETRAITIS. It is hard to say because we could not see what was taking place.

MR. KERSTEN. Were there many women left at the end?

CANON PETRAITIS. In the column?

MR. KERSTEN. Yes; among the prisoners.

CANON PETRAITIS. You see, they tried to accompany people of their own nationality, so they could speak to each other. They did not march separately. They were mixed among the men.

MR. BONIN. Father, apparently this prison camp in Minsk was a concentration center for all people who offended in some way the theory and the philosophy of the Soviet regime.

CANON PETRAITIS. It was a formal prison of theirs. It seemed that a mass of people were attacked there in wartime, when the war broke out. Otherwise, for Lithuanian prisoners Minsk had been a transit center. Some people would be kept there on the way to Moscow or elsewhere. It was a formal prison.

MR. BONIN. But it appears as though it was a concentration center for people who were to be either kept there or to be moved on to Siberia.

CANON PETRAITIS. Most of them were detained there prior to trial and after trial they were moved out.

MR. BONIN. Were they people who actually committed some criminal offense under the laws of the country they belonged to, or were they political offenders?

CANON PETRAITIS. There were all sorts of people, it seems, because there were some criminals among them, who had short sentences, 3 or more years, more or less.

MR. BONIN. Now, I understand that there were a great number of Polish prisoners in there.

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes, there were. There were people of all nationalities.

MR. BONIN. People of all nationalities?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes.

MR. BONIN. But this was a Soviet prison camp, wasn't it?

CANON PETRAITIS. A formal prison, it seems to me.

MR. BONIN. It wasn't a Polish prison.

MR. JURGELA. You said camp. He said it was a formal prison—regular prison.

MR. BONIN. It was a regular prison but not a Polish prison, was it?

CANON PETRAITIS. No, that was a Russian prison.

MR. BONIN. Russian. Apparently, under this Soviet system, they don't place much value upon a human life, do they?

CANON PETRAITIS. Well, you see, life doesn't mean anything to them. In the cultural world like here in America, they cannot understand that, and I am not surprised that they cannot understand that. You see, it is a huge nation. Every nation has renegades, the sadists.

MR. BONIN. This is a part of the happiness that the Soviet system promises all people, isn't it?

CANON PETRAITIS. They have no happiness. In theory, they proclaim it very nicely. They told me, to myself, when they came to announce that the teaching of religion was to be suspended, so we began to teach children religion inside the church, and the NKVD men came around and brought a paper. He ordered me to sign the paper

that I would not teach the religion anywhere, I would not teach children anywhere. I picked up their constitution and I pointed to them that according to their constitution there is a freedom of belief, freedom of religion. So they told me, "Pay no attention to what is said in the constitution, but what is said to you by the Government, by the Communist Party." He said, "You see what a smart aleck he is. He is basing himself on the constitution." The constitution is only written. It is necessary as an ornament, as a picture, and what the Communist Party orders, that is the obligatory thing, not the reading of the constitution.

MR. BOXIN. In other words, the constitution doesn't mean a thing as far as governing the people. It is what the leaders of the Communist Party say what shall be done?

MR. JURGELA. He said clearly and he said in Russian that the constitution is written for the foolish people.

MR. BOXIN. Now, Father, I have just one more question.

Do you know from your own experience whether or not an investigation had been made to determine the number of people that were murdered in this death march from the Minsk prison?

CANON PETRAITIS. I heard that during the German rule something or other was being done, but we couldn't know about it, because we did not enjoy much freedom under the Germans.

MR. BOXIN. Then it is unknown whether it has actually been established as to the number of people that were killed?

CANON PETRAITIS. These natives, the local people, after we were free, we could get around when the Germans came, so these local people estimated variously, some said, "There are 700 corpses," and some said, "There are 900," but that the bodies were torn to pieces.

MR. BOXIN. In other words, this is the first time that this has been brought forth before some official Government committee or organization, is that correct?

CANON PETRAITIS. Abroad, yes, I think so. There was no time to conduct such an investigation by the Lithuanians, because we had no freedom as we have freedom here. There were books written about it in the archives. Something or other has been done. I don't have the volume of the archives. By that I mean there are several volumes that are called Lithuanian Archives that have been published in Lithuania during the German occupation dealing with various phases of Bolshevik cruelty.

And when he uses the word "archives," or when I use that word, I mean that publication.

MR. BOXIN. Father, I sympathize with your tragic experiences under Soviet domination, and I believe that you have made a valuable contribution to this investigation.

CANON PETRAITIS. That is just a little. If I were to state everything regarding their means of interrogation, well——

Once they tossed a beaten man into our cell by mistake. I did not recognize him, but I was not surprised, for there were two good friends of his in my cell and they did not recognize that this was their friend.

His face was like this [indicating], huge and swollen, you could see no eyes, except they were all swollen, and they were just small slits.

And there were cuts in his back. The entire body was beaten up.

MR. KERSTEN. Congressman Madden?

MR. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions.

Father Petraitis has testified here for 2 hours and 15 minutes, and has related probably the most barbarous procession of atrocities that the modern world has ever experienced, but your narration, Father, of these atrocities committed on you and on your countrymen in this death march is but one of a great number of atrocities that have been committed by the Communists in the last 13 or 14 years, to my knowledge, because I happened to be a member of the Katyn massacre investigating committee, and we recorded over 2,300 pages of atrocities dealing with that massacre; 2,300 pages of testimony, and your testimony regarding this death march is identical with the testimony that has been rendered by the boys from Korea that experienced this same or almost identical treatment from the Communists that was inflicted against the Lithuanian people.

I might say that in the Washington, Detroit, and New York hearings, the testimony was identical with yours, in regard to massacres and the barbarous and inhuman treatment that has been inflicted on the people of Estonia and on the people of Latvia, and on the Balkan countries. It is a part of the pattern of the Soviet leaders, and your contribution here today in your testimony this afternoon, I think, when these facts are made known to the millions, and broadcast by the Voice of America behind the Iron Curtain, that it will give the underground that are now working behind the Iron Curtain and the Balkan countries that are under subjection a great deal of encouragement, and the testimony that is being revealed by this committee, I think, will drive home to the minds of a lot of these fuzzy-minded people, even in this country that still think the Communist leaders have some kind of a modern ideology that might be called a system of Government, when it is nothing more than a brutal, barbarous, criminal conspiracy, and from the testimony revealed by this committee, and the other committees of the Congress letting the people of the free world and also those behind the Iron Curtain know, what communism really is, and that testimony of the kind revealed by you will eventually sound the death knell to communism.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Machrowicz?

Canon PETRAITIS. I wish to say one more thing. I know what Cardinal Mindszenty would say, that it is the same system being used.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I am not going to torture you with going into detail of some of your horrible experiences, but you just now mentioned something that I had in mind. We hear in the United States, of these so-called confessions from Cardinal Mindszenty and various others in various walks of life, and when I hear the testimony of how you were tortured to get your confession, I am going to ask your opinion as to the voluntary nature of the confessions that we hear so much about here?

Canon PETRAITIS. They have no value. They will make of men anything that they want to. Every once in a while there may be one out of a thousand might be able to withstand it.

For instance, they addressed such foolish questions to me: Were you organizing a gang to go to Moscow and kill Stalin? I said: Yes; I did organize. And they said: Do you wish to travel to Russia and place some dynamite, a bomb under a factory? I said: Yes; I will go.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. In other words, isn't it true that a person under those conditions will admit almost anything?

CANON PETRAITIS. Because the human being can stand it no longer. He just hopes for the end to come sooner. There is no hope that a man will live, and those tortures become insufferable, and when they let a person smoke or give him shots, that is a certainty. Why does a man feel so elated after that?

MR. MACHROWICZ. Just one other matter. During the investigation of the Katyn massacre, we had one witness, a former Soviet officer, who testified as to his own knowledge of the Katyn massacre, where 4,200 bodies were found, but expressed surprise that we were excited about it because he told us there was nothing to be excited about in one Katyn Forest massacre—that there are thousands of such places now existing in Soviet Russia.

Isn't it your opinion that there are many places in Russia just about the same as the Cherven Forest?

CANON PETRAITIS. I am not thinking. I believe that, like I believe in God.

MR. MACHROWICZ. Thank you, Father, and all I can say is I don't believe in torturing anybody but I would like to have all these so-called pink intellectuals who run around this country teaching communism be punished by listening to stories like yours and that mother who lost a child that we heard in Detroit, to listen to such testimony, and then go out and preach communism.

CANON PETRAITIS. They would not believe—American Communists will not believe, because they visualize things differently.

And they would be hanged after half a year; at most after 1 year after the Communists would come here, because those of us who have suffered that; in that event we would keep silent, while these fellows would still dare express their opinion.

They would feel that they had contributed a great deal to the cause so they don't deserve such things. And this type of people would be executed first so that they would not organize the people who remained mute, who would not speak.

MR. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

MR. KERSTEN. Congressman Dodd?

MR. DODD. I have no questions.

MR. JURGELA. The witness wishes to add that he weighed 180 pounds at the time of his imprisonment and he weighed 75 pounds at the time of his escape, when he returned home. Those are the photographs after he got home.

MR. KERSTEN. Just one short question. Before you were put in prison by the Communists in Lithuania, what city were you in?

CANON PETRAITIS. I was the pastor of Erzvilkas.

MR. KERSTEN. In other words, you were a Catholic priest attending to parish duties, pastor of this church; is that right?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. And, as such, teaching religion and conducting religious ceremonies, your work was considered a crime against the Communist state; isn't that true?

CANON PETRAITIS. That was a crime. It was a crime and especially because I used to bury the poor man gratis, and after I had been detained they charged me with that—they complained that I was burying the poor people gratis.

MR. KERSTEN. Now, I can tell you in New York we had testimony—we had the original documents and the translation of these documents

required by the Communists for ministers and priests and rabbis to sign that they would not teach children religion at all, and, as I understand it, you signed such a document. You signed a document not to teach religion to children, isn't that right, and you were forced to do so by the Communists?

CANON PETRAITIS. I signed; I had to sign. I wrote this way that I have read the above. I had to sign it.

MR. KERSTEN. Yes.

CANON PETRAITIS. And they demanded a statement that I would not teach; I wrote that I just have read it.

MR. KERSTEN. All right. I want to say that in New York we had several Lutheran pastors and several Catholic priests, all of whom stated to the same effect as to how the Communists treat ministers of the Gospel, be they Protestant, Jewish, or Catholic. As I understand it, after you had marched for a day and a half or two and were very hungry, they promised you some soup at midnight. They promised you soup to eat or drink, isn't that right, on the march?

CANON PETRAITIS. That was the execution.

MR. KERSTEN. In other words, the soup they gave you was bullets; is that right?

CANON PETRAITIS. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you, Father. I think that you have helped to unmask the Communist's fine phrases, and negotiations, and peace promises, and shown us something of the hideous brutality of this way of life that they would like to impose in every country, including even this country.

Thank you.

CANON PETRAITIS. Thank you.

MR. MCTIGUE. Colonel Tumas, please.

MR. KERSTEN. Colonel Tumas.

CANON PETRAITIS. May I have those pictures, please? They are all I have.

MR. KERSTEN. Yes.

MR. MCTIGUE. Colonel Tumas.

MR. KERSTEN. Do you promise that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel TUMAS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COL. JUOZAS TUMAS, CHICAGO, ILL.

MR. MCTIGUE. Will you state your name, please?

Colonel TUMAS. Juozas Tumas.

MR. MCTIGUE. What is your address?

Colonel TUMAS. 4518 South Talman Avenue, Chicago, Ill.

MR. MCTIGUE. Where were you born?

Colonel TUMAS. In Lithuania.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were you there at the time the Soviet occupied Lithuania?

Colonel TUMAS. Yes. At that time I was in Kaunas.

MR. MCTIGUE. Isn't it true that you were a career officer in command of the Second Infantry Division of the Lithuanian Army?

Colonel TUMAS. Yes, I have been commanding officer of the Second Infantry Division.

Mr. McTIGUE. And isn't it true, Colonel, that you were arrested on May 20, 1941, by the NKVD?

Colonel TUMAS. May 10.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in the room when Fathetr Petraitis was testifying to the death march from the prison in Minsk to the Cherven Forest?

Colonel TUMAS. Yes, I was present and heard it.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you also a prisoner in that march from Minsk to the Cherven Forest?

Colonel TUMAS. Yes, from the prison of Minsk to the forest of Cherven, I was in the same group.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the testimony that Father Petraitis gave here on this subject this afternoon tell pretty much the story as it happened?

Colonel TUMAS. Yes, except the last moment, from the moment they removed us from the German prison in the direction of the forest. Here my testimony differs.

Mr. McTIGUE. But you will corroborate the testimony on the general subject of the march that Father Petraitis gave here this afternoon?

Colonel TUMAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bonin?

Mr. BONIN. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. KERSTEN. I might state that we might have gone into more detail with the present witness, but it is largely corroborative of the massacre which is also documented in other respects.

The hearing will now adjourn until tomorrow morning in this same room at 10 a. m.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, December 11, 1953.)

BALTIC STATES INVESTIGATION

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
BALTIC COMMITTEE,
Chicago, Ill.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. in room 209, United States Courthouse, Hon. Charles J. Kersten (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Bonin, Madden, Dodd, and Machrowicz.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel, and Constantine R. Jurgela, of counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearings will come to order.

Mr. Snieckus, please.

Are you to be this gentleman's interpreter?

Mr. JANCIOUS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. First, the interpreter, will you be sworn, please? You do solemnly swear that you will truly interpret Lithuanian into English and English into Lithuanian, so help you God?

Mr. JANCIOUS. I do.

Frank Jancius, interpreter, was sworn to interpret Lithuanian into English and English into Lithuanian.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now will the witness please raise his right hand.

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SNEECKUS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JUOZAS SNEECKUS, BROTHER OF ANTANAS SNEECKUS, NO. 1 COMMUNIST IN LITHUANIA

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, Mr. Interpreter, when counsel asks you questions you will put the questions to the witness, just as he asks them, and when you answer them back in English, answer them in the first person, just as though you were the witness who is being questioned, instead of saying, "He said something or other," say, "I did this, that, or the other thing."

The INTERPRETER. All right.

Mr. KERSTEN. I will ask you, Mr. Witness, your full name.

Mr. SNEECKUS. Juozas Snieckus.

Mr. KERSTEN. You may proceed, Mr. McTigue.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mr. SNEECKUS. In Lithuania.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Where are you living now?

Mr. SNEECKUS. In Cleveland, Ohio.

Mr. MCTIGUE. How long did you live in Lithuania?

Mr. SNIECKUS. Forty-four years.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just a minute, please. We want this to be spoken loudly in Lithuanian also, because this is going over the Voice of America and we want the people in Lithuania, living under the Communists, to hear this. Speak up in the Voice of America microphone.

Mr. SNIECKUS. All right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have a brother Antanas?

Mr. SNIECKUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How old is he?

Mr. SNIECKUS. As much as I know from the newspapers, he is still in Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. How old is he?

Mr. SNIECKUS. Fifty.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What did you say?

Mr. SNIECKUS. Fifty-one, I mean.

Mr. KERSTEN. You speak in Lithuanian, because already the Baltic Communist puppet governments are beginning to react to these stories, and they are already blasting the committee, and we want you to tell your story right here over the Voice of America.

Mr. SNIECKUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. In addition to Antanas, how many other brothers and sisters have you?

Mr. SNIECKUS. I have 2 brothers and 3 sisters, 1 brother is now dead.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your brother Antanas at the time the Soviet occupied the country of Lithuania, the top Communist in Lithuania, and is he still the top Communist, to your knowledge?

Mr. SNIECKUS. At that time he was secretary to the Communist Party in Lithuania, the Lithuanian Communists in Lithuania, and as much as I have been able to learn from the newspapers today, he still remains in that position.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your brother Antanas ever in jail?

Mr. SNIECKUS. Yes, he was in prison twice.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he in prison when the Soviet invaded Lithuania in 1940?

Mr. SNIECKUS. At that time he was in prison. He had been sentenced for 8 years, and that was his second prison term.

Mr. McTIGUE. As soon as the Russians invaded Lithuania, was your brother released from prison?

Mr. SNIECKUS. He was released, together with other political prisoners under the influence of the present Lithuanian President.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your brother ever, before that time, before 1940, in Moscow, for training of any kind?

Mr. SNIECKUS. As much as we know, he should have been there, although he never told the rest of the family that he had been there.

Mr. McTIGUE. When the deportations were started in Lithuania in June of 1941, did you have the occasion to go to your brother to intercede for anybody?

Mr. SNIECKUS. Yes, my sister and I both spoke to him. He had come to our house, either influenced by his wife or someone else, and we had asked him to take into consideration the needs of our people.

Mr. MADDEN. The needs of what?

Mr. SNIECKUS. The needs of our people.

Mr. MADDEN. Speak louder, please.

Mr. SNECKUS. The first thing he said when he came into the house, "Why are you so moved? Are you speaking of some sort of deportation?" and my sister immediately began to cry. Then she said, "Well, can't you see what is happening here?"

Mr. McTIGUE. Before that, before developing that point, did your mother ever go to see Antanas at his office in the NKVD headquarters?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes, that was in 1940, before the deportations. She had gone to see him because he never went home to his mother.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did your mother say after she returned home, and after she talked with Antanas?

Mr. SNECKUS. She was very tearful and she said: "I did not believe that my son could ever be like that."

Mr. McTIGUE. When the deportation started in June of 1941 were any members of Antanas' or your family arrested?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes, my sister and her family were arrested; my cousin, and my uncle with their wives, and they were put in boxcars and shipped out.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before that happened, before they were shipped out, did you call upon your brother, as top Communist leader, who could in all probability have stopped this; did you call upon him for assistance? Did he come to your home? Did you or anybody in your family talk with him about it?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes, we asked my sister who lived at Mariampole and I also went to Kaunas and conferred in what way we could influence Antanas to help our relatives.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did Antanas do?

Mr. SNECKUS. He came to my brother's house and we had a talk with him. Yes, we spoke to him about the deportations and we asked him why these people were being deported. They were innocent people and he had talked to us about it previously and mentioned again: "Well, take, for example, the people we are shipping out of Kaunas, they are only the hangers on, the low lives, the prostitutes and others, but your brother, he is a rich man, a farmer and these others, so we have to ship them out."

Mr. McTIGUE. So your brother never helped you or your sister or your mother?

Mr. SNECKUS. We never asked him directly but went about things in a roundabout way. We pointed out that uncle did not live on the farm but lived in Kaunas and that the farm was in his son's control and why should he be deported?

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you and your family stay on during the first Soviet occupation of Lithuania?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes; we remained in Lithuania. There was no alternative since the borders were very strongly guarded and we lived in a desperation like all the other Lithuanians.

Mr. McTIGUE. When the Soviets invaded Lithuania for the second time, and drove the Germans out, where did you go?

Mr. SNECKUS. We moved westward at every opportunity because we had placed all our hopes in the democracies and although the Germans were not very friendly to us, we thought in the West we would find the means of life and freedom.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you afraid that when Antanas, your own brother, returned to Lithuania again, he might wreak vengeance on your family?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes; we had this in mind, just like all the other Lithuanians. From our brother we expected nothing. We had no hopes in him.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did your mother and the rest of your family, the part of it which was left, go into Germany?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes; we all went to Germany and lived in the DP camps aided by American help.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it true that your mother passed away at a DP camp in Hanau, Germany, in January 1948?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes; she lived with my family in Hanau. I had her buried at Hanau.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it true when your mother asked about Antanas said, "I curse the day when I gave birth to a traitor who is torturing his own country"?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes. At that time visitors were at our house, and they said, "Well, Mother, your son is king of Lithuania now," and she said—

Mr. MADDEN. Just a moment. We did not get that.

Mr. SNECKUS. They said, "Your son is king in Lithuania now," and she replied, "Didn't the thunder strike him yet," or I guess, "Didn't the lightning strike him yet?"

Mr. McTIGUE. Would you recognize your brother's signature, if I asked you to identify it?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes. I can identify it, his writing remains before my eyes to this day.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is this your brother Antanas' signature that I show you?

Mr. SNECKUS. Oh, yes; this is written by his hand.

Mr. McTIGUE. I would like to introduce this into the record, Mr. Chairman, and have it marked for identification.

Mr. KERSTEN. It may be marked.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is this the Lithuanian document?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then I will have to ask you, Mr. Jurgela, to identify the translation of the Lithuanian document which is just being entered and which I hold in my hand. Come around here, please.

Will you mark the document in Lithuanian as 17-A and the English translation as 17-B, please?

(Exhibit 17-A, original language will be found in committee files.)

(The documents were marked "Exhibits 17-A and 17-B." See p. 676.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you identify this, Mr. Jurgela, as the English translation of the original Lithuanian document which has been entered into the record as exhibit No. 17-A?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes; this is the translation.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just 1 minute. I want to get them straight for the record. The Lithuanian document is 17-A; is that correct, Mr. McTigue?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the translation is what?

Mr. McTIGUE. 17-B.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you; we want to be sure that appears in the record.

Mr. JURGELA. This is the English translation which I have made personally from this exhibit 17-A, which is the plan for the first mass arrests of 1940, approved by Snieckus.

Mr. McTIGUE. This, in other words, was aproved by Antanas Snieckus, this man's brother, and it is a plan for the liquidation of the leading personnel of the various political parties in Lithuania?

Mr. JURGELA. Yes; it was done by the head of the Security Department.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Snieckus, I am rather interested in knowing what causes a person to become a Communist, and I would like to ask you this question. You never were a Communist, were you?

Mr. SNECKUS. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was any other member of your family, other than your brother, Antanas, a Communist?

Mr. SNECKUS. No one in our immediate family or any of our other relations that I know of has ever been a Communist.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. What was your parents' occupation?

Mr. SNECKUS. My father was a farmer.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. A middle-class farmer?

Mr. SNECKUS. According to Lithuanian standards, he had a good-sized farm. He had about 80 hectares of land, or about 200 acres.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. How old was your brother when he joined the Communist Party?

Mr. SNECKUS. He was 17 years old at the time. He was working in a postal telegraph agency at Alytus, and there, under the influence of a strong Communist cell, working secretly, he joined the party, and he was later arrested, and his name was found in the party's files at that time.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Later, he was arrested?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Was there anything in his private life that you can think of that caused him to accept the Communist philosophy?

Mr. SNECKUS. There couldn't have been anything, since he had a good job, and he could have all the rights of a Lithuanian citizen and could have lived there as such.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You feel the only reason he joined the party was because of the influence of the men with whom he worked and with whom he associated?

Mr. SNECKUS. That, and also it seems that there was another influence. During the time of the First World War he studied at a gymnasium, which is a secondary school.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. It is not a gymnasium as we here consider it. It is a school?

Mr. SNECKUS. Yes. There was a Communist movement there, which evidently affected him.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Do you think also that it was under the influence of promise of power in case the Communists took over Lithuania?

Mr. SNECKUS. That is not known to me, but we have to feel that he had the feeling or the yearning for power.

Also, he could have been influenced by another thing. When he was first arrested, he was not yet 18 years old, and he was released, he was

not kept in custody by the prison authorities, and he was released, and at that time he fled to Russia.

MR. MACHROWICZ. What was he arrested for the first time when he was 18?

MR. SNIIECKUS. They found his name in the secret list of the Communist Party.

MR. MACHROWICZ. That is all.

MR. KERSTEN. Congressman Madden, of Indiana.

MR. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions, but I do wish to make this observation: Since the Baltic Committee opened hearings in Washington, and held hearings in New York, Detroit, and here, we have heard numerous examples of what communism can do to the minds of people, and, as a member of the Katyn Committee, we took an avalanche of testimony regarding Communist horrors, and Communist tortures, and the methods used by communism in order to gain power and control nations, but in all of the testimony that I have heard, this is the first time where we have had direct testimony concerning a No. 1 Communist inflicting vengeance on his own family. He sentenced his relatives to torture and slave labor camps. I don't know how to explain what is behind the mental processes of an ideology that will bring a human to do what your brother has done. Possibly that is one of the basic reasons why communism is the scourge that it is today, and, as I stated, your testimony has placed in factual recording what communism will do to a fellow human being in order to install fear in men's minds so they can control nations.

And you can tell the witness this committee is indeed grateful for this testimony as it is something completely unusual from the avalanche of testimony that the Baltic Committee and the Katyn Committee have recorded regarding the barbarism that is the fundamental foundation underlying communism.

MR. KERSTEN. Congressman Dodd, any questions?

MR. DODD. No questions.

MR. KERSTEN. I will just say this, too; I won't ask any questions. I think the story is eloquent just as it is in the record and it certainly seems to be the practice of the type of teaching such as we have here in this Soviet textbook for children for use in the non-Russian schools of the Soviet Union including the Baltic States, and all of the enslaved nations. The story in this textbook glorifies a boy, a young heroic Communist pioneer, and there is a picture of him turning his father over to the executioner, as the boy testifies heroically in court against the father, because the father gave grain against the state authorities' instructions.

There is a statue raised to this boy in Moscow according to the Soviet Communist who wrote the book. This is the type of thing being taught children. We will have this afternoon, I believe, some testimony from nuns who sought to teach the children and kindergarten about the existence of God and were driven out of the schools because they did. This type of story fits right into the picture and I agree with you, Mr. Madden, that this is important to bring out to the people in this country. I hope the people back in Lithuania get the story, too.

MR. KERSTEN. Next we will have the testimony of Jonas Bildusas. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

MR. BILDUSAS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JONAS BILDUSAS, EMPLOYEE OF LITHUANIAN
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE IN TAURAGE

Mr. McTIGUE. State your name.

Mr. BILDUSAS. Jonas Bildusas.

Mr. KERSTEN. Does he speak English?

The INTERPRETER. Fairly well. He gets stuck sometimes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why don't you sit there, in case he needs you.

Mr. Bildusas, what is your address?

Mr. BILDUSAS. 6836 South Maplewood Avenue, Chicago, Ill.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you a citizen?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes, I am now a citizen.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you live in Lithuania?

Mr. BILDUSAS. All my life, until 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you there at the time the Soviets occupied Lithuania?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I was employed in Lithuania Agricultural Cooperative in Taurage.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time when you were appointed chief executive officer of the county of Taurage?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes, I was, about June 25; exactly the date I don't remember; about June 25, 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who appointed you to this post?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I was appointed by the Minister of the Interior, Communist, Gedvilas.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were appointed by the Communists?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why did you take that job under Communist appointment?

Mr. BILDUSAS. When the Communists occupied Lithuania, leaders of Lithuanian political parties, regarding the Communist domination as a temporary wartime situation and striving to save that which could be saved for the Lithuanian nation, advised governmental employees to stay on the job and to accept new governmental jobs if offered.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me ask you this, and I am sure that the testimony will develop the fact that you are violently anti-Communist, but when you took that job at that time did you think there was a chance that you could get along with the Communists, that maybe you could work with them, that maybe they weren't so bad after all, that there was a possibility of doing business with them?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. In the very beginning I thought so, and the Lithuanian political leaders thought so. We knew very much about the Communists since 1917, from the Lithuanian refugees and soldiers who were in Russia during World War I.

We know very much about these atrocities. We read some books and we read the papers, but we did not think that after all those years that the Communists would be worse than Attila's Huns, and that they would be so mentally abnormal that these atrocities could only be explained by psychiatry.

Mr. McTIGUE. I wanted to make that point, Mr. Chairman, because there are a great many people in this country, of course, who think

they can do business with the Communists, and I think that Mr. Bildusas' experiences will prove a real lesson, an object lesson, for those who think we can get along with and do business with the Communists.

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, the fact that they are still perpetrating atrocities in Korea within the last year or two indicates that that is their general plan of action, that that is their ordinary activity; isn't that right?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right. And there are many people in the free world who do not believe—there are many Americans who do not believe—and I would like to tell to all the men who still do not comprehend the evil of the Communists, "As we once were, so you are now; as we are now, you may be."

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you mean by that, as Lithuanians once were, do you mean ignorant about the true nature of communism?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Pardon me.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you mean they were ignorant about the Communists?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No. We Lithuanians were treated in Lithuania, it could be the same with the Americans.

Mr. KERSTEN. Oh, I see.

Mr. McTIGUE. You testified, Mr. Bildusas, that you were appointed by the Communists to do this job in June of 1940?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Pardon me. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead. What happened 2 or 3 months later?

Mr. BILDUSAS. On September 10 I was arrested because I could not go along with communism.

Mr. McTIGUE. You decided, then, in the short period of 3 months, that you had seen enough of communism?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I saw pretty soon it was not possible to go along with them because every direction of the activities in the interior affairs led to communism.

Mr. McTIGUE. What particular matters did you object to during the brief period you held this office?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Please allow me, first of all, to state that the Communist Party in Lithuania was very weak and had no right to represent the Lithuanian people.

For instance, in the town of Taurage, a town of about 14,000 inhabitants, there were only around 20 Communists.

Mr. MADDEN. Underground?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Underground. And when the Russian Army occupied Lithuania, the Communists felt that they were the lords. They wanted to increase the number of Communists. They invited the laborers to join the Communist Party. Many of them did not, but the hoodlums joined.

When the hoodlums got their membership cards of the party they attacked people who were quietly going about their business on the streets.

Once two brothers who were teachers were attacked by these hoodlums with knives, and I ordered the police to arrest the hoodlums. Then they come running to me, the Russian chief of secret police, Sokolov, and two representatives from the Communist Party.

Mr. KERSTEN. How do you spell Sokolov?

Mr. BILDUSAS. S-o-k-o-l-o-v.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead.

Mr. BILDUSAS. And they asked me to free them. I did not. Then they threatened me and went away.

Later when I had conversations with Sokolov, Sokolov told me "It is not the big thing that the bourgeois have their bellies cut," because now the laborer has to feel the lord, and it will come pretty soon that all government will be by labor people for the Communists.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me go back for a moment, Mr. Bildusas.

You testified that you were chief executive officer of county of Taurage?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Would that be something like our county commissioners here in the United States, or county managers?

Mr. BILDUSAS. It would be in miniature like the governor of a State.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you arrested by the NKVD?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I was arrested September 10, 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were you charged with?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Oh, they charged me with spying for Germany, that I was a saboteur, that I had organized the people to exterminate the Communists, and so on, and so on.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did they get the evidence to support the charge that you were a saboteur?

What kind of evidence was it?

Mr. BILDUSAS. When they arrested me they knew I had an external pass (passport), and I had gone to Paris for the International Industrial Exposition in 1937, and to International Cooperative lectures which were held in Nancy in France, in that year.

Mr. McTIGUE. So the fact that you had gone out of the country from time to time was the basis of the charge for your being a saboteur?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes, that was the basis, because people from Russia can't get out of Russia, and they think in the free world it is the same.

Mr. McTIGUE. They thought there must be something wrong with anybody who does that?

Mr. BILDUSAS. It must be something like that.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you were arrested by the NKVD, what happened?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I was brought to the prison and held about 2 months by myself.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were placed in solitary confinement, is that what you are testifying to?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That would be a solitary cell, I would be in solitary confinement.

Mr. BILDUSAS. On November 5, I was thrown in solitary confinement for 5 days. I didn't get any food or any water. On November 10, 1940, I was taken from the jail, from the solitary confinement to the quarters of the NKVD in the town.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you questioned then?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. They closed me in a cell in the basement. The cell was so overheated I actually had a headache.

Mr. McTIGUE. The cell was so hot?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. That same day a policeman, Radionov—

Mr. KERSTEN. Just a minute, spell that.

Mr. BILDUSAS. R-a-d-i-o-n-o-v.

Mr. KERSTEN. I am not sure that we have the correct spelling of the witness' name. Spell it for us.

Mr. BILDUSAS. J-o-n-a-s B-i-l-d-u-s-a-s.

Mr. KERSTEN. Pardon the interruption.

Mr. BILDUSAS. Radionov gave me a cigarette and a sheet of blank paper and told me to write. I asked what I have to write. "You have to write everything of your youth; what you have committed." I told him I didn't commit anything, and then he asked me why are you here? Innocent people don't come here.

Mr. MADDEN. What is that?

Mr. BILDUSAS. "Innocent people do not come here," i. e., "innocent people will not be arrested." I refused to write. Then he began to cause me to use bad language and to ask me to confess. I was interrogated for exactly 1 month, from November 10 to December 10, 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did this questioning take place? In the night?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Almost all in the night, but I have been questioned without pause for 36 hours twice, once for 60 hours and once for 84 hours.

Mr. McTIGUE. At one time, during the period of your confinement, you were questioned steadily for 36 hours?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes; I was questioned steadily for 36 hours twice.

Mr. McTIGUE. And once for 60 hours?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And one time for 84 hours steadily?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. During the interrogation—

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you ever permitted to sleep or were you given anything to eat, for example, during those 84-straight hours while you were being questioned?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No, no sleep, no food, no water. I was so tired, I no longer knew what was going around me. When I would faint from exhaustion, and fall on the floor, the agents would pour water on me, revive me, and again seat me on the stool, striking me in the face, and banging my head against the wall. They said I must admit that I was guilty of all the charges. The agents, when they would become tired, their places would be taken by other agents. When they would all become tired, they would take me down to the cellar cell or to the guard to keep me awake. The stool was placed some distance from the wall so I could not lean back to rest, and I was ordered to sit without moving. When I would faint and fall to the floor, the guard would kick me, and again force me onto the stool. The corridor doors were open. The outside temperature was about 10° below zero.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were taken back to the cellar cell when you were not wanted?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. When I was taken from the jail by the NKVD, Emilis Cancingeris was brought into my cell; once I was brought back exhausted to my cell and further guards were ordered to watch me through the cell door and prevent my falling asleep.

I wanted to sleep so much that I would have gladly given half of my life for a half hour of sleep.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long had you been awake at that time, Mr. Bildusas?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That was 36 hours.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were continually questioned?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And not permitted to sleep?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. I couldn't stand it and crowded under the bunk to get at least a little sleep. Cancingeris gave me a felt boot as a pillow. I gratefully placed it under my head but in a few minutes felt myself being eaten by insects.

I looked at myself and saw that I was crawling with lice where the felt boot was alive with lice.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was this done deliberately; were the lice put in the boot deliberately?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes; I realized the NKVD had even used this despicable means to force me to confess.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did I understand you correctly to say that this felt boot was filled with lice?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes; it was a felt boot usually used in Russia, and it was filled with lice.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you still talking about the 36 hours that you were questioned now? Are you talking about that?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I was questioned 36 hours. After 36 hours I was brought back to my cell and at night I couldn't sleep and in the daytime I wasn't permitted to sleep because in the daytime it was not permitted for one to sleep.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you manage to stay awake during the many hours you were questioned?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I didn't know what was going on around me. I fell from the chair and lay there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have anything to eat or drink during the 84-hour questioning?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No; during the questioning I got no food or water.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you ever sign any confession or piece of paper during this questioning, or did you at any time you were in the prison?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No. On another occasion the NKVD agent, Radionov brought four street hoodlums to visit me. Radionov questioned them and all four men answered the questions the way Radionov wanted them to answer: "I have been guilty of everything I have been accused of by the NKVD."

On December 7 or 8, 1940, Radionov handed to me a paper which he demanded that I sign without reading. I insisted that I be allowed to read the paper which stated that I confessed my guilt to all the NKVD charges against me.

I have refused to sign. At that moment a group of NKVD came running in. They raised a row and began threatening to beat me to death, to shoot me, and to arrest and slay my family.

Mr. McTIGUE. And still you didn't confess; is that right? You never confessed at any time?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No; I told them that I would not sign the paper even though I had to die right then and there.

NKVD Official Sokolov then again began talking to me in a calm voice, saying, as best I can remember: "You see what we have made of you. Even you can't recognize yourself. We know how to turn a man into nothing, to push him into the dark but we also know how to wash dirt from a man. If you admit your guilt we will call off the interrogation. Then there will be a light sentence and you will again return to public life."

I refused to admit any guilt and to sign the proposed confession. So Sokolov then said: "We have other means to make you confess."

On December 10, 1940, I was returned to prison, locked in a solitary confinement cell and told that I would be kept there until I would agree to admit to the charges made against me.

The solitary confinement cell was cold, 22° below zero, and the cold came through the barred window high in the wall.

I had to stand up every few minutes and stamp my feet to keep from freezing. As ordered by the NKVD, the food brought to me was first chilled in the snow and I got half of the food that the other prisoners got.

Mr. McTIGUE. You got half rations, is that what you are saying?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You got only half the food they gave to the other prisoners?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes; that is right. I was still suffering from the lice given to me by the NKVD. I even thought then to commit suicide. When I was in the NKVD basement I found there a piece of wire. I sharpened the end of the wire and I thought to pierce my heart. Later the NKVD were searching in the cell; I had to take off my clothes, and they looked around on my body and in this section they found this piece of wire, and they took it away. All of the time then I was placed in solitary confinement in NKVD quarters.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then, if the NKVD hadn't found this wire you probably would have committed suicide; is that correct?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Maybe, yes, and the——

Mr. McTIGUE. That was your intention, anyway?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I have had the intention to commit suicide because I didn't know how long I would be questioned, how long I would be held in solitary confinement.

I have had an aluminum spoon. And I sharpened one edge as a knife and I thought to cut my arm [indicating motion of right hand across left upper arm]. But once I was decided to commit suicide; but before my eyes appeared my family and the spoon dropped on the floor. On December——

Mr. McTIGUE. You mean you thought about your family and then you decided not to commit suicide?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. A NKVD man came to the cell and asked me whether I wanted to confess now. When they would get my negative answer they would make fun of me and go away.

On December 24, 1940, I was taken from the solitary confinement cell with a swollen face, and swollen hands and feet, and placed in the large common cell in the prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your face swollen from the beatings you had endured?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you beaten every night or at regular intervals in the last period you are talking about?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No. When I was questioned and during the interrogation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then what happened, Mr. Bildusas?

Mr. BILDUSAS. The cell was crowded with prisoners. The cell windows were boarded from the outside. The air was foul because at times we had to take care of our physical needs right in the cell for weeks.

The food was so poor that all of the prisoners looked like living corpses. The young prisoners were crying because of their great hunger.

Antanas Mozuraitis, he tried to chew and eat a leather lace taken from his shoe. We had no books to read, and were not even allowed the Communist paper. Our families were not allowed to visit us, and we were not allowed to receive any mail from them. We didn't even know where they were, while our families did not know what happened to us.

The prison guards terrorized the prisoners even here.

Here I have one document about this, an original document. Here is the original document, that says in translation it is so. January 10, this year, at 18 o'clock, the guard, Vaclovas Dzirkus, was on duty.

I ordered the prisoners of the cell No. 3 not to sit on the bench and not to slumber, but they didn't obey. Bildusas said to me, where did I, such a charlatan come from. He said this is good for the others, but not for us. He said I broke his health at secret police headquarters, and I am troubling him again. Please set this in order. Dzirkus.

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you, Mr. Bildusas, what appears to be a——

Will you mark these documents, please?

(The documents were marked "Exhibits 18-A and 18-B." Will be found in committee files.)

Mr. KERSTEN. I show you, Mr. Bildusas, what appears to be a dossier or a sheaf of papers, and ask you what that is. That is exhibit 18-B. What is that?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is the files about me, which were in the prison when I was there.

Mr. KERSTEN. This was your prison file; is that right?

Mr. BILDUSAS. This is my prison file.

Mr. KERSTEN. How did you get hold of these?

Mr. BILDUSAS. At the beginning of the war.

Mr. KERSTEN. What time was it?

Mr. BILDUSAS. June 22, 1941, when the Germans attacked.

Mr. KERSTEN. I understand. Where were you at the time?

Mr. BILDUSAS. In prison.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where in prison; what town?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Taurage.

Mr. KERSTEN. And when did you first come into possession of Exhibit 18-B? When did you first get it?

Mr. BILDUSAS. After I left prison, after the Germans occupied Taurage.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did this come from the office of the prison where you were imprisoned?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long after you got out of prison did you get hold of it?

Mr. BILDUSAS. June 22, my son was in prison to look for me, but I fled to the village from the prison, and my son found this file on that same day, the 22d of June.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did he tell you where he found it?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Mr. BILDUSAS. In the office of the prison.

Mr. KERSTEN. So he went right to the prison file and picked out your prison file?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. And then gave it to you?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes, after that date, as many others did.

Mr. KERSTEN. After many others did from the NKVD files?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what you have read is exhibit 18-A, and is a translation of one of the documents in your file?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And I note that exhibit 18-B, the original file, is written in Russian and Lithuanian?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And, it appears to be the same as the other prison files that have come to our attention that the Soviets left behind when they fled from Lithuania?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the other Baltic nations?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think that should be made a part of the record.

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bildusas, is it satisfactory with you if we keep this Soviet NKVD document? We will have it photostated and will return the original to you, in a matter of a week or so.

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes, Mr. Congressman. Here are two more original documents; one of them is a list of the things they took from me as incriminating evidence against me. Among these things, there are magazines from foreign countries. He is considered guilty who is reading magazines from foreign countries. He has to be a spy for foreign countries, too. And when they searched my house they made a list of my belongings, like my clothes, shoes, linen, et cetera, were considered property of the government. Those are the original documents signed by two NKVD agents.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you released from prison finally?

Mr. BILDUSAS. At 4 o'clock in the morning on June 22, 1941, the NKVA Agent Parfionov was leading student Tallat-Kelpsa from the NKVD dungeon to the prison, and the prison-guard gates had barely opened when the sound of artillery was heard, and the Germans began war against the Soviets.

Agent Parfionov shot student Tallat-Kelpsa on the spot, and he ordered the NKVD prison guards to open the cell doors and to shoot all of the political prisoners.

Mr. KERSTEN. To shoot them?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. He ordered them to do what?

Mr. BILDUSAS. To shoot all political prisoners.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were among the political prisoners; is that right?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. At that moment an artillery shell fell in the prison and killed two NKVD men. Four shells struck the prison building and killed 16 men. The NKVD men all fled.

The prisoners then broke open their cell doors and fled from the prison. I was one of those who escaped.

Mr. McTIGUE. And only for those last-minute artillery shells you would have been shot right there and then?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you mark these documents as "Exhibits 18-C, 18-D, 18-E, and 18-F," please.

(Exhibits 18-D and 18-E will be found in committee files.)

(The items were marked "Exhibits Nos. 18-C and 18-F." See pp. 677 and 678.)

Mr. KERSTEN. Now I will show you exhibit 18-C and ask you what that is?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is the building of the high school; once it was a psychiatric hospital. There were small cells there for violent patients. When the Communists occupied Lithuania, they made a prison out of these cells in this building in the basement, and closed up the prisoners who were caught fleeing to Germany.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in this prison?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. But it was used as a prison?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That was used as a prison, and when the Germans occupied Taurage we went there and we found puddles of dried blood on the floor, on the walls, and the spots of the bullets in the walls. The men were shot down.

Later we found the graves in bushes in the forest, and people with their hands tied behind them and with bullets in their heads.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were those graves apparently of prisoners who had been taken from this prison pictured on exhibit 18-C?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes. That was a high school, my two sons went to this school.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was this high school used as a prison?

Mr. BILDUSAS. As a prison.

Mr. KERSTEN. And apparently, from all appearances, these were prisoners who were executed in this prison?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were the bodies of these prisoners found?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where?

Mr. BILDUSAS. In the bushes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Maybe about 25.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right. And 18-F, that is a prison picture of you; is it not?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is my prison picture of me.

Mr. KERSTEN. And 18-D and 18-E are lists of property that—

Mr. BILDUSAS. This is the list of my property.

Mr. KERSTEN. By property you mean things on your person?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes, on my person, because I didn't have a house—my clothing, my shoes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is 18-E?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Those are the things which were taken as incriminating evidence from me.

Mr. KERSTEN. What would be an example of some of the incriminating evidence.

Mr. BILDUSAS. Various personal correspondence. And there are mentioned foreign magazines, 25 copies that they found in my house. This list of incriminating evidence is written in Russian.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you leave Lithuania, Mr. Bildusas?

Mr. BILDUSAS. In 1944, in October.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you go to Germany?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes, I went to West Germany and was waiting for the Allied forces.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you emigrate to the United States?

Mr. BILDUSAS. June 7, 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. And where are you employed now?

Mr. BILDUSAS. I am working as a laborer in the United States Steel Co.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have, thank you.

Mr. KERSTEN. I just want to say this: At first, you thought you could cooperate with the Communists; didn't you, Mr. Bildusas?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes; I thought it would be possible.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you found out, to your great sorrow, that you could not cooperate with the Communists?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No. I could not go along with the Communists because of these atrocities, because they considered the Lithuanian people as an enemy of communism; every Lithuanian was striving to have his own house, his own farm, or his own business, and in the communistic system every property and business belongs to the state and is run by the governmental agents.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you went through this torture and questioning and imprisonment that you have described, and that gave you a real knowledge of what the Communists are; did it not?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. After having gone through that experience, would you trust a Communist?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No; never.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you enter into any agreements with the Communists?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No; that is not possible.

Mr. KERSTEN. Would you place any reliance upon the word of a Communist?

Mr. BILDUSAS. No; never.

Mr. KERSTEN. So when the Communists come with nice words, and talks of peace, what would that mean to you?

Mr. BILDUSAS. That would mean there would be war, because they are preparing all the time for war. The communistic dogma, the communistic gospel is all for war.

Mr. KERSTEN. You have learned that through bitter experience, have you not?

Mr. BILDUSAS. Sure, I learned that. They are crazy mentally, and there never could be normal negotiations.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. I have no questions, except to make a comment that the experience of this witness in trying to collaborate or work with the Communists is identical with that of every other person in

Lithuania and in Poland, and in every other country behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Who try to collaborate with the Communists—

Mr. BILDUSAS. Yes, like Mikolajczyk.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Yes, you were going to mention Mikolajczyk.

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. He was in exactly the same position as you, he tried to work with the Communists in Poland, and thought he could work something out with them, and he ended up by being forced to leave the country, and many of his colleagues were either killed or sent to Siberia.

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Which to me proves conclusively that you just cannot do business with Communists.

Mr. BILDUSAS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Dodd?

Mr. DODD. I would just like to add to what Congressman Machrowicz has just said: I think it is well to point out that these tactics and methods, that we have heard about before this committee, that are being employed in Korea against American prisoners of war, and civilians, proves that the pattern continues without change.

Mr. BILDUSAS. That is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Mr. Dodd. I certainly agree with you.

We will at this time adjourn until 2 o'clock in this room.

(Whereupon, an adjournment was taken at 11:55 a. m., to 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:40 p. m.)

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order, please. Will Mrs. Welch please bring the next witness in?

I will state for the record at this time that the next witness, a lady, has relatives presently in Lithuanian and she believes that her appearance here today, if she were to be identified, would endanger these relatives, and we believe there is a real basis for this fear on her part. We have experienced the same thing in Detroit where witnesses would not testify unless their identity remained unknown. So, complying with this request, we have agreed not to bring out this fact concerning the identity of this witness. I have personally talked to this witness and know her identity, as others of our investigators do, and we know something of her background, and we are satisfied that her story is an important contribution to these hearings, and, we, therefore, acceded to her request to keep her identity unknown.

Will you stand up, lady, please, and be sworn? Will you raise your right hand, please?

You do solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

The WITNESS. I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. Have a chair, please.

TESTIMONY OF AN ANONYMOUS WITNESS (THROUGH INTERPRETER)

Mr. KERSTEN. Madam Witness, you live in the Chicago area; is that correct?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is your occupation or profession?

The WITNESS. I am a nurse.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you work in a Chicago hospital; is that right?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You were born in Lithuania?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in Lithuania during the year from June of 1940, to June of 1941, when the Communists occupied Lithuania?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You lived in Kaunas; did you?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Kaunas was the capital?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you live in the home of a family, the head of which the man was a member, an important official of the Lithuanian Government before the Communists took over?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that man and his family lived in a regular residence in the city of Kaunas; did they?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Directing your attention to the month of January, I believe, 1941, were you in that home, and was this man there and his family?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you state whether something happened to that man on that occasion?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Tell us in your own way, without giving us the name, what happened on this occasion?

The WITNESS. He was arrested and taken from the house on January 2, and in the evening at 10 o'clock, come two Russian officers, in Russian uniforms, and ask for this man. This man is at the home and was upstairs.

Mr. KERSTEN. Lean forward a little bit so that you can talk right into the microphone.

Will you repeat that last part, Mr. Reporter?

(The last part of the answer was repeated as follows:

"Answer by the witness: He was arrested and taken from the house on January 2d and in the evening at 10 o'clock come two Russian officers, in Russian uniforms, and asked for this man; this man is at the home and was upstairs.")

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, did these officers question the man, the head of the house?

The WITNESS. The first question was that the officer wanted a room for rent and he was very friendly the first time. After that a couple of seconds he asked about guns.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean the Russian officers asked the man if he had a gun?

The WITNESS. Yes, a gun, after a while; that means they know.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, just one moment. Would it be easier for you to talk in Lithuanian and to have Mr. Jurgela translate it?

The WITNESS. O. K.; I will do that.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you just tell us now in your own way what took place that night?

And, Mr. Jurgela, break in every so often so that it won't be too lengthy.

The WITNESS. That was January 2 at 10 p. m. in the evening, two Russian officers arrived.

Mr. KERSTEN. This was the year 1941?

The WITNESS. 1941, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. All right.

The WITNESS. And they asked if the landlord, the proprietor of this house was home. I said; "Yes."

I led them upstairs and showed them; they seemed to be very friendly and they wanted to rent a room.

A few seconds later the Russians inquired of the landlord whether he owned a pistol. Then they said, "Sit down, you are arrested. And they started to search all over the house."

They looked mostly for the books on chemical and physical subjects and containing some formulas or plans of some factories. They packed all those books into two suitcases and they took those suitcases away.

All this lasted until January 3, 6 a. m., rather, 6:15 a. m.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many hours would that have been, about?

The WITNESS. 6 or 8 hours.

Mr. KERSTEN. What were you doing during this time?

The WITNESS. I was sitting and looking.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did the Russian officers give directions to you?

The WITNESS. Not then; they just asked me who I was.

Mr. KERSTEN. After this lengthy questioning, what did they do with the man?

The WITNESS. They told him to dress up and they took him away with them when they went away.

Mr. KERSTEN. What about the wife and the children?

The WITNESS. The wife and the child remained at home at that time. Uniformed Russian soldiers were stationed all around the house, and one of them stood in the doorway.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did anything happen to the wife and the children later?

The WITNESS. At the end of May, or early in June, they arrived to take them away.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean the wife and children?

The WITNESS. The wife and one child.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did they do?

The WITNESS. I told them that they had been removed about a half hour earlier.

Mr. KERSTEN. You told whom?

The WITNESS. I told that to the Russians.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did the wife and child do?

The WITNESS. They immediately left the house and went into hiding, and they stayed in hiding until the German Army arrived.

Mr. KERSTEN. In other words, until the Communists had left Lithuania, is that right?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, will you tell us, Madam Witness, if you saw in your immediate neighborhood other families being arrested, or members of families?

The WITNESS. Yes, I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Tell us what you saw about that.

The WITNESS. I saw the families being loaded up and they were delivered to the railroad station.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were some of the families living right around your neighborhood?

The WITNESS. Yes, one family. I know one family which resided not far from my home.

The INTERPRETER. The witness inquired whether she should name the family's name?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Perhaps she had better not, I don't think it would add anything to the record, other than the fact that she saw this particular family being deported.

Did you go down to the railway station sometime in the month of June?

The WITNESS. Yes, I was working in a certain office.

Mr. KERSTEN. How close was that office to the railway yard or station?

The WITNESS. Two or three hundred meters.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you get a pretty good look at the railway yards from that office window?

The WITNESS. Yes, a very good look.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, I want you to tell us, Madam Witness, in your own way, just what you saw when you were looking toward the railway yards.

The WITNESS. Through the office window I have seen a great many families being brought up to the railway station and loaded on trains.

Mr. KERSTEN. What kind of trains?

The WITNESS. The trains were cattle trains, or freight cars. They were encircled by barbed wire, especially those small windows, slit windows.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean the windows of the cars?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And these were, you say, cattle cars?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, how many cars on these trains, as near as you can remember, was it—just 2 or 3—or were there more?

The WITNESS. Oh, no. I saw more or less 40 to 50 cars in this echelon.

Mr. KERSTEN. By that do you mean 40 to 50 cattle cars?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And by the time these trains were ready to pull out about how many people were in each of these cattle cars?

The WITNESS. I couldn't say, but there were a great many.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did they appear to be full?

The WITNESS. Yes; they were very full.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, did you recognize any of your friends being thrust into these cattle cars or after they were in these cars?

The WITNESS. I have seen a great many friends from schooldays and from my work, from my place of employment.

Mr. KERSTEN. How were they being put into these cattle cars?

The WITNESS. Like cattle.

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, who was assisting them into the cattle cars?

The WITNESS. No one.

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, were there Russian soldiers there?

The WITNESS. The Russian soldiers were stationed in lines about 10 to 15 paces away from the train.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you notice anything about the men and the rest of the families?

The WITNESS. Yes; I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Tell us what you saw about that?

The WITNESS. When the truck arrived at the station, so the men walked to the one side and the women walked to the other side, and they were placed in different groups.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you notice whether they were placed this way by the Russian soldiers?

The WITNESS. Yes. They were directed by the Russian soldiers.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were the Russian soldiers armed with their guns?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did they have bayonets on them?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And after the people were placed in these cars, did you notice anything in particular?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What did you notice?

The WITNESS. I have seen—it was a very hot day, and then the rain came, and female hands were stretched out from those barbed wire windows, and they were collecting drops of the rain.

Mr. KERSTEN. Doing what with the drops of the rain?

The WITNESS. They pulled those inside the cars to drink.

Mr. KERSTEN. To drink?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you notice any children at the windows?

The WITNESS. Those small slit windows were high up to the car, and I could not see. I could only see female hands and arms.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you have some other people trying to prepare some food for these people in the cattle cars?

The WITNESS. Yes; when we saw that scene we all cried and we prepared some sandwiches and hot coffee.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you prepare these sandwiches and coffee?

The WITNESS. In our office.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what did you do then with the sandwiches and hot coffee?

The WITNESS. Two girls walked out toward the cars, and they wanted to distribute those sandwiches to the people inside the cars, but the Russians saw that they are leaving the building with sandwiches, and they began to beat them up and kick them up.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who did the Russian soldiers begin to kick?

The WITNESS. Those girls who were carrying the sandwiches.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened to these girls then?

The WITNESS. They came back all blue, and crying, and we hid them away.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were they able to get any sandwiches or coffee through to the people stuffed in the cattle cars?

The WITNESS. We thought that they would be able to do that, but they came back all beaten up.

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, were they able to get any of this food through to the people in the cars?

The WITNESS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. As I understand it, then, the Russian guards kicked them away; is that right?

The WITNESS. Yes, they kicked them away. They beat them up, and kicked them away.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long, to your thinking, did these cattle cars remain there on the tracks with the people in them?

The WITNESS. I think 2 or 3 days.

Mr. KERSTEN. And all this time so far as you know, without any food and water?

The WITNESS. No (shaking head).

Mr. KERSTEN. Meaning that there was no food or water, so far as you know.

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You say there were about 50 of these cars that you saw?

The WITNESS. Yes, about.

Mr. KERSTEN. On this one occasion?

The WITNESS. Yes; then after a while some other cars arrived and they filled those cars with people.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is that?

The WITNESS. And then after a while other cars arrived and they filled those cars with people.

Mr. KERSTEN. This is just one train that you are telling about? Was the same situation true of other trains?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many trains did you happen to see brought out of the station there?

The WITNESS. About three.

Mr. KERSTEN. Three trains with a large number of cattle cars in each one?

The WITNESS. In each one, more or less, 20 or 30 people, I think.

Mr. KERSTEN. In each car?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You previously stated you thought there were about 50 cars?

The WITNESS. Fifty cars in each train.

Mr. KERSTEN. You think about 50 cars in each train; is that right?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And they were all cattle cars in each train; is that right?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And those people, from your understanding, were all sent to Siberia; weren't they?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And many of them you knew?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And have you ever heard from any of your friends since?

The WITNESS. Nothing.

Mr. KERSTEN. And all the people that you knew there, were they good people or criminals?

The WITNESS. From my point of view they were all good people; mostly Catholic and good people, educated people.

Mr. KERSTEN. Lithuania is almost completely Catholic; is it not?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And can you think of those people on their own choice ever wanting the Communists to come into their country?

The WITNESS. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. Now, as I understand it, Madame Witness, you do not wish your identity known because you have relatives in Lithuania; is that correct?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you know how Communists act and that sometimes they try to make it bad for one's relatives; is that not right?

The WITNESS. Yes, very bad.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. Madame Witness, when the Baltic Committee opened its hearings in Washington a week ago, Monday, during those hearings two women testified who were taken to Siberia in cattle cars such as you described.

I do not know whether they described the construction or the appearance of the ventilation in these cars. Could you give an idea what windows, if any, were in these cars, where the air could get into these cars? Could you give a description of that?

The WITNESS. A small window there was and the window remained mostly shut, and the cover was wrapped in barbed wire.

Mr. MADDEN. As I understand it there are two small windows up toward the top.

The WITNESS. I don't know; I saw just the one little window.

Mr. MADDEN. I might state for the record, Mr. Chairman, that if I remember right one of these women that testified in Washington was from Estonia, and Estonia is almost predominantly a Lutheran-Protestant country.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is right.

Mr. MADDEN. And the same method was used out of Estonia and Latvia as was used out of Lithuania in transporting prisoners out to Siberia, and the testimony of these 2 women in Washington stated that 1 car this lady was in had 43 people and after 3 days without food they had to remove several women from the car in order to get 2 kettles of black bread and soup into the car.

Mr. KERSTEN. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. And that in the car she was in there were 37 women and about 8 or 9 children, in this particular car that this 1 woman who testified in Washington was in.

It was also testified in Washington and I think also in either New York or Detroit that Lithuania at that time had an estimated population of 3,300,000 and there were only 1,800 Communist in the country.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is right.

Mr. MADDEN. That was in 1939 and 2 years after, in 1941 out of a population of 3,300,000 there were only 2,100 Communists, after 2 years, and most of those additional Communists came in from Russia, those 400 additional ones, which merely reveals the fact that the organized terror of the Communists—although in Lithuania there were 3,300,000, those 2,000 got control of Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. And in getting this control they were successful in wrenching from their homes and sending them into permanent exile several hundred thousand of the people, of the citizenry of these defenseless nations.

Mr. MADDEN. That is right; that is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Machrowicz?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Dodd?

Mr. DODD. No questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Madame Witness.

The WITNESS. Thank you for your kindness.

Mr. KERSTEN. Sister Alexandra, please.

Mr. Jurgela, will you come over to the witness stand and help the witness, please?

Will you raise your right hand—

I am sorry. Just one minute, Mr. Photographer.

A PHOTOGRAPHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. The Sisters here have requested, because of a rule of their order, that no pictures be taken. They do not desire any photographs, and I would like to respect that request.

The PHOTOGRAPHER. O. K.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you. It is a rule of their order.

Now will you rise, please?

You do solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Sister ALEXANDER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF SISTER ALEXANDRA, FORMER TEACHER OF KINDERGARTEN IN LITHUANIA, THROUGH INTERPRETER

Mr. KERSTEN. Your name is Sister Maria Alexandra?

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Jurgela, will you move that silver microphone a little closer so the witness' voice will carry.

Just lean forward a little bit.

That is spelled A-l-e-x-a-n-d-r-a?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And the first name is spelled M-a-r-i-a?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you are presently a member of a religious community here in Chicago, are you?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What is the name of your religious community?

Sister ALEXANDRA. The Sisters of St. Casimir.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what is the address of your convent?

Sister ALEXANDRA. West Marquette Road.

Mr. KERSTEN. 2601 West Marquette Road, is that right?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, that is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many Sisters are located there at the present time?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Now, about—I don't know, really.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just approximately?

Sister ALEXANDRA. About 40, I think.

Mr. KERSTEN. About 40?

Sister ALEXANDRA. About 40.

Mr. KERSTEN. And there is a girl's high school close by, is that not right?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Conducted by your order?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Not far away.

Mr. KERSTEN. Within a block or two?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes; one block.

Mr. KERSTEN. And that is the Maria High School?

Sister ALEXANDRA. The Maria High School.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is a high school for girls?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, for girls.

Mr. KERSTEN. And most of the nuns of your order are of Lithuanian background; is that correct?

Sister ALEXANDRA. All of them are Lithuanian.

Mr. KERSTEN. You say all of them are?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Sister, were you born in Lithuania?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in Lithuania when the Communists came in 1940?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, I was in Lithuania.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was the name of the city or town that you were in?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Not far away from Kaunas, close to Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. What was the name—was it a suburb of Kaunas?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, a suburb.

Mr. KERSTEN. Sister, I think it might be better—it might be easier for Sister Alexandra if you just stated your answers in Lithuanian and Mr. Jurgela can answer it in English. Will that be satisfactory?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Then you speak right up, Mr. Jurgela.

Were you a nun at that time when the Communists came?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what was your occupation?

Sister ALEXANDRA. I was a teacher in school.

Mr. KERSTEN. Who did you teach?

Sister ALEXANDRA. The children in kindergarten.

Mr. KERSTEN. What were the ages?

Sister ALEXANDRA. From 3 to 7.

Mr. KERSTEN. And when the Communists came, did the sisters change their religious garb?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. To a regular secular dress, such as women would wear ordinarily?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And did the Communists come into your school and take over the direction of it?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Oh, yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you have some talks with the Communists in charge?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, they told us how to teach the children. There is no God. That Stalin is God, and all people must revere him as a god, and to pray to him and sing hymns composed in his honor.

Mr. KERSTEN. You mean to Stalin?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, to Stalin.

Mr. KERSTEN. Well, what did you do?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Just the same. I taught children about God. I show them pictures of Lenin and Stalin that we had in the school, but I did not say anything about it regarding them.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was there a crucifix in your classroom?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, prior to that. When the Russians came in they told us to remove the crucifix, and to hang the picture of Stalin.

Mr. KERSTEN. And did the Communist agent come into your school-room to check up on you?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, every day, sometimes several times a day.

Mr. KERSTEN. And did he ask the children about whether a crucifix had been put up there in his absence?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes. He used to ask that, and the children, not knowing anything, they used to say "Yes."

Mr. KERSTEN. And did you used to put it somewhere other than on the wall?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, put it away in a secret place so that no one would see it.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did the Communist agent when he came into your classroom give the children lectures about the existence of God, or, rather, the nonexistence of God?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Oh, yes. He explained to them that God is giving them nothing, and that Stalin could give them anything they asked him.

Mr. KERSTEN. You heard that with your own ears before your small children; is that right?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes. Yes, that is right.

Mr. KERSTEN. At any rate——

Sister ALEXANDRA. He thought the children would ask him for something, for some candy or something, but the children did not.

Mr. KERSTEN. You, without his consent and against his orders, then, and when he was out of the room would continue to teach religion to the children; is that right?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Oh, yes, because my duty as a nun was to teach religion.

Mr. KERSTEN. And about the existence of God; is that right?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. So, you got into a little trouble with the Communists, didn't you?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. On account of that trouble, did you have some military trucks with Russian soldiers calling at your home in the night?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Oh, yes, several times.

Mr. KERSTEN. And, at that time, where were you living, Sister?

Sister ALEXANDRA. In a private home, with a certain woman. Two nuns were living there together.

Mr. KERSTEN. You and another nun?

Sister ALEXANDRA. And another nun.

Mr. KERSTEN. And what time of the day or night would the Russian military truck first call for you?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Eleven o'clock at night.

Mr. KERSTEN. And, what did you and the other nun do when you saw them?

Sister ALEXANDRA. When we saw the truck arrive, we jumped out the window the other side of the house and hid in the bushes.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long did you stay out of the house?

Sister ALEXANDRA. We stayed in the forest the first time 3 days and 3 nights.

Mr. KERSTEN. You and the other nun?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, and 2 priests, and 1 man who used to inform us of what was going on at home.

Mr. KERSTEN. And did you ascertain that the Russian military truck called for you again after the first time?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Oh, yes, several times, many times.

Mr. KERSTEN. And, did you come back after the first 3 days in the forest?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, for a while. We would just enter at dusk and just have a little snack and left again.

Mr. KERSTEN. How long did you stay in the forest the second time?

Sister ALEXANDRA. About 1 week then.

Mr. KERSTEN. And then, after that, did you sleep somewhere else?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Inasmuch as the nights were cold, so I slept several nights inside a church.

Mr. KERSTEN. Where did you sleep?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Behind the great altar, in a niche.

Mr. KERSTEN. In a niche?

Sister ALEXANDRA. There is such a hole like in back of the altar.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you cover yourself up with something so that you would not be seen?

Sister ALEXANDRA. With church vestments, like ordinates, and so on.

Mr. KERSTEN. And, while you were in there, would you hear any Russian troops coming in searching for you?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, they had come one night.

Mr. KERSTEN. They didn't find you, though, did they?

Sister ALEXANDRA. They could not find.

Mr. KERSTEN. How many times, all told, did you ascertain that the Russian trucks or truck called for you, the military truck?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Very frequently; probably around 15 or 20 times. Some times they left the truck in front of the house, and stood there all day long.

Mr. KERSTEN. But they never caught you, did they?

Sister ALEXANDRA. No, never, because a certain man used to warn us about it.

Mr. KERSTEN. Whenever they would be coming, I suppose?

Sister ALEXANDRA. No, he notified us when he saw the truck standing.

Mr. KERSTEN. And later on, were you there in Kaunas at the time, or rather, in the suburb, at the time the people were deported from that area?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, I was. Once I was traveling to my monastery by way of Kaunas, and I have seen trains with people packed inside.

Mr. KERSTEN. Tell us about that, Sister.

Sister ALEXANDRA. It was a very long train. The type that transports cattle. The windows were all barred. They only left one little window in each car. There were about twenty of those linked up into a single train. One could see through those slot windows how many people were packed there. They were crammed, and I could hear weeping.

Mr. KERSTEN. You heard that, did you?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you hear anything of what they said or were crying about?

Sister ALEXANDRA. No, I did not hear. I could not distinguish their speech or words, but I did hear them weeping, and moaning.

Mr. KERSTEN. You heard them weeping and moaning?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you notice whether or not others of their relatives or friends were nearby watching the trains or the people?

Sister ALEXANDRA. I don't know whether they were relatives, but there were a great many people around.

Mr. KERSTEN. What were they doing?

Sister ALEXANDRA. They looked very sad, and they were weeping.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is, both the people outside of the trains watching and the people inside of the trains; is that right?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many of these—pardon me.

Sister ALEXANDRA. Whenever the Russians saw somebody crying in public, so they seized that person and packed them inside the train, too.

Mr. KERSTEN. You saw that, did you?

Sister ALEXANDRA. Yes, I did.

Mr. KERSTEN. About how many trains did you happen to see, Sister?

Sister ALEXANDRA. I have seen that once.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was that in Kaunas, or where?

Sister ALEXANDRA. In Kaunas.

Mr. KERSTEN. What do you think the people of Lithuania thought about the Communists taking over their country?

Sister ALEXANDRA. They considered that was a terrible thing. I don't know how to express myself.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you, Sister Alexandra.

Sister Cleopha, will you come up please?

TESTIMONY OF SISTER CLEOPHA, THROUGH INTERPRETER

Mr. KERSTEN. Raise your right arm. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes, I do.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is C-l-e-o-p-h-a, is that correct?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And it is Sister Maria Cleopha, is is not?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you are a member of the same religious community that Sister Alexandra is?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And live at the same address?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are also of Lithuanian background, are you not?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you were born in Lithuania?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Were you in Lithuania when the Communists took over the government in the year 1940?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What happened to your residence when the Communists took over at that time?

Sister CLEOPHA. We were expelled from the home.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was that in June of 1940?

Sister CLEOPHA. That was in December 1940.

Mr. KERSTEN. And from your regular residence did you then go into another place where you were required to do some domestic work?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Was there a Russian officer or a Russian official there?

Sister CLEOPHA. The commissars in charge of buildings.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did he come to this place where you were required to be, to live?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes; he used to come.

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you have a brother?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did the Communists do anything to him?

Sister CLEOPHA. He was taken into the prison.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you at any time have to leave the home to avoid being deported?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. But the Communists didn't catch you, either, did they?

Sister CLEOPHA. No.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see some of the deportation trains?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes; I did see them.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you see some families being taken out of their homes by the Russian soldiers?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes; I did see that.

Mr. KERSTEN. Tell us a little bit about what you saw in that connection, about that.

Sister CLEOPHA. At 11 o'clock in the daytime, trucks arrived and stopped in front of our home. We looked—we were all scared—to see what was going to happen, but they stopped in front of the adjoining house; they placed the Russian soldiers outside and they went inside to make a search. And then they moved some people into the trucks and moved them away.

Mr. KERSTEN. You saw this with your own eyes, did you?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes; I did.

MR. KERSTEN. Did you notice the feelings of the people that were being taken away?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes; I saw it.

MR. KERSTEN. What did you notice?

Sister CLEOPHA. They were very much depressed, it was painful to look at them.

MR. KERSTEN. How close did you get to the deportation—to some of the deportation cattle cars?

Sister CLEOPHA. I came quite close, right up to the sentries who were guarding those cars.

MR. KERSTEN. You mean the Communist soldiers?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. At that time now you were no longer wearing a religious habit, were you?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes; I did not wear it.

MR. KERSTEN. Before the Communists came you wore the usual religious nuns' habit, is that correct?

Sister CLEOPHA. Yes.

MR. KERSTEN. Now, tell us, when you were close to the cattle cars of the deportation trains, tell us what you saw, Sister, and heard?

Sister CLEOPHA. I didn't speak to the people because there were sentries outside, but we looked at those people, and the windows were very small, and they were high up and very narrow, so we could only see the heads of the people. The people were very much depressed, some were crying—some were weeping.

I don't know what else to say.

MR. KERSTEN. Do you remember anything that any of them said or cried?

Sister CLEOPHA. No; because we did not try to speak to them.

MR. KERSTEN. About how many cattle cars were on these trains, in your remembrance?

Sister CLEOPHA. I have seen four trains. I couldn't say how many cars, but they were fairly long trains.

MR. KERSTEN. And as to the condition of the people in all of these trains that you noticed, was it the same way, that they were all sad and depressed, and some crying?

Sister CLEOPHA. They were very depressed.

MR. KERSTEN. The fact is, is it not, Sister, that these were all good people, so far as you knew, that were being forced from their homes?

Sister CLEOPHA. I didn't know many of them, but it seems to me that they were all good.

MR. KERSTEN. And they were sent to Siberia never to return, so far as you know, is that right?

Sister CLEOPHA. In my time they did not return.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you, Sister.

Congressman Madden?

MR. MADDEN. No questions.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you, Sister.

MR. McTIGUE. Mr. Daukantas.

MR. KERSTEN. You do solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. DAUKANTAS. Yes; I do.

MR. KERSTEN. Have a chair.

TESTIMONY OF BLADAS DAUKANTAS, FORMER TEACHER WHO
SERVED ON ELECTION BOARD IN LITHUANIA

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name, please?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Bladas Daukantas.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your address?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. 3735 Euclid Avenue, East Chicago, Ind.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your occupation?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. I am working at Inland Steel, stove tender.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. In Chicago.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Lithuania at the time the Soviets occupied the country?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was that?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. It was when they occupied it, it was in 1940, in June.

Mr. McTIGUE. What part of Lithuania were you in at that time?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Telsiai.

Mr. McTIGUE. We have had a great deal of protest from the Soviets as a consequence of some of our hearings to the effect that the elections in Latvia—

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE (continuing). Lithuania and Estonia were free and open. Have you anything that you might want to say on that subject?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes, sir. I was then schoolmaster and it happened in my school was the elections, and I was appointed there as a member.

Mr. McTIGUE. The people came to your school to cast their ballots in the so-called free election?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead.

Mr. DAUKANTAS. They came in and we had a list. The list was from Telsiai. According to the list the inhabitants should come—they were forced to come—and throw in their ballots. There was a ballot only on one list, that one they had to throw in. There were about 25 percent out of over a hundred that put in the ballots. But they weren't all ballots. Some of them put in empty papers, they threw empty papers in it.

After the election on our list it showed only 25 percent dropped ballots.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then what did you do?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Then we were told to add those that were short in the ballot box.

On the third day it was announced that our circuit—I don't know how to explain that—district—no it was not a district, it was a small—

Mr. MADDEN. Polling place, or precinct?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Precinct, yes. Out of our precinct there were 96½ percent ballots voted.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to the other 3½ percent?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. We were short, I think.

Mr. McTIGUE. I see. So that you and the other members of the election board were required to stuff the ballot boxes?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. At the insistence—

Mr. DAUKANTAS. There was one person from Telsiai, he assisted us.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do during the time that Lithuania was occupied by the Soviets?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. I was a teacher, I had a school 8 kilometers from Telsiai.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you stay on there after the Soviets left for the first time and when the German Army occupied Lithuania?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. I had escaped, because they were after me. On June 14, in the morning, I left my home, and my wife knew where I went. Later she came to me and asked me not to come home because they were looking for me.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Soviet retreated from Lithuania in 1941, and when the Germans occupied Lithuania, did you have occasion to observe any atrocities that had been committed during the period of that Soviet occupation?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes, sir. I was working with the administration of the recovered city of Telsiai, and after the war people were looking all around, some looking for old trucks and taking out the motors, looking for gas, and they came to the administration and told us some of the ditches in the forest—that there might be some people there.

Mr. MADDEN. Bodies?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Bodies there. So there was a commission appointed and we sent them to investigate. They found there were three ditches, and they dug them out with their hands, because they were so messed up in those ditches that you couldn't do it with no shovel, you got to dig it out by your hands.

Then when they were all out, they were washed and laid in rows.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many bodies did you find there?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. There were 73 Lithuanians, atrocities from the jail, and 2 were Russians.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, if you will recall it was at this Rainiai Forest where, in the course of testimony in Detroit, a woman testified about finding the body of her son. This is the very same forest, the same massacre.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is right. The little elderly lady in Detroit testified she came to the same forest, and there were 73 bodies there, and 1 of them was her son, most of them bearing the marks of terrible torture on their bodies.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct.

When did you leave Lithuania, Mr. Daukantas?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. In 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you emigrate to the United States?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. In 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. Those are all the questions I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Madden?

Mr. MADDEN. Did the Communists tell you, or talk to you about your school, what should be taught there, what you should do in your school?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes, sir. As soon as they came over in 1940, in the fall, we had to remove the cross, and all our religious pictures, and famous portraits, and they gave us to hang up their own pictures.

There was Stalin, Lenin, and others—Marx—and so on, and so forth.

Mr. MADDEN. How about books?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes, books, they tore out leaves—they tore out pages, pages were torn out. Wherever there was something about religion, or there was something about our patriots, that would remind them of Lithuania, they were all torn out.

Mr. MADDEN. How many elections were held at your school, Mr. Daukantas?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Two.

Mr. MADDEN. And at each time these elections were held, the authorities, the Communist authorities, told you, or asked you to commit—or to stuff the ballots, or put in additional ballots?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes—no, the first time there was not, only the second time it was, I guess it was in January, in the beginning of January.

I can't remember the date.

When it was election to the Supreme Soviet.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just a question; from your experience living under the Communists what do you think that we here in America that haven't experienced that, can learn?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. One thing I wish, that every American would understand Communists and fight their own way to save the world from communism.

Mr. KERSTEN. Americans should.

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. What do you think the difference is in living under the Communists and living here in the United States?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Oh, there is no comparison. It is like going down, because there there is no freedom. You don't feel yourself. You are just like material. You just wait until somebody pushes you here or there. You have no rights. And here—I am living here; I just came in; I have got my property and everything and there I lost my rights, everything.

I can't compare them. There is a very big——

Mr. KERSTEN. Contrast?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Contrast.

Mr. KERSTEN. Like night and day?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. Well, I like night, but I don't like communism.

Mr. KERSTEN. Thank you.

Mr. MADDEN. The Russian delegate, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, made a speech stating that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and these other Baltic countries that are under the control of the Kremlin, all voluntarily wanted to come under the control of the Kremlin, of the Soviets. Was Vishinsky lying when he made that speech?

Mr. DAUKANTAS. He was lying. I was a witness of the election when the people, free, voted for the union to communism; that is, that we put in the ballots, which were 100 percent, and the people who were voting, they were some kinds of—like I was a teacher; I was afraid for my job.

Some other ones, the ones that had something to be afraid of, they voted, and the other people, they didn't vote. Even laborers didn't vote.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. That is all; thank you. Mr. Nenorta.

TESTIMONY OF PRANAS NENORTA, FORMER POLICE OFFICIAL IN KAUNAS, THROUGH INTERPRETER

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes; I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name?

Mr. NENORTA. Pranas Nenorta.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your address?

Mr. NENORTA. 3811 Butternut Street, East Chicago, Ill.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is your occupation?

Mr. NENORTA. I work at Universal Atlas Cement Co.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you born?

Mr. NENORTA. In Lithuania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Lithuania when the Communists occupied the country?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were you doing at that time?

Mr. NENORTA. I was a police official at that time.

Mr. McTIGUE. In what city or village?

Mr. NENORTA. Kaunas.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was your immediate superior officer arrested by the Communists?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was he charged with?

Mr. NENORTA. The same as they accused other Lithuanians; he, for instance, was accused of being a policeman.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was arrested for being a policeman?

Mr. NENORTA. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Communists thereafter come to you and ask you to do something as far as this was concerned?

Mr. NENORTA. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Communists at any time ask you to testify against your former chief?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why did they want you to do that?

Mr. NENORTA. They were looking for evidence to back their charges against him. Usually when the arrested people did not incriminate themselves, they usually sought evidence of some sort to incriminate them.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of false testimony did they suggest that you give?

Mr. NENORTA. They asked me about one of the criminal policemen in this matter: Do you know such and such a criminal police department officer? Yes, I said, I do.

Do you know why he was serving in the police department; he used to go abroad to Vienna to the Congress of Criminologists, they asked. Do you know that he used to write articles about matters of arresting and obtaining evidence against criminals?

I replied that I knew this. After I made a deposition, they asked me to sign it. This deposition was written in Russian.

I knew Russian and could read it; I read it and refused to sign it. Because we had spoken of Vienna, the deposition contained the following: That I knew such and such a criminal police officer and that besides his police work, he also undertook certain political activity.

When I refused to sign this they used stricter means and began to beat me. But I still refused to sign. Then they called another NKVD man to their assistance.

This new NKVD man held my arms behind my back and another man hit me over the head with the handle of his club.

They beat me until I fainted, but when I recovered I still refused to sign so they let me to myself.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened thereafter?

Mr. NENORTA. They asked me nothing else.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you confined to this jail?

Mr. NENORTA. Eleven months.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you continuously interrogated, beaten, and punished during those 11 months?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes; they interrogated me often, and they beat me a few times. This time I have described about the evidence for the criminal policeman, and once besides that.

Mr. McTIGUE. But you never signed the false testimony or evidence that they wanted you to give against your former police chief; is that correct?

Mr. NENORTA. Never.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you released from this prison?

Mr. NENORTA. We left the prison when the Germans occupied Lithuania at the beginning of the Germany-Russo War.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you immigrate to this country?

Mr. NENORTA. On June 20, 1949.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you immigrate from Germany?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You went from Lithuania in 1944, after the Soviet started to occupy the country for the second time, into Germany?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. No further questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. What were those beatings? How did they beat you? What kind of instrument did they use?

Mr. NENORTA. Their fists. They kicked my shinbones, and with the end of a revolver they hit me on the head or the back of the neck.

Mr. KERSTEN. Because you refused to sign a statement against your superior police officer that was untrue?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. And had you signed it, they would have used that statement possibly to banish or execute or convict or murder your superior officer; is that true?

Mr. NENORTA. Yes; they used it as a means of charging him with some crime and punishing him for that crime.

Mr. MADDEN. That is all.

Mr. KERSTEN. What lesson do you think the people in this country could take from your experience in living under Communists?

Mr. NENORTA. Herewith, I would like to tell the American people that my personal experiences prove that the Communists in trying to establish their dictatorship throughout the world use various devices which degrade freedom and human rights. They arrest innocent people, invent various accusations, and in order to justify their means,

they abuse their witnesses by means of self-incrimination. I wish to point out that among the charges that were made against me personally, there was one, the fact that I had built a wooden home for myself. The cellmates who had not homes of their own were glad they would not be accused of such a thing.

About 3 weeks later, one of my cellmates was called out to be interrogated, and when he returned, he said that they had asked him if he had any property, and when he replied that he did not, they charged him with not having property.

MR. KERSTEN. What do you think of the difference between living in America here and living under communism in Lithuania?

MR. NENORTA. A very big difference. We have freedom here and there was no freedom there.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you.

Father Zakarauskas.

TESTIMONY OF VACLOVAS ZAKARAUSKAS, ASSISTANT AT CATHEDRAL AT KAUNAS WHEN SOVIET OCCUPIED LITHUANIA

MR. KERSTEN. You do solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. Yes.

MR. MCTIGUE. Will you state your name, please?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. Vaclovas Zakarauskas.

MR. MCTIGUE. Spell it, please?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. V-a-c-l-o-v-a-s Z-a-k-a-r-a-u-s-k-a-s.

MR. MCTIGUE. What is your address in Chicago, please?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. 6812 South Washtenaw Avenue.

MR. MCTIGUE. Are you connected with a parish in the city of Chicago?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. I live with a friendly pastor at his rectory.

MR. MCTIGUE. Where were you born, Father?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. Lithuania.

MR. MCTIGUE. Where, in Lithuania?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. In the village of Rumsiskis, in the district of Kaunas.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were you assistant at the cathedral at Kaunas when the Soviet occupied Lithuania?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. Yes. I was assistant in the cathedral, and chaplain to a secondary school.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were there any attempts by the Communists to force priests to become NKVD spies?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. Yes, I myself had experience in that.

MR. MCTIGUE. Tell us about that, will you, please, Father?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. When the Communists first came into Lithuania, I was released from duties, dismissed from my duties as chaplain immediately. I learned from my students that all signs of religious symbols, like pictures and crucifixes were taken from the walls and thrown out. There were religious clubs in the schools and these were immediately abolished, just like other cultural groups.

Personally, I was persecuted because of my preaching. Before the war, and during independent Latvia, I made radio broadcasts through the country of Lithuania, within the cathedral. I was often visited by the NKVD men, who had been placed in charge of taking care of the clergy. His name was Mortavicius. Recently I learned from

people that he is now the Vice Commissar of Interior Affairs. He often spoke before religious groups that religious life would be abolished in Lithuania.

Besides this, I wish to point out that he usually visited at night. He always came armed and placed his weapon on the table. He demanded and said that the priests should first show sympathy to the present regime; that those who were not in sympathy would sooner or later be liquidated. However, the liquidation of the priests in Lithuania would be different than it had been in Poland in 1939. He explained that in Poland they first began to liquidate the priests. That created a disturbance, and an unfavorable opinion amongst the people. People would congregate in railroad stations and would lay themselves across the tracks not to allow the train bearing the priests to leave the station; that this situation was very harmful for communism, and Communist propaganda and free will. "We will do just the opposite in Lithuania. We will begin to first deport the Lithuanian civilians, beginning with the intellectuals or the more active people, workers and others. Then we will take the priests. We will announce to the world that they are voluntarily going to Siberia to serve the needs of their countrymen," but he smiled and said, "They will never reach their countrymen. They will remain in this country forever." He meant that they would be killed in Lithuania. That is why, during the deportations, there was a very large number of civilians deported, but a comparatively small number of priests.

We knew this and were always prepared. The majority of priests did not live in their homes, wishing to save their lives.

Every night was a fearful night, because every sound of an automobile motor meant that they were coming to arrest and deport us.

I had an old pastor, a superior, at the cathedral, and he never lived in the cathedral at night, but was always prepared for deportation.

I was asked to give them copies of all the sermons I had preached in Lithuania during the years of independence, all of the radio sermons.

The INTERPRETER. The Father now wishes to tell some of his personal experiences in Kaunas about the religious persecution there.

Mr. KERSTEN. Very well.

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. First, religion was abolished in the schools. There were no religious practices whatsoever allowed for the students. In Kaunas there were a few gymnasiums at which Sisters or others—

Mr. MADDEN. What is a gymnasium?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. A secondary school, a high school.

The Sisters were taken away, the school was nationalized, and the teaching Sisters were dispersed.

You have just heard from the Sisters of St. Casimir, who had quite a monastery near Kaunas, that they had the monastery taken away from them, and it was made into a national archives center.

The Sisters, if they wanted to live or exist, had to become servants, they had to become either servant girls or had to do the work of laborers, hard labor.

Another sign of religious persecution took place in the Catholic press. All the entire Catholic press was immediately abolished. The more famous editors and correspondents, reporters, were arrested and jailed. Some of them died at the Cherven massacre.

Mr. KERSTEN. Just at that point, let me ask you, Father, were you here yesterday when the testimony regarding the Cherven massacre was related?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. Yes, I heard that testimony.

Mr. KERSTEN. Did you know about that massacre after it occurred? Did you find out about it later?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. I learned about this immediately when the Petraitis brothers returned from the trip. I also heard all of this massacre described by another brother of the Petraitis who died in Germany.

Not only was it forbidden to publish new papers in books, but even those religious books that had been published in times of independence were taken out of the libraries and were destroyed.

They even took out manuscripts and old books that were contained in the library of the seminary in Kaunas. They were piled up into a truck and were taken to a paper factory where they were reused again as paper.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to them?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. They were bound up and made into paper.

Mr. KERSTEN. These textbooks were used for what?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. For pulp paper. Now, as far as the priests were concerned, usually the rectories were taken over and nationalized. For instance, at Kaunas, I had a two-room apartment; my brother, my sister and a student lived there with me.

Mortavicius, the official, mentioned: You will see how well the priests will live in our present great fatherland.

One night, about 2 o'clock in the morning there was a knock on my door and he entered with a large family of 8 people, 6 children and 2 adults. They moved around all my books and tables and had the family live in my apartment.

Perhaps this was done purposely since it was a non-Catholic family and they wanted to cause some unpleasantness for a Catholic priest. The next day Mortavicius called and he asked me:

"Do you have a lot of freedom living in your apartment?" I replied: "Yes; I expected this in the Great Russia. I get along very well with this family."

And we lived this way for 3 weeks. Evidently this did not help him attain his purposes, for one night they came and took away the family and the old people.

All Catholic societies and church organizations were immediately abolished. I had many friends, teachers, and Government officials, who would come late at night to my apartment and complain how hard their life was, how their conscience was being raped.

Teachers were told not to attend church services and not to speak of religion to the children. Officials in the various institutions were forbidden to wear any official signs of religion, like medals, etc.

Mr. KERSTEN. I understand, then, Father, the Communists came in and they quite effectively destroyed any open practice of religion; is that right?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. Yes. First they destroyed open life and then they tried to get into the conscience of the people.

Mr. KERSTEN. Does that substantially tell the story that you experienced under the Communists and their attitude toward religion?

Father ZAKARAUSKAS. Yes; that is my personal experience.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you. Congressman Madden?

MR. MADDEN. No questions.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you, Father.

I would like to say at this time that we have found since we came to Chicago that there are a large number of people in this area who have personal experiences of life under the Communists, that a large number of possible potential witnesses, many of whom we should like to have the opportunity to hear, are here.

Our schedule, however, is such that we have stayed here up to the very end and have tried to crowd everything into these 2 days.

There are a number of witnesses whom we had planned to call, would like to have called, but because of time we cannot call any further witnesses now.

It is quite possible that after the first of the year it may be advisable or necessary to come back to this area for additional testimony of eye witnesses to life under the Communists.

I think the stories of the several witnesses here before us like those in Detroit, in New York, and Washington, demonstrate that there are in this country people who have lived under the Communists and know at first hand what that life is. It has been very enlightening for the members of the committee, and for me, certainly. I think that a great deal of clearing of the atmosphere as to the actual life under the Communists has been made.

The stories of these witnesses, much of them harrowing experiences, are something that I think the people of America want to know about.

MR. MADDEN, did you have something to say at this time?

MR. MADDEN. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that the testimony that has been revealed in the 2 weeks' hearings of the Baltic Committee since we started at Washington, has been highly revealing; in fact, it has been the first time that under oath an authorized congressional committee has taken recorded testimony as to the inhuman, barbarous brutalities that have been inflicted upon innocent peoples by the Communist tyrants in the Kremlin, and these victims don't number in the thousands, they number up into the hundreds of thousands.

MR. Chairman, the revelations of the Baltic Committee's testimony corroborates to a great extent the barbarity that was revealed by over 110 witnesses who testified before the Katyn Massacre Committee, who held hearings in Washington, Chicago, and England, and Europe. And the remarkable thing that I would like to have in the record is the testimony that is revealed by witnesses from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which is nothing more than a blueprint and a complete repetition, you might say, almost identical with the barbarities and the massacres that were revealed by the Katyn Committee. The reports coming out of Korea only recently, of the barbarities and the murders and the massacres committed on the American boys and the boys fighting under the United Nations banner in Korea, is an exact blueprint of what has been revealed at these hearings. Over 4,230 bodies were found there at Katyn and there are probably 10,000 to 12,000 of the intelligentsia of Poland that were massacred in 2 other camps, whose bodies have not been found.

All this happened in 1939 and 1940 and 1941, not only in Poland and other countries, but the testimony offered here in the last 2 weeks, includes Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

After Hitler turned on Russia, and the Communists, in 1941, Stalin and the Kremlin wanted some of these Polish officers from Poland to help build an army to fight Hitler. The flower of the Polish Army, as we now know, had already been massacred by Stalin and his associates. When the leaders of Poland went to the Kremlin they asked: What happened to these Polish officers? We need them now to fight Hitler, and Stalin, Molotov, and Vishinsky brazenly lied to the Polish emissaries, including General Anders and said he didn't know; they must have escaped to Manchuria.

That was said, wasn't it, Congressman Machrowicz, in 1943?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. 1943.

Mr. MADDEN. That is 3 years later than the testimony we have taken here on Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which shows the malicious, unmitigated lying that is used by the leaders of the Kremlin, from Stalin down, to inflict their inhuman barbarities on innocent people and, Mr. Chairman, I think that the Baltic Committee has revealed so far in its work astounding evidence corroborating what has been stated and heard of the inhumanities and the barbarities of the Communist dictators.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Machrowicz, have you a statement?

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Mr. Chairman, I think both my colleagues have stated my views on the situation existing with relation to the work of this committee. I just want to add this very briefly: That this committee is not presenting this gruesome evidence merely for the sake of presenting a gruesome picture. There is something more than that involved in the functioning of this committee.

In these gruesome stories that have been told from the witness stand there is a lesson and a warning to us Americans and if we listen to the stories and merely sympathize with these people but don't take the warning that is so obvious in what we have heard, not only here in Chicago but in Detroit, New York, and Washington, the same fate that befell the Baltic States could very easily befall the United States of America.

The Americans are, in some respects peculiar people. They love to read stories with a happy ending. We don't like to hear the grim realities of life, and we don't like to hear grim stories of tortures, or brutal atrocities, but when we stop to realize that the same things that befell these people can happen to us, and we will then learn a lesson which will be very valuable to the United States of America. When we learn that we can't do business with inhuman beings like the Communists, and that we can't expect, by making treaties with those persons to solve the problems which have been so well presented before this committee, when we will have learned that lesson, then I think that this committee has done a good job.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Dodd?

Mr. DODD. I can only add one thought, and that is this: It seems to me that one of the most constructive things we are doing here is in the making of the record with respect to these three small countries. Many of the witnesses who have appeared here are the last living representatives of their governments, the last legitimate governments of those countries, and they are getting along in years, and their memory, of course, will not be as sharp always as it is now. The record itself could not otherwise be preserved other than in this manner, so

if we have done nothing else but to write a record of the right kind, I think that we will have made some contribution, not only to the importance of history, but as my fellow Congressman has pointed out, as well to those people who still need to learn this important lesson. I suppose all of us are cognizant of the difficulties that we have had in convincing people whether the Nazi state was a vicious organization, which no one could do business with. All of the things that communism represents are shown there, and the people know it now, and while the people have recognized the basic evil of nazism, they somehow happen to distinguish the evils of communism from the Nazi evil.

MR. KERSTEN. You make that statement, I presume, on your experience of having been a prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials?

MR. DODD. Yes, and in listening to these stories, and I think that we have accomplished something very constructive, and I still think we have a lot of work to do, and I would like to compliment our chairman on the way he has conducted these hearings.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you.

MR. DODD. It has been very well done.

MR. KERSTEN. Thank you. Before we adjourn, I would like to state that the record shows that we have now had hearings in Washington, New York, Detroit, and in Chicago. The fact is that not too many of our American people know that the policy of our Government is to recognize the free and independent nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and has never recognized the incorporation of those small nations into the Soviet Union. The flags of these countries still fly in the consulates and the embassies and elsewhere in this country, and in contrast to that the Soviets claimed recently—in fact, Mr. Vishinsky, last December, in making the statement before the United Nations, and in Soviet publications, the New Times, and recently over the radio, claimed that they belonged to the Soviet Union. The sole claim of the Soviets to these three Baltic States is that these people voluntarily, and by their own will came into the Soviet Union, and that they are now happy peoples' democracies. I believe that the evidence in these 4 hearings has done a great deal to disprove that claim, and one very important thing I think the evidence shows is that the same people that took over these 3 defenseless countries and other countries in Eastern Europe back in 1940 are still in power today: Vishinsky, Molotov, Malenkov. Vishinsky himself, personally, went to Riga, Latvia, and through the Soviet Embassy, and with local Communists, managed to take over Latvia, and thereby established a pattern. The Communists destroy all elements of society by destroying the national life, the cultural life, the religious life, and the educational life; they destroy the family, the school, and deport hundreds of thousands of people into exile and death. I think that one very symbolic fact, showing the complete perversion of humanity and civilization, is demonstrated when they went to the jails and released the criminals with long criminal records, robbers and thieves. These are the people they put into power; these are the people that they put in charge over the innocent people, and it is that complete upside down perversity which the Communists are using in attempting to establish communism in these countries. That is the record I think we are beginning to write.

Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, during the course of Dr. Padalis' testimony in Detroit on December 8, reference was made to the introduction into the record, as exhibits, the original in Russian as well as the English translation of a memorandum entitled "Detailed Memorandum Regarding Counter-Revolutionary Leaflets Spreading on the Territory of Lithuania S. S. R." It was suggested then that the original and translation would be available for identification and introduction here in Chicago. What purports to be the original and translation have just been handed to me, but frankly, Mr. Chairman, I haven't had the opportunity to study these documents and respectfully request that their introduction be put over until our next hearing.

Mr. KERSTEN. Very well, the request is granted.

At this time the hearings are adjourned sine die until after the first of the year.

(Thereupon the hearings were adjourned, sine die.)

EXHIBIT 1

[H. Res. 231, 82d Cong., 1st sess.]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the Government of the United States of America maintains diplomatic relations with the governments of the Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and consistently has refused to recognize their seizure and forced "incorporation" into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That there is hereby created a select committee to be composed of seven Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker, one of whom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the committee shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

The committee is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of said seizure and forced "incorporation" of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including in such investigation, but not limited to, secret agreements pertaining to the Baltic nations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and German Nazi regime in the years of 1939-1940; treaties between the Baltic nations and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the violation thereof; the infiltration of the Baltic nations by Soviet agents and the invasion of the Baltic nations by the Soviet armed forces in the years 1939-1940; the fraudulent election system imposed upon the Baltic nations in the year 1940 to insure the election of persons favorable to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and inimical to the Baltic nations and the Baltic peoples.

The committee shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) as soon as practicable during the present Congress the results of its investigation and study, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the committee, or any subcommittee thereof authorized by the committee to hold hearings, is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places within or outside the United States, its Territories, and possessions, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any member of the committee designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or member.

(NOTE.—On exhibits 2A through 4A, the original language document may be found in committee files.)

EXHIBIT 2-A

[Translation ²]

No. 94

PEACE TREATY BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST
FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND PROTOCOL, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON
JULY 12, 1920

Russia on the one part and Lithuania on the other part, being guided by a firm desire to establish, on the principles of right and justice, lasting foundations for future relations, guaranteeing to both countries and their peoples all the benefits of peace and good neighbourship, have decided to enter into negotiations for such purpose and have appointed as their representatives to this end:

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic:—
Adolf Abramovitch Joffe,
Julian Josephovitch Marchlevski, and
Leonid Leonidovitch Obolenski;
and

² Translation communicated by His Britannic Majesty's Foreign Office.

The Government of the Lithuanian Democratic Republic:—

Thomas Narusevicius,
Peter Klimas,
Simon Rozenbaum,
Josef Vailokaitis, and
Witovt Rackauskas.

The said representatives having mutually produced their powers, which were found drawn up in proper form and in due order, agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I

Proceeding from the right, proclaimed by the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, of all nations to free self-determination up to their complete separation from the State into the composition of which they enter, Russia recognises without reservation the sovereign rights and independence of the Lithuanian State, with all the juridical consequences arising from such recognition, and voluntarily and for all time abandons all the sovereign rights of Russia over the Lithuanian people and their territory.

The fact of the past subjection of Lithuania to Russia does not impose on the Lithuanian nation and its territory any liabilities whatsoever towards Russia.

ARTICLE 2

The State frontier between Russia and Lithuania proceeds:—

Commencing from the point of the junction of the Gorodnianka river with the Bobr river at 2 versts on the east of the Tsharnyliks village along the Gorodnianka small stream between the villages of Khmeliniki and Khmelevka and the villages of Levki and Olsha; from there along the dried-up watercourse to the southern side of the village of Veselovo; from there along the unnamed tributary of the small stream Kamennaya to the junction of this tributary with the aforesaid small stream Kamennaya at a distance of about a verst from the village of Veselovo. Farther, up the flow of the small stream Kamennaya for a distance of about one verst; from there along the dried-up watercourse roughly in the direction of the eastern side of the village of Nerasnaya right up to the source of the unnamed tributary of the small stream Siderka; farther, along this tributary to its confluence with the small stream Siderka at a distance of about one verst from the village of Siderka; from there along the flow of the Siderka (Siderianka) small stream, between the villages of Shestaki and Siderka, past the town of Sidra, between the villages of Yuashi and Ogorodniki, past the village of Beniashi, past the village of Litvinka, between the villages of Zveriany and Timani up to the village of Lovtshiki; from there along the dried-up watercourse in the direction of the southern outskirts of the village Volkusha; from there to the northern side of the village of Tshuprinovo; farther, up the elevation with the trigonometric point 108.0, which is at a distance of about one verst on the south of the village of Novodeli; farther, in a direction towards the northern side of the environs of Toltshi, at a distance of roughly one verst on the north of same; from there in a direction towards the southern side of the village of Dubovaya; farther, along the small stream Indurka, past the village of Luzhki, past the town of Indura, past the village of Prokopitshi, past the village of Belev; farther, along the small stream Lashanka, past the village of Bobrovniki, and, farther, along this small stream to its junction with the small stream Svislotsh. Farther, along the small stream Svislotsh up to its junction with the Neman river; from there along the Neman river to the mouth of the Berezina river along the Berezina, Islotsh and Volozhinka rivers along the western side of the town of Volozhin and along the northern side of the villages of Briki, Burlaki and Polikshovstshizna; from there to the north-east along the eastern side of the villages of Melashi and Gintovtshizna (Menzhikovtshizna) at about one verst from them; farther, towards the north-east in the direction of the western side of the town of Kholkhlo at a distance of about one verst from the same; farther, towards the western side of the village of Sukhonarovstshizna at a distance of about one verst from it. From there the frontier turns north-east towards the western side of the village of Berezovtzy at a distance of about one verst from it; farther, towards the north-east in the direction of the western side of the village of Vaskovtzy; from there in the direction of the western side

of the village of Lialkovtshizna at a distance of about one verst from it; from there it turns to the north towards the western side of the village of Kulevshizna, and from there to the north between the villages of Dreni and Zherlaki; from there to the north-west along the eastern side of the village of Garavina and the western side of the village of Adamovitchi; farther, towards the eastern side of the village of Myslevitchi; farther, along the eastern side of the village of Bukhovstshina, towards the station of Molodetshno, crossing the railway junction in such a manner, that the Vilno-Molodetshno-Lida railway line remains in Lithuanian territory, and the Vileika-Molodetshno-Minsk railway line in Russian territory; from there along the small stream Bukhovka to its junction with the small stream Usha; along this small stream Usha to the village of Usha; from there it turns north-east and passes along the dried-up watercourse on the western side of the villages of Slobodka, Dolgaya and Prenta; from there along the small stream Narotch, and near the village of Tsheremstshitza, at a distance of about one verst from the same, it turns northward and passes along the eastern shore of the Bliada lake; at a distance of about one verst from same it proceeds northward across the Miastra lake, and upon issuing from this lake, along the dried-up watercourse between the village of Pikoltzy on the western side, and the village of Mintshaki on the eastern side; farther, northward and on the western side of the village of Volotshek at a distance of about one verst from it; from there northward across the Madziol lake to the western side of the village of Pshegrode at a distance of about one verst from same; from there towards the source of the Miadzeka small stream, and along this small stream to its junction with the Disna river; from there the frontier proceeds along the dried-up watercourse north-eastward towards the western side of the village of Borovyia, at a distance of about one verst from the same; farther, north-eastward in a direction across the Mikhalishki lake; farther, along the small stream Nistshenka to the parallel of the Ozyraitzy lake, to the western edge of the Repistshe lake, to the western outskirts of Zamoshie; to the Zolva lake; along the small stream Zolyitza, across the Dryviaty lake to the Tzno lake and Neslizha lake; farther, northward across the Nedrovo lake, and from this lake along the Druika river to its intersection with the boundary line of the province of Kovno; farther, along the boundary line of the province of Kovno, and, farther, to the Western Dvina river near the Shafranovo farm.

REMARK 1

The frontier line between Lithuania and Poland, and between Lithuania and Latvia, will be fixed by arrangement with these States.

REMARK 2

The State frontier between the two contracting parties shall be established *in situ*, and the frontier marks shall be fixed by a mixed commission having an equal number of representatives on both sides. In establishing the frontier *in situ* the mixed commission shall be guided by ethnographic and economic features, keeping as far as possible to the natural lines of division, and inhabited points shall as far as possible enter wholly into the composition of one State. In those cases where the frontier is carried along lakes, rivers and canals, it shall pass through the middle of these lakes, rivers, and canals, unless otherwise provided for in this treaty.

REMARK 3

The frontier herein described has been delineated in red line on the map hereto annexed.³

In the event of any disagreement between the map and text, the text shall be the deciding factor.

REMARK 4

The artificial diversion of water from the frontier rivers and lakes, causing a lowering of the average level of the water of same, is not permitted.

The order and conditions of navigation and fishing in these rivers and lakes shall be determined by a special arrangement, and fishing may only be carried on by means which do not exhaust the fishing resources.

³ Not reproduced.

ARTICLE 3

The conditions relating to the protection of the frontier, as also custom-house and other questions connected therewith, will be regulated by a separate agreement between the contracting parties after the occupied localities dividing Lithuania and Russia shall have been freed of occupation.

ARTICLE 4

Both contracting parties undertake:—

(1) Not to permit on their territory the formation and sojourn of the Governments, organizations or groups, who have for their object armed warfare against the other contracting party. Similarly not to permit within their territories the recruiting and mobilization of effectives for the armies of such Governments, organizations or groups, and the sojourn of their Governments and officials.

(2) To prohibit those countries who are *de facto* in a state of war with the other of the contracting parties, and also organizations or groups, who have as their object armed warfare against the other contracting party, the importation into their ports and the transport through their territories of all that may be made use of against the other contracting party, such as: armed forces, military equipment, technical war supplies and artillery, commissariat, engineering and flying materials.

ARTICLE 5

In the event of international recognition of the permanent neutrality of Lithuania, Russia on its part undertakes to conform to such neutrality and to participate in the guarantees for the maintenance of same.

ARTICLE 6

Persons resident at the date of the ratification of this treaty within the confines of Lithuania, who themselves or whose parents have permanently resided in Lithuania, or who have registered with the rural, municipal or corporate bodies in the territory of the Lithuanian State, and also persons, who prior to 1914 were residing in the territory of the same State for not less than the last ten years and had a permanent occupation there, excepting former civil and military officials not of Lithuanian origin and the members of their families, shall *ipso facto* be considered citizens of the Lithuanian State.

Persons of the same category, residing at the time of the ratification of this treaty in the territory of a third State, but not naturalised there, are equally considered to be Lithuanian citizens.

However, all persons who have attained the age of 18 years and are resident in the territory of Lithuania, are entitled within the period of one year from the date of the ratification of this treaty to declare their wish to opt for Russian citizenship, and their citizenship shall extend to the children under 18 years of age and to the wife, if no other arrangement has been made between the husband and wife.

Similarly, persons residing in the territory of Russia and coming under the first paragraph of this article, may within the same period and on the same conditions opt for Lithuanian citizenship.

Those who have made a declaration of optation and also those who follow their citizenship, shall retain their rights to personal and real property within the limits of the laws in force in that State in which they reside, but must within a year from the date of handing in the declaration leave its confines, they being entitled to realise all their property or to take the same away with them.

REMARK 1

For persons residing in the Caucasus and Russia in Asia, the periods indicated in this article for lodging the declarations, and also for departure, are extended by one year.

REMARK 2

The rights of optants indicated in this article shall be enjoyed by those citizens also who prior to and during the world war were resident in the territory of one side, but at the moment of the ratification of this treaty reside in the territory of the other.

Fugitives, with regard to their property which they were unable to take out of the country under the re-evacuation of Fugitives Treaty of the 30th June, 1920, enjoy the same rights as are provided for in this article in regard to optants, but only in so far as they do prove that such property belongs to them and was at the time of the re-evacuation in their actual possession.

ARTICLE 7

Fugitives of both contracting parties, who desire to return to their country of origin, shall be returned to such country at the earliest possible date.

The order and conditions of re-evacuation are to be established by arrangement between the Governments of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE 8

Both contracting parties mutually renounce all accounts whatsoever arising from the fact of Lithuania having in the past belonged to the past Empire of Russia, and acknowledge that State property of various denominations, existing on the territory of either of them, constitutes the inalienable property of the respective State. However, if property thus belonging to Lithuania has been removed from its territory after the 1st August, 1914, by a third State, the right of claiming same passes to the Lithuanian State.

To the Lithuanian State are transferred all the claims of the Russian Treasury burdening properties situated within the Lithuanian State, and also all claims against Lithuanian citizens, but only for the amounts not liquidated by counter-claims subject to acceptance in payment on account.

REMARKS

The right of claiming from small peasants their debts to the former Russian Peasants' Land Bank and others, now nationalised Russian land banks, and also the right of claiming the debts due to the former Russian Noblemen's Land Bank and others, now nationalised Russian land banks, secured on landed estates, in the event of such estates passing into the possession of small and landless peasants, are not transferred to the Lithuanian Government, but are considered cancelled.

The documents and deeds, in proof of the titles referred to in this article, shall be delivered by the Russian Government to the Lithuanian Government as far as they are actually in the possession of the former. In the event of it being impossible to effect this within the period of one year from the date of the ratification of the present treaty, such documents and deeds shall be deemed to be lost.

ARTICLE 9

(1) The Russian Government shall return at its expense to Lithuania, and shall hand over to the Lithuanian Government, the libraries, archives, museums, objects of vertu, educational supplies, documents, and other property of educational establishments, scientific, governmental, religious, communal and professional institutions, in so far as the said objects have been removed beyond the limits of Lithuania during the world war of 1914-1917, and which actually are or shall prove to be in the keeping of the governmental or communal establishments of Russia.

As regards the archives, libraries, museums, objects of vertu, and documents, which are of material scientific, artistic, or historical value to Lithuania, and had been removed from the confines of Lithuania to Russia prior to the world war of 1914-1917, the Russian Government agrees to return the same to Lithuania, in so far as their elimination may not cause serious deficiencies in the Russian archives, libraries, museums, picture galleries, in which they are kept.

The questions relating to such elimination are to be dealt with by a special mixed commission of an equal number of members of the two contracting parties.

(2) The Russian Government shall return at its expense, and shall hand over to the Lithuanian Government, all the judicial and governmental dossiers, judicial and governmental archives, including amongst these also the archives of senior and junior notaries, the archives of mortgage registries, the archives of the Consistorial Departments of all confessions, the archives and plans of the surveying, land-establishment, forestal, railway, roadway, postal and telegraphic and other offices, the plans, drawings, maps and, generally, all the material of the topographical section of the military district of Vilno, removed during the

world war of 1914-1917 from the confines of Lithuania, in so far as they refer to the territory of the Lithuanian State: the archives of the local branches of the noblemen's and peasants' banks, of the branches of the State bank and of all other credit, co-operative, mutual assurance establishments; also the archives and affairs of private establishments of Lithuania in so far as all the said objects actually are or shall prove to be in the keeping of governmental or communal establishments of Russia.

(3) The Russian Government shall return at its expense, and shall hand over to the Lithuanian Government for delivery to whomsoever it may concern; all kinds of title deeds, such as: purchase and mortgage deeds, agreements of lease, all kinds of cash securities, etc. including amongst these books, papers and documents required to effect settlements, and, generally, documents which are of importance for determining the ownership and legal titles of Lithuanian citizens, and which have been removed from the confines of Lithuania during the world war of 1914-1917, as far as the same actually are or shall prove to be in the keeping of governmental or communal establishments of Russia. In the event of their not being returned within two years from the date of the ratification of this treaty, such documents shall be deemed to be lost.

(4) As regards parts of the archives of the central establishments which relate to the territory of Lithuania and which are subject to elimination, there is to be a special arrangement, for which purpose a mixed commission of an equal number of members of the two contracting parties is to be appointed.

ARTICLE 10

(1) The Russian Government shall return at its expense, and shall hand over to the Lithuanian Government for delivery to whomsoever it may concern, the property of communal, benevolent, culture, educational establishments, and also the bells and utensils of churches and places of worship of all denominations which have been evacuated during the world war of 1914-1917, in so far as the said objects actually are or shall prove to be in the keeping of the governmental or communal establishments of Russia.

(2) (a) As regards the payments in savings banks, deposits, guarantees and other amounts paid into the former Russian governmental and judicial establishments, as far as such payments and amounts belong to citizens of Lithuania,

(b) as regards deposits or amounts of various descriptions paid into the branches of the State bank and into the nationalised and liquidated credit establishments, and their branches, in so far as such deposits and amounts belong to citizens of Lithuania, the Russian Government binds itself to admit to the Lithuanian citizens all those rights which at the time were admitted to all Russian citizens, and, therefore, grant permission to Lithuanian citizens, who in consequence of the occupation were not able to make use at the time of these their rights, to make use of the same now and to receive compensation for their claims in paper money values which have currency in the Russian Republic at the time such compensation is paid, and at the rate of exchange of the paper rouble existing on the internal money market at the time of the final occupation of Lithuania, that is, on the 1st September, 1915.

As regards securities and properties now kept, and which have been kept, at the offices of the banks and in their safes, as far as such securities and properties belong to citizens of Lithuania, the conditions set out in the first paragraph of this clause are to apply.

The sums, securities and properties mentioned in this article are to be handed over to the Lithuanian Government for delivery to whomsoever it may concern.

(3) The Russian Government shall return at its expense, and hand over to the Lithuanian Government the funds which are intended for the endowment of stipends for the educational establishments of Lithuania and for the Lithuanian citizens in the educational establishments in Russia.

(4) As regards payment of Russian monetary assignats, securities, governmental or state-guaranteed, and also private securities issued by companies and institutions, the undertakings of which have been nationalised by the Russian Government and which are circulating within the confines of Lithuania, and also as regards satisfaction of claims by Lithuanian citizens against the Russian Exchequer and against the nationalised institutions, Russia binds herself to allow Lithuania and Lithuanian citizens all those privileges, rights and preferences which are directly or indirectly granted by her or which may be granted to any third State or to its citizens, companies and institutions.

In the event of the securities and title deeds not being available, the Russian Government expresses its willingness, in the case of the application of this clause of this article, to recognise as the holders of the securities and others those who submit adequate proofs of the evacuation of the papers belonging to them during the war.

ARTICLE 11

(1) The Russian Government shall return to the Lithuanian Government, for delivery to whomsoever it may concern, the property of Lithuanian citizens or partnerships, companies and joint stock companies, the majority of the stock or shares of which at the time of the promulgation of the respective decrees of nationalisation by the Russian Government, belonged to Lithuanian citizens, and which had been evacuated during the world war of 1914-1917, in so far as such property actually is or shall prove to be in the keeping of the Russian Government.

REMARK

The present clause does not apply to funds, deposits and securities in the care of the branches of the State Bank or private banks, credit establishments and saving banks in the territory of Lithuania.

(2) As regards the railway rolling stock and telegraph and telephone installations, as well as all the equipment of the railway shops evacuated into Russia during the world war of 1914-1917, Russia agrees to make good to Lithuania part of these at a rate corresponding to the local requirements of the Lithuanian State, and making allowance for the general lowering of the tone of the economic life.

In order to exactly determine the amount of the said replacement, a mixed commission consisting of an equal number of members of the two contracting parties shall be appointed immediately upon the ratification of the present treaty.

REMARK

The replacement of railway rolling stock and telegraph and telephone installations and railway shop plant due to the occupied territory of Lithuania can only commence after the same has been relieved from occupation.

(3) For the purpose of carrying out the conditions set forth in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the present Treaty, the Russian Government undertakes to supply the Government of Lithuania with all the particulars and data referring thereto and to give every possible assistance in tracing returnable property, archives, documents, etc. The more detailed arrangement of the questions arising in connection with this subject shall be entrusted to a special mixed commission consisting of an equal number of members of the two contracting parties.

ARTICLE 12

The Russian Government taking into consideration that during the world war Lithuania has been almost entirely ruined, and that Lithuanian citizens are deprived of the possibility even of re-establishing their homesteads, their partly destroyed and gutted buildings, owing to the destruction of the forests of Lithuania, expresses its willingness:

(1) To release Lithuania from responsibilities in regard to the debts and any other liabilities of Russia, including such as have resulted from the issue of paper money, treasury notes, bonds, series and certificates of the Russian Treasury in connection with the foreign and internal loans of the Russian State, guarantees to sundry institutions and undertakings, and the guaranteed loans of same, etc. All such claims of creditors of Russia for the share relating to Lithuania shall only be directed against Russia.

(2) In the localities nearest to the frontiers of Lithuania and as near as possible to rivers down which timber can be floated, and to railways, to grant to the Lithuanian Government the right to cut timber over an area of 100,000 dessiatins with a gradual allocation during the period of twenty years of timber-cutting areas in accordance with the plans of the Russian Forestal Department. The fixing of the detailed conditions of the cutting of timber is left to a mixed commission consisting of an equal number of members of both contracting parties.

(3) To give to the Lithuanian Government 3,000,000 roubles in gold within the period of one month and a half from the date of the ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 13

(1) The contracting parties agree to commence within the earliest possible time after the ratification of the present treaty, negotiations for the conclusion of trading and transit conventions.

(2) The principle of the most-favoured nation shall be the basis of the trading convention.

(3) The following principles shall form the basis of the transit convention :

(a) Goods passing in transit through the territory of one of the contracting parties shall not be subject to any import dues or taxes.

(b) The freight rates for goods in transit shall not be higher than the freight rates for similar goods of local destination.

REMARK

Prior to the commencement of normal conditions, mutual transit traffic between Russia and Lithuania shall be regulated by the same principles. Other conditions in reference to the transit trade shall be fixed by special temporary agreements.

(4) The Russian and Lithuanian commercial fleets shall mutually make use of the harbours of the contracting parties on equal rights.

(5) Property left after the death of a citizen of one of the contracting parties on territory of the other shall be handed *in toto* into the charge of the consular or respective representative of the country to which the testator belonged, to be dealt with by the same in accordance with the laws of such country.

ARTICLE 14

The diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties shall be established immediately after the ratification of the present treaty. Upon the ratification of the present treaty the parties shall proceed with the making of a Consular Convention.

ARTICLE 15

Upon the ratification of this treaty the Russian Government shall release Lithuanian citizens and those opting Lithuanian citizenship, and the Lithuanian Government shall release Russian citizens and those opting Russian citizenship of military and civil classes from penalties in connection with all political and disciplinary actions. However, if judgments have as yet not been given in such cases, the proceedings in connection with the same shall be stopped.

Persons who commit the aforesaid acts after the ratification of this treaty shall not enjoy this amnesty.

Persons condemned by a criminal court for acts not coming under the amnesty shall be returned to their country of origin after serving sentence. However, in the event of judgment in cases of such description not being given prior to the expiration of one year from the date of the accused being charged, he shall on the expiration of this period be handed over to the home authorities with all the proceedings relating thereto.

In connection therewith both contracting parties also release their own citizens from punishment for acts committed by them prior to the ratification of the present treaty for the benefit of the other party.

ARTICLE 16

In dealing with the present treaty the two contracting parties shall take into consideration the fact of their never having been in a state of war one with the other and that Lithuania as a region of military operations during the world war of 1914-1917 has particularly suffered from the latter. Therefore, all the conditions of the present treaty can in no way serve as a precedent for any third country. On the other hand, should one of the contracting parties allow a third country or the citizens thereof special privileges, rights and preferences, the same shall without special agreement also extend to the other party or to the citizens thereof.

REMARK

The contracting parties, however, shall not prefer any claims to preferential rights which one of them may grant to a third country united to it by custom house or any other union.

ARTICLE 17

The settlement of questions of a public-legal and private-legal description arising between the citizens of the contracting parties, and also the adjustment of any separate points between the two countries, or between the countries and citizens of the other party, shall be effected by a special mixed commission of an equal number of members of the two parties, appointed immediately upon the ratification of the present treaty, the composition, powers, and duties of which shall be fixed by an instruction, to be agreed upon between the two contracting parties.

ARTICLE 18

The present treaty is drawn up in the Russian and Lithuanian languages. In its reading both texts are to be considered authentic.

ARTICLE 19

The present treaty is subject to ratification.

The exchange of the letters of ratification is to take place at Moscow.

Wherever the time of the ratification of the treaty is mentioned in the present treaty, this applies to the time of the mutual exchange of the letters of ratification.

In witness whereof the representatives of both parties have set their hands to the present treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

The original was drawn up in duplicate and executed in the city of Moscow on the twelfth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty.

[Translation ⁴]

PROTOCOL

The signatories of the present Protocol met on October 14th, 1920, at Moscow, in the offices of the Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs, in order to exchange the instruments of ratification of the Peace Treaty, between Russia on the one hand and Lithuania on the other, which was signed at Moscow on July 12th, 1920, in accordance with Article 19 of that Treaty.

After presentation of the instruments of ratification, which were found to be in good and due form, the two Parties satisfied themselves that the contents were identical and the exchange of ratifications took place. In testimony whereof the undersigned have drawn up this Protocol and have thereto affixed their hand and seal.

This Protocol is drawn up in duplicate.

(Signed) J. BALTRUŠAITIS.

(Signed) L. KARACHAN.

EXHIBIT 2-B

[Translation ²]

No. 1410

TREATY OF NONAGGRESSION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 28, 1926

The President of the Lithuanian Republic, of the one part, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, of the other part, being convinced that the interests of the Lithuanian people and of the peoples

⁴ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

² Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics demand constant co-operation based on mutual confidence, have agreed, in order to contribute to the best of their ability to the maintenance of universal peace, to conclude a treaty with a view to strengthening the friendly relations existing between them, and to this end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Lithuanian Republic:

Mykolas Slezevičius, Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic; and

Jurjis Baltrušaitis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Lithuanian Republic accredited to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics; and

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics:

Georges Tchitcherine, Member of the C. E. C. of the Union of Socialist Republics, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs; and

Serge Alexandrovsky, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in Lithuania;

Who having met at Moscow and exchanged their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

The relations between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Lithuanian Republic shall continue to be based on the Treaty of Peace between Lithuania and Russia, concluded at Moscow on July 12, 1920, all the provisions of which shall retain their force and inviolability.

ARTICLE 2

The Lithuanian Republic and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics undertake to respect in all circumstances each others sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability.

ARTICLE 3

Each of the two Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any act of aggression whatsoever against the other Party.

Should one of the Contracting Parties, despite its peaceful attitude, be attacked by one or several third Powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to support the said third Power or Powers against the Contracting Party attacked.

ARTICLE 4

If, on the occasion of a conflict of the type mentioned in Article 3, second paragraph, or at a time when neither of the Contracting Parties is engaged in warlike operations, a political agreement directed against one of the Contracting Parties is concluded between third Powers, or a coalition is formed between third Powers with a view to the economic or financial boycott of either of the Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to adhere to such agreement or coalition.

ARTICLE 5

Should a dispute arise between them, the Contracting Parties undertake to appoint conciliation commissions, if it should not prove possible to settle the dispute by diplomatic means.

The composition of the said commissions, their rights and the procedure they shall observe shall be settled in virtue of a separate agreement to be concluded between the two Parties.

ARTICLE 6

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, which must take place within six weeks of the date of its signature.

The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Kovno.

The present Treaty has been drawn up in Lithuanian and Russian.

As regards interpretation, both texts shall be considered as authentic.

ARTICLE 7

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for five years, except Articles 1 and 2, the duration of the validity of which is not limited.

The validity of the present Treaty shall be prolonged automatically, on each occasion for one year, until either of the Contracting Parties expresses, at least six months before the expiration of the Treaty, the desire to enter upon negotiations regarding the future form of political relations between the two States.

In faith whereof, the Plenipotentiaries have affixed to the present Treaty their autograph signatures, and their seals.

The original has been done and signed in duplicate at Moscow the twenty-eighth day of September, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-six.

[L. S.]	(Signed)	MYKOLAS SLEŽEVIČIUS.
	(Signed)	JURIS BALTRUŠAITIS.
[L. S.]	(Signed)	G. V. TCHITCHERINE.
	(Signed)	SERGE ALEXANDROVSKY.

NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN M. MYKOLAS SLEŽEVIČIUS, PRIME MINISTER OF THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC AND M. TCHITCHERINE, PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

I

LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LITHUANIAN LEGATION IN THE U. S. S. R.

No. 3773

MOSCOW

Moscow, September 28, 1926.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

On the occasion of the signature on today's date of the Treaty between Lithuania and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, I have the honour to make the following declarations:

(1) The two Governments have examined the questions of principle which are bound up with Lithuania's membership of the League of Nations. As regards this question the Lithuanian Government, both during the negotiations for the conclusion of the Treaty, and at the time of its signature, was guided by the conviction that the principle adopted by the Parties in Article 4 of the Treaty and relating to non-participation in any political agreements directed against one of the Contracting Parties which might be concluded between third Powers cannot in any way hinder Lithuania's execution of the obligations laid upon her by the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(2) The Lithuanian Government is convinced that Lithuania's membership of the League of Nations cannot constitute an obstacle to the friendly development of the relations between Lithuania and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

(3) At the same time the Lithuanian Government considers that, in view of Lithuania's geographical situation, the obligations laid upon her by her membership of the League of Nations—an institution whose fundamental purpose is to settle international disputes in a peaceful and equitable manner—cannot constitute an obstacle to the Lithuanian nation's aspirations towards neutrality, which is the policy best suited to her vital interests.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) MYKOLAS SLEŽEVIČIUS,
Prime Minister and Minister of Justice,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic.

Monsieur G. TCHITCHERINE,
People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

II

Moscow, September 28, 1926.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

On to-day's date you have addressed to me a Note to the following effect :

"(1) The two Governments have examined the questions of principle which are bound up with Lithuania's membership of the League of Nations. As regards this question the Lithuanian Government, both during the negotiations for the conclusion of the Treaty, and at the time of its signature, was guided by the conviction that the principle adopted by the Parties in Article 4 of the Treaty and relating to non-participation in any political agreements directed against one of the Contracting Parties which might be concluded between third Powers, cannot in any way hinder Lithuania's execution of the obligations laid up on her by the Covenant of the League of Nations.

"(2) The Lithuanian Government is convinced that Lithuania's membership of the League of Nations cannot constitute an obstacle to the friendly development of the relations between Lithuania and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

"(3) At the same time the Lithuanian Government considers that in view of Lithuania's geographical situation, the obligations laid upon her by her membership of the League of Nations—an Institution whose fundamental purpose is to settle international disputes in a peaceful and equitable manner—cannot constitute an obstacle to the Lithuanian nation's aspirations towards neutrality, which is the policy best suited to her vital interests."

In conformity with my Government's instructions, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Union takes due note of the above declaration.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) GEORGES TCHITCHERINE.

Monsieur MYKOLAS SLEŽEVIČIUS,

Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic.

III

Moscow, September 28, 1926.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

On the occasion of the signature on today's date of the Treaty between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Lithuanian Republic, I have the honour to inform you of the following :

The Government of the Union, being guided as always by its desire to see the Lithuanian nation, like all other nations, independent—a desire which the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has on several occasions expressed in its declarations—and in conformity with the Note addressed by the Soviet Government on April 5, 1923, to the Polish Government, and with the good-will with which the public opinion of the workers of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics follows the destinies of the Lithuanian nation, declares that the *de facto* violation of the Lithuanian frontiers committed against the will of the Lithuanian nation has not shaken its attitude with regard to the territorial sovereignty defined in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace, concluded between Russia and Lithuania on July 12, 1920, and in the Note annexed to the said Article.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) GEORGES TCHITCHERINE.

Monsieur MYKOLAS SLEŽEVIČIUS,

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic.

IV

REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LITHUANIAN LEGATION IN THE U. S. S. R.

No. 3772

MOSCOW

Moscow, September 28, 1926.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

On today's date you have addressed to me a Note to the following effect:

"The Government of the Union, being guided as always by its desire to see the Lithuanian nation, like all other nations, independent—a desire which the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has on several occasions expressed in its declarations—and in conformity with the Note addressed by the Soviet Government on April 5th, 1923, to the Polish Government, and with the good-will with which the public opinion of the workers of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics follows the destinies of the Lithuanian nation, declares that the *de facto* violation of the Lithuanian frontiers committed against the will of the Lithuanian nation has not shaken its attitude with regard to the territorial sovereignty defined in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace, concluded between Russia and Lithuania on July 12, 1920, and in the Note annexed to the said Article."

Acting on my Government's instructions, I have the honour to inform you that the Lithuanian Government takes due note of the above declaration.

I have the honour to be,

(Signed) MYKOLAS SLEŽEVIČIUS,
Prime Minister and Minister of Justice,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic.

Monsieur GEORGES TCHITCHERINE,
People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

EXHIBIT 2C

[Translation ¹]

No. 2859

PROTOCOL RENEWING THE TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN
 LITHUANIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF
 SEPTEMBER 28, 1936. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, MAY 6, 1931

The President of the Lithuanian Republic and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Considering that the Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow on September 28th, 1926, has effectively helped to strengthen and develop friendly relations between the two States and to consolidate peace in Eastern Europe,

And being desirous of further strengthening and developing their mutual relations, which are inspired with a spirit of peace and sincer friendship,

Have decided to prolong the validity of the said Treaty, and have to that end appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Lithuanian Republic:

Jurgis Baltrusaitis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Lithuanian Republic at Moscow;

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :
 Maxim Litvinov, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Commissary for Foreign
 Affairs ;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have
 agreed on the following provisions :

ARTICLE 1

The Treaty concluded between the Lithuanian Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Moscow on September 28, 1926, together with the notes of the Governments of Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics annexed thereto, shall be deemed to be prolonged for a period of five years from the date of expiry of the said Treaty. Unless either of the Contracting Parties informs the other, six months before the expiry of this period, of its desire to enter upon negotiations regarding the future form of the political relations between the two States, the Treaty shall be regarded as being automatically prolonged on each occasion for one year.

ARTICLE 2

The present Protocol is drawn up in the Lithuanian and Russian languages. For its interpretation both texts shall be deemed authentic. The Protocol shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place at Kaunas.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in duplicate, May 6, 1931.

JURGIS BALTRUŠAITIS.
 LITVINOV.

EXHIBIT 2-D

[Translation ¹]

No. 3405

CONVENTION ² BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOR THE DEFINITION OF AGGRES- SION—SIGNED AT LONDON, JULY 5TH, 1933

*French official text communicated by the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
 The registration of this Convention took place April 16th, 1934*

The President of the Republic of Lithuania and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ;

Being desirous of consolidating the peaceful relations existing between their countries ;

Mindful of the fact that the Briand-Kellogg Pact ³, of which they are signatories, and likewise the Pact ⁴ of Non-Aggression concluded between them at Moscow on September 28th, 1926, prohibit all aggression ;

Deeming it necessary, in the interest of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified ;

And noting that all States have an equal right to independence, security, the defense of their territories and the free development of their institutions ;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries ;

An judging it expedient, in the interest of the general peace, to bring into force as between their countries precise rules defining aggression, until such time as those rules shall become universal ;

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

² The exchange of ratifications took place at Moscow, December 14th, 1933.

³ Vol. XCIV, page 57 ; and Vol. CXXXIV, page 411, of this Series.

⁴ Volume LX, page 145, of this Series.

Have decided, with the aforesaid objects, to conclude the present Convention and have duly authorised for that purpose:

The President of the Republic of Lithuania:

Mr. Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. Maxime Litvinoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:

Who have agreed upon the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with the other Party, from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, the definition of aggression framed by the Committee on Security Questions of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, following on the Soviet delegation's proposal.

ARTICLE 2

Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

- (1) Declaration of war upon another State;
- (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
- (3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
- (4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
- (5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

ARTICLE 3

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2 (for examples, see Annex).

ARTICLE 4

The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their national laws.

It shall come into force immediately after the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Moscow.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done in London in two copies, in French, July 5th, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-three.

(s) VACLOVAS SIDZIKAUSKAS.

(s) MAXIME LITVINOFF.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

The High Contracting Parties signatories of the Convention relating to the definition of aggression,

Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the rule laid down in Article 3 of that Convention shall be in no way restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor,

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

A. *The internal condition of a State:*

E. g., its political, economic or social structure; alleged defects in its administrations; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war.

B. *The international conduct of a State:*

E. g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to eco-

conomic, financial or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognise that the present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.

(s) V. SIDZIKAUSKAS.

(s) MAXIME LITVINOFF.

EXHIBIT 2-E

TREATY INFORMATION

Compiled by the Treaty Division

CONCILIATION

TREATY OF CONCILIATION WITH HUNGARY (TREATY SERIES NO. 798)

The present composition of the International Commission provided for under the terms of the Treaty of Conciliation between the United States and Hungary, signed January 26, 1929, appears in this *Bulletin* under the heading "International Conferences, Commissions, etc."

MUTUAL GUARANTIES

SOVIET-LITHUANIAN TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

The American Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the Secretary of State with a despatch dated October 30, 1939, a copy of the English translation of the treaty between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, signed on October 10, 1939, as published in the *Moscow Daily News* of October 16, 1939. The text is as follows:

"TREATY ON THE TRANSFER OF THE CITY OF VILNO AND VILNO PROVINCE TO THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC AND ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND LITHUANIA

"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the one side and
"the President of the Lithuanian Republic on the other side,

"for the purpose of developing the friendly relations established by the Treaty of Peace of July 12, 1920, and based on recognition of the independent state existence and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other Party; recognizing that the Treaty of Peace of July 12, 1920, and the Pact on Non-Aggression and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of September 28, 1926, form as heretofore a firm basis for their mutual relations and undertakings,

"convinced that the definition of the exact conditions of insuring mutual security and the just settlement of the question regarding the state appurtenance of the city of Vilno and Vilno Province, unlawfully wrested from Lithuania by Poland, meet the interests of both Contracting Parties,

"found it necessary to conclude between them the following Treaty on the Transfer of the City of Vilno and Vilno Province to the Lithuanian Republic and on Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet Union and Lithuania and appointed for this purpose as their authorized representatives

"the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

"V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs,

"the President of the Lithuanian Republic:

"Juozas Urbis, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which authorized representatives, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in due form and good order, have agreed on the following:

"ARTICLE 1

"For the purpose of consolidating the friendship between the USSR and Lithuania, the city of Vilno and Vilno Province are transferred by the Soviet Union to the Lithuanian Republic and included in the territory of the Lithuanian state, the boundary between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic being estab-

lished in accordance with the map appended hereto, which boundary shall be specified in more detail in a supplementary protocol.

"ARTICLE II

"The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic undertake to render each other every assistance, including military, in the event of aggression or the menace of aggression against Lithuania, as well as in the event of aggression or the menace of aggression against the Soviet Union through Lithuanian territory on the part of any European power.

"ARTICLE III

"The Soviet Union undertakes to render the Lithuanian army assistance in armaments and other military equipment on favorable terms.

"ARTICLE IV

"The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic undertake jointly to effect protection of the state boundaries of Lithuania, for which purpose the Soviet Union is granted the right to maintain, at its expense, at points in the Lithuanian Republic mutually agreed upon, Soviet armed land and air forces of strictly limited strength. The exact location of these troops and the boundaries within which they may be quartered, their strength at each particular point, and also all other questions, such as economic, administrative, jurisdictional, and other, arising in connection with the presence of Soviet armed forces on the territory of Lithuania under the present Treaty, shall be regulated by special agreements.

"The sites and buildings necessary for this purpose shall be allotted by the Lithuanian Government on lease at reasonable terms.

"ARTICLE V

"In the event of the menace of aggression against Lithuania or against the USSR through the territory of Lithuania, the two Contracting Parties shall immediately discuss the resulting situation and take all measures found necessary by mutual agreement to secure the inviolability of the territory of the Contracting Parties.

"ARTICLE VI

"The two Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude any alliances nor to participate in coalitions directed against either of the Contracting Parties.

"ARTICLE VII

"Realization of this pact shall not affect to any extent the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, in particular their state organization, economic and social systems, military measures and, in general, the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs.

"The localities in which the Soviet armed land and air forces will be quartered (Article IV of the present Treaty) under all circumstances remain a component part of the territory of the Lithuanian Republic.

"ARTICLE VIII

"The term of validity of the present Treaty in regard to the undertakings for mutual assistance between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic (Articles II-VII) is 15 years and unless one of the Contracting Parties finds it necessary to denounce the provisions of the present Treaty established for a specified term one year prior to the expiration of that term, these provisions shall automatically continue valid for the next 10 years.

"ARTICLE IX

"The present Treaty comes into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange of the instruments shall take place in the city of Kaunas within six days of the date of the signing of the present Treaty.

"The present Treaty is done in two originals, in the Russian and Lithuanian languages, in the city of Moscow on October 10, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV.
J. URSIS."

EXHIBIT 3-A

[Translation ¹]

No. 67

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN LATVIA AND RUSSIA, DONE AT MOSCOW,
COMPLETED AND SIGNED AT RIGA, AUGUST 11, 1920

Russia on the one hand and Latvia on the other, being strongly desirous of bringing to an end the present state of war between them, and of bringing about a final settlement of all the questions arising from the former subjection of Latvia to Russia, have decided to commence negotiations for peace and to conclude as soon as possible a lasting, honourable and just peace. For this purpose they have appointed as their representatives:

The Government of the Federal Socialist Republic of Russian Soviets:

Adolphe Abramovitch Joffe, and

Jacob Stanislavovitch Hanetski.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Latvia:

Jean Wessman,

Pierre Bergis,

Ans Buschewitzs,

Edouard Kalnin,

Charles Pauluk.

These representatives being assembled at Moscow and having mutually examined the powers with which they were furnished, which were recognised to be in good and due form, agreed on the following terms:

ARTICLE 1

The state of war between the Contracting Parties shall cease from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

By virtue of the principle proclaimed by the Federal Socialist Republic of the Russian Soviets, which establishes the right of self-determination for all nations, even to the point of total separation from the States with which they have been incorporated, and in view of the desire expressed by the Latvian people to possess an independent national existence. Russia unreservedly recognises the independence and sovereignty of the Latvian State and voluntarily and irrevocably renounces all sovereign rights over the Latvian people and territory which formerly belonged to Russia under the then existing constitutional law as well as under international Treaties, which, in the sense here indicated, shall in future cease to be valid. The previous status of subjection of Latvia to Russia shall not entail any obligation towards Russia on the part of the Latvian people or territory.

ARTICLE 3

The state frontier between Russia and Latvia shall be fixed as follows: Starting from the Estonian frontier between the villages of Babina and Vuimorsk, through Vuimorsk, along the river Cloubotsa through Vachkova, then along the little river Opotchna and the rivers Opotchka and Viada as far as Doublinina. Here by the shortest route it reaches the river Koukhva, then along the river Koukhva, and along its tributary the river Pelega, as far as Oumernichi. From there in a straight line towards the river Outroïa as far as the letter "V" of the word "Kailov"; along the river Outroïa as far as the bend which it forms at Malaja Melnitsa; from there in a straight line to the curve of the river Lja, 2 versts to the North of the word "Starina." Then along the river Lja and the administrative frontier of the districts of Lutsin, Rejitsa and Dvinsk with those of Opotchesk, Sebej and Drissa as far as Pazina on the river Ossounitsa; then in a straight line across the White Lake, the Black Lake and the lake between Vassilieva and Mossichki; through the farm of Saveiki as far as the mouth of the narrow river which runs into the Western Dvina between Koskovtsi and the farm and village of Novoje Selo, then along the Western Dvina as far as the farm of Chafranovo.

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

Fourteen days after the ratification of the Treaty the Contracting Parties each undertake to withdraw their troops as far as the state frontier of their own territory.

NOTE (1). The frontiers indicated in this article are marked in red on the map (Scale 3 versts to the inch) annexed to this article. In case of difference between the text and the map, the text shall be considered valid.

NOTE (2). The fixing of the State frontier between Russia and Latvia and the placing of frontier posts shall be carried out by a special Mixed Frontier Commission composed of an equal number of delegates from both Parties. As regards the actual marking of the frontier and the allocation of uninhabited points, across which the frontier passes, to the territory of one or other of the Contracting Parties, the decisions of this Frontier Commission shall be based on ethnographic and economic considerations. In cases when basing its decisions on ethnographic and economic conditions this Mixed Commission shall fix a frontier on rivers or lakes; the frontier shall follow the central line of the river or lake without taking into consideration whether the former administrative frontier passed on either bank of such river or lake.

NOTE (3). In rivers and lakes forming part of the frontier the artificial withdrawal, from rivers and lakes forming part of the frontier, of waters liable to cause a lowering of the average level is forbidden. In the case of such rivers and lakes navigation and fishing shall form the subject of regulations established by mutual agreement; in fishing, only such instruments shall be sanctioned as do not cause any risk of exhausting the supply of fishes in these waters.

ARTICLE 4

The two Contracting Parties undertake:

(1) To forbid any army to remain on either territory except their own army or that of friendly States with which one of the Contracting Parties has concluded a military Convention, but which are not in a *de facto* state of war with either Contracting Party; and also to forbid, within the limits of their respective territory the mobilisation and recruiting of any personnel intended for the armies of States, organisations, or groups, for purposes of armed conflict against the other Contracting Party.

NOTE: The names given to certain units forming the "Division of Latvian Chasseurs" which at present forms part of the Russian Army, shall be recognised by the two Parties as having only an historic significance. These units have not and shall not have in the future a predominance of Latvian national element, and in spite of their name shall have no connexion either with the people or with the State of Latvia.

Consequently the fact that these detachments preserve their historic name shall not be considered by Latvia as an infringement of this clause.

Both parties undertake not to give to their military units new titles derived from geographical or national names of the other party.

(2) Not to permit the formation or residence in their territory of organisations or groups of any kind claiming to represent the Government of all or part of the territory of the other Contracting Party; or of representatives or officials of organisations or groups having as their object the overthrow of the Government of the other Contracting Party.

(3) To forbid Governments in a *de facto* state of war with the other Party, and organisations and groups having as their object military action against the other Contracting Party, to transport through their ports or their territory, anything which might be used for military purposes against the other Contracting Party, in particular, military forces belonging to these States, organisations or groups; material of war; technical military stores belonging to artillery, supply services, engineers, or air services.

(4) To forbid, except in cases provided for by International Law, passage through or navigation in their territorial waters of all war-ships, gun-boats, torpedo-boats, etc., belonging either to organisations and groups whose object is military action against the other Contracting Party, or to Governments which are in state of war with the other Contracting Party and which aim a military action against the other Contracting Party. This provision shall come into force as soon as such intentions are known to the Contracting Party to whom the said territorial waters and ports belong.

ARTICLE 5

The two parties mutually undertake not to claim the expenses of the war from each other. By this is understood the expenses incurred by the State for the conduct of the war, and likewise any compensations for losses occasioned by the war, that is losses occasioned to themselves or to their subjects by military operations, including all kinds of requisitions made by one of the Contracting Parties in the territory of the other.

ARTICLE 6

In view of the fact that it is necessary to apportion in an equitable manner among the States of the world, the obligation to make good the damages caused by the world-war of 1914-1917 to States that have been ruined, or to portions of States on whose territory military operations have taken place, the two Contracting Parties undertake to do all in their power to secure an agreement among all States in order to establish an International Fund, which would be used to cover the sums intended for the reparation of damages due to the war.

Independently of the creation of this International Fund, the Contracting Parties consider it necessary that Russia and all new States constituting independent Republics in what was formerly Russian territory, should render each other, as far as possible, mutual support to make good from their own resources the damage caused by the world-war, and undertake to do all in their power to secure this agreement between the above-mentioned Republics.

ARTICLE 7

Prisoners of war of both parties shall be repatriated as soon as possible. The method of exchange of prisoners is laid down in the Annex to this present Article.

NOTE: All captives who are not serving voluntarily in the Army of the Government which has made them prisoners shall be considered as prisoners of war.

ANNEX

(1) Prisoners of the two contracting Parties shall be repatriated unless, with the consent of the Government on whose territory they are, they express the desire to remain in the country in which they are or to proceed to any other country.

(2) At the time of their liberation, their papers and belongings, which may have been taken from them by order of the authorities of the Government which made them prisoner, shall be returned to them. Likewise, money earned by their work and not yet paid or credited to them shall be paid to them.

(3) Each of the contracting parties undertakes to repay expenses which it has incurred for the maintenance of its citizens who have been prisoners of war, so far as these expenses have not been made good by the work of the said prisoners of war on Government or private undertakings. This repayment shall be made in the currency of the country which captured the prisoners.

NOTE.—The indemnity due for the expenses of maintenance of prisoners of war includes the cost of their food, their clothing and their pay.

(4) Prisoners shall be despatched by detachments towards the frontiers of their State at the expense of the Government which made them prisoners; when handed over they shall be accompanied by a list on which shall be noted the Christian name, father's Christian name, and family name of the prisoner, the date on which he was made prisoner, and the place at which he worked during his captivity.

(5) Immediately after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace there shall be established, for exchange of prisoners of war, a Mixed Commission composed of three representatives of each of the Contracting Parties. Its duties shall be to supervise the carrying out of the conditions stated in the present Annex, to settle the periods, the methods and the order of repatriation of prisoners, and the expenses in accordance with the data given at the moment of the handing over of prisoners of war by the party concerned.

(6) The return of civilian and military interned persons, being nationals of the Contracting Parties, and also of hostages, shall be carried out at the request of the other Party on the basis already laid down.

ARTICLE 8

Persons residing, on the day of the ratification of the Treaty within the frontiers of Latvia, and likewise refugees residing in Russia who were registered, or whose parents were registered, before August 1st, 1914, in urban, rural or corporate societies, in the territory now forming the State of Latvia, are recognized as Latvian citizens.

Persons of the same category residing at the moment of ratification of this present Treaty within the frontiers of Russia, with the exception of the refugees above-mentioned, are recognised as Russian subjects.

Nevertheless, any person of the age of 18 years and above, residing in Latvian territory, has the right during one year, dating from the day of the ratification of the present Treaty, to declare that he does not desire to retain his Latvian nationality and to opt in favour of Russia; and in this case children of less than 18 years of age and wives acquire the latter nationality, unless and agreement to the contrary has been concluded between the married couple.

Likewise, Russian citizens can, under the terms of the second paragraph of this clause, during the same period of time and under the same conditions, opt for the status of Latvian citizens.

Those who have made a declaration of option, and likewise those of their family to whom the nationality is transmitted, retain their rights to their movable property and real estate within the limits of the laws in force in the State which they inhabit, and in case of departure they have the right to liquidate or carry away whatever belongs to them.

NOTE (1). Persons living at the time of the ratification of this Treaty in the territory of a third State, who are not naturalised and who fall within the provisions of the first paragraph of this article, are also recognised as citizens of Latvia, but preserve the right, under the conditions laid down, of opting for Russian nationality.

NOTE (2). Persons who, before or during the world-war of 1914-1917, were living in the territory of one of the Parties, and who at the time of the ratification of this Treaty are living in the territory of the other Party, shall also enjoy the rights granted under this Article to persons exercising the right of option.

Refugees who may have been able to remove their property in virtue of the Agreement of June 12, 1920, regarding the repatriation of refugees, shall enjoy the rights laid down in the Article dealing with optants, subject to proof that such property belongs to them, and was actually in their possession at the time of repatriation.

NOTE (3). Each of the two Contracting Parties shall grant to citizens of the other Party, in the same way as to optants, permission and facilities for returning freely to their own country, and generally for leaving the territory of the State of the other Party. In the same way, each of the two Contracting Parties undertakes to demobilise the citizens of the other Party immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Agreement as to the repatriation of refugees, concluded between Russia and Latvia on June 12th of the current year, shall remain in force with the following addition: refugees of both Parties shall, in addition to the rights granted to them under the above-mentioned Agreement, enjoy the rights conferred by the present Treaty of Peace on citizens and optants of the Party concerned.

ARTICLE 10

The two Contracting Parties mutually abandon all claims arising from the fact that Latvia once formed part of Russia, and recognise that national property of every kind in the territory of each of the Parties shall be the indisputable property of the State concerned. The right to claim Russian State property transported since August 1st, 1914, out of Latvian territory to the territory of a third State shall rest with the Latvian Government.

In the same way rights which may be claimed by Russia over legal entities or over other States are also transferred to the Latvian State, in so far as such rights concern Latvian territory.

The Latvian State takes over all claims of the Russian Treasury against property situated within Latvian territory, as well as credits of every kind against

Latvian citizens, but only in so far as they have not been met by payments on account.

NOTE: The right to claim from small peasant proprietors their debts towards the former Russian Peasant Land Bank or towards other Russian Land Banks which have now been nationalised, as well as the right to claim debts contracted towards the former Russian Nobility Land Bank or towards other Russian Land Banks which to-day have been nationalised—debts which are a burden on the lands of these proprietors, in view of the fact that such lands have passed to peasants possessing little or no land—shall not pass to the Latvian Government; such debts shall be simply cancelled.

All deeds and documents forming proofs of the above-mentioned rights shall be transmitted to the Latvian Government by the Russian Government as soon as the latter obtains possession of them. In cases where such transmission cannot be effected within the period of one year after the ratification of this Treaty, such documents and deeds not transmitted shall be considered as lost.

ARTICLE 11

(1) The Russian Government shall at its own expense restore to Latvia and return to the Latvian Government all libraries, records, museums, works of art, educational material, documents and other property of educational and scientific establishments, Government, religious and communal property and property of incorporated institutions, in so far as such objects were removed from Latvian territory during the world-war of 1914–1917, and in so far as they are or may be actually in the possession of the Governmental or Public administrative bodies of Russia.

In respect of records, libraries, museums, works of art and documents which are of supreme importance for Latvia from a scientific, artistic or historical point of view, and which were removed from Latvia into Russia before the world-war of 1914–1917, the Russian Government consents to restore such property to Latvia in so far as such restoration shall not cause serious loss to the Russian records, libraries, museums, and picture galleries in which they are kept.

Questions concerning such restoration shall be submitted to the decision of a Mixed Commission formed of an equal number of members for each of the contracting parties.

(2) The Russian Government shall restore at its own expense and return to the Latvian Government all files concerning affairs of justice and of the State, all legal and governmental records including records of notaries of the first and second class, records of mortgage departments, records of religious departments of all sects, survey records and plans, records of administration of land, railways, forests, highroads, posts and telegraphs, and other administrations: the plans, estimates, maps, and, in general, all topographical materials of the Military district of Vilna in so far as they concern the territory of the Latvian State: records of local branches of the Nobility and Peasant Banks, of the branches of the State Bank and of all other establishments for credit for mutual insurance and for co-operative purposes, as well as the records and files of private administrations of Latvia, in so far as such objects are or will be actually in possession of the Governmental or Public institutions of Russia.

(3) The Russian Government shall give up at its own expense and send to the Latvian Government to be allocated to those concerned titles to property of every kind, such as: deeds of purchase, mortgages, farm leases contracts and contracts of all kinds, etc.; also all books, papers and documents necessary for making up accounts, and in general all documents of any value in determining rights of property of Latvian citizens who have been evacuated from Latvia into Russia during the world-war of 1914–1917, in so far as such documents are or will be actually in the possession of Governmental or Public institutions of Russia.

Should these documents not be restored within two years from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty, they will be considered as lost.

(4) Russia undertakes to withdraw from the archives of its central and local administrations such of the documents as directly concern the provinces forming part of Latvia.

ARTICLE 12

(1) The Russian Government restores to Latvia all property which was evacuated to Russia during the world-war of 1914–1917, belonging to religious, civil, charitable or educational administrations, together with the bells and objects used for purposes of worship in churches and convents of all denominations,

in so far as such objects are, or may be, actually in the possession of the Governmental or Public administrations of Russia.

(2) The Russian Government restores to Latvia the securities evacuated to Russia after the 1st August, 1914, which had been deposited with or belonged to commercial or credit institutions, such as Banks, Mutual Loan Societies, Savings Banks and Mortgage Institutions, Municipal Public Banks and Pawnbrokers' Establishments, which were in operation within the territory of Latvia, with the exception of gold, precious stones and bank notes, in so far as these securities are, or may be, actually in the possession of the Governmental or Public institutions of Russia.

(3) As far as concerns the payment of Russian State Loans, guaranteed by the Government, which are in circulation within the territory of Latvia, and also all loans issued by Companies and private administrations, whose undertakings have been nationalised by the Russian Government, and also as far as concerns the settlement of the claims of Latvian nationals upon the Russian Treasury, and upon the undertakings which have been nationalised, Russia undertakes to grant to Latvia, to Latvian nationals and administrations, all rights, advantages and preferences which are directly or indirectly assured to Latvia, or which may be granted to any third State, or to nationals or institutions of such third State. If any securities or titles to property are missing, the Russian Government declares itself prepared in accordance with this paragraph to recognise as holders of the securities above referred to, those persons who shall be in a position to prove that the securities which belong to them were evacuated during the war.

(4) As far as concerns Savings Bank Deposits, Bank balances, and guarantees for loans and other sums deposited in the former institutions of Justice or of Government, insofar as such sums are the property of Latvian nationals, and also as far as concerns payments or sums above mentioned, which may have been deposited in the branches of the former State Bank, or in private credit institutions, or their branches, which have been liquidated or nationalised insofar as such sums or deposits belong to Latvian nationals, the Russian Government undertakes to accord to such Latvian nationals all the rights which were formerly accorded to all Russian nationals, and, accordingly, authorises Latvian nationals, who, by reason of the occupation, may not have been able to assert their claims, to assert such claims now.

In payment of the indemnity for claims of Latvian nationals, the Russian Government will take account of the depreciation in the value of Russian money since the 3rd September, 1917, the date of the actual occupation of Latvia, up to the date of the payment of the sums refunded.

(5) The provisions of Sub-Paragraph 4 of the present Article shall be observed as regards securities and credit balances which are, or were deposited, in banks or strong rooms, if such securities or balances are the property of Latvian nationals, and are, or may be, actually in the possession of Governmental or Public institutions. These provisions are also applicable to securities and property of Latvian nationals deposited in credit institutions or in the strong-rooms of such institutions, which have been evacuated since 1st August, 1914.

NOTE: The sums, securities and property referred to in this paragraph will be transmitted to the Latvian Government, which will undertake to deliver them to the rightful owners.

ARTICLE 13

The Russian Government restores to the Latvian Government for delivery to the rightful owners the property belonging from a legal or material point of view, to Latvian towns, corporations or individuals which was evacuated during the world war, 1914-1917, insofar as such property is, or may be, in the possession of Governmental or Public institutions.

NOTE: (1). In case of doubt, the majority of the shares which were the property of Latvian nationals before the coming into force of the Decree of the Russian Government as to the nationalisation of industry, shall be recognised as belonging to Latvian Joint Stock Companies and Associations.

NOTE (2). The present Article does not refer to capital, deposits or securities which are in the branches of the State Bank, or in private banks, credit institutions or savings banks situated in Latvian territory.

ARTICLE 14

(1) As far as concerns postal, telegraphic and telephonic material evacuated from Latvia into Russia during the world-war of 1914-1917, Russia undertakes to restore to Latvia and to transfer to the Latvian Government an amount equal to that which really represents the economic needs of Latvia and the intellectual life of this independent State, in so far as the said material is, or may be in the possession of the Governmental and Public institutions of Russia.

(2) As far as concerns the material for purposes of navigation and water transport, and as far as concerns the light-houses in service in Latvian ports, which may have been evacuated during the war, Russia undertakes to return to Latvia and to restore to the Latvian Government, an amount of material exactly corresponding to the needs of Latvia as an independent Government for the working of its ports, in so far as this material is, or may be, actually in the possession of the Governmental or Public institutions of Russia.

(3) As far as concerns the rolling-stock of fixed railway material, including work-shops evacuated from Latvia into Russia during the world-war of 1914-1917, Russia undertakes to restore to Latvia and to transmit to the Latvian Government an amount of material equal to that which actually corresponds to the economic needs of Latvia as an independent Government, in so far as such material is, or may be, actually in the possession of the Governmental or Public institutions of Russia.

In order to determine exactly the quantity of material referred to above which is to be restored, and also to determine the periods within which such material shall be delivered, a mixed Commission, composed of Russian and Latvian Representatives in equal proportions, shall be set up immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace. This Commission shall base its estimate of the material to be restored upon the economic situation of the districts which, under the present Treaty, constitute the country of Latvia as it was before the war of 1914-1917. After having set apart and deducted the material which ensured the maintenance of trade and national transport for the whole of (former) Russia, the Commission shall definitely decide what are the requirements of Latvia, as at present constituted, as an independent State, while taking into consideration the general decrease in economic activity.

ARTICLE 15

In order to facilitate the carrying-out of Articles 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the present Treaty, the Russian Government undertakes to furnish the Latvian Government with full and complete information with regard to these Articles, and to afford it every kind of assistance in its task of determining the property, documents and archives to be restored.

Property which has to be given back to Latvia in accordance with the foregoing Articles may be restored, by agreement between Russia and Latvia, either in kind or in its equivalent money-value.

On account of the sums which may be due to Latvia in this way, Russia shall pay Latvia, within two months of the ratification of the Treaty, the sum of 4,000,000 gold roubles.

ARTICLE 16

Taking into consideration the damage suffered by Latvia owing to the world-war of 1914-1917, Russia :—

(1) Exempts Latvia from all responsibility with regard to all the debts and obligations of Russia, including the issue of paper-money Treasury Bonds resulting from Treasury obligations or receipts. With regard to the domestic and foreign loans of the Russian Empire, guarantees, or loans contracted by various institutions and undertakings, etc. All claims of this nature, lodged by creditors of Russia must be exclusively addressed to Russia.

(2) With a view to assisting the Latvian peasants in the restoration of buildings destroyed in the course of the war, the latter is accorded the right to cut down wood over an area of one hundred thousand deciatines, in as close proximity as possible to the Latvian frontier and also to railways and navigable rivers; the procedure for giving effect to this concession shall be decided by a mixed Russo-Latvian Commission composed of an equal number of representatives of both countries. This Commission shall be set up immediately after the ratification of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 17

(1) The contracting parties have agreed to conclude, immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty, commercial and transit agreements, consular, postal and telegraphic conventions, and a convention relating to the deepening of the bed of the western reaches of the Dvina.

(2) Pending the conclusion of these commercial and transit agreements, the Contracting Parties are agreed that their economic relations shall be governed according to the following principles:—

(a) The two parties guarantee to each other the "most-favoured nation" treatment.

(b) Goods in transit through the territory of the Contracting Parties are exempt from all taxes and customs-duties.

(c) Freight-rates applied to goods in transit must not be higher than the rates applied to goods of the same nature of national origin.

(3) Property bequeathed by a national of one of the Contracting Parties, but situated in the territory of the other, shall be transferred in its entirety to the Consul or Representative of the Government of the country to which the deceased belonged, to be disposed of according to the laws of the country of origin of the deceased.

ARTICLE 18

The Contracting Parties bind themselves simultaneously to take the necessary steps to ensure the safe navigation of trading vessels in their waters by organising the necessary pilot services, and by re-establishing lighthouses and buoys in dangerous zones; and they bind themselves to do all that is necessary with a view to the location of mine-fields until they have been completely swept.

The two Contracting Parties have agreed to take part in the work of sweeping for mines in the Baltic. With this object an agreement will be concluded between the two parties. An arbitration tribunal will assign to each party its share in this work in the event of their failing to agree upon this point.

ARTICLE 19

Diplomatic and consular relations between the Contracting Parties will be renewed immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 20

After the ratification of the present Treaty Latvian citizens, and those who opt for Latvian nationality, on the one hand, and Russian citizens and those who opt for Russian nationality, on the other hand, military and civilians alike, shall be amnestied by the Russian and Latvian Governments respectively from all penalties for political or disciplinary offences. If judgment in respect of such offences has not yet been pronounced the case shall be dismissed.

Persons committing any of the above-mentioned offences after the ratification of the present Treaty shall not benefit by this amnesty.

Persons undergoing trial, or who have been convicted or arrested for crimes and offenses against common law committed before the ratification of the present Treaty, as well as those who are undergoing sentences for the same offenses, shall be immediately handed over to their Government, if the latter should so desire; all documents connected with their cases shall also be handed over at the time of extradition.

The two Contracting Parties shall, at the same time, amnesty their own nationals from penalties for offences committed to the advantage of the other party before the signature of the present Treaty.

NOTE (1). The provisions of the foregoing paragraph relating to amnesty and extradition are only applicable to persons upon whom sentence has not been passed at the time of the signature of the present Treaty.

NOTE (2). Russian subjects, and persons opting for Russian nationality, who took part in the conspiracy of April 16, 1919, and in Bermond's attack, shall not benefit under the provisions of this paragraph.

ARTICLE 21

The solution of questions relating to public or domestic legislation which may arise between the Government of one country and the citizens of the other country, shall be entrusted to a Mixed Commission consisting of an equal number from both sides to be appointed immediately after the ratification of the present

Treaty. The Composition, rights, and obligations of this Commission shall be laid down in instructions which are to be drawn up by agreement between the two contracting parties.

ARTICLE 22

The present Treaty is drawn up in Russian and Lettish.
For purposes of interpretation both texts are to be regarded as official.

ARTICLE 23

The present Treaty is to be submitted for ratification and shall come into force from the moment of ratification, except as otherwise provided in the Treaty. The exchange of letters of ratification shall take place at Moscow.

In all cases, in the present Treaty, in which reference is made to the time of ratification of the Treaty, this is to be understood to mean the time of the exchange of letters of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the representatives of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

The original text is in duplicate.

DONE at Moscow, completed and signed at Riga on the 11th August, 1920.

RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN LATVIA AND RUSSIA

Whereas the Plenipotentiaries of Latvia and the Plenipotentiaries of Russia signed the following Treaty of Peace between Latvia and Russia on the 11th August, 1920.

[Here follows the text of the Treaty]

and Whereas this Treaty has been approved by the Latvian Constituent Assembly on the 2nd of September 1920, I hereby confirm this Provisional Convention and authorise its execution.

RIGA, *September 25, 1920.*

(Signed) J. TSCHAKSTE,
President of the Latvian Constituent Assembly.
(Countersigned) MEIEROVICS,
Minister of Foreign Affairs for Latvia.

[Translation ¹]

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF DEPUTIES OF THE WORKMEN, PEASANTS, COSSACKS, AND SOLDIERS OF THE RED ARMY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF THE SOVIETS

Announces that:

The Plenipotentiary Representatives of the Russian Federal Socialist Republic of the Soviets and the Plenipotentiary Representatives of the Democratic Republic of Latvia have drawn up at Moscow, and have completed and signed at Riga on August 11th, 1920, the Treaty of Peace between Russia, on the one hand, and Latvia on the other, of which Treaty the exact wording is as follows:

[Here follows the text of the Treaty of Peace with the signatures]

After examining this Treaty, the Pan Russian Central Executive Committee of the Councils of Deputies for the workmen, peasants, cossacks, and soldiers of the Red Army at their Seventh Meeting on September 9th, 1920, have approved and ratified all its provisions and have undertaken that all the provisions set forth in the above-mentioned documents shall be strictly observed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the President of the Pan Russian Central Executive Committee, after having signed these Letters of Ratification has now confirmed them and has affixed thereto the State seal.

Moscow, *September 9, 1920.*

For the President of the Central Pan Russian Executive Committee of the Council of Deputies for the workmen, peasants, cossacks and soldiers of the Red Army.

(Signed) J. LOUTCHNOVINOV.
(Signed) IENOUKIDZE, *Secretary.*

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

[Translation ¹]

PROTOCOL

The undersigned met on October 4th 1920 at Moscow, at the Office of the Peoples Commissary for Foreign Affairs in order to exchange Letters of Ratification of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Riga on the 11th August 1920 between Russia on the one hand and Latvia on the other, in conformity with Article 23 of the aforementioned Treaty of Peace.

After which, seeing that the Letters had been presented and found by both parties to be in good and due form, and that their contents were found to be identical, the exchange of letters of Ratification took place.

In witness whereof the undersigned have drawn up the present Protocol and have thereto affixed their signatures and seals.

The original has been done in duplicate and signed on the 4th of October 1920 at 6.30 p. m.

(Signed)
GEORGES TCHITCHERIN.
L. KARAKHAN.

G. ALBAT.
W. GREWIN.

Certified true copy:

[L. S.] L. SEYA,
Director of Political and Economic Affairs.

EXHIBIT 3-B

[Translation ²]

No. 3408

TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN LATVIA AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, SIGNED AT RIGA, FEBRUARY
5TH, 1932

The President of the Latvian Republic and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Having in view the Peace Treaty concluded on August 11th, 1920, between Latvia and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the effect of which extends to the entire territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and all the provisions of which remain invariably and permanently the firm foundation of the relations between the High Contracting Parties;

Being convinced that it is in the interests of both High Contracting Parties to adopt certain provisions which may contribute to the development and consolidation of the friendly relations between the two States;

Being firmly resolved to respect mutually and unreservedly each other's sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and inviolability;

Being guided by the desire to contribute to the consolidation of world peace;

Declaring that none of the obligations so far assumed by either of the Parties hinders the peaceful development of their mutual relations or is incompatible with the present Treaty;

Being desirous of confirming and supplementing in their relations the General Pact of Renunciation of War of August 27th, 1928, which continues to retain its effect as in the past between the High Contracting Parties, independently of the duration or the normal expiry of the present Treaty or its possible denunciation before the date provided for;

Have decided to conclude the present Treaty, and have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Latvian Republic:

M. Margers Skujenieks, Prime Minister, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs;

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

² Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
M. Boris Spiridonovitch Stomoniakov, Member of the Council of the
People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and
M. Alexis Ivanovich Svidersky, Plenipotentiary Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have
agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any act of
aggression directed against the other, and also from any acts of violence directed
against the territorial integrity and inviolability or the political independence
of the other Contracting Party, regardless of whether such aggression or such
acts are committed separately or together with other powers, with or without a
declaration of war.

ARTICLE 2

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to be a party to any mili-
tary or political treaties, conventions or agreements directed against the inde-
pendence, territorial integrity or political security of the other Party, or to any
treaties, conventions, or agreements aiming at an economic or financial boycott
of either of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 3

The obligations provided for in the present Treaty may not in any way limit
or change the international rights and obligations devolving on the High Con-
tracting Parties from treaties concluded by them before the coming into force
of the present Treaty and duly published in the official publications of each
Party, in so far as such treaties do not include any elements of aggression
within the meaning of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

In view of the obligations assumed in the present Treaty, the High Contract-
ing Parties undertake to submit all disputes, whatever their kind or origin,
which may arise between them after the signature of the present Treaty and
which cannot be settled within a reasonable period by ordinary diplomatic proce-
dure, to a procedure of conciliation in a joint conciliation commission of
which the composition, powers, and procedure are to be fixed by a special Con-
vention which the two Parties undertake to conclude as early as possible, and
which shall come into force at the same time as the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 5

The present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Latvian and Russian lan-
guages, both texts being equally authentic. It shall be ratified and the instru-
ments of ratification shall be exchanged between the High Contracting Parties
in Moscow.

ARTICLE 6

The present Treaty shall come into force at the moment of the exchange of the
instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for three years. Each of
the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to denounce the Treaty by giving
notice six months before the expiry of this period, or without giving notice if the
other Contracting Party commits an aggression upon any third State. If the
Treaty is not denounced by either of the High Contracting Parties, its period
of validity shall be automatically prolonged for two years; in the same manner,
the Treaty shall be deemed to be prolonged on each occasion for a further period
of two years, if it is not denounced by either of the Contracting Parties in the
manner provided in the present Article.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the pres-
ent Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

DONE at Riga, in duplicate, in the Latvian and Russian languages, February
5th, 1932.

(Signed) MARGERS SKUJENIEKS.
(Signed) B. STOMONIAKOV.
(Signed) A. SVIDERSKI.

PROTOCOL MODIFYING THE CONDITIONS OF VALIDITY OF THE ABOVE AGREEMENT

The President of the Latvian Republic and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Guided by the aspiration to provide the firmest possible basis for the development of the relations between their countries;

Desirous of giving each other fresh proof of the unchangeability and solidity of the peaceful and friendly relations happily established between them;

Inspired by the desire to contribute to the consolidation of world peace and to the stability and peaceful development of international relations in Eastern Europe;

Noting that the conclusion, at Riga on February 5th, 1932, of the Treaty between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has had a beneficial effect on their relations and on the solution of the above-mentioned problems;

Have decided to sign the present Protocol and have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Latvian Republic:

Dr. Alfred Bīlmanis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Latvian Republic in Moscow;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Maxime Maximovich Litvinoff, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having exchange their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

In alternation of the period of validity of the Treaty concluded at Riga on February 5th, 1932, between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, provided for in the first sentence of Article 6 of the said Treaty, the Treaty shall remain in force until December 31st, 1945.

ARTICLE 2

The present Protocol is drawn up in duplicate, in the Latvian and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. It shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the High Contracting Parties at Riga.

The present Protocol shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have thereto affixed their seals.

DONE in Moscow, in duplicate, in the Latvian and Russian languages, April 4th, 1934.

(Signed) Dr. ALFR. BĪLMANIS.

(Signed) M. LITVINOFF.

EXHIBIT 3-C

[Translation ¹]

No. 4381

PROTOCOL MODIFYING THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT, WITH FINAL PROTOCOL, CONCLUDED ON DECEMBER 4TH, 1933, BETWEEN LATVIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, JUNE 21ST, 1937

The undersigned, being duly authorised by their Governments, have agreed to introduce the following amendments in the Economic Agreement between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of December 4th, 1933, and in the Final Protocol to the said Agreement.

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

1

Article 2 of the aforesaid Agreement shall in future read as follows:

"The execution of the provisions of Article 1 of the present Agreement shall be verified at the end of each year of the duration of the Commercial Treaty by persons specially appointed for the purpose by both Governments, two persons being appointed by each Party. This verification must be concluded not later than on the last day of the second month after the corresponding year of the duration of the Commercial Treaty."

2

Article 4 of the aforesaid Agreement shall in future read as follows:

"If it is found, when verifying the returns regarding the exchange of goods, that the value of Soviet goods imported into Latvia is higher or lower than the value of Latvian goods exported during the same year to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the difference shall be carried forward to the following year, and must be made up in the course of that year."

3

The last sentence of Clause 3 of the Final Protocol to Article 1 shall in future read as follows:

"Should the Treaty be denounced by either Contracting Party, the difference remaining at the end of the corresponding year must be made up in the course of four months from the date when the Commercial Treaty ceases to apply, that is to say, two months for the verification of the exchange of goods in the last year, and two months for making up the difference."

4

The present Protocol is subject to ratification. It shall come into force as from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Riga as soon as possible.

The present Protocol shall remain in force for the entire duration of the aforesaid Economic Agreement between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Done at Moscow, in duplicate, in the Latvian and Russian languages, this 21st day of June, 1937.

V. MUTERS.
Vl. POTEKINE.

[Translation ¹]

No. 3409

CONVENTION RELATING TO CONCILIATION PROCEDURE BETWEEN
LATVIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.
SIGNED AT RIGA, JUNE 18TH, 1932

In accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty concluded at Riga on February 5th, 1932, between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the Latvian Republic and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have decided to conclude a Convention relating to conciliation procedure, and have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Latvian Republic:

M. Karlis Zarins, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Alexei Ivanovich Svidersky, Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to submit for amicable settlement in the Conciliation Commission, in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention, disputes of all kinds which may arise between them on account of circumstances occurring after the coming into force of the Treaty concluded at Riga on February 5th, 1932, between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which cannot be settled through the diplomatic channel within a reasonable time. This undertaking also refers in particular to any possible differences regarding the interpretation and execution of treaties and agreements concluded or to be concluded between the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

The Conciliation Commission provided for in Article 1 shall not be permanent, but shall be specially constituted for each session. It shall meet once a year for an ordinary session, the exact date of which shall be fixed on each occasion by agreement between the two High Contracting Parties.

Extraordinary sessions shall be held if, in the opinion of either Party, they are required by any urgent special case.

All the sessions of the Conciliation Commission shall take place at Riga and Moscow alternately. The place of meeting of the first session shall be decided by lot.

As a general rule, the session must not last for more than fourteen days.

ARTICLE 3

The Conciliation Commission shall consist of four members, each of the High Contracting Parties appointing two members from among its own citizens for each session of the Commission.

Each of the Contracting Parties shall be entitled to have recourse to the services of experts appointed by it, who may sit on the Commission in an advisory capacity.

The chair shall be taken at each session by one of the members of the Commission representing the Party in whose territory the session is held.

ARTICLE 4

The task of the Conciliation Commission shall be to examine disputes submitted to it and to propose to the two High Contracting Parties an equitable solution satisfactory to both Parties, and in particular to avert any possible future disagreement between the two Parties on the same questions.

If, during one session, the Conciliation Commission does not arrive at a common proposal on any one of the questions on its agenda, the question may be again submitted to an extraordinary session of the Conciliation Commission, which must, however, take place not later than four months after the first session.

The results of each session of the Conciliation Commission shall be submitted in the form of a report to the Governments of the two Parties.

The report or parts thereof may be published only by agreement between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 5

Each of the Parties shall transmit to the other Party through the diplomatic channel, not later than fourteen days before the date of meeting of the ordinary session of the Conciliation Commission, a list of the questions which it desires to examine at the session in question.

In case of an application to hold an extraordinary session, the Party making the application must inform the other Party of the circumstances connected with the urgent special case which give rise to the application. The Commission must meet not later than one month after the receipt of the application.

ARTICLE 6

Both High Contracting Parties undertake to furnish the Commission with all particulars which it may require, and to facilitate in all respects the accomplishment of its task.

ARTICLE 7

The two High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any measure which might have an unfavourable effect on the discussion of any question in the Conciliation Commission. In particular, they declare their willingness to consider the question of preventive measures for this purpose.

ARTICLE 8

The Conciliation Commission shall be deemed to form a quorum only if all the members duly convened are present.

If one of the members is not in a position to take part in the work of the Commission, the Party concerned shall appoint a substitute for him not later than thirty days after his inability to attend has been established.

The decisions of the Commission shall be taken by the unanimous consent of its members.

ARTICLE 9

The Conciliation Commission shall submit to both Governments a report on all the questions in dispute submitted for its consideration. The report shall be submitted before the end of the session during which the disputes have been considered, unless the Contracting Parties have decided by common consent to prolong that period.

The report shall contain a proposal for the settlement of each question in dispute submitted to the Commission, if such proposal has been accepted by all the members of the Commission.

Should the Commission not have been able to agree to joint proposals, the report shall contain the proposals of both Parties.

ARTICLE 10

Further details of procedure shall be fixed by the Conciliation Commission itself as may be required.

ARTICLE 11

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to inform the other Party within a reasonable time, which shall in no case exceed three months, whether it accepts the Commission's proposals as recorded in the report.

ARTICLE 12

The remuneration of the members of the Conciliation Commission, and of the experts and other persons called in by each of the High Contracting Parties, shall be defrayed by the Party concerned.

All other expenses connected with the activities of the Commission shall be divided equally between the two Parties.

ARTICLE 13

The present Convention constitutes an integral part of the Treaty concluded at Riga on February 5th, 1932, between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and is subject to ratification.

It shall come into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the aforesaid Treaty.

The present Convention shall remain in force for the period for which the Treaty of February 5th, 1932, is concluded.

ARTICLE 14

The present Convention is drawn up in the Latvian and Russian languages. Both texts are equally authentic.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

DONE at Riga, in duplicate, June 18th, 1932.

(Signed) K. ZARINS.

(Signed) A. SVIDERSKI.

EXHIBIT 3-D

[Translation ¹]

No. 3411

ECONOMIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN LATVIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, DECEMBER 4TH, 1933

The undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

In the course of each year during which the Commercial Treaty concluded this day between Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics remains in force, the Trade Delegation of the Union and the Soviet economic organisations shall purchase in Latvia, for importation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, goods of Latvian origin to the value of the goods exported from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Latvia, so that the exports of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Latvia shall be approximately equal to its imports from Latvia.

ARTICLE 2

The execution of the provisions of Article 1 of the present Agreement shall be verified at the end of each half-year of the duration of the Commercial Treaty by persons specially appointed for the purpose by both Governments, two persons being appointed by each Party. This verification must be concluded not later than on the last day of the second month after the corresponding half-year of the duration of the Commercial Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

The value of Soviet imports into Latvia shall be determined on the basis of prices for delivery free at frontier or c. i. f. Latvian ports, according to the Latvian official statistics. The value of Latvian imports into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be determined on the basis of prices for delivery free at frontier or c. i. f. Soviet ports, according to the Soviet official statistics. The Parties shall be entitled to make corrections in the statistics on the basis of documentary material.

ARTICLE 4

If it is found, when verifying the returns regarding the exchange of goods, that the value of Soviet goods imported into Latvia is higher or lower than the value of Latvian goods exported during the same half-year to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the difference shall be carried forward to the following half-year, and must be made up in the course of that half-year.

ARTICLE 5

The present Economic Agreement shall remain in force for the entire duration of the Commercial Treaty of to-day's date.

DONE at Moscow, in duplicate, in the Latvian and Russian languages, December 4th, 1933.

(Signed) Dr. ALFR. BILMANIS.

(Signed) B. STOMONAKOV.

(Signed) V. MUNTERS.

(Signed) S. DYOLAICKIS.

(Signed) E. OZOLINS.

(Signed) I. LORENCIS.

FINAL PROTOCOL

To Article 1

1. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states that not less than 50% of the purchases made by the Union of Latvia on the basis of Article 1 of the present Agreement will consist of agricultural products.

2. A refusal by the Foreign Exchange Commission of the Latvian Ministry of Finance to permit the export of manufactured goods of Latvian origin to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against payment in lats may not serve as a

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

justification for failure to observe the relationship established in Article 1 of the present Agreement between Soviet exports to Latvia and Soviet imports from Latvia.

The Latvian delegation states that, as regards the grant of permits to export manufactured goods of Latvian origin against payment in lats, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not be placed in a worse position than any third State.

3. The difference between exports from the Union to Latvia and imports into the Union from Latvia must not exceed two hundred thousand (200,000) lats in either direction at the end of each year during which the Commercial Treaty remains in force. Should the Treaty be denounced by either Contracting Party, the difference remaining at the end of the corresponding year must be made up in the course of four months from the date when the Commercial Treaty ceases to apply, that is to say, two months for the verification of the exchange of goods in the last half-year, and two months for making up the difference.

To Article 3

The Parties will grant each other mutual assistance in verifying the invoices and other documents submitted to the Customs administrations, on which the statistical registration is based.

To Article 4

The provisions of Article 4 shall not in any way affect the provisions of the Final Protocol to Article 1, paragraph 3, of the present Agreement.

DONE at Moscow, in duplicate, in the Latvian and Russian languages, December 4th, 1933.

(Signed) Dr. ALFR. BILMANIS.

(Signed) V. MUTERS.

(Signed) E. OZOLINS.

(Signed) B. STOMONAKOV.

(Signed) S. DVOLAICKIS.

(Signed) I. LORENCIS.

EXHIBIT 3-E

[Translation]

No. 4656

PACT OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, OCTOBER 5TH, 1939

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the one part, and

The President of the Republic of Latvia, of the other part.

With the object of developing the friendly relations established by the Treaty of Peace of August 11th, 1920, founded upon recognition of the independent political existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Party;

Recognising that the Treaty of Peace of August 11th, 1920, and the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of February 5th, 1932, continue to constitute the firm foundation of their mutual relations and obligations;

Convinced that it is in the interests of both Contracting Parties that the exact conditions under which their mutual security is assured should be determined;

Have deemed it necessary to conclude between themselves the Pact of Mutual Assistance hereunder, and have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. V. M. Molotoff, President of the Council of People's Commissaries and People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Republic of Latvia:

M. Vilhelm Muters, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

ARTICLE I

The two Contracting Parties undertake to render each other assistance of every kind, including military assistance, in the event of a direct aggression or threat of aggression by any great European Power against the maritime frontiers of the Contracting Parties in the Baltic Sea or against their land frontiers across the territory of the Estonian or Lithuanian Republics, and also against the bases provided for in Article III.

ARTICLE II

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to assist the Latvian army, on advantageous terms, with armaments and other war material.

ARTICLE III

The Latvian Republic, with a view to ensuring the security of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and consolidating its own independence, grants to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the right to have in the towns of Liepāja (Libau) and Ventspils (Windau) naval bases and a number of aerodromes for an air force, these to be leased at a reasonable rent. The exact sites of the bases and aerodromes shall be assigned and their boundaries determined by special agreement.

With a view to the defence of the Strait of Irbes, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is granted the right, on the same conditions, to construct a base for coastal artillery on the littoral between Ventspils and Pitrags.

With a view to the defence of the naval bases, the aerodromes and the coastal artillery base, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have the right to maintain at its own expense, in the areas allotted for the bases and aerodromes, a strictly limited quantity of Soviet armed land and air forces, the maximum number of which shall be determined by a special agreement.

ARTICLE IV

The two Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude alliances or to take part in coalitions directed against either of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE V

The enforcement of the present Pact may in no way impair the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, more especially with regard to their political structure, economic and social systems, and military measures.

The areas allotted for the bases and aerodromes (Article III) shall remain Latvian territory.

ARTICLE VI

The present Pact shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification. The exchange of instruments shall take place at Riga within six days from the date of signature of the present Pact.

The period of validity of the present Pact shall be ten years, provided always that, if neither of the Contracting Parties finds it necessary to denounce the present Pact one year before the expiry of that period, the Pact shall automatically continue to have effect for the ten years following.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Pact and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow in duplicate originals, in the Russian and Latvian languages, this 5th day of October, 1939.

V. MUTERS.
V. MOLOTOFF.

EXHIBIT 3-F

{Translation ¹}

No. 3391

CONVENTION² FOR THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION—SIGNED AT
LONDON, JULY 3RD, 1933

French official text communicated by the Roumanian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the League of Nations, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and by the Permanent Delegate of Finland accredited to the League of Nations. The registration of this Convention took place March 29th, 1934.

His Majesty the King of Roumania, the President of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, and His Majesty the King of Afghanistan :

Being desirous of consolidating the peaceful relations existing between their countries ;

Mindful of the fact that the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of which they are signatories, prohibits all aggression :

Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified ;

And noting that all States have an equal right to independence, security, the defence of their territories, and the free development of their institutions ;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries ;

And judging it expedient, in the interest of the general peace, to bring into force, as between their countries, precise rules defining aggression, until such time as those rules shall become universal ;

Have decided, with the aforesaid objects, to conclude the present Convention, and have duly authorised for the purpose :

His Majesty the King of Roumania :

M. Nicholas Titulescu, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

The President of the Estonian Republic :

Dr. Oskar Kallas, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London ;

The President of the Latvian Republic :

M. Waldemaras Salnais, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

The President of the Polish Republic :

M. Edouard Raczyński, Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary ;

The President of the Turkish Republic :

Tevfik Rüstü Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :

M. Maxine Litvinoff, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs ;

His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia :

Fatollah Khan Noury Esfandiary, Chargé d'Affaires in London ;

His Majesty the King of Afghanistan :

Ali Mohammed Khan, Minister of Education ;

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

² *Deposit of ratification in Moscow:*

Roumania.....	October 16th, 1933.
Poland.....	October 16th, 1933.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	October 16th, 1933.
Afghanistan.....	October 20th, 1933.
Persia.....	November 16th, 1933.
Latvia.....	December 4th, 1933.
Estonia.....	December 4th, 1933.
Turkey.....	March 23rd, 1934.
<i>Accession:</i>	
Finland.....	January 31st, 1934.

Who have agreed on the following provisions :

ARTICLE I

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the other Parties, from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, the definition of aggression as explained in the report dated May 24th, 1933, of the Committee on Security Questions (Politis report) to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which report was made in consequence of the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

ARTICLE II

Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions :

- (1) Declaration of war upon another State ;
- (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State ;
- (3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State ;
- (4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State ;
- (5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

ARTICLE III

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article II. (For examples, see Annex.)

ARTICLE IV

The present Convention shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with its laws.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the High Contracting Parties with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by two of the High Contracting Parties, the present Convention shall come into force as between those two Parties. The Convention shall come into force as regards each of the other High Contracting Parties when it deposits its instruments of ratification.

Each deposit of instruments of ratification shall immediately be notified by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to all the signatories of the present Convention.

ARTICLE V

The present Convention has been signed in eight copies, of which each of the High Contracting Parties has received one.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

DONE in London, July 3rd, 1933.

[L. s.]	(Signed)	N. TITULESCU.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	O. KALLAS.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	WALDEMARAS SALNAIS.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	E. RACZYNSKI.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	TEVFIK RÜSTÜ.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	MAXIME LITVINOFF.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	ALI MOHAMMED KHAN.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	F. NOURY ESFANDIARY.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE III OF THE CONVENTION RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

The High Contracting Parties signatories of the Convention relating to the definition of aggression.

Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the rule laid down in Article III of that Convention shall be in no way restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor.

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article II of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

A. The internal condition of a State:

E. g., its political, economic or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war.

B. The international conduct of a State:

E. g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article II.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognise that the present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.

[L. s.]	(Signed)	N. TITULESCU.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	O. KALLAS.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	WALDEMARAS SALNAIS.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	E. RACZYNSKI.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	TEVFIK RÜSTÜ.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	MAXIME LITVINOFF.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	ALI MOHAMMED KHAN.
[L. s.]	(Signed)	F. NOURY ESFANDIARY.

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE

It is hereby agreed between the High Contracting Parties that should one or more of the other States immediately adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accede in the future to the present Convention, the said accession shall confer on the State or States in question the same rights and shall impose on them the same obligations as those conferred and imposed on the ordinary signatories.

DONE at London on July 3rd, 1933.

(Signed) MAXIME LITVINOFF.
S. SALNAIS.
N. TITULESCO.
ALI MOHAMMAD.
F. NOURY ESFANDIARY.
O. KALLAS.
E. RACZYNSKI.
T. RÜSTÜ.

EXHIBIT 4-A

[Translation ¹]

No. 289

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ESTHONIA, SIGNED AT TARTU ON FEBRUARY 2, 1920

Esthonia of the one part, and Russia of the other part, moved by a sincere desire to put an end to the war which has broken out between them, have decided to enter into peace negotiations, and to conclude as quickly as possible a just, hon-

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

ourable and lasting peace, and have therefore appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Esthonia:

Jaän Poska, member of the Constituent Assembly;

Ant, Piip, member of the Constituent Assembly;

Mait. Puuman, member of the Constituent Assembly;

Julius Seljamäa, member of the Constituent Assembly; and

Jaän Soots, Major-General of the General Staff;

and the Council of the Commissaries of the People of the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia:

Adolphe Abramovitch Joffe, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen, Peasants, Soldiers of the Red Army and Cossacks, and

Isidor Emmanuelovitch Goukovski, member of the College of the Popular Commissariat of State Control.

The plenipotentiaries appointed, having met at Tartu, after communicating their powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1

The state of war between the Contracting Parties shall be at an end from the date on which the present Treaty of Peace shall come into force.

ARTICLE 2

On the basis of the right of all peoples freely to decide their own destinies, and even to separate themselves completely from the State of which they form part, a right proclaimed by the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, Russia unreservedly recognises the independence and autonomy of the State of Esthonia, and renounces voluntarily and for ever all rights of sovereignty formerly held by Russia over the Esthonian people and territory by virtue of the former legal situation, and by virtue of international treaties, which, in respect of such rights, shall henceforth lose their force.

No obligation towards Russia devolves upon the Esthonian people and territory from the fact that Esthonia was formerly part of Russia.

ARTICLE 3

(1) The frontier between Esthonia and Russia shall take the following course:

Starting from the Bay of Narva, one verst south of the Fishermen's House, it proceeds towards Ropsha, then follows the course of the rivers Mertvitskaia and Rosson as far as the village of Ilkino; thence it passes one verst to the west of the village of Keikino, half a verst to the west of the village of Isvosi, and continues towards the village of Kobolvaki; it then crosses the mouth of the River Shchuchka, passes by Krivaia Luka, by the Pechurki estate, at the confluence of the three sources of the River Vtroia, follows the southern boundary of the village of Kurichok with its outlying buildings and proceeds . . . [line omitted in original] . . . of Lake Peipus, which it follows southwards, thus passing one verst to the east of the Island of Piirisaar (Pork); follows the middle of the strait as far as the Island of Salu, passes thence across Lake Pihkva (Pskov) between the Talabski Islands and the Island of Kamenka, then to the east of the village of Poddubie (on the southern shore of Lake Pskov) and to the look-out post on the railway near Griadishche, then passes successively to the west of the village of Shahintsoi, to the east of Novaia, across Lake Poganova, between the villages of Babina and Vomorski, one and a-half versts to the south of the forester's settlement (north of Glybochina) to Sprekhtichi and the farm of Kudepi.

Note 1. The frontier described in this article is marked in red on the map (3 versts to an inch—o. m. 0.254) which forms the first Annex to Article 3.

In case of divergence between the text and the map, the text shall prevail.

Note 2. The demarcation of the frontier between the two contracting countries, and the setting-up of frontier marks, shall be carried out under the direction of a special Mixed Commission composed on an equal number of members of each of the two parties. In carrying out the delimitation of the frontier, this Mixed Commission shall decide upon the assignment to one or the other party of inhabited places lying on the frontier, in accordance with

the ethnographical indications, and taking into account economic and agricultural considerations.

(2) The part of the Esthonian territory to the east of the Narova, the River Narova itself and the islands lying in it, and also the zone to the south of Lake Pskov contained between the above-mentioned frontier and a line joining the villages Borok-Smolui-Belkova-Sprekhtichi, shall be considered to be neutral in a military sense until January 1, 1922.

Esthonia undertakes to maintain in the neutralised zones no troops whatsoever except those which may be necessary for frontier duty and for the preservation of order, the number of which is laid down in the Second Annex to the present Article: to construct no fortifications or observation posts in those zones, to establish no military magazines there, to keep no kind of war material there, with the exception of that indispensable for the effectives permitted, and also to establish there no bases or depots for the use of vessels of any kind or of any air fleet whatsoever.

(3) Russia, on her side, undertakes to maintain no troops in the Pskov region to the west of the following line: western bank of the estuary of the Velikaia, villages of Sivtseva, Luhnova, Samulina, Shalki and Sprekhtichi, until January 1st, 1922, with the exception of those which are indispensable for frontier duty and the preservation of order, the number of which is laid down in the Second Annex to the present Article.

(4) The Contracting Parties undertake to maintain no armed vessel on the Lakes of Peipus and Pskov.

Annex 1 to Article 3

(Map²)

Annex 2 to Article 3

The two Contracting Parties undertake:

(1) to withdraw their troops behind their respective frontiers, in the sector contained between the Gulf of Finland and the mouth of the River Shchuchka, within the twenty-eight days following the ratification of the Peace Treaty;

(2) to withdraw their troops, with all their material and supplies, from the neutralized in which, under §§ 2 and 3 of Article 3, it is forbidden to maintain any troops except those necessary for frontier duty and the preservation of order, within the forty-two days following the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(3) to withdraw, in accordance with § 4 of Article 3, the armed vessels lying in Lakes Peipus and Pskov during the forty-two days after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, or to remove their guns, mines, mine-laying apparatus and munitions of war of every kind;

(4) to maintain for frontier duty, in the neutralised zones in which the presence of troops is forbidden, not more than forty men to a verst during the first six months following the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and thereafter not more than thirty: subject to this provision, the construction of a barbed-wire entanglement along the whole frontier shall be permitted. The number of men detailed to maintain internal order shall not exceed five hundred in each zone;

(5) to maintain on Lagoes Peipus and Pskov no armed vessels of the Customs service, except patrol boats armed with guns of a maximum calibre of 47 mm. and with machine-guns, at the maximum rate of two guns and two machine-guns to each boat, the number of such patrol boats not to exceed five.

ARTICLE 4

For one year from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty, persons of non-Esthonian origin residing in Esthonia, and aged eighteen years or over, shall have the right to opt for Russian nationality: women and children under eighteen years of age shall follow the nationality of the husband or father, unless there exist between husband and wife any agreement to the contrary. Persons opting for Russia shall leave Esthonian territory within one year from the date of such option, but shall retain their rights over their real property and may remove their personal property. Similarly, persons of Esthonian origin residing in Russia may opt for Esthonian nationality during the same period and under the same conditions.

Each of the two contracting Governments reserves the right of rejecting such options of nationality.

² Not reproduced in this volume.

Note.—In case of persons of doubtful origin, there shall be considered as Estonians those who are personally registered, or whose parents were registered, in a rural or urban community, or in any "class", in the territory which now forms the State of Estonia.

ARTICLE 5

Should the perpetual neutrality of Estonia be internationally recognised, Russia undertakes to respect such neutrality and to join in guaranteeing it.

ARTICLE 6

In case of the neutralisation of the Gulf of Finland, the two contracting Parties undertake to accede to such neutralisation of the conditions drawn up by common agreement of the States concerned and established by international declarations relating thereto; in case of the conclusion of any such international agreement, they also undertake to bring their naval forces, or a portion thereof, into conformity with the provisions of such international agreement.

ARTICLE 7

The two contracting Parties undertake:

(1) to forbid the presence in their territory of any troops except those of their own Governments, or of friendly States with which either of the contracting Parties may have concluded a military agreement, but which are not *de facto* in a state of war with either of the Contracting Parties; and also to forbid the recruiting and mobilisation, within the limits of their territory, of unofficial forces drawn from the ranks of the armies of such States, and the organisation of private detachments for the purpose of armed warfare against the other contracting Party;

(2) to disarm such land and sea forces as are in their territory and were not in the service of either of the two contracting Governments on October 1, 1919; to neutralise and immobilise, until January 1, 1922, all goods, artillery and commissariat material (except food and clothing), engineering and air material, that is to say, guns, machine-guns, rifles, side-arms, munitions, aeroplanes, armoured cars, tanks, armoured trains, etc., belonging to the land or sea forces referred to, with the exception of the technical and war material assigned to such forces but belonging to the contracting Parties or to other States. Any portion of such material which may belong to other States shall be returned within six months from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty. The disarmament of the irregular land and sea forces indicated above, and the immobilisation and neutralisation of their military stocks and of their technical and war material, shall be completed, the first 30 % of the men and material in the seven days following the ratification of the present Peace Treaty, and the remainder during the two following weeks, at the rate of 35 % in each week;

(3) to forbid all officers and men of the irregular troops disarmed under the provisions of the previous § (2) to enter as volunteers, under any pretext whatever, in the ranks of the Government troops of the contracting Parties, except:

(a) persons of Estonian nationality residing outside Estonia but opting for that country;

(b) persons of non-Estonian nationality residing in Estonia before May 1, 1919, and not opting in favour of Russia;

(c) persons of non-Estonian nationality not opting in favour of Russia and having served in the Estonian army before November 22, 1919.

Persons falling into categories *a*, *b*, and *c* may take service in the armies of the Estonian Government.

(4) (a) to refuse to countries which are *de facto* in a state of war with either of the contracting Parties, and to organisations or groups whose object is armed warfare against either of the contracting Parties, the passage through their ports and their territory of anything which might be used in attacking the other contracting Party, and particularly of the armed forces attached to such States, organisations or groups, and of any objects and any war material of the artillery, commissariat, engineers, air force or other arm belonging to such military formations;

(4) (b) to forbid, except in cases provided for in international law, the launching and navigation in their territorial waters of any warships, gunboats, mine-layers, etc., belonging either to organisations or groups whose object is to

make war upon the other contracting Party, or to countries which are in a state of war with that Party, if the object of such vessels is to attack it, and if that object is known to the contracting Party to whose territory the harbours and territorial waters utilised belong;

(5) To forbid the formation, and the presence in their territory, of any organisations or groups whatsoever claiming to govern all or part of the territory of the other contracting Party, and the presence of representatives or officials of organisations or groups whose object is to overthrow the Government of the other Party to the Treaty.

(6) The Governments of the two contracting Parties undertake mutually to supply, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Peace Treaty, precise data relating to the condition of non-governmental forces, and also of the military stocks (fixed or movable) and of the military or technical material belonging to those irregular forces, in their territory at the date of the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, that is to say, on the thirty first day of December nineteen hundred and nineteen.

(7) To superintend the execution of the military guarantees mutually agreed upon by the contracting Parties, a joint Commission shall be formed, the composition, privileges and duties of which shall be determined by instructions annexed to the present Article.

Annex to Article 7

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE JOINT COMMISSION CONSTITUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE 7

(1) To superintend the carrying out of the military guarantees provided for in Article 7, a joint Commission, consisting of representatives of the two contracting Parties, shall be formed.

(2) Composition of the Commission: four members for each Party, namely: a President, two representatives of the War Ministry and one representative of the Admiralty.

(3) The duty of the Commission shall be: effectually to control the carrying-out of all the conditions laid down in § 2 of Article 2 in the form prescribed in the subsequent Articles of these instructions, and within the periods laid down, in regard to this matter, in § 2 of Article 7.

Note. Information relating to § 3 of Article 2, if required for the settlement of possible disputes, shall be supplied to the Commission by the Government concerned.

(4) The Commission shall receive from the Government concerned, or from the local organisations appointed thereby, all information required for the execution of the military guarantees.

(5) To ensure the effectual control of the execution of the military guarantees, the Commission shall have the right to verify in person the information supplied to it under § 4 above, and, if need be, to superintend on the spot the discharge of the obligations laid down in § 2 of Article 7.

(6) To ensure free communication between members of the Commission and their Governments, a direct telegraph line (Hughes apparatus) is established between the town of Rakvere (Vesenberg), the seat of the Commission, and Petrograd or Moscow. During its stay in Russian territory, the Commission shall sit at Pskov, and a direct telegraph line (Hughes apparatus) shall connect that city with Tallinn (Reval). Members of the Commission shall be entitled to make free use of the telegraph, and to despatch special messengers. Correspondence despatched and received by special messenger shall enjoy diplomatic privileges.

(7) The Commission shall draw up in Esthonian and Russian a statement of its work and conclusions, which shall be submitted to both the Governments concerned.

(8) After the complete discharge of all the duties imposed on the Commission by § 3 of these instructions, and after it has verified the facts in accordance with § 5, and, in any case, within one month at most from the date on which the members of the Commission are informed by their respective Governments that the latter have fulfilled all the conditions of guarantee which come within the competence of the Commission, that body shall be dissolved. The Commission's activities may be prolonged, if need be, by agreement between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 8

The two Parties mutually surrender their claims to the repayment of their war expenses, i. e., military expenses, and also to the repayment of war losses, i. e., those caused to the State or to individuals as a result of military measures, including losses arising from requisitions, of whatever nature, made in enemy territory.

ARTICLE 9

The prisoners of war of both countries shall be released as soon as possible. The formalities for the exchange of prisoners are set out in the Annex to this Article.

Note 1. The term "prisoners of war" shall apply to individuals who were captured and did not take service in the armies of the State which captured them.

Note 2. Prisoners of war who were captured by irregular forces and did not take service in the ranks of such forces shall be repatriated in the ordinary course.

Annex to Article 9

(1) Prisoners of war of both contracting Parties shall be repatriated, unless they prefer to remain in the country in which they are (with the consent of the Government of that country), or to go to some other country.

(2) The periods within which the exchange of prisoners of war shall be carried out shall be settled by the two Governments after the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(3) Prisoners of war shall, at the time of their release, have restored to them everything of which they were deprived by acts of the authorities of the Government which captured them, and shall also receive the full amount of the pay due to them, or any part of such pay withheld from them.

(4) Each of the contracting Parties shall undertake to refund the costs of the maintenance of its citizens who were made prisoners, as far as these expenses have not been covered by the work of the prisoners in State or private enterprises. The payment shall be carried out in the currency of the State which maintained the prisoners.

Note. The costs of maintenance to be refunded shall comprise the value of the prisoners' food, the supplies made to him in kind, and his pay.

(5) Prisoners shall be conducted to the frontier in detachments, at the expense of the Government which captured them; the return of these prisoners shall be carried out according to the lists drawn up, which shall show the Christian name, patronymic and family name of the prisoner, the date of his capture, the unit in which he was serving before capture, and, if he has been sentenced to imprisonment for any act regarded as criminal, the precise nature of such crime and the date on which it was committed.

(6) Immediately after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, a Committee, consisting of four representatives of each of the contracting Parties, shall be formed for the exchange of prisoners of war. This Committee shall superintend the carrying-out of the clauses of the present Annex, organise the repatriation of prisoners, and also determine the amount of their maintenance costs by reference to the accounts submitted at the time of the release of the prisoners by the party concerned.

ARTICLE 10

The contracting Parties shall remit to prisoners of war and internal civilians, on their return to their own country, all punishments to which they may have been condemned for criminal acts committed for the benefit of the opposite party, and all disciplinary punishment of every kind.

The amnesty shall not extend to persons who have committed a crime of the kind mentioned above, or a breach of discipline, after the signature of the Peace Treaty.

Prisoners of war and interned civilians, sentenced by a criminal court for any crime not covered by the amnesty, before the ratification of the present Treaty, or after it but before the expiration of one year from the date of the ratification, shall not be repatriated until their punishment has been carried out.

Those prisoners or interned civilians who have been prosecuted for criminal acts not covered by the amnesty, but upon whom no sentence has been passed within one year from the date of the ratification of the present Peace Treaty,

shall be handed over to the authorities of their own country at the expiration of this period, together with all documents relating to the proceedings brought against them.

ARTICLE 11

Russia surrenders any claim to the transfer, or repayment of the value, of property of the former Russian Empire, of whatever nature, whether real or other estate, situated in Esthonia and forming the common property of the whole nation. Such property shall include: military or other buildings, forts, harbours, vessels of every kind (including warships), their cargoes, etc. She also surrenders all rights held by the Russian State over the real and personal property of individuals formerly subject to it, as far as such property may be situated in Esthonian territory, within the limits assigned to Esthonia by the treaty, or in her territorial waters, or may have been situated there at the time of the German occupation, *i. e.*, on February 23, 1918. Russia also surrenders all her rights over vessels, including warships, which were situated as above during the German occupation, and, lastly, over those which, during the war between Esthonia and Russia, were either captured directly by Esthonian forces or captured by other forces and afterwards handed over to the Esthonian Government. All the property enumerated above becomes the sole property of Esthonia and is free from all obligations as from November 15, 1917, or, if it has been acquired by Russia since that date, from the date of such acquisition.

All claims of the Russian Treasury against Esthonian subjects, if recoverable in Esthonia, pass to Esthonia, but only in so far as they cannot be set off by counterclaims on the part of the debtors.

The documents and records which attest the rights mentioned in this Article shall be transferred by the Russian Government to the Esthonian Government; if the transfer be not completed within six months from the date of the ratification of the Treaty, such documents shall be deemed to be lost.

Esthonia, for her part, shall not be entitled to bring against Russia any claim based on her former status as a part of the Russian Empire.

ARTICLE 12

Notwithstanding the agreements concluded in Article II:

(1) Russia grants to Esthonia fifteen millions of gold roubles, of which eight millions shall be payable within one month, and the remaining seven millions within two months, from the date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(2) Esthonia shall bear no part in the responsibility for the debts or any other obligations of Russia, and particularly for those arising from the issue of paper currency, Treasury bonds, debentures, foreign or internal loans, the guaranteeing of loans issued by various concerns or enterprises, etc.; all claims of the creditors of Russia for debts relating to Esthonia shall be brought against Russia exclusively.

(3) As regards the redemption of Russian State bonds, guaranteed by the State and now in circulation in Esthonian territory, and that of other securities issued by companies or concerns whose enterprises have been nationalised by the Russian Government, and also as regards the satisfaction of the claims of Esthonian subjects against the Russian Treasury, Russia shall be obliged to grant to Esthonia and Esthonian citizens all exemptions from taxation, rights and privileges which she has directly or indirectly offered, or may offer, to any foreign State or to the subjects, companies or enterprises of such State.

Note. Claims of Esthonian subjects against local branch banks in Esthonia which were nationalised by the decree of the Central Executive Committee (December 14, 1917) for the Nationalisation of Banks shall, if they were advanced before the promulgation of this decree, have the same titles to consideration as claims against the Russian Treasury, so far as they cannot be met out of the property remaining in possession of such branches.

(4) The Russian Government shall restore to the Esthonian Government all property of the University of Tartu, and of other educational institutions, which is, or was, situated in Esthonian territory and has been removed to Russia. Such property shall include libraries, records, documents and, in general, all other objects having a scientific or historical interest for Esthonia. Such restitution shall only be made so far as the whereabouts of the property is known to the Government or public institutions of Russia, or shall be revealed to them.

(5) The Russian Government shall restore to the Estonian Government, which shall deliver them to their owners, all objects of value, except gold and precious stones, negotiable securities and credit vouchers such as mortgages, bills of exchange, etc., removed from Estonian territory by financial, educational and other organisations of the Government or by local authorities or individuals, if the present whereabouts of such personal property be indicated by the Estonian authorities. If such indications be not furnished, or if the property in question be not discovered in the places indicated, the Russian Government shall, in accordance with § 3 of this Article, be prepared to recognise as holders of the negotiable and other securities persons producing sufficient evidence that the relative documents were removed during the war. A special joint Commission shall be formed to consider such claims.

(6) In fulfilment of the conditions laid down in §§ 3, 4 and 5 of this Article, the Russian Government undertakes to supply the Estonian Government with all necessary information, and fully to co-operate with it in the search for the goods, objects, records, documents, etc., to be restored. The decision of any questions raised in relation to this matter shall be entrusted to the Special Joint Commission, which shall consist of an equal number of members of the two contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 13

Russia declares that the exemptions, rights and privileges granted to Estonia and to her citizens by the present Treaty shall in no case, and under no circumstances, constitute a precedent when Peace Treaties are concluded between Russia and the other States formed from the late Russian Empire; if, however, in concluding such treaties, Russia grants to any one of these new States or to its subjects any exemptions, rights or private privileges, these shall be fully extended immediately and without special agreement to Estonia and her subjects.

ARTICLE 14

The decision of any questions of public or private law which may arise between citizens of the contracting Parties, and the settlement of certain special questions between the two Governments, or between one of the contracting Governments and the citizens of the other, shall be carried out by special Joint Commissions which shall be formed immediately upon the ratification of the present Treaty. The composition, rights and duties of these Commissions shall be fixed by "instructions" which shall be confirmed in the case of each Commission by an Agreement between the two contracting Parties.

The duties of these Commissions shall include, among others :

(1) The drawing-up of a commercial Treaty and the consideration of all questions of an economic nature;

(2) The settlement of questions relating to the division of the records of the organisations of the former central power, of the archives of the administrative and judicial bodies of the civil records, and of the registers and documents relating to current business of such administrative or judicial bodies;

(3) The settlement of questions relating to the payment for property in Russia belonging to Estonian subjects, and for property in Estonia belonging to Russian subjects, and of other questions regarding the protection of the interests of citizens of one Party to the Treaty in the country of the other Party;

(4) The settlement of questions concerning property of rural or other associations which has been divided by the new frontiers.

ARTICLE 15

Diplomatic and consular relations between Estonia and Russia shall be established within a period to be fixed by a subsequent agreement.

ARTICLE 16

Economic relations between Estonia and Russia shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of the Annex to this Article.

Annex I to Article 16

(1) The contracting Parties agree that the conclusion of Peace shall also put an end to the state of war between them in the financial and economic field.

(2) The contracting Parties agree to enter, as soon as possible after the ratification of the present Peace Treaty, into negotiations for the conclusion of a commercial Treaty, to be based upon the following principles:

(a) The "most-favoured nation" treatment shall be granted, in the territory of each Party, to the citizens, to commercial, industrial, or financial enterprises and companies, to ships and their cargoes, to the products of agricultural and rural industry of the other contracting Party, and, further, to the export and import of the goods of one of the contracting Parties from or into the territory of the other Party.

(b) Goods passing through the territory of one of the contracting Parties shall not be subject to any import duty and shall not pay any transit tax.

(c) The freight charges on goods in transit shall not be higher than those on other classes of goods consigned to the country.

Note. Until the conclusion of the commercial Treaty, the commercial relations between Esthonia and Russia shall be governed by these principles.

(3) In the free docks at the port of Tallinn (Reval) and other Esthonian ports, sites shall be reserved to Russia for the transshipment and warehousing of goods consigned to or from Russia, and the dimensions of these sites shall be in proportion to the size of the port and the volume of Russian commercial traffic; further, the taxes imposed in respect of these sites shall not exceed the transit duties imposed on Esthonian nationals.

(4) The contracting Parties shall advance no claim to the enjoyment of privileges granted by either of them to a third State by virtue of a Customs or other union.

(5) The personal property left after decease in the territory of one of the contracting Parties by subjects of the other Party shall be handed over in its entirety to the consular representative or other delegate of the State to which the deceased belonged, in order that its return to Esthonia may be carried out in conformity with the laws to which the deceased was subject.

ANNEX 2 TO ARTICLE 16

(1) The artificial drawing-off of the waters of Lakes Peipus and Pskov, to an extent involving the lowering by more than a foot of the mean level of the waters of these lakes, and the measures proposed for raising that level, shall only be carried out in accordance with a special Convention between Esthonia and Russia.

(2) A special Convention shall be concluded between the two contracting Parties with reference to the fisheries of Lakes Peipus and Pskov, which are only to be carried on by methods which will not exhaust the supply of fish in these lakes; and also with reference to mercantile traffic on the lakes.

ANNEX 3 TO ARTICLE 16

(1) Esthonia agrees to grant to Russia the privilege of using the electrical power produced by the falls of the Narova; the compensation to be paid to Esthonia for this privilege shall be determined, together with the other conditions, by a special Convention.

(2) Russia agrees to grant to Esthonia the privilege of a concession for the construction and working of a normal-gauge railway line (single or double), to run as directly as possible between Moscow and some point on the Russo-Esthonian frontier, with the right of purchase at the expiry of the concession; the duration of the concession, the period of purchase and all other conditions regarding the concession to be decided by a special Commission.

(3) Russia agrees to grant to Esthonia the privilege of exploiting an area of one million desiatins of forest in the governments of Petrograd, Pskov, Tver, Novgorod, Olonetz, Vologda and Archangel; the conditions of the concession to be decided by a special Commission.

ARTICLE 17

The two contracting Parties mutually agree to take all steps in their power to ensure the safety of commercial vessels in their territorial waters by engaging the number of pilots necessary for the navigation of such vessels, by establishing lights and buoys, and by making special arrangements to enclose the mine-fields until the sea is completely cleared of them.

Both Parties agree to take part in the sweeping of the mine-fields in the Baltic Sea, and a special Convention shall be concluded between them on this subject. If such Convention be not concluded, the share of each Party in the clearing of the sea shall be defined by an arbitration court.

ARTICLE 18

The rights granted to Esthonian citizens by the present Treaty and its Annexes shall extend to institutions of "local self-government", towns and associations, and to relief organisations, churches, ecclesiastical and educational institutions, and all legal entities.

ARTICLE 19

The Russian and Esthonian texts of the present Treaty shall both be authentic.

ARTICLE 20

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties. The exchange of ratifications shall take place at Moscow at the earliest possible date.

The Treaty shall come into force immediately upon ratification.

Wherever the date of ratification is mentioned in the present Treaty as the date of its coming into force, this date shall be understood as meaning that on which the two contracting Parties shall inform each other of the ratification.

In faith whereof the Envoys Plenipotentiary of both Parties have signed the present Peace Treaty with their own hands and have sealed it with their seals.

The original has been done and signed in duplicate in the city of Tartu this second day of February of the year nineteen and twenty.

(Signed) J. POSKA.

(Signed) ANT. PIIP.

(Signed) M. PUUMAN.

(Signed) JUL. SELJAMAA.

(Signed) J. SOOTS, *Major-General*.

(Signed) A. JOFFEE.

(Signed) I. GOUKOVSKI.

EXHIBIT 4-B

[Translation ¹]

No. 2152

TREATY ² OF COMMERCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—SIGNED AT
TALLINN, MAY, 17, 1929

French official text communicated by the Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The registration of this Treaty took place September 19, 1929

The Republic of Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being desirous of executing and further defining the provisions of paragraph (2) of Annex I to Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Dorpat on February 2, 1920, and of consolidating the economic relations between their respective countries, have decided to conclude a Commercial Treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Head of the Estonian Republic:

M. K. Pääts, President of the Delegation of the Estonian Republic,

M. A. Piip, Member of the Delegation of the Estonian Republic.

M. K. Virma, Member of the Delegation of the Estonian Republic,

M. M. Hurt, Member of the Delegation of the Estonian Republic;

The Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. A. Petrovski, President of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

M. I. Smirnoff, Member of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

M. M. Kaufmann, Member of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

² The exchange of ratifications took place at Moscow, September 4, 1929. Came into force September 19, 1929.

M. B. Rosenblum, Member of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows :

CHAPTER 1.—ESTABLISHMENT

ARTICLE 1

With a view to encouraging commercial relations between the two countries, each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to grant to nationals of the other Party permission to enter its territory, subject to the general regulations concerning the admittance of foreigners.

Nationals of one of the Contracting Parties who have obtained permission to enter the territory of the other shall have the right to stay in that territory and to leave it on a footing of equality with nationals of the most favoured nation, subject to observance of the laws and regulations in force in the said country.

It is understood that the above provisions shall in no way affect the right of one of the Contracting Parties to refuse permission in certain cases to nationals of the other to enter or to stay in the country.

ARTICLE 2

Nationals of one of the Contracting Parties may, on entering or leaving the territory of the other, in conformity with the provisions of Article 1, import or export their property intended solely for their personal or household use, including the instruments, tools, utensils, etc., necessary for the exercise of their profession or trade, provided that they comply with the relevant regulations in force in the country of import or export. They shall not be placed, in this connection, in a position less favourable than that accorded to nationals of the most favoured nation.

It is understood that any article imported under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be exported without restriction and duty-free by the person by whom it was imported, provided that the identity of the said article is proved beyond dispute.

ARTICLE 3

Property of every kind belonging to nationals of one of the countries and lawfully imported into or acquired in the other country shall not be subjected in that country by the Government or by any local authority, save in the cases and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the national laws, to any measure of requisition—unless equitable compensation is given—or to confiscation or re-purchase in any form whatsoever.

Nationals of each of the Contracting Parties shall not be required, on the ground of their being foreigners, to pay, on the export of their property, charges, taxes or duties other or higher than would be imposed in like circumstances on nationals of the country, or on subjects of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 4

As regards their persons and property, nationals of each of the Contracting Parties in the territory of the other shall enjoy the protection of the courts and of the authorities, in conformity with international law, to the same extent as nationals of the country or as subjects of the most favoured nation.

They shall, in the territory of the other Party, have free access for the purpose both as plaintiffs and defendants to the courts and other bodies competent to ensure legal protection, and shall in this respect enjoy all the rights and privileges accorded to nationals. They shall be entitled, like the latter, to choose their legal and other advisers from among persons allowed to exercise the professions in question under the laws of the country.

ARTICLE 5

National of one Contracting Party appearing before the courts of the other Party as plaintiffs or interveners shall not be required to give security or to make a deposit under any head whatsoever on the ground of their being foreigners or not having a domicile or residence in the country, provided that they have a domicile in the territory of one or other of the Parties.

The same rule shall apply to payments as security for costs.

ARTICLE 6

When a plaintiff or intervener has been ordered in the territory of one of the Contracting Parties to pay the costs of an action and is exempt from any obligation concerning security, deposit or previous payment, in virtue of Article 5 or under the law of the country in which the action was brought, the said judgment, on a request being transmitted through the diplomatic channel, shall be made executory by the competent authority of the other Party free of charge.

The same shall apply to legal decisions which may later fix the amount of the costs.

ARTICLE 7

The judgments in respect of costs referred to in Article 6 shall be declared to be executory, without the parties being heard, in accordance with the law of the country in which the judgments are to be executed, but this shall not prevent an appeal being lodged subsequently by the parties against whom judgment has been given.

The authorities competent to decide on a request asking that a judgment be made executory, shall confine themselves to determining:

(1) Whether the judgment has been drawn up in a form which fulfils the conditions necessary for it to be valid, under the law of the country in which it was given

(2) Whether the judgment has become final under the same law.

(3) Whether the executive provisions of the judgment are accompanied by a translation drafted, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, in the language of the said authorities and authenticated by the diplomatic representative or a consul of the Party making the application, or by a sworn translator of the Party applied to.

The conditions laid down in paragraph 2, Nos. (1) and (2), shall be regarded as being fulfilled if the competent authority of the Party making the application furnishes a declaration to the effect that the judgment has acquired force of law. The competence of the authority shall be attested by the institute empowered thereto by the applicant State. The declaration and attestation shall be translated in accordance with paragraph 2, No. 3. Until an agreement to the contrary has been concluded between the two Governments, applications shall always be accompanied by the declaration referred to in the first sentence of the present paragraph.

ARTICLE 8

As regards legal aid to the poor, nationals of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Party shall be assimilated to nationals of the latter Party.

ARTICLE 9

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes, on terms of reciprocity, to grant to consuls of the other Contracting Party all the rights and privileges which it grants to consuls of the most favoured nation.

The establishment of consuls in places where there are not as yet consuls of the other Contracting Party shall be governed by a special agreement between the two Parties.

Consuls shall be career officials of the Consular service under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country which they represent and shall receive their salary from the State by which they were appointed; they shall not be allowed to engage in trade or industry in the territory of the country in which they carry out their duties.

Before the appointment of a consul the State appointing him shall obtain the consent of the State in whose territory the consul is to carry out his duties.

ARTICLE 10

Nationals of one of the Contracting Parties shall not be subject in the territory of the other Party to charges, contributions, taxes or burdens of any kind whatsoever other or higher than those imposed on nationals of the country or on subjects of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 11

Nationals of one of the Contracting Parties in the territory of the other shall be exempt from military service and from any compulsory public service and simi-

larly from any contribution, whether pecuniary or in kind, in lieu of personal service. They shall also be exempt from forced loans.

They shall not be subject, either in time of peace or in time of war, to military charges or requisitions other, higher, or less favourable as regards conditions of application than those imposed upon nationals of the most favoured nation. They shall in all such cases receive fair compensation.

Nationals of each of the Contracting Parties shall be exempt at all times from official duties, whether judicial, administrative or municipal.

ARTICLE 12

Joint stock companies and commercial companies of every kind, including industrial, financial, insurance, transport and forwarding companies, whose headquarters are situated in the territory of one Contracting Party and which are legally constituted there in accordance with the laws of that Party shall also be recognised in the territory of the other Party as having a legal existence, and shall have the right to appear before the courts as plaintiffs or defendants.

Nevertheless, it is agreed that the question whether such a company constituted in the territory of one of the Contracting Parties is to be allowed to pursue its activities in the territory of the other shall always be governed by the relevant laws and regulations in force in the last-named territory. In this respect, and also as regards their operation, companies of one of the Contracting Parties shall not be placed, in the territory of the other, in a position less favourable than that applicable to companies of the most favoured nation.

Companies of one of the Contracting Parties shall not be liable to duties, charges, taxes, contributions or burdens of any description other or higher than those imposed upon similar national companies or companies of the most favored nation.

CHAPTER II.—COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION

ARTICLE 13

The two Contracting Parties shall use their best endeavours to promote the development of commercial relations between their respective countries.

Products of the soil and industry of Estonia or of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics imported into the territory of the other country for consumption, warehousing, re-export or transit shall not be liable, in respect of import, export, re-export or transit, to duties, charges, surcharges, taxes, contributions or obligations, whether general or local, other or more burdensome than those imposed on products of the most favoured nation.

Neither of the Contracting Parties shall impose, in respect of the exportation of any article to the territory of the other Party, duties or charges other or higher than those which are or may hereafter be imposed in respect of the exportation of like articles to any other country.

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to establish and not to apply to the trade of the other Party measures which are not applicable to the trade of all other States.

ARTICLE 14

With a view to reserving the benefits of the above provisions for products originating in their respective countries, the Contracting Parties may require that products and goods imported into their territory shall be accompanied by a certificate of origin showing, in the case of a natural product, that it originated in the other country, and, in the case of a manufactured product, that the value of the raw materials or of the foreign half-finished products has been increased by not less than 33⅓% by reason of the work carried out in the territory of the last-named Party.

Certificates of origin shall be issued in Estonia by the Ministry of National Economy or such State institutes as it may authorise, or by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Home Trade and its organs, or by the Western Chamber of Commerce of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and by such other competent organisation in either State as may be agreed upon between the Contracting Parties.

The form of certificates of origin shall be established by agreement between the two Parties.

Should one of the Contracting Parties require a visa and legalisation for certificates of origin, the other Party shall be entitled to do the same. No charge shall be made for visa or legalisation.

ARTICLE 15

As regards the system applicable to vessels and their cargoes, the two Contracting Parties shall accord one another most-favoured-nation-treatment.

ARTICLE 16

1. The two Contracting Parties shall grant one another freedom of transit on all routes declared open for transit under the internal regulations, subject to the conditions laid down in the said regulations.

2. Goods of all kinds and similarly baggage conveyed in transit through the territory of one of the Contracting Parties shall be exempt from payment of all import, export and transit duties whether conveyed in through traffic or unloaded, warehoused and reloaded in course of transit. By "warehouses" are meant premises placed under the supervision of the Customs authorities.

3. The transport of goods, passengers and baggage between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be effected on the basis of the Convention concerning through railway traffic concluded at Riga between Estonia, Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on October 29, 1925, and of the Agreements supplementing that Convention which have already been or may hereafter be concluded.

4. As regards the levying by the Contracting Parties of transit charges and railway surcharges and also the duration and methods of transport, no distinction shall be made between nationals of the two Contracting Parties or between juridical persons belonging to the said Parties. More particularly, the Estonian railways shall not apply to goods consigned from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to an Estonian station or to goods consigned from an Estonian station to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or to goods consigned in transit through Estonia, transit tariffs or surcharges higher than those applicable in the same direction and for the same distance to Estonian goods of like character. The same measures shall be applied by the railways of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to goods consigned from Estonia to a station in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or from a station in the Union to an Estonian station or in transit through the Union.

The Contracting Parties shall assist one another as far as possible in the matter of railway tariffs and more particularly as regards the establishment of through tariffs.

6. Railway tariffs in respect of the transport of goods in transit from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through Estonia, on railway lines of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics leading to and from Estonian ports shall be fixed, other conditions being equal, on a basis not less favourable than that applicable on railways of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics leading to ports of third Powers situated on the Baltic.

7. Transport tariffs for goods in transit from Estonia to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be assessed on the railways of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics according to the transit tariff, should such a tariff be put into force, or according to the export tariff, if, on the railways of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics conveying goods in transit as far as the frontier station or corresponding port, the export tariff is applicable to goods of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The railway transit tariffs applicable to Union goods which are being conveyed from or to the Union in transit through Estonia shall be the lowest rates in force in Estonia.

8. It is understood that the conditions for the transport of passengers, baggage and goods on the railways and on the waterways and roads of each of the Contracting Parties shall be identical in every respect with the conditions applicable to the transport of passengers, baggage and goods of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 17

1. To ensure the operation of the foreign trade monopoly which, under the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is held by the Union Government, a Trade Delegation with headquarters at Tallinn shall be set up as part of the Legation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Estonia.

2. The functions of the Trade Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be:

(a) To develop commercial and economic relations between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to protect the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the matter of foreign trade.

(b) To regulate trade with Estonia on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(c) To engage on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in foreign trade with Estonia.

ARTICLE 18

The Commercial Delegate and his assistant shall be members of the diplomatic staff of the Legation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and shall enjoy all the rights and privileges accorded to members of diplomatic missions. The official premises of the Trade Delegation at Tallinn shall be accorded extraterritoriality.

The Trade Delegation shall have the right to use cipher.

Members of the Trade Delegation who are nationals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and have been appointed and sent to Tallinn by the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Home Trade, shall not be required in Estonia to pay any tax on income earned in the service of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Such exemption, however, shall not apply to more than thirty persons.

Should it be necessary to establish branches of the Trade Delegation, the places where such branches are to be established shall be fixed by agreement between the Parties.

ARTICLE 19

All acts of the Trade Delegation shall be on account of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the latter shall accordingly assume responsibility for all transactions carried out by its Commercial Delegate or by duly authorised members of the Delegation.

The Trade Delegation need not be registered in the Commercial Register but shall be bound to publish duly in the Official Journal (*Riigi Teataja*) the names of members of the Delegation empowered to represent it. The powers thus conferred shall be deemed binding in respect of every transaction until the Trade Delegation has published a notice in the Official Journal (*Riigi Teataja*) to the effect that the duties of the holder of a responsible post on the Delegation have been terminated.

ARTICLE 20

Judicial questions which may arise in respect of commercial transactions concluded by the Trade Delegation in Estonia shall be settled in conformity with Estonian substantive and procedural law, but it is understood that, should an agreement to this effect exist between the parties to a contract, Soviet jurisdiction shall be admitted for transactions concluded in Estonia but executory in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 21

Legal acts performed by the Trade Delegation in Estonia which are binding upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and also the economic effects of such acts, shall be dealt with under Estonian law and shall be subject to Estonian jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the responsibility incurred under Article 19 of the present Treaty by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in respect of transactions carried out by the Trade Delegation, no preventive legal measures or administrative measures shall be employed in regard to the property of the Trade Delegation or its branches.

ARTICLE 22

In the case of judgments which have acquired force of law, measures of compulsory execution may be applied in the form of distraint on property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Estonia, except in so far as concerns objects which, according to the general rules of international law, are intended for the exercise of sovereign rights or are intended for the official use of diplomatic, consular or trade delegations

CHAPTER III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 23

The provisions of the present Treaty shall not apply to rights or favours which are or may hereafter be accorded :

(1) By either of the Contracting Parties to a neighbouring country to facilitate frontier traffic within a zone not exceeding fifteen kilometres ;

(2) By either of the Contracting Parties to a third country in virtue of a Customs union which has already been or may hereafter be concluded ;

(3) By Estonia to Finland, Latvia or Lithuania ;

(4) By the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Finland, Latvia or Lithuania or to the continental States bordering on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Asia.

ARTICLE 24

The two Contracting Parties undertake within a period of three months to begin negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on commercial arbitration, a convention on judicial assistance in civil matters, a convention on fisheries and the protection of fisheries in Lakes Peipus and Pskov and a convention on veterinary and health matters.

ARTICLE 25

The present Treaty, done in duplicate French texts, shall be ratified and the instruments of ratifications shall be exchanged at Moscow as soon as possible.

The Treaty shall come into force on the fifteenth day following the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

The Treaty is concluded for a period of three years. If, on the expiry of that period, neither of the Contracting Parties has declared its intention of terminating it, the Treaty shall remain in force for six months as from the date on which one of the Contracting Parties shall inform the other of its intention to denounce it.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

DONE at Tallinn, May 17, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine.

K. PÄTS.

A. PIP.

K. VIRMA

MAX HURT.

A. PETROVSKI.

I. SMIRNOFF.

M. KAUFMANN.

B. ROSENBLUM.

FINAL PROTOCOL

At the moment of signing the Commercial Treaty of to-day's date, the two Contracting Parties have decided to define further certain clauses and the conditions of application attaching thereto, as follows :

Ad Article 1

It is understood that the provisions of Article 1 shall not affect the internal regulations concerning passport visas.

Ad Article 7

The two Contracting Parties shall notify one another of the institute authorised to issue the attestation required under the last paragraph of Article 7.

Ad Article 9

It is agreed that the term "consul" shall include consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls and consular agents.

Ad Article 12

The Contracting Parties declare that the privileges accorded by either of them to joint stock companies of every kind, commercial associations or other juridical persons of the most favoured nation shall be accorded also to all State economic organisations of the other Contracting Party established in conformity with the laws of that Party.

Ad Article 15

It is understood that the provisions of the present Article shall not apply to the coasting trade.

Ad Article 16

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 16, Estonia shall be accorded, as regards the transit of her products through the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, all the rights accorded under Union legislation and under international treaties of which the Union is a signatory to countries which have concluded a commercial treaty with the Union.

2. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to accord to Estonian textile products the right of transit through the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the Kingisepp-Manchuria and Pskov-Manchuria Railways.

3. Government commercial and transport organisations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as co-operative organisations, shall have the right in Estonia:

(a) To make use on favourable terms of port installations and warehouses belonging to the Estonian Government;

(b) To lease plots of land and to build thereon warehouses, elevators and cold storage premises, and to build within port areas other installations that may be necessary for transport.

The conditions governing use and exploitation shall be laid down in special treaties concerning exploitation to be concluded between the Contracting Parties.

Ad Article 18

1. The provisions of the present Treaty, and more particularly of Article 18, shall not be a bar to the serving of documents on the Trade Delegation.

2. By "official premises of the Trade Delegation" shall be meant the premises of the central administration and of those sections which are under the same roof as the Trade Delegation.

3. The Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not insist on determining the rights of branches and members of the Council of the Trade Delegation in regard to the question of extritoriality, in view of the fact that the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had occasion, during the negotiations relating to the present Treaty, to declare that it is not necessary at present to establish the rights of either the said branches or the said members.

If, however, with increased activities it becomes necessary to appoint members of the Council of the Trade Delegation or to open branches, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reserves the right to raise the question of their extritoriality through the diplomatic channel.

The present Protocol shall form an integral part of the Commercial Treaty signed this day.

DONE AT TALLINN, MAY 17, 1929.

K. PÄTS.	A. PETROVSKI.
A. PIIP.	I. SMIRNOFF.
K. VIRMA.	M. KAUFMANN.
MAX HURT.	B. ROSENBLUM.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

I

TALLINN, May 17, 1929.

SIR,

On behalf of the Estonian Delegation entrusted with the negotiations for the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honour to make the following declaration:

The Estonian Delegation notes that almost all the commercial treaties concluded by Estonia contain a special clause reserving Estonia's right to grant to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics special favours which cannot be claimed by third States. This policy, which was inaugurated directly after the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between Estonia and the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, has been adhered to with very few exceptions. It is now systematically pursued, so that the clause in question is found in all the treaties recently concluded.

It is the Estonian Government's intention to continue this policy in all commercial treaties that may be concluded with other States. If, however, the Soviet clause should not occur in any particular treaty, the Estonian Government is prepared to take the necessary steps to ensure that the existence of such a treaty shall not debar the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from enjoying the treatment accorded to the most favoured nation, as soon as the two Parties have agreed on the date for the establishment of such treatment. The present declaration shall not, however, apply to the States mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 23 of the Commercial Treaty of today's date.

I have the honour to be, etc.

K. PÄTS.

His Excellency M. A. PETROVSKI,
*President of the Delegation of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Tallinn.*

II

TALLINN, May 17, 1929.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the following letter:

"On behalf of the Estonian Delegation entrusted with the negotiations for the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honour to make the following declaration:

"The Estonian Delegation notes that almost all the commercial treaties concluded by Estonia contain a special clause reserving Estonia's right to grant to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic special favours which cannot be claimed by third States. This policy, which was inaugurated directly after the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between Estonia and the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, has been adhered to with very few exceptions. It is now systematically pursued, so that the clause in question is found in all the treaties recently concluded.

"It is the Estonian Government's intention to continue this policy in all commercial treaties that may be concluded with other States. If, notwithstanding, the Soviet clause should not occur in any particular treaty, the Estonian Government is prepared to take the necessary steps to ensure the existence of such a treaty shall not debar the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from enjoying the treatment accorded to the most favoured nation, as soon as the two Parties have agreed on the date for the establishment of such treatment. The present declaration shall not, however, apply to the States mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 23 of the Commercial Treaty of to-day's date."

I duly note the foregoing declaration and have the honour, etc.

A. PETROVSKI.

His Excellency M. K. PÄTS,
*President of the Delegation of the Estonian Republic,
Tallinn.*

III

TALLINN, May 17, 1929.

No. 132-W.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

With reference to the last paragraph of Article 14 of the Commercial Treaty signed this day between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honour to declare that the Estonian Government will not require either visa of legalisation by its consular representatives abroad in the case of certificates of origin issued for Union goods by the institutes and organisations mentioned in paragraph 2 of the aforesaid article.

I should be glad if you would inform me whether the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared on its side not to require either visa or legalisation in the case of certificates of origin issued for Estonian goods.

I have the honour to be, etc.

J. LATTIK.

His Excellency M. A. PETROVSKI,
*Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Tallinn.*

IV

TALLINN, May 17, 1929.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 132-W of to-day's date and to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees not to require either visa or legalisation by the consular representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics abroad in the case of certificates of origin issued for Estonian goods by the institutes and organisations mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Commercial Treaty signed this day.

I have the honour to be, etc.

A. PETROVSKI.

His Excellency M. J. LATTIK.

*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Estonian Republic,
Tallinn.*

EXHIBIT 4-C

[Translation ¹]

No. 3020

TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DIS-
PUTES BETWEEN ESTONIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW MAY 4, 1932

The President of the Estonian Republic, of the one part, and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the other part,

Being convinced that it is in the interests of the two High Contracting Parties to lay down definite conditions contributing to strengthen the friendly relations existing between them.

Animated by the desire to contribute in that manner to the maintenance of universal peace.

Considering that the Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920, constitutes, now as heretofore, the unshakable foundation of their mutual relations and obligations,

Declaring that none of the international obligations assumed by either of the High Contracting Parties is incompatible with the peaceful development of their mutual relations or in contradiction with the present Treaty,

Being desirous of supplementing and defining, so far as concerns their mutual relations, the Pact for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris on August 27, 1928,

Have decided to conclude the present Treaty, and to this end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Estonian Republic:

M. Julius Seljamaa, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Maxim Maximovitch Litvinov, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Who having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1

Each of the High Contracting Parties guarantees to the other Party the inviolability of the existing frontiers between them, as defined by the Peace Treaty signed on February 2, 1920, and undertakes to refrain from any act of aggression

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

or any violent measures directed against the integrity and inviolability of the territory or against the political independence of the other Contracting Party, whether such acts of aggression or such violent measures are undertaken separately or in conjunction with other Powers, with or without a declaration of war.

Article 2

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to take part in political agreements manifestly directed in an aggressive sense against the other Party, nor in coalitions of the same nature having as their object to subject the other Party to an economic or financial boycott.

ARTICLE 3

The obligations mentioned in the preceding Articles of the present Treaty shall in no case affect or modify the rights and international obligations developing on the High Contracting Parties from treaties concluded or obligations assumed prior to the entry into force of the present Treaty, so far as the said rights and obligations contain no elements of aggression within the meaning of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

Taking into consideration the obligations assumed in virtue of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit all disputes, whatever their nature or origin, which may arise between them subsequent to the coming into force of the present Treaty, and which it may not have been possible to settle within a reasonable time through the ordinary diplomatic channel, to a procedure of conciliation in a mixed Conciliation Commission, whose composition, powers, and procedure shall be fixed by a separate Convention, which the two Parties undertake to conclude within the shortest possible time, and which shall come into force simultaneously with the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 5

The present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in Estonian and Russian, both texts being authentic. It shall be ratified within the shortest possible time, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the High Contracting Parties at Tallinn within forty-five days of the date of the ratification of the present Treaty by Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 6

The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, and shall remain in force for three years from that date.

Either of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to denounce the Treaty by notifying the other Party of its intention six months before the expiry of the said period, or without giving such notice in the event of an act of aggression being committed by the other High Contracting Party against any third Power whatsoever.

If the Treaty is not denounced by one or other of the High Contracting Parties, its validity shall be tacitly prolonged for a period of two years; similarly, the Treaty shall be deemed to be prolonged on each subsequent occasion for a further period of two years provided it has not been denounced by one or other of the High Contracting Parties, according to the procedure laid down in the present Article.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

DONE at Moscow, in duplicate, May 4, 1932.

[L. S.] JUL. SELIAMAA.
[L. S.] M. LITVINOV.

EXHIBIT 4-D

[Translation ¹]

No. 3021

CONCILIATION CONVENTION BETWEEN ESTONIA AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, JUNE 16,
1932

In accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the Estonian Republic and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have decided to conclude a Conciliation Convention, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Estonian Republic:

M. Julius Seljamaa, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Boris Spiridonovitch Stomonjakov, Member of the Council of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

All disputes between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics arising out of circumstances that may develop after the coming into force of the present Convention, particularly disputes concerning the interpretation and application of conventions concluded or to be concluded between the High Contracting Parties, which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be submitted to a Conciliation Commission with a view to arriving at a mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 2

The Commission shall meet once a year on a date to be fixed by the two Governments. The Governments may, however, agree either to summon one or more extraordinary sessions, in case of urgency, or to defer an ordinary session to the following year.

The Commission shall meet alternately in Moscow and Tallinn, the first session to take place in Moscow. As a general rule, no session shall last longer than fifteen days.

ARTICLE 3

Each of the two Governments shall appoint two members of the Commission for each session, to be chosen from among its own nationals. Each session shall be presided over by one of the two members of the Commission who are nationals of the country in whose territory the session is held.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled, in special cases, to attach experts to its delegation who shall have the right to take part in the sessions of the Commission in an advisory capacity.

ARTICLE 4

Not later than fifteen days from the date of the summoning of the ordinary session of the Conciliation Commission, each of the Parties shall communicate to the other Party, through the diplomatic channel, a list of the questions which it desires to consider during that session.

In the case of a request for the summoning of an extraordinary session, the Government making the request shall inform the other Government of the urgent circumstances which have prompted its request. The Commission shall meet not later than one month after the request has been received.

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

ARTICLE 5

It shall be the duty of the Conciliation Commission to elucidate disputed questions and to propose to both Governments the interpretation or the bases of conciliation which it shall deem to be equitable and on which it shall recommend them to reach an agreement by the diplomatic channel. Should the Commission be unable to agree upon a common proposal regarding any question on the agenda in the course of one session, that question shall, at the request of one of the Parties, be submitted to further examination at an extraordinary session, which shall be held not later than four months after the preceding session.

The findings of each session shall be submitted to the two Governments in the form of a joint report, which shall be published, in whole or in part, with the consent of the Parties.

ARTICLE 6

The Conciliation Commission shall itself decide the form of its procedure.

ARTICLE 7

Both Parties undertake to supply the Commission with all necessary information and to facilitate the accomplishment of its task in every way.

ARTICLE 8

Both Parties undertake to refrain from any measure dependent on them which might have a prejudicial effect on the proposals made by the Commission on the questions submitted to it, and to take, as far as possible, all necessary preventive measures to that end.

ARTICLE 9

The present Convention forms an integral part of the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, concluded on May 4, 1932, between Estonia and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and shall be deemed to be ratified by virtue of the ratification of that Treaty.

It shall come into force simultaneously with the Treaty in question, and shall remain in force during the whole period of validity of that Treaty.

ARTICLE 10

The present Convention is done at Moscow, in duplicate, in Estonian and Russian, June 16, 1932.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

[L. S.] JUL. SELJAMAA.

[L. S.] B. STOMONYAKOV.

EXHIBIT 4-E

[Translation ¹]

No. 3455

PROTOCOL RENEWING THE TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES OF MAY 4TH, 1932, BETWEEN ESTONIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, APRIL 4TH, 1934

The President of the Estonian Republic and the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Guided by the desire to provide the firmest possible basis for the development of the relations between their countries,

Solicitous to give each other fresh proof of the unalterable nature and solidity of the peaceful and friendly relations happily established between them,

¹ Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, for information.

Inspired by a desire to contribute to the consolidation of universal peace and to the stability and peaceful development of international relations in Eastern Europe,

Having observed that the Treaty concluded on May 4th, 1932, at Moscow, between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has exercised a beneficial influence on the relations between the two countries and on the solution of the problems in question,

Have decided to sign the present Protocol and have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Estonian Republic:

M. Karl Tofer, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Estonian Republic in Moscow;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. Maxime Maximovitch Litvinoff, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE I

In alteration of the period of validity of the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Pacific Settlement of Disputes concluded at Moscow on May 4th, 1932, between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which period is provided for in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the said Treaty, the Treaty shall remain in force until December 31st, 1945.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol is drawn up in duplicate in the Estonian and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. It shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged between the High Contracting Parties at Tallinn.

The present Protocol shall come into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Moscow, in duplicate, in the Estonian and Russian languages, April 4th, 1934.

[L. S.] K. TOFER.

[L. S.] M. LITVINOFF.

EXHIBIT 4-F

[Translation ¹]

No. 4643

PACT OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 28TH, 1939

The President of the Republic of Estonia, of the one part, and

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the other part;

Desirous of developing the friendly relations established by the Treaty of Peace of February 2nd, 1920, based on the recognition of independent political existence and non-intervention by either Contracting Party in the internal affairs of the other Contracting Party;

Recognizing that the Peace Treaty of February 2nd, 1920, and the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of May 4th, 1932 are and remain the solid foundation of their reciprocal relations and obligations;

Convinced that it is in the interest of both Contracting Parties to determine the exact conditions for the consolidation of their mutual security;

Have deemed it necessary to conclude between themselves the Pact of Mutual

¹ Translation of the Estonian Government.

Assistance hereunder, and have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the Republic of Estonia:

M. Karl Selter, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

M. V. M. Molotoff, President of the Council of People's Commissaries and People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs;

Who have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The two Contracting Parties under take to render each other assistance of every kind, including military assistance, in the event of direct aggression or threat of aggression on the part of a European Great Power against the maritime frontiers of the Contracting Parties in the Baltic Sea, or against their land frontiers across the territory of the Republic of Latvia, and also against the bases provided for in Article III.

ARTICLE II

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to assist the Estonian army on advantageous terms, with armaments or other war material.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Estonia grants the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the right to have naval bases on the Estonian islands of Saare Maa and Hiiumaa and in the town of Paldiski, together with a number of aerodromes for air forces, on lease at reasonable rates. The exact sites of the bases and aerodromes in question shall be assigned, and the limits thereof defined, by common accord.

With a view to the defence of the naval bases and aerodromes in question, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be entitled at its own expense to maintain strictly limited numbers of Soviet land and air armed forces, up to a maximum to be determined by special agreement, within the areas allotted for the said bases and aerodromes.

ARTICLE IV

The two Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude alliances or to take part in coalitions directed against either of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE V

The enforcement of the present Pact may in no way impair the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties or, more especially, their economic system or political structure.

The areas allotted for the bases and aerodromes (Article III) shall remain territory of the Republic of Estonia.

ARTICLE VI

The present Pact shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification. The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Tallinn within six days from the date of signature of the present Pact.

The period of validity of the present Pact shall be ten years, provided always that, if neither of the Contracting Parties deem it necessary to denounce it one year before the expiry, of that period, its validity shall be automatically renewed for a further period of five years.

ARTICLE VII

The present Pact is drawn up in duplicate originals in the Estonian and Russian languages at Moscow, this 28th day of September, 1939.

September 28th, 1939.

K. SELTER

V. MOLOTOFF.

EXHIBIT 4-G

SPEECH BY V. MOLOTOV ON THE FIFTH EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ON OCTOBER 31, 1939

[*Pravda*, No. 303, of November 1, 1939]

[p. 34] I shall now pass on to our relations with the Baltic countries. As you know important changes have taken place in this sphere as well. Relations of the Soviet Union with [35] Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are based on the Peace Treaties concluded with the respective countries in 1920. By these Treaties Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became independent States, and ever since then the Soviet Union has invariably pursued a friendly policy towards these newly created small states. This was a reflection of the radical difference between the policy of the Soviet Government and the policy of Tsarist Russia which brutally oppressed the small nations, denied them every opportunity of independent national and political development and left them with most painful memories of itself.

It must be admitted that the experience of the past two decades of the development of Soviet-Estonian, Soviet-Latvian, and Soviet-Lithuanian friendly relations has created favourable conditions for the further consolidation of political and all other relations between the U. S. S. R. and its Baltic neighbours. This has also been revealed in the recent diplomatic negotiations with the representatives of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and in the Treaties which were signed in Moscow as a result of these negotiations.

As you know the Soviet Union has concluded Pacts of Mutual Assistance with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are of major political significance. The principles underlying all these pacts are identical. They are based on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the other, and they include military assistance in case of any of these countries being attacked. In view of the special geographical position of these countries, which form a kind of approach to the U. S. S. R., particularly from the Baltic, these Pacts allow the Soviet Union to maintain naval bases and aerodromes at specified points of Estonia and Latvia, and in the case of the Pact with Lithuania, provides for the defence of the Lithuanian borders jointly with the Soviet Union.

The creation of these Soviet naval bases and aerodromes on the territory of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and the stationing of a certain number of Red Army units to protect [36] these bases and aerodromes ensure a reliable defence base not only for the Soviet Union but also for the Baltic States themselves and thereby contribute to the preservation of peace, which is to the interest of our peoples. Our recent diplomatic negotiations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have shown that we have sufficient confidence in each other and a proper understanding of the necessity of adopting these measures of military defence in the interest both of the Soviet Union and of these States themselves. The negotiations have revealed fully the anxiety of the parties concerned to preserve peace and safeguard the security of our peoples who are engaged in peaceful labour. It was all this that ensured the successful completion of the negotiations and the conclusion of Pacts of Mutual Assistance which are of great historical importance.

The special character of these Mutual Assistance Pacts in no way implies any interference of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, as some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. On the contrary, all these Pacts of Mutual Assistance strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of the signatory States and the principle of non-interference in each other's affairs. These Pacts are based on mutual respect for the political, social, and economic structure of the contracting parties and are designed to strengthen the bases for peaceful neighbourly co-operation between our peoples. We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the Pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the spreading of the nonsense about Sovietizing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of enemies of our common causes, and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.

In view of the improvement in our political relations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Soviet Union has gone a long way to meet the economic needs of these States, and has concluded Trade Agreements with them. Thanks to these economic agreements, trade with the Baltic countries will become several times as great as formerly, and there are favourable prospects for its further growth. At a time when [37] all European countries, including neutral States, are experiencing tremendous trade difficulties, these economic agreements between

the U. S. S. R. and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are of great positive importance to them. Thus the rapprochement between the U. S. S. R. on the one hand and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the other will contribute to a more rapid progress of their agriculture, industry, and transport and in general to the national well-being of our Baltic neighbours.

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SPEECH BY V. MOLOTOV AT THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ON
MARCH 29, 1940

[Pravda, No. 89, of March 30, 1940]

[p. 64] The conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Finland consummates the task we set ourselves last year of safeguarding the security of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Baltic. This Treaty is a necessary complement to the three Pacts of Mutual Assistance concluded with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania respectively. Our experience during the six months that have elapsed since these Pacts of Mutual Assistance were concluded has enabled us to draw very definite positive conclusions concerning these Treaties with the Baltic countries. It is quite clear that the Treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have served to strengthen the international position both of the Soviet Union and of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

In spite of the scare raised by imperialists circles hostile to the Soviet Union, the State and political independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has not suffered in any way, while economic intercourse between these countries and the Soviet Union has begun to increase markedly. The Pacts with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are being carried out in a satisfactory manner and this creates premises for a further improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and these countries.

EXHIBIT 4-II

[Copy]

[Postal telegraph cable]

New York, *July 12, 1940.*

VAELISMIN
TALLINN/ESTONIA/

PRESSITEADETEL EESTIS VALIMISED JA VENEGA UEHINEMISE RAHVAAHALETUS 15 STOP
PALUN TELEGRAFERIDA MILLINE HAAEALETUS MIS ALLUSEL JA KORRAS

PEAKONSULAAT 847

[Translation of the above]

[Postal telegraph cable]

New York, *July 12, 1940.*

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TALLINN /ESTONIA/

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS ON THE 15TH THERE WILL BE IN ESTONIA ELECTIONS AND
A PLEBISCITE TO JOIN RUSSIA STOP PLEASE CABLE WHAT VOTING ON WHAT BASIS AND
ORDER

CONSULATE GENERAL 847

This is to certify that the above is a true and correct copy and translation of a cable sent by the Consulate General of Estonia in New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia on July 12, 1940.

New York, N. Y., February 25, 1954.
Reg. No. 77.

[SEAL]

(Signed) Johannes Kaiv,
JOHANNES KAIV,
Acting Consul General of Estonia in charge of Legation.

[Copy]

[Commercial cables]

SAATKOND

TALLINN, July 13, 1940.

NY (CONSULATE GENL ESTONIA 9 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA) —

RAHVAAHAAELETUST POLE AINULT RIIGIVOLIKOGU VALIMISED POEHISEADUSE ALUSEL
UEHINEMISE JUTUD ALUSETA—

VAELISMIN 1333

[Translation of the above]

[Commercial cables]

TALLINN, July 13, 1940.

SAATKOND

NY (CONSULATE GENL ESTONIA 9 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA) —

THERE IS NO PLEBISCITE ONLY CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ELECTIONS ON BASIS OF CONSTITUTION. RUMORS ABOUT JOINING WITHOUT FOUNDATION—

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1333

This is to certify that the above is a true and correct copy and translation of a cable received by the Consulate General of Estonia in New York from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, dated Tallinn July 13, 1940.

New York, February 25, 1954.

Reg. No. 78.

[SEAL]

(Signed) Johannes Kaiv,
JOHANNES KAIV,*Acting Consul General of Estonia in charge of Legation.*

EXHIBIT 4-I

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ESTONIA

9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.

This is to certify that the attached is a true and correct extract-translation from a report by an Estonian military expert, submitted to the Consulate General of Estonia in New York in January, 1954 and now on file at this Consulate.

New York, N. Y., February 25, 1954.

Reg. No. 76.

[SEAL]

(Signed) Johannes Kaiv,
JOHANNES KAIV,*Acting Consul General of Estonia in charge of Legation.*

[Extract—translation—from a report by an Estonian military expert, submitted to the Consulate General of Estonia in New York in January 1954]

SUMMARY OF SOVIET MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN ESTONIA

The Soviets are trying to maintain that the reason for the annexation of the Baltic States has been the desire to fortify the defense of the borders of the Soviet Union. However, the Kremlin's military preparations in the north-western part of the Soviet Union cannot, with the best of intentions, be regarded as a defense of the borders. From Murmansk to Kaliningrad (Königsberg) "the borders of the Soviet Union are being protected" by three military districts and by the navies of the Baltic and the Polar Sea.

In the north is the White Sea military district under the command of Marshal K. A. Meretskov. It is estimated that this military district is composed of about 250,000 men. Eight divisions comprise the so-called "Polar Army". No military expert can justify the keeping of such a large army in the far north for defense purposes. The only possible enemy there might be Finland, but the Soviet Union has no grounds for looking upon Finland as a future enemy, because she is being controlled by public and secret agencies. All Soviet military preparations in

the north are aimed at a breakthrough to the Atlantic over Finland and Sweden. Preparations for the execution of this plan have been carried on by the Kremlin already for years, as has been revealed by the Swedish trials of spies for securing information for the Soviets on the northern defenses of Sweden and especially on Boden.

The Leningrad military district is also scheduled to take part in the conquest of Scandinavia, and for the preparation of this operation the territory of Estonia has been subordinated to it.

Analyzing the military preparations in Estonia by the Leningrad military district, it is evident that they are meant for attack, and in no way can they be attributed to a border defense. The construction of launching platforms for long distance missiles, the concentration of landing crafts, the establishment of large stores of ammunition, food and mobilization equipment on Estonian territory and the placement of large military concentrations in Estonia, which under no circumstances are necessary for the protection of these shore lines, prove this even more conclusively in view of the fact that opposite Estonia, across the Baltic Sea, is neutral Sweden and looking from the shores of the Elbe river Estonia is in the far rear of the Soviet state.

To the south of Estonia—the Baltic military district comprises the “Union Republics” of Latvia and Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region, and also the strong military concentrations located there. This district is under the command of Marshall I. H. Bagramjan who became known in the last world war by his “breakthroughs”.

On the basis of the available data it must be assumed that in case of war these three military districts will comprise the former “North-West front” whose purpose it will be to conquer Scandinavia in order to place the Baltic and Arctic Sea fleets in Norwegian bases on the Atlantic.

In regard to the question of execution of the occupation of Scandinavia the opinions of the experts differ. Some suppose that the attack upon Sweden will be started simultaneously by Meretskov from the north and Bagramjan from the south over the island of Gotland, and when they will have achieved already a certain success and tied up the Swedish armies, then the Leningrad forces, with the support of the Baltic Sea fleet, will invade central Sweden over the islands of Hiin and Saaremaa.

In the north a certain part of Meretskov's army group would stay to conquer Sweden, beginning with the Boden region, and the “Polar army” would immediately invade Norway and occupy the line Bodö-Narvik. At the same time the army group of Bagramjan would occupy South-Sweden, and then the Leningrad army group would invade Central Sweden and immediately proceed over Oslo to the Atlantic. Bagramjan's forces would safeguard the connection of the forces on the Atlantic shore with the motherland.

Other experts, however, think that the crossing of the Norwegian mountains would be beyond the power of the Leningrad district and without the conquest of Denmark and a landing from there on South Norway nothing would come of it.

How the Soviet Union would execute the Scandinavian conquest operation does not belong in the framework of the question under analysis, but in any event the military preparations of the Kremlin in Estonia are of an offensive and not defensive character.

(Exhibit 5A, Lithuanian newspaper, may be found in files of the committee.)

EXHIBIT 5-B

[Translation from “Lietuvos Aidas” of June 16, 1940—No. 281 /5490]

FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL CITIZENS AND INHABITANTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

At 11 PM / our time / on June 14 of this year, the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Soviet Union and the Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Urbšys in Moscow an ultimatum in which it was demanded to satisfy the following demands by 10 AM / Moscow time / of June 15:

1. That prosecution would be immediately instituted against the Minister for Internal Affairs Skučas and the Director of the Security Department Povilaitis

as directly responsible for the acts of provocation committed against the Soviet garrisons in Lithuania.

2. That a new government would be formed immediately in Lithuania which would be capable and determined to guarantee the honorable execution of the Mutual Assistance Pact between Lithuania and the Soviet Union, and would determinedly suppress the enemies of the treaty.

3. That the free admittance of detachments of the Soviet army into Lithuanian territory, to be distributed in the most important Lithuanian centers in sufficient number to guarantee the execution of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania and to prevent acts of provocation directed against the Soviet garrisons in Lithuania, be immediately assured.

The government of the Soviet Union holds the fulfillment of these demands as the primary condition without which the conscientious and honorable execution of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania is impossible.

The government of the Soviet Union expects an answer from the government of Lithuania by 10 AM of June 15th. The failure to receive an answer from the Lithuanian government by the specified time will be considered as a refusal to comply with the above enumerated demands.

In the beginning the ultimatum's motivation was given. The majority of the motives are already known to our public from "Tass" communiques published in our press regarding the disappearance of soldiers of the Soviet Union in Lithuania and other matters.

After receiving news of this ultimatum, the government of Lithuania immediately gathered in a conference presided over by the President of the Republic itself. The conference decided to accept all the demands of the government of the Soviet Union and to inform it of this decision through Urbšys in Moscow within the specified time. The government, headed by Prime Minister Merkys, immediately resigned. The President of the Republic asked General Raštikis to form a new government. General Raštikis immediately proceeded to form a new government. But our minister in Moscow was informed by the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars and the Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov that Raštikis is not satisfactory to the government of the Soviet Union and that it was necessary to come to an agreement with the government of the Soviet Union regarding the Prime Minister and other members of the government.

Soon afterwards, Minister of Foreign Affairs Urbšys telephoned to inform that detachments of the army of the Soviet Union shall cross the Lithuanian border at 2 PM of June 15th in predetermined places and shall from there proceed to the more important Lithuanian centers. The same announcement later was made by a telegram which was published in an "Elta" bulletin.

The government of Lithuania, seriously appreciating the situation, immediately ordered through its organs that the arriving Soviet army would be welcomed as demanded by the government of the Soviet Union.

High representatives of the government of the Soviet Union are expected to arrive in Kaunas by a special plane, with whom our government hopes to solve in a friendly fashion the problems arising in connection with this new situation. The citizens of the Republic of Lithuania and all residents of the country are requested to keep calm, pursue their daily occupations and do their daily work. At this moment the most important thing is to preserve order, tranquillity and discipline.

The ultimatum of the Soviet Union to the government of Lithuania of June 14, 1940, as published in "Lietuvos Aidas" No. 281 is the same as the above translation.

(Signed) K. MUSTEIKIS.

EXHIBIT 5-C

[Translation from "Lietuvos Aidas" of June 16, 1940—No. 281 /54901]

"TASS" COMMUNIQUE REGARDING THE SOLUTION OF CONFLICT

"Tass" has issued the following communique regarding the solution of the conflict between Lithuania and the Soviet Union:

"On June 14, the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Soviet Union Molotov, in the name of his government made the following state-

ment to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Urbšys, then present in Moscow, for transmission to the Lithuanian government:

'After the recent exchange of opinions in Moscow between Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, on one side, and Merkys, the Prime Minister, and Urbšys, the Minister for Foreign Relations of Lithuania, on the other side the government of the Soviet Union holds the following facts as established:

1/ During the last months, on the part of the organs of the Lithuanian government there occurred several kidnappings of soldiers belonging to the detachments of the army of the Soviet Union settled in Lithuanian territory according to the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania and the torture of these persons with the purpose of discovering military secrets of the Soviet state. Further, it has been determined that soldier Butajev was not only kidnapped but also killed by Lithuanian police after the government of the Soviet Union asked for his return. Two Soviet soldiers—Pisarev and Shmaygonec—succeeded in escaping from the hands of the Lithuanian police who had kidnapped and tortured them. Soldier Shutov, who had been kidnapped in Lithuania, has not yet been found. With such acts directed against the detachments of the Soviet army settled in Lithuania, the organs of Lithuanian government wish to make the presence of the detachments of the army of the Soviet Union in Lithuania impossible. This is further testified to by other facts lately occurring especially frequently as the numerous arrests and placing in concentration camps of Lithuanian citizens from among those persons serving the detachments of the Soviet army is launderers, canteen personnel and others, and the mass arrests of Lithuanian citizens from among the laborers and technicians employed in the construction of barracks for the detachments of the army of the Soviet Union. These unbridled and unmotivated repressions of citizens of Lithuania in the employment of the detachments of the army of the Soviet Union are calculated not only to make the presence of those detachments in Lithuania impossible, but also to create antagonism against Soviet soldiers in preparation of the attack of these military detachments. All these facts show that the Lithuanian government is grossly violating the Mutual Assistance Pact signed with the Soviet Union and is preparing an attack on the Soviet garrisons settled in Lithuania in accordance with the Pact.

2/ Soon after the making of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, Lithuania entered into a military alliance with Latvia and Estonia, so changing into a military alliance the earlier so called Baltic Entente in which, prior to this, only Latvia and Estonia were joined in a military alliance. The government of the Soviet Union considers this alliance directed against the Soviet Union. After Lithuania entered this military alliance, the relations between the staffs of the armed forces of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, formed without informing the Soviet Union, were strengthened. It is also known that from 1940 this military alliance is publishing a magazine "Revue Baltique" in English, French and German languages. All these facts show that the Lithuanian government has in a very coarse manner violated the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, which forbids both nations "to enter any treaty of alliance or participate in any coalition directed against one of the parties to this Pact" / Article 6 of the Pact /.

All these breaches of the Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania and the unfriendly acts of the Lithuanian government against the Soviet Union were committed in spite of the exceptionally favourable and clearly pro-Lithuanian policy of the Soviet Union regarding Lithuania to which, as it is well known, the Soviet Union, on its own initiative, returned the territory and the city of Vilnius. The government of the Soviet Union considers the continuance of this situation as impossible. The government of the Soviet Union considers it essentially necessary and urgent: 1/ that the Minister for Internal Affairs Skučas and the Director of the Security Department Povilaitis be prosecuted as directly responsible for the provocations perpetrated against the garrisons of the Soviet Union in Lithuania; 2/ that a new government of Lithuania be immediately formed which would be capable and willing to guarantee the execution of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania and would determinately stifle the enemies of the treaty; 3/ that a free entrance of detachments of the Soviet armed forces into Lithuanian territory and their settling in the most important centers of Lithuania in sufficiently large numbers to guarantee the possibility of execution of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, and to stop acts of provocation directed against the garrisons of the army of the Soviet Union in Lithuania be immediately assured.

The government of the Soviet Union holds the fulfillment of the above demands as the first condition without which the assurance of loyal and honorable execution of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the Soviet Union and Lithuania is impossible. The government of the Soviet Union expects an answer from the government of Lithuania by 10 AM of June 15th. If no answer would be received until the specified time, that shall be considered as refusal to fulfill the above enumerated demands of the Soviet Union".

"At 10 AM of June 15th Urbšys presented Molotov with the answer of the government of Lithuania, that the terms set by the government of the Soviet Union are accepted."

The ultimatum of the Soviet Union to the government of Lithuania of June 14, 1940, as published in "Lietuvos Aidas" No. 281 is the same as the above translation.

(Signed) K. Musteikis.
K. MUSTEIKIS.

EXHIBIT 5-D

[Translation from "Lietuvos Aidas" of June 16, 1940—No. 281 /5490]

TELEGRAM FROM MINISTER URBŠYS JUNE 15TH 2 PM

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Urbšys about 2 PM of June 15th sent the following telegram from Moscow:

"The Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Soviet Union and the Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov has presented me the following demands: '1/ The armed forces of the Soviet Union shall cross the Lithuanian border at 3 PM of June 15th at the following places—Eišiškės, Druskininkai, railway station of Gudagojus, Druskininkaliai, Dūkštas and Pabrad; 2/ Separate detachments of the Soviet army crossing the border shall enter Vilnius, Kaunas, Raseiniai, Panėvėžys and Šiauliai; 3/ Other points of distribution of the army of the Soviet Union shall be determined by agreement by General Pavlov representing the Soviet Union and General Vitkauskas representing Lithuania; 4/ Gen. Pavlov and Gen. Vitkauskas shall meet in the railway station of Gudagojus at 8 PM of June 15th; to avoid unnecessary conflicts and misunderstandings the organs of the Lithuanian government shall immediately order the population and the armed forces not to interfere with the movements of the army of the Soviet Union in Lithuanian territory'".

The above translation of the telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs is a true interpretation into the English language of the demands dictated on June 15, 1940 by the Bolsheviks in connection with the occupation of Lithuania


(Signed) K. Musteikis.
K. MUSTEIKIS.

EXHIBIT 6-A




The Red Army invaded Latvia on June 17, 1940. Troops are shown entering the public square of the capital city of Riga effecting the "take-over" under the direction of Andrei Vishinsky.

EXHIBIT 6-B



The Red Army invaded Latvia on June 17, 1940. Troops are shown entering the public square of the capital city of Riga effecting the "take-over" under the direction of Andrei Vishinsky.

EXHIBIT 6-C



The Red Army invaded Latvia on June 17, 1940. Troops are shown entering the public square of the capital city of Riga effecting the "take-over" under the direction of Andrei Vishinsky.

EXHIBIT 6-D



The Communist fifth column in Latvia staged well-planned riots preceding the entrance of the Red troops. This picture shows police attempting to control a riot near the Riga railroad station.

EXHIBIT 6-E

11.

*Padomju sarīcības tuulas
komksaru paldoms prēkš-
sēdētāja biedrs*



2. *Staphylococcus aureus*

Audiență pie Vaisis prezidenția

[Faint handwritten notes]

Noslēgts līgums par Keo

[illegible]

Anglu k.
atsta! F

$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{3}$ $\frac{1}{6}$

The Latvian press was immediately taken over and the arrival of Commissar Vishinsky was heralded, as shown here, in all the newspapers.

EXHIBIT G-F



Vishinsky's first move in Latvia was to turn loose the prisoners in jail. Some of them are shown here celebrating their release. Many were later appointed to important positions in the militia and the police.


EXHIBIT 6-G



Directing the seizure of Latvia, Andrei Vishinsky is shown here addressing the people from the balcony of the Soviet Embassy in Riga.

EXHIBIT 6-II

Vēlāk
Liepājas prefekts.



Botanikers Matiss
Vēlāk kļuvis zagli, sodīts
6 g. 9 m.

One of the released prisoners, Botanikers Matiss, had served a total of 2 years and 3 months for several convictions. Under the Vishinsky regime he was appointed chief of police in Liepājas, Latvia's second largest city.

EXHIBIT 6-I

Vēlāk
Daugavpils prefekts.



Celmins Augusts
Zaglijs-recidivists, sodīts ar parasto
cības noma 6 g.

Clemins Augusts, a habitual criminal who had been convicted many times, was released from a 6-year term and appointed chief of police in Daugavpils, Latvia's third largest city.

EXHIBIT 6-J


Vēlāk
Rīgas milicijas II. iecirk.
priekšnieks



Cipe Gutmanis
būgļis-recidivists, 3 g. 6 m.
cietuma stāšs.


Cipe Gutmanis, another habitual criminal, served 3 years and 6 months in jail. He was appointed by the Vishinsky regime to the important post of chief of police in the second district of Riga.

EXHIBIT 6-K




The first move the Soviets made was to select their own government. Latvian Augusts Kirchensteins, leader of the Latvian Soviet Friendship Society, was made the puppet president. Elections were held in violation of the Constitution and the puppet parliament voted to ask Moscow to incorporate the country into the USSR. Here President Kirchensteins is shown entering the Supreme Soviet to beg for incorporation.

EXHIBIT 6-L




Latvian President Kirchensteins at the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet.

EXHIBIT 6-M



Premier Stalin listening to Kirchenstein's speech.

EXHIBIT 14-N




Molotov and Nikoian applaud the President of Latvia's request to become a member of the Soviet Union.

EXHIBIT G-O



Andrei Zhdanov is shown here waving his cap at the crowd in Tallinn, Estonia. He directed the seizure of that country for the Kremlin.

EXHIBIT G-P



The forceful seizure of Estonia is shown here as Red Army and Navy units escort the new President of Estonia to the rostrum of the parliament in Tallinn.

EXHIBIT 6-Q



In spite of the announced intention of the Kremlin not to interfere with the economy of any of the Baltic countries, the Communists immediately took over all the stores and stripped them of their merchandise. This is a picture of an "inventory" in a mercantile establishment in Riga.


EXHIBIT 6-R

Ввиду

социально опасного
разрешенияО. Иустин
26/VI-412


For more than a year the NKVD conducted a reign of terror in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This is a reproduction of one of the execution orders. This document, translated, says, "shoot all socially dangerous persons" and carries the signature of a NKVD officer.

EXHIBIT 6-S




Tortures were common and these are some of the torture instruments found in the basement of the NKVD headquarters in Riga, Latvia.

EXHIBIT 6-T




Tortures were common and these are some of the torture instruments found in the basement of the NKVD headquarters in Riga, Latvia.

EXHIBIT 6-U



Deportations were systematically carried out in the three countries, and it was estimated that more than 200,000 people were sent to Siberia and to slave labor camps. This is a picture of one of the cars filled with deportees.

EXHIBIT 6-V



When the Germans invaded the Baltic States in June of 1941, the NKVD fled. This is a picture of the last NKVD units running out of Riga, Latvia.

EXHIBIT 6-W



The NKVD left behind them numerous documents including execution orders and plans for the systematic destruction of the economy in the Baltic Nations. Many of these documents will be presented as evidence before the House Baltic Committee.

EXHIBIT 6-X



The NKVD left behind them numerous documents, including execution orders and plans for the systematic destruction of the economy in the Baltic Nations. Many of these documents will be presented as evidence before the House Baltic Committee.

EXHIBIT 6-Y




The NKVD left behind them numerous documents, including execution orders and plans for the systematic destruction of the economy in the Baltic Nations. Many of these documents will be presented as evidence before the House Baltic Committee.

EXHIBIT G-Z



After the Russian departure, evidence of the atrocities were uncovered in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These pictures were taken in the jail yard in Riga, Latvia, where approximately 200 people who had been murdered were interred.

EXHIBIT G-AA



After the Russian departure, evidence of the atrocities were uncovered in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These pictures were taken in the jail yard in Riga, Latvia, where approximately 200 people who had been murdered were interred.

EXHIBIT 6-BB



After the Russian departure, evidence of the atrocities were uncovered in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These pictures were taken in the jail yard in Riga, Latvia, where approximately 200 people who had been murdered were interred.

EXHIBIT 6-CC



The pattern of atrocities conducted by the Soviets in the Baltic States in 1940 is the same pattern that was used in Korea in 1951 and 1952. This picture, taken in Riga, Latvia, is almost the same as the Korean atrocity pictures recently released, even to gunshot wounds in the back of the head and the Russian-style knots around the wrists.

EXHIBIT 6-ZZ




The Red Army invaded Lithuania on June 15, 1940. Troops are shown entering the city of Kaunas, Lithuania, effecting the "take over."

EXHIBIT 7-A



After the Russian departure, evidence of the atrocities were uncovered in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These pictures were taken in the jail yard in Riga, Latvia, where approximately 200 people who had been murdered were interred.

Екһивт 7-В



Director of the Department of Education, Arnold Chuihe: 1) As he appeared in life, 2) after exhumation. There are marks of torture around eyes and lips. His only crime had been conscientious educational work.

EXHIBIT 7-C

[Copy of a photostat]

[Translation from the Russian language]

List of Cases on Persons Arrested by the Peoples' Commissariat of State Security / NKGB / of the Latvian SSR who, in Accordance With the Martial Law Proclaimed by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R., were Accused of Counter-revolutionary Activities

No.	Last and first name of the arrested	Charges preferred and remarks
1	Krishmanis, Janis	On June 24, 1941, expressed admiration for the German occupants. Spread propaganda to the effect that Germany would soon liberate Latvia and Estonia from the Russian bandits. (Accusation proved in accordance with Art. 58-10, Part 2 of the UK.)
2	Lasmanis (Solovieva) Antonina	Served as an agent of German and French intelligence, gathered material on the Red Army which was later turned over to the enemy (accused acc. to Art. 58, p. 1-a of the UK; proved guilty.)
3	Kalnuprus, August-Gotfrid	Member of Latvian Home Guards. Was hiding in forests to avoid draft in the Red Army. Captured on June 22, 1941. (Accused under Art. 58, p. 1-a and 58-4 of the UK; accusation proved.)
4	Henings, Oscar	In the summer of 1940 and April 1941 expressed hope to his friends that the Germans would soon enter Latvia, and made threats to the Party and Soviet regime. (Accusation under Art. 58-10, p. 1 of the UK proved.)
5	Danenbergs, Nikolai	Active participant in the Kronstadt resurrection, later fled to Finland. (Accusation proved according to Art. 58-4 of the UK.)
6	Somovitch, Victor Konstant	On June 24, 1941, sang fascist songs on the streets and when stopped, he ridiculed the Soviet regime. (Accusation under Art. 58-10, Part 2 of the UK proved.)
7	Baukshkis, Karlis	On June 22, 1941, organized and assumed leadership of a group of Latvian Home Guards and later, hiding in the woods, the group attempted to fight in order to overthrow the Soviet regime. (Accus. proved under Art. 58-2 and 58-11 of the UK.)
8	Jandals, Harald	Conducted counter-revolutionary propaganda against the Soviet order, slandered the Red Army, and expressed intention to penetrate the secret service and Soviet authorities in order to obtain information for Germany. (Accusation under Art. 58-10, Part 1 and 58 p. 1-1 of the UK by material evidence proved.)
9	Lukins, Miervaldis	In 1919 actively fought against the Soviet regime and the Red Army. In the following years, from 1920 to the establishment of the Soviet power, was aide-de-camp to President Ulmanis and other presidents. Conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. (Proved guilty under Art. 58-13 of the UK.)
10	Rainits, Nikolai	In 1919 enlisted in the German National Corps of the Landwehr. A national-socialist and adherent of Hitler, he conducted malicious anti-Soviet propaganda among his friends. In the middle of July attempted to enter Germany illegally. (Accused under Art. 58, p. 1-a and 58-10, Part 2 of the UK, and proved guilty by material evidence.)
11	Dzirago, Thomas	Conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and spread defeatist ideas among the population. In 1919-1920 served in the Polish Army and actively participated in combat action against the Red Army. On June 10 and June 22, 1941, Dzirago, denounced Soviet rule and praised the German form of state administration before the leading workers, boasting that the Germans would soon enter the Latvian SSR. (Under Art. 58-10, Part 2 proved guilty.)
12	Neiberg, Heinrich	During an air raid alarm in the night of June 24-25, 1941, when German airplanes flew over the city of Riga, fired shots from the window of his apartment in order to cause panic among the population. (Art. 58, p. 1-a and 58-13 of the UK; proved guilty.)
13	Berzinsh-Nave, Hugo	Being a counter-revolutionary and against the Soviet regime, he spread anti-revolutionary propaganda among the tenants of the house where he lived, also spread malicious rumors that since June 22 all trade relations with other countries had been cut off; also advised workers to secure larger quantities of food, which action proved harmful to the interests of the government. (Art. 58-10, Part 2 of the UK; accusation proved.)
14	Bartenverfer, Aleksandr	Being hostile toward the Soviet regime, conducted counter-revolutionary propaganda among a number of persons, praising fascism and slandering Soviet aviation. (Accusation under Art. 58-10, Part 1 of the UK proved.)
15	Gutkevitch, Jazep	Avoided draft; suspected of joining the enemy. (Accused under Art. 58, p. 1-a of the UK.)

No.	Last and first name of the arrested	Charges preferred and remarks
16	Flaming, Adolf.....	During 1940-1941 systematically conducted anti-revolutionary propaganda against the Soviet rule and its government, praising the fascist regime of Germany. (Accusation proved under Art. 58-10, Part 2 of the UK.)
17	Bueis, Juris.....	Opposed to Soviet rule; during 1940-1941 systematically conducted counter-revolutionary propaganda against the Soviet regime, praising fascist form of government. (According to Art. 58-10, Part 2 of the UK accusation proved.)
18	Kuznetsov, Matvei Nikolaevitch.....	In 1924 left the SSSR and applied for citizenship in Latvia. In 1932-1933 went from Latvia to Germany, Czechoslovakia and Finland. On July 23, 1941, was suspected of treason for signaling to German airplane, which act resulted in bombing of the S. S. "Smolny".
19	Kagan, Jazep Abramovitch.....	Being hostile anti-socialist element, at the time of German fascist attack on the Soviet Union, conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and committed treason flashing signals which resulted in the bombing of the S. S. Smolny. (Accusation proved according to Art. 58, p. 1-a and 58-10, Part 2 of the UK.)
20	Dolgov, Pjotr Evstratievitch.....	Conducted malicious propaganda at the time of the attack of German fascists on the USSR. Suspected of committing treason on June 23, 1941 by flashing signals to facilitate bombing of the S. S. "Smolny". (Accus. proved according to Art. 58, p. 1-a and 58-10, Part 2 of the UK.)
21	Alekseev, Sergel Anatolevitch.....	Conducted malicious propaganda. On June 23, 1941 committed a treacherous act by signaling German airplanes to bomb S. S. "Smolny". (Proved guilty under Art. 58, p. 1-a and 58-10, Part 2 of the UK.)
22	Herling, Jan.....	Suspected of treason for giving signals of June 23, 1941 to enemy airplanes to bomb S. S. "Smolny". (Accusation proved under Art. 58, p. 1-a of the UK.)
23	Lusis, Pauls.....	Suspected of treason by giving signals to the enemy airplanes on June 23, 1941, and firing at the S. S. "Smolny". (Proved guilty under Art. 58, p. 1-a of the UK.)
24	Janson, Edgar-Robert.....	For a number of years was an agent of German intelligence. At the time of war operations between the USSR and Germany, signaled to the enemy airplanes. (Accus. proved under Art. 58, p. 1-a of the UK.)
25	Fridelfelns (Fridenfelds?), Kristaps.....	Guilty of sabotage. During the war signaled German airplanes. (Proved guilty under Art. 58-14 of the UK.)
26	Goldmanis, Veniamin Girshevitch.....	Suspected of treason, i. e., on June 25, 1941, fired at a Red army patrol from his apartment. (Accusation proved under Art. 19-58-8 of the UK.)
27	Kruze, Eduard.....	In 1919 served in the White Army as a private. From 1922 to 1940 worked as investigating judge; at the hearings of the Communists and members of the Communist Youth League (Consomol) was beating them, pulling their hair and mocking at them. (Proved guilty under Art. 58-13 of the UK.)
28	Rozenberg, August.....	At the beginning of war operations with Germany deserted his work and conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. (Proved guilty under Art. 58-14 of the UK.)
29	Rutenberg, Karl.....	From 1931 to 1937 active member of the Home Guards. When Germany opened military operations, he deserted his work on June 22-24. In 1934 participated in the fascist coup d'état. (According to Article 58-13 and 58-14 of the UK proved guilty.)
30	Jakobson, August.....	Conducted malicious propaganda at the Kegums railroad station. (Acc. to Art. 58-10, Part 2 of the UK proved guilty.)
31	Patmanieks, Vilhelm.....	Conducted anti-Soviet propaganda at a coal depot, spoke of Red Army weakness and praised the German army. (According to Art. 58-10, Part 1 of the UK proved guilty.)
32	Pikans, Vilis.....	From 1934 to 1940 was a member of the Home Guard. After establishment of the Soviet regime in Latvia conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and threatened to resist actively the Soviet authorities in case of war against Germany. (According to Art. 58-1a and 58-13 of the UK proved guilty.)
33	Mednis, Arvid.....	Member of an espionage organization, by whose order gathered espionage material on the Soviet Union for German intelligence. At the beginning of war between the USSR and Germany, ordered members of his organization to aid German parachutists in their landing on the territory of the Latvia SSR. (Proved guilty under Art. 58, p. 1-a of the UK.)
34	Lasmanis, Helena.....	Hostile toward the Soviet regime, she secured intelligence on the existence of the espionage organization "Tevijas Sargas" and maintained, for illegal activities, close relations with the head of this organization, Klavinsh (arrested). (Acc. to Art. 58-12 of the UK proved guilty.)
35	Fogelmanis, Nikolai.....	Officer of the old Tsarist army. On June 23 made bonfire in the backyard of his house by which he assisted German airplanes in finding their targets. In 1919 enlisted voluntarily the Latvian Army, where he held responsible high posts. His last rank was that of a colonel. (Accusation according to Art. 58-13 of the UK proved.)

No.	Last and first name of the arrested	Charges preferred and remarks
36	Kuznecov, Matvei Nikolaevitch... Kagan, Jazep Abramovitch... Dolgov, Pjotr Eyrstratievitch... Aleksiev, Sergei Antonievitch... Herling, Jan... Lusis, Pauls... Kuks, Janis...	During the bombing of Riga all flashed signals, previously agreed upon, to objectives to be bombed. (Proved guilty according to Art. 58, 1-a and 58-10, Part 2 of the U.K.)
37	Valeskalns, Voldemars	In May 1941 deserted the Red Army and, together with some others, made preparations to escape abroad with forged documents. (Proved guilty, Art. 58 1-a.)
38	Keidans, Richard	On June 25 flashed signals from his apartment to the Fascist air force, thus assisting bombing of objectives. (Proved guilty accord. to Art. 58-1.)
39	Dzerens, Anton	According to unbiased information, after midnight, on June 23, 1941, observed the sky from a high point, and obviously tried to direct fascist air craft toward their objectives. (Proved guilty according to Art. 58-1a.)
40	Daukst, Aloizij	On June 22 shouted "Heil, Hitler" in the streets of Riga, by which act he invited anti-Soviet element to assist Hitler. (Accord. to Art. 58-10 of the UK proved guilty.)
41	Udris, Eduards	Arrested for illegal crossing of frontier. On January 1, 1938 was indicted and ordered to leave the USSR. Was an agent of the Latvian secret police. (Accusation under Art. 58 of the UK proved.)
42	Vikelis, Julijs	Being dissatisfied with the establishment of the Soviet regime in Latvia, systematically conducted anti-Soviet discussions among his friends, aimed to undermine the authority of Soviet rule in Latvia. At the beginning of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany, Udris increased his malicious anti-Soviet propaganda. (Prosecuted according to Art. 58-10, Part 2 of the U.K. Found guilty.)
43	Ishevsky, Dmitri Aleksandrovitch	Being dissatisfied with the establishment of the Soviet regime in Latvia, systematically conducted anti-Soviet discussions among his friends, aimed at undermining Soviet authority in Latvia. At the beginning of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany anti-Soviet utterances from Vikelis increased. Suspected of signaling to German aircraft which bombed Latvian territory, which is a crime acc. to Art. 58, p. 10, part 2; found guilty.
44	Svarubs, Rudolf	Accused of participating in espionage activities of the Lokkart in 1918, for which he was sentenced by Soviet authorities to five years imprisonment, but escaped to Poland. There he worked in the White Guard newspapers and defended the enemies of the Soviet people—Tukhachevsky and others. Prosecuted according to Art. 58. Found guilty.
45	Rubulis, Vladislavs	A former policeman, accused of hostility toward the Soviet regime; during an enemy air raid over Riga, was found in a cemetery, thereby violating military regulations, i. e., committed a crime provided by Art. 58-p. 1-a, and proved guilty.
46	Bobrov, Konstantin	Former policeman, accused of hostility toward the Soviet regime; during an air raid alarm, while enemy planes were over Riga, he was found flashing signals from the roof of his house, Gertrudes iela 47. Crime prov. by Art. 58, p. 1-a; found guilty.
47	Svarups, Rudolf	Accused of committing acts of sabotage in the "Krasny Kva-drat" factory, where he worked as an engineer and mechanic at the time of martial law. On June 22 by Bobrov's fault the factory was not provided with drinking water, thereby hampering considerably factory production. Moreover, according to reports from "Parttorg", Bobrovs signaled to enemy aircraft. According to information from the 5th division of the NKGB of the Latvian SSR—the former director of the "Kvadrat", Graupnek, who repatriated to Germany, is a member of German intelligence and maintained relations with Bobrov, Konstantin. Bobrov lived for some time in the same apartment and had close contact with Danos, nee Saks, who maintained a women's dress shop and was suspected by the KRO, NKGB of the Latvian SSR of German espionage.
48	Vinzarajs, Elvira	From 1936 to 1940 served as a police officer and suppressed the left-wing movement. Was found in a cemetery during an air raid and thereby violated military regulations. Proved guilty according to Art. 58-1a and 58-13 of the U.K.
49	Burneiko, Kazimir	From 1919 to 1940 was a member of the military-fascist organization of Home Guards, and under the Soviet regime participated in illegal meetings.
50	Elerbush, Inna	Kept a Fascist swastika which he received from Elerbush.
51	Bergmanis, Jan	Kept a Fascist swastika and later transmitted it to Burneiko.
52	Chagus, Michel	Opposed the revolutionary movement in 1932; enlisted in the military-fascist organization of Home Guards. With the establishment of the Soviet regime, he conducted anti-Soviet propaganda.
53	Vistins, Heinrich	Joined the military-fascist organization of Home Guards. Recently conducted anti-Soviet propaganda.
54		Member of the military-fascist organization of Home Guards. Recently conducted anti-Soviet propaganda.

No.	Last and first name of the arrested	Charges preferred and remarks
55	Chuibē, Arnold.....	Former vice-director of the Department of Schools of Fascist Latvia. During German air raids signaled bombing squadrons for espionage purpose. Accusation according to Art. 58-1 and 58-4 of the UK proved.
56	Chulbe, Arnold-Nikolai.....	Member of the military-fascist organization of Home Guards. During German air raids signaled bombing squadrons for espionage purpose. Accusation acc. to Art. 58-1 and 58-4 of the UK proved.
57	Rinks, Eduard.....	Captain third class of the former Latvian navy. During German air raids signaled bombers for espionage purpose. Accusation acc. to Art. 58-1a and 58-4 of the UK proved.
58	Genoch, Eduard Abramovitch.....	Was engaged in intelligence work against the USSR in behalf of German effort in the territory of the Latvian SSR.
59	Millers, Eriks.....	Born in 1916. Anti-Soviet disposed, conducted anti-Soviet propaganda among the residents of Riga. Praised German fascism. Former member of the counter-revolutionary organization "Vanagi". Accused according to Art. 58-10, Part 2 of the UK, RSFSR.
60	Kuks, Janis.....	In April 1941 was hiding from Soviet authorities Peter Kuks and Raimunds Eglt, and assisted them in deserting the Red Army and furnishing them forged documents, guns and bullets. Prosecuted according to Art. 58, p. 1 "v" of the UK, RSFSR.
61	Valdmanis, Karl.....	Veteran policeman, active member of the Home Guards, cooperated with and aided German air force to locate objectives. Art. 58, p. 1 over 16, and 58, p. 1-a of the UK, RSFSR.
62	Roga, Videvuts-Janis-Modrins.....	Ardent anti-Sovietist, active member of the Home Guards.
63	Cirs, Adolf.....	Anti-Sovietist and active member of the military-fascist organization of the Home Guards.
64	Trubeks, Nisons Movshevitch.....	Betrayed his country. From the time of the German fascist attack on Soviet territory until his arrest, he was extending aid of an espionage nature to the German air force—to the detriment of the military forces of the USSR—flashing them signals of various colors. Art. 58, p. 1-a, RSFSR.
65	Trubeks, Dina Moliseevna.....	Betrayed her country. To the detriment of the military power of the USSR, was extending help of an espionage nature to enemy planes by flashing them multi-color-red signals from the time of the German fascist attack on Soviet territory until her arrest. Art. 58, p. 1-a, RSFSR.
66	Skalitis, Indriks.....	Of a "Kulak" (i. e. farmer) family. Before Soviet rule in Latvia owned a large bakery, a bakery shop and two-story house. Exploited his workers of which he employed eight. Violently anti-Soviet, he spread malicious rumors, slandered the Red Army, demonstrated sympathy for the Germans and distributed counter-revolutionary leaflets. Accused of crime accord. to Art. 58, p. 10, Part 2; proved guilty.
67	Jakubovska, Veronika.....	Hostile to the existing rule in Soviet Latvia, on June 22, 1941, constructed paper letters welcoming Hitler and appealing to him for aid; pasted them on the window of her apartment. Art. 58, p. 10, Part 2. Accusation proved.
68	Frishenfelds, Peter.....	Formerly a large houseowner. Dissatisfied with the establishment of the Soviet regime in Latvia, conducted among his friends anti-Soviet discussions directed at undermining the authority of the Soviet regime in Latvia. When the war began between the Soviet Union and Germany, Frishenfelds' utterances were materialized. Crime provided by Art. 58, p. 10, Part 2; proved guilty.
		The niece of Danos O.-Saks, Ariadna, is known to be a German spy, arrested by the KRO NKGB of the Latvian SSR, crime prov. by Art. 58, p. 1-a. The accused pleaded not guilty.
69	Dzorens, Anton.....	Former member of Home Guards, engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda. On June 22, 1941, conducted counter-revolutionary propaganda among workers aimed at undermining the authority of the Soviet regime; praised Hitlerite policy, at the end of his speech shouting: "Heil Hitler—hurrah Hitler." Guilt according to Art. 58, 1a, prov. d.
70	Daukst, Alozijs.....	In 1938 was indicted and ordered by Special Counsel to leave the territory of the USSR. On October 26, 1938, established himself in Latvia; in 1937, as an agent of the information bureau of the Latvian Army, was transferred to the USSR to perform espionage work; had espionage contact with the agents of the Latvian intelligence service. Proved guilty according to Art. 58, p. 6.
71	Klaun, Richard.....	Born in 1896, in the district of Cesis, accused of betraying his country, i. e. in 1923 crossed the border from USSR to Latvia, and conducted espionage activities on Latvian territory until his arrest; crime proved by Art. 58, p. 1, RSFSR.
72	Lelen, Robert.....	Accused of appealing in a public place to the masses on June 22, 1941, to fight against the Soviet rule in order to help Germany; crime prov. by Art. 58, p. 10, Part I of the UK, RSFSR.
73	Shirmanis, Janis.....	Accused of espionage activities against the Soviet Union, in behalf of German effort; crime prov. by Art. 58, p. 1-a.

No.	Last and first name of the arrested	Charges preferred and remarks
74	Plankenburg, Arthur.....	Accused of active anti-Soviet propaganda of a destructive nature in favor of Germany; crime proved by Art. 58, p. 10, Part 2.
75	Rozenberg, Arthur.....	Accused of spreading systematic anti-Soviet defeatist propaganda among the population, by praising German fascism and predicting an early ending to Soviet rule. Prov. by Art. 58, p. 10, Part 2.
76	Lucavs, Herbert.....	Accused of spreading systematic anti-Soviet propaganda among the population, praising Hitler's fascism, and expressing his approval as to the new territories seized by Hitler; crime prov. by Art. 58, p. 10, Part 2.
77	Kaulinsh, Robert.....	Conducted anti-Soviet propaganda, praised fascist order in Germany, and in 1941 tried to go to Germany. Accusation under Art. 58-10, p. 1 of the UK proved.
78	Grinshtein, Hugo.....	Exposed as an active anti-Sovietist, who conducted propaganda among the workers at the Riga freight station, and spread slanderous rumors that the Germans would soon enter Riga and defeat the Russians.

Peoples Commissariat of State Security of the Latvian SSR, Captain of State Security: S. SHUSTIN.

Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the troops of the NKVD of the Latvian SSR Military jurist 2nd rank: SOLDATENKOV.

Assistant Military Prosecutor of Investigation in the Baltic—PRIBOVO
Military jurist 2nd rank: SOLNCEV.

[Written by hand:] In view that these constitute a social menace all are to be shot.

26/VI-41

S. SHUSTIN.

[Translation from the Russian language]

[Written on a separate piece of paper:] "Arrested sixty two persons received. Signed: / signature not clear—undecipherable / 27/VI-41"

* * *

Strictly Confidential

* * *

List of Cases on Persons Arrested for Counter-Revolutionary Activities in the Period of War Operations, Accusation Having Been Proved

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Brashe, Voldemar | 18. Kalnbirze, Janis |
| 2. Levens, Evald | 19. Bruks, Olgert |
| 3. Matrosov, Ivan | 20. Bruks, Erhard |
| 4. Feldhun, Hirsh | 21. Bruninova, Fritz |
| 5. Stenberg, Adam | 22. Gibelhauzen, Sten |
| 6. Strautkane, Alfred | 23. Krombergs, August |
| 7. Timmermanis, Alfred | 24. Grinstein, Guno |
| 8. Cirulis, Karl | 25. Blankenburg, Artur |
| 9. Reinis, Alfred | 26. Lubanietis, Matzian |
| 10. Gazejs, Arnold | 27. Graudins, Alfons |
| 11. Gurvitch, Philip | 28. Indritzans, Daniel |
| 12. Muizhuris, August | 29. Polak, Rudolf |
| 13. Purinsh, Fritz | 30. Balodis, Vilis |
| 14. Gravitis, Oscar | 31. Cepelis, Arvid-Aleksandr |
| 15. Graudins, Martin | 32. Kazak, Paul |
| 16. Penka, Otto | 33. Adamaitis, Anton |
| 17. Buters, Mness | 34. Baltgalvis, Janis |


Chief of the Division of Investigation
NKGB of the Latvian SSR
Captain of the State Security. Signed: VEVERS.

Assistant Military Prosecutor PRIBOVO
Military Jurist 2nd rank, Signed: SOLNCEV.

Assistant Prosecutor of the Latvian SSR. Signed: BUTILIN.

CITY OF RIGA, June 28, 1941.

EXHIBIT 7-D



Colonel Streips, one of thousands whose path from life and freedom passed through the Cheka chambers of torture and ended in a martyr's death. There is a bullet hole in his forehead and his lips are lacerated.

EXHIBIT 7-E

ВИДКА ИЗ ПЛЕЧЕКА

ИЗДАНИЕ СОВЕТА СОВЕТОВ СОВЕТАМИ СОВЕТАМИ СОВЕТАМИ

1941 года, мая 21 дня.

Военный Трибунал Прибалтийского Военного Округа в
г. Риге, в составе:

председатель: зажиточный судья, постановивший дело № 00287 по обвинению
Франкевича Гедимина Святославовича, 1921 года рождения, уроженца
г. Риги, по национальности поляк, гражданина СССР, по обвинению
в том, что он владел и хранил в своем доме в г. Риге, в районе
егося средней школы, кожаного, бумажного и чуждого оружия, а также
«Машинки», на основании, в соответствии с, предусмотренных ст. ст.
19-58-9, 58-10 ч.1 и 58-11 УК РСФСР.

Данными судебного следствия и материалами дела установлено
по

На основании вышеизложенного Военный Трибунал признал
Франкевича виновным по ст. ст. 19-58-9, 58-10 ч.1 и 58-11 УК РСФСР
руководствуясь ст. ст. 319, 320 УК и 19 УК РСФСР -

ПРИГОВОР

Франкевича Г. Святославовича по обвинению в совершении
деяний и преступлений на основании ст. 19-58-9 УК РСФСР подпадает
под меру уголовного наказания - расстрел, с конфискацией всего
именно ему принадлежащего имущества.

Приговор по ст. 19-58-9 УК РСФСР окончательный и обжалованию
не подлежит, а по ст. ст. 58-10 ч.1 и 58-11 УК РСФСР приговор
быть обжалован в высшем судебном порядке, через Военный Трибунал,
в состав Коллегии Верховного Суда СССР, в течение 72-х часов с
момента вручения копии приговора осужденному.

ВИДКА СОВЕТА:

СУД. СЕКРЕТАРЬ ОТ ИМЕНИ
ТЕХНИК ИНТЕРНАЛЫ И ТАТА

(ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ)

Sentence of death found on the corpse of a murdered schoolboy, Gedimin
Franckevich. The dark spots are bloodstains.

EXHIBIT 7-E



Disfigured head of the murdered schoolboy, Gedimin Frankevich.

EXHIBIT 7-F



The pattern of atrocities conducted by the Soviets in the Baltic States in 1940 is the same pattern that was used in Korea in 1951 and 1952. This picture, taken in Baltezers, Latvia, is almost the same as the Korean atrocity pictures recently released, even to gunshot wounds in the back of the head, and the Russian-style knots around the wrists.

EXHIBIT 7-G



A number of exhumed bodies at Dreilini, near Riga. Woods concealed the graves of many other victims.

EXHIBIT 7-II




Disinterment of 98 victims of the Cheka who were found buried in the courtyard of Riga central prison in July 1941.

EXHIBIT 7-H




Victims of the Cheka found buried in the garden of the Villa of Baltezers.
Exhumed on July 22, 1941.

EXHIBIT 7-I



A victim of the Cheka, Janis Ozolins, commander of the Railway Defense Guard: in life and after exhumation.

EXHIBIT 7-J



Torture instrument found in the Tallinn Cheka.

EXHIBIT 7-J



View of the execution chamber in the Riga Cheka. Behind the lowered curtain can be seen the bullet pierced boards. The curtain of impregnated cloth was used to prevent spattering the wall with blood.

EXHIBIT 8

In the United States District Court, District of New Jersey

In Admiralty

LIETUVOS ZEMES UJIO KOOPERATYVU SAJUNGA LIETUKIS (AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF LITHUANIA LIETUKIS) ET AL., LIBELANTS
vs.

THE S/S DENNY, HER TACKLE, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Deposition of witness on behalf of claimants-respondents, taken at the office of P. A. Beck, Esq., 39 Cortlandt Street, New York, N. Y., on May 21, 1941

Appearances: P. A. Beck, Esq., for claimants-respondents. No appearance for libelants.

Mr. BECK. This deposition was taken pursuant to notice dated May 20th and served about 12 o'clock on Mr. Gessinger of counsel for libelants. Mr. Recht's office was notified about 9:30 of counsel's intention to take depositions of two witnesses to be produced. In the afternoon Mr. Recht stated to counsel that counsel for libelants would not participate in the examination of these witnesses. The notice of depositions fixed the time of the hearing at 10 o'clock. At about 10:30 the examination proceeded without the appearance of counsel representing the libelants.

OWEN J. C. NOREM, being duly sworn and examined as a witness on behalf of the claimants-respondents, testified as follows:

Direct examination by Mr. BECK:

Q. You were the United States Minister to Lithuania; were you not?—A. I was.

Q. Will you please state when you took up that commission and when you left Lithuania?—A. I was appointed United States Minister to Lithuania in the summer of 1937 and in the fall of 1937 I arrived in Lithuania and began my duties there.

Q. When did you leave Lithuania?—A. On July 30, 1940.

Q. Were you in charge of the Legation in Kaunas?—A. I was.

Q. And during the pursuit of your duties did you travel to any extent throughout Lithuania?—A. Yes; I did. I visited all parts of Lithuania and traveled in Russia, Germany and all the surrounding countries of Northern Europe.

Q. Did you make any particular examination of Lithuanian laws, customs and history?—A. Yes; I did.

Q. Will you state briefly what examination you made?—A. I was interested in preparing a work on Lithuania. Consequently I made contacts with members of the faculty of the University of Kaunas and with other informed individuals in Lithuania and gathered as much material as was available. I also visited places where archeological excavations were being made and so forth.

Q. In the course of your duty as Minister to Lithuania was it necessary for you to familiarize yourself with the laws of Lithuania?—A. Yes. I had of course two career secretaries and eleven clerks working at the Legation and it was their duty to assimilate all of this material and most of it went over my desk. I don't say I read all of it. I studied much of it.

Q. Did you follow the course of legislation and decrees as they were issued by the Lithuanian Government?—A. I did.

Q. Prior to June 17, 1940? A. I did.

Q. Do you know whether Lithuania is governed by one single code or whether different codes are in effect in Lithuania?—A. Different codes are in effect in Lithuania. There is the Russian Law and the Napoleonic Law and Lithuanian Law and the Baltic Code, which is a section of Russian Law.

Q. Can you tell me in what part of Lithuania the Baltic Code is in effect?—A. The Baltic Code is in effect on the seacoast. It has special maritime provisions, regulations, etc.

Q. Do you know whether the Port of Sventoji is in Lithuania?—A. Yes; it is on the northwestern coast of Lithuania.

Q. Do you know whether Sventoji is in the area in which the Baltic Code prevails?—A. Yes; the Baltic Code, according to my knowledge, includes the entire coastline of Lithuania which at best is very small. The Baltic Code would cover the area of Sventoji and Palanga. Those are the only two.

Q. Palanga is farther from the Latvian coast than Sventoji?—A. Yes.

Q. Were you in Kaunas on or about June 17, 1940?—A. I was.

Q. Will you state what you observed with respect to the appearance of Russian soldiers in the streets of Kaunas on June 17, 1940?—A. The occupation of course began early in the afternoon. I think it was June 15th and the armored division arrived in town at the close of that day about 6 o'clock and on the following day the air units arrived and various mechanized troops and of course they made quite a display; paraded through the town, and it was one continuous parade of soldiers. They made a great show of armored strength.

Q. Could you estimate the number of troops?—A. It was estimated at various figures; I believe something between 250,000 and 400,000; very difficult to get exact military figures. The Russians of course wouldn't tell and no one knows accurately, but they moved many of the units from Lithuania to Latvia and Estonia, because they occupied Latvia and Estonia directly after Lithuania, but all in all, it was a tremendous military display, obviously, designed to overawe the people, and then of course following the troops eventually came the organizers. That is the branch of the Russian service that could perhaps be called the civilian organizers or commissars, that follow the army. The Russians have a peculiar system. They organize the people that they take.

Q. Can you tell me of what the armored divisions consisted?—A. They had tanks and trucks, armored cars. The artillery came on about the fourth day of invasion, mostly light artillery, field artillery.

Q. About how long after the army passed through Kaunas did those civilian organizers as you have characterized them appear?—A. Within a week they were on the scene and beginning their activities.

Q. And what activities did you observe?—A. They assumed posts at various strategic places, such as the Department of the Interior, almost immediately, and the banks and in other departments of the government; eventually in the foreign office which had the least interest for them.

Q. Did you personally see the civilian organizers that you have described in the several posts that you have mentioned as their having assumed?—A. Yes; I did.

Q. I show you a document headed Darbo Lietuvo, No. 20, dated Kaunas, July 26, 1940, and ask you whether you were in Kaunas at that time?—A. I was.

Q. And do you recall having been informed of the passage of that Act?—A. Yes.

Q. And did you come by that information through your duties as American Minister?—A. That is right.

Q. And will you state for the record, please, the condition of the press and other means of communication in Lithuania after the events of June 15th-17th?—A. After a brief moment of realization we might say that the Russians were there and were there to regularize all news, and eventually sovietized all news, gradually maintained a very level soviet tone, undoubtedly showing the influence behind the press. This was done very subtly, through subtle threats and the fear that resulted from the very presence of the Russians and the way things were going. Those editors who showed some slight resistance were "liquidated." The press was under strict government control and nothing was published without the sanction of the government. This happened within less than a week after the appearance of the Russian Army in Kaunas. The same is true of telephones and telegraph communications.

Q. Are you familiar with a paper in Kaunas by the name of Darbo Lietuvo?—A. I was.

Q. Will you tell us what its standing was with the government after the invasion?—A. It was semiofficial. The people had the appearance of being very much afraid and were actuated by fear in everything they did while I was in Lithuania.

Q. Were you in Kaunas at the time of the elections?—A. Yes; I was.

Q. Will you briefly describe how the elections were conducted?—A. A campaign of notice was conducted and in the notices it was said that anyone failing to vote would be considered an enemy of the people, and on the day of election many people appeared at the polls but the actual voting of course was ridiculous because they were given one list to vote for and they were counted as they came in and whether they voted yes or no really made little difference.

Q. Did you observe personally any places where the voting was being done on election day?—A. I had one observer stationed at a precinct where he observed some Russian and Lithuanian-communistic sympathizers voting several

times and when they first counted the ballots the result was 122 percent in this precinct of Kaunas but they quickly rectified that error.

Q. Was that report made to you by your observer in pursuance of his duty as a member of the Embassy staff?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you personally observe any of the elections?—A. I drove about the City of Kaunas and I observed conditions at many of the polling places and I saw how they were conducted and in the main my observations were corroborated by the report of the observer, that I have just related.

Q. These civilian organizers that you saw in various branches of the government and in the banks—did they have an official title?—A. They are commissars, and apparently controlled all matters relating to the business to which they were assigned. I investigated the situation with respect to the condition of Lithuanian credits abroad and found that there was danger that the new government would seize Lithuanian credits, and reported to my government. The freezing orders of the United States Government followed my report within a few days.

Q. In your investigation of conditions in Lithuania while you were United States Minister there, did you learn anything about the Lithuanian Agriculture Cooperative Association, generally known as Lietukis?—A. I did.

Q. Will you describe its organization and functions, briefly?—A. In the beginning it was organized to aid the farmer in buying certain necessary materials and was headed by these patriotic Lithuanians such as Tubelis, etc. It was my understanding that it was a semi-government organization until it reached the position of more or less independence. It purchased such materials as machinery and fertilizer, gasoline, fuel oil, etc., and sold them directly to the farmer.

Q. Can you state about how many branches there were throughout the country of this organization?—A. I don't just recall but I would say over one hundred.

Q. Do you know whether they had employees in the various branches?—A. Yes; they maintained certain establishments necessary to the carrying on of their activities; for instance, when working at the port of Klaipeda (Memel) they had storage places and warehouses, etc.

Q. Can you state how general the practice was of installing commissars in business places throughout Lithuania?—A. The practice of establishing commissars was very general. They took an interest in any organization that was making money and appeared affluent, even business so small as to employ only five or six employees. I recall that they nationalized all businesses employing five or more persons.

Q. Did this nationalization apply to the Lietukis organization?—A. Yes, it is my information it did, gained from my investigation of conditions in the course of my official duties.

(Signed) OWEN J. C. NOREM.

Sworn to before me this 21st day of May, 1941.

[SEAL]

(Signed) FRANCIS GALWEY,

Notary Public, New York County, New York County Clerk's No. 322.

Commission expires March 30, 1942.

In the United States District Court, District of New Jersey

LIETUVOS ZEMES UJIO KOOPERATYVU SAJUNGA LIETUKIS (AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF LITHUANIA LIETUKIS), ET AL., LIBELANTS

against

THE SS DENNY, HER TACKLE, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

I, Frances Galwey, a Notary Public in and for the County of New York, State of New York, duly appointed and empowered to act in and for the County of New York, State of New York, and duly authorized under and by virtue of the Acts of Congress of the United States and of the Revised Statutes, to take depositions de bene esse in Civil cases pending in the Courts of the United States, do hereby certify: That the forgoing deposition of Owen C. J. Norem was taken on behalf of the claimant-respondents before me at the office of P. A. Beck, Esq., 39 Cortlandt Street, Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, on May 21, 1941, pur-

suant to notice; that I was attended upon the taking of said deposition by P. A. Beck, Esq., of counsel for the claimant-respondents; that there was no appearance on behalf of the libelants.

That said witness was by me first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and that he was thereupon examined by counsel present; that I took down the testimony of said witness in shorthand, and caused the same to be transcribed to typewriting by a person under my personal supervision and who is not interested in this cause; and the deposition as above set forth, was read over and signed by Owen C. J. Norem in my presence.

I further certify that I have retained the said deposition in my possession for the purpose of delivering the same with my own hand, in a sealed postpaid wrapper, into the Post Office, addressed to the Clerk of the United States District Court, District of Jersey, Newark, New Jersey, for the Court for which the same was taken.

I further certify that I have no business employment or office connection with the parties to the suit, or their attorneys.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal, this 21st day of May, 1941.

[SEAL]

(Signed) Frances Galwey.

FRANCES GALWEY.

*Notary Public, New York County,
New York County Clerk's No. 322.*

Commission expires March 30, 1942.

EXHIBIT 9

[From Autobiographer Herbert Hoover, 1951]

THE OTHER BALTIC STATES

The events in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania merit more discussion than their combined population of 4,700,000 people might indicate. Here was a heroic struggle of subjugated races of historical interest. The part we took in their struggle also has some connotations in later history.

Never has there been an instance of human emancipation occurring under such appalling difficulties. Here were three non-Slavic tribes, probably somewhat related to the Finns and Hungarians who had settled this area in some dim past. They had been subjected over centuries alternately to German, Polish and Russian oppression. There was an alien class overlordship upon them, from an aristocracy descended from the original German Baltic Barons—the "Balts"—with a sprinkling of Russians. In this top layer were the great landowners and industrialists. The mass of the people had passed through serfdom into a peasantry and city workers. Their lot was not happy. Up to the great war they were more sorely exploited than almost any other racial group in Europe. Yet over hundreds of years these races had shown extraordinary intellectual resistance to Germanization and Russification. They had maintained their languages, their racial culture and a determined resolution that freedom would come some time. There was only one large city, Riga, with such smaller ports and manufacturing towns as Reval, Libau, and Memel, which had been built up largely as the commercial outlets from Russia. Otherwise the people were farmers in rich agricultural lands.

When the political explosion in Europe came with the Armistice the resolution of these races at once asserted itself. They each broke into democratic revolutions with provisional governments. Their individualism was such that the three states could not and would not combine into one state although their racial affinities, their aspirations, their economic problems and their future defense and independence all pointed to that necessity.

They were confronted with difficulties which to any but intrepid peoples would have been too much even to contemplate. They were divided in their political ideas because there had been no opportunity for development of cohesions through experience. The great majority aspired to parliamentary government and to free economic systems. However, when their political and social ideas came to light in parliament, there were from twelve to sixteen different political groups in each legislature, stretching from Communism to rank class autocracy.

The Communist conflagration in Russia spread plenty of sparks among them—and fanned these local fires with invading Red Armies. A majority of parties

agreed on two things: They would be free. They would divide the land holdings of the great Balt and Russian barons. The people therefore had on one hand to combine against the Balts who were supported from Germany, and on the other against the Communists, to say nothing of their domestic differences.

Prior to the Armistice, they had been occupied by the Germans—indeed they were practically annexed under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty between Russia and Germany. The Germans had created an army of occupation mostly of Balts and White Russians under German officers with General von der Goltz in command.

Therefore, with the Soviet spreading Communism by infection and by attacking armies, with the Balt element endeavoring to control the governments, with an uncontrolled German-commanded army in their midst, and rank starvation everywhere, these peoples were fighting on four fronts. In this almost impossible setting, however, the people of each state at once organized provisional republics.

The Allies, fearing general chaos if the German Army withdrew, had stipulated that General von der Goltz's army should stay there until the Allies settled their future. This army lived by requisition and every German and Balt common soldier had been promised a large landed estate. But everything was delayed by the French, who held that these states must remain *in statu quo* until they could be returned to Russia some time in the future when the Bolshevik Government had been abolished.

A few weeks after the Armistice I began to receive prayers imploring for food, medical supplies, clothing, and raw materials. If the liberal elements could control the food for starving peoples, they would have a powerful hold on the situation. But until some sort of order could be established we could do very little quickly.

In our preliminary organization, I first annexed Estonia to Finland for relief purposes, placing it under Major Ferry Heath at Helsinki. I annexed Latvia and Lithuania to Poland under Colonel Grove at Warsaw. But as the situation became more strenuous I set up a separate mission for the three Baltic states under Colonel John C. Groome and a staff of thirty-six American officers.

With this sort of background, we can move into their individual and hitherto unwritten histories—and behind each was the question of food and freedom.

ESTONIA

In Estonia, four days after the Armistice a council of various groups erected a provisional government at Reval. This council had indeed been born at the time of the Russian Revolution (April, 1917) but had been snuffed out by the German occupation. In December, 1918 the Russian Red Army invaded them. With an improvised force of Finnish, Swedish, White Russian, and Latvian volunteers, but mainly Estonian peasants, they held the Communists off. Our men reported that George Washington's army at Valley Forge was better clothed, better fed and better armed. There can be no doubt of their courage. One division lost 50 per cent in a single action against the Communists but held its ground.

The food situation was horrible enough but our staff soon overcame the worst conditions. In some of the towns the mortality of children had been as high as 35 per cent during the past year. From the Finns we secured in January 1919 an advance of 2,000 tons of flour by undertaking to replace it later on. With another shipment from Copenhagen and a small transshipment from England, we managed to keep things going until we could get regular shipments in motion. In due time we established the free feeding of children from which a lasting impression of America has remained in the Estonian mind.

The Estonians more formally organized a Constitutional Assembly on April 13th (1919) and discovered there were twelve different political parties with no one in majority. Anyway they were united in their determination to be free. Having beaten the Communists, their volunteer contingents joined in an attempt to capture Petrograd, which I relate elsewhere. Otherwise, Estonia offered little more than the usual routine of fighting famine and disease. Being an agricultural state, they were finally comfortable after the arrival of the harvest in 1919.

A human note of true Americanism sounds in one of Lieutenant John Thors' reports. He had charge in Reval and related that upon the arrival of the S. S. *Lake Duncay* the captain asked for a baseball field for his crew to determine whether they or the firemen had the better team. Thors found a field and decided that he would charge the Estonians admission to this strange performance. He borrowed a band from the town and inserted full publicity into the press. Our sailors and firemen gave cigarettes to be sold for 1.50 marks

a pack—say 25 cents—a reduction of about 80% of the current price. The brass band, cigarettes and baseball game proved to be a huge success. After the performance was over, he found that the receipts amounted to 3,200 marks for the Children's Relief.

Our Estonian statistical record was:

Supplies

	Food (tons)	Clothing, Medical, Miscellaneous (tons)	Total (tons)
From—			
United States.....	53, 554	4, 179	57, 733
United Kingdom.....	8, 224	400	8, 624
Denmark.....	462		462
Total.....	62, 240	4, 579	66, 819
Financed by—			
Cash paid to the United States.....			\$414, 815
Loans from United States.....			16, 764, 071
Charity from United States (Child Feeding).....			1, 460, 796
Loans from United Kingdom.....			2, 342, 360
Denmark Exchange Commodities.....			35, 207
Total.....			\$21, 017, 249

In looking over the musty statistics one item of charity catches the eye—"230,000 children's garments, 35,000 needles and 139,000 buttons."

LATVIA

The new Republic of Latvia had a more troubled infancy than Estonia. Five days after the Armistice, a council of leading Letts, under the leadership of Karlis Ulmanis, proclaimed a Republic at Riga. Ulmanis was provisional President. He was one of the unique figures to emerge in the war years. He had been brought to Nebraska by an uncle when ten years old, had been educated at a mid-West University and had taught economics. Shortly before the war he had returned to Latvia to minister to his mother and was caught in the draft of the Russian Army. Probably more than any one other man he was responsible for the independence movement of these three Baltic races. His devotion to freedom gave direction to all of them.²

His frail government was at once opposed by the Balts. Due to refusal of their support he was unable to overcome a Communist rising in Riga early in January (1919) supported by an invasion of the Russian Bolshevik Army.

We were about to land food supplies when Ulmanis and his government were forced to retreat underground. Later (on April 2), he pulled his government together and established a headquarters for it at Libau. He then renewed his appeals to me to stop starvation. Through Colonel Grove, I sent Major Frank Ross and Captain John H. Hollister from our staff in Warsaw. We ordered a cargo into Libau which arrived on April 9th in charge of Major DuBois Brookings and Lieutenant George P. Harrington. In a week they had kitchens operating and were feeding some 20,000 of the most distressed people. But at the end of that week a Balt uprising, led by large land owners and surreptitiously supported by von der Goltz's army, seized Libau. Von der Goltz's action was part of a general conspiracy to establish Balt control of all three Baltic states under a Baron von Stryck. Ulmanis had to flee again, this time to Sweden. Our men, therefore, suspended food distribution for a few days to see what would happen next. On April 20th a squadron of Allied destroyers appeared and von der Goltz issued a proclamation announcing that he had nothing to do with the overthrow of the Latvian Government; whereupon our men resumed distribution.

Ulmanis again began to organize. Things in Libau rocked along under uncertain control with von der Goltz's army in and out of the situation. In the meantime, I received the most terrible reports about the conduct of the Com-

² Twenty years later, at his invitation, I visited the prosperous Latvian Republic. Still later, as a captive, he was executed by the Communists at Leningrad.

munist Government in Riga. On May 7th I sent a memorandum to the "Big Four":

The situation at Riga has developed into a most distressing form. From advices received from different quarters, it appears that the Bolshevik Government being unable to provide foodstuffs was mobbed by the populace and had withdrawn its army from the city, which was given over to complete anarchy of wholesale massacre and murder. It appears that a large number of women and children of the so-called "bourgeois" were transported to an island in the bay and have been slowly starving under the guardianship of a lot of female harpies.

We are endeavoring to arrange for a shipload of food, but the question arises at once as to any form of guardianship by which the food could be discharged and distributed. It seems almost impossible to contemplate sending any merchant ship in without naval escort and to secure anything like a reasonable distribution without some kind of military protection.

My information was incorrect in the detail of the withdrawal of the Russian Communist army from Riga. They were still on the job and doing their worst.

As nothing happened, from this appeal, I followed on the 9th with a more urgent letter to Mr. Wilson going into more details, and asking for naval protection to our ships and the port cities.

Mr. Wilson replied:

PARIS, 21 May 1919.

MY DEAR HOOVER:

I read with deep interest and concern your letter of the ninth of May about the situation in the Baltic Provinces, and yesterday had an opportunity to read it to the other members of the "Council of Four." Mr. Lloyd George suggested that I request you to have a conference with Admiral Hope, or anyone else who represents the British Admiralty here, in order to ascertain whether it was feasible from a naval point of view to carry out the programme you suggest. If the programme were adopted, it would, I suppose, necessarily be the British Navy that executed it, and we would very much appreciate a memorandum from you as to the result of your conference with the British Admiralty.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

At a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 13th, they appointed a committee including me, to make a recommendation. We reported promptly, but the military seemed to think it would require weeks to organize action.

In view of what was going on in Riga, this was slower than I could bear. In desperation I sent a telegram to General von der Goltz (whose duty under the Armistice was to preserve order in that region) asking him to occupy Riga. On receiving his agreement, I instructed our men to prepare food for immediate delivery to the city. On May 21st, Major Brookings loaded a train of 40 carloads at Libau and started it for Riga under Lieutenant Harrington following von der Goltz's army. The train reached a point ten miles from the city. Beyond that the tracks were destroyed. Von der Goltz, assisted by the ragged Latvian Army, made a quick movement and occupied parts of the city on May 22nd. In the meantime, I had ordered one of our cargoes afloat into Riga and Admiral Benson sent a destroyer to protect it. Lieutenant Harrington, like the real American he was, set his doughboys to recruiting labor and repairing tracks while he went ahead into Riga, and by using wagons and hand-carts was able to get some food into the city on the 24th.

From one of Lieutenant Harrington's sergeants, there came to me a story of which America should be proud. When Harrington arrived at Riga, fighting in the suburbs between von der Goltz and the Communists was still going on. There were many dead from starvation and battle in the streets. Harrington did not quite know how to get hold of the situation. He inquired if there was an American Consulate. There was. He sent the sergeant who found a small American flag nailed to the door and a typewritten notice in Lettish and vigorous English warning all comers to stay away—signed by the "Acting Consul of the United States of America." The sergeant had some difficulty in raising anybody, but finally a girl peeked through a crack and, seeing his uniform, threw the door wide open—and broke into tears. She was the stenographer, an American of Lettish birth, who had stayed by the ship when the Consul had been

withdrawn in advance of the German occupation a year before. She pulled herself together quickly when told that they had a trainload of food on the edge of the city and wanted to find somebody in authority. She knew whom to get and managed it as if she had been the very mother of Riga itself. She was very thin and hungry and the sergeant assumed the duty of caring for her needs.

Three days after Harrington's arrival, our ship *Lake Mary* arrived amid rejoicing. By this time, however, Harrington was giving one meal a day from his meagre supplies to 200,000 people.

The history of the Communist doings in Riga from January to May, 1919, had never been adequately told in English. A Latvian Soviet Republic had been set up mostly under Lettish and Finnish Communists. The prisons were opened and the dregs of Riga—once a city of a million people—were turned loose on the people. Together with the Communists, they looted every store, every house. The people were left without food except at exorbitant prices from the Communists. The banks and public institutions were plundered. Literally hundreds of innocent people were daily executed without trials in a sadistic orgy of blood, of which the world has known few equals. Clergymen, doctors, teachers, young girls, were taken to prison and mowed down by machine guns. On many days as many as 1,000 were executed. The deaths from starvation and other causes were so many that coffins could not be provided and bodies by the hundreds were dumped into trenches.

But we were soon to experience another kind of trouble. A German colonel, placed in charge of the city by von der Goltz, set up a military court made up mostly of Balts to find and try those guilty of assassination and execution under the Red regime. There were men on the court whose wives, sons and daughters were among the executed. At once a White Terror replaced a Red Terror with its round of executions. Our men not only protested, but asked me to protest.

I had no particular authority in the matter but sent a telegram to Colonel Groome:

. . . The Germans alone are responsible for this white terror which succeeded the red terror in this particular instance . . . As soon as you get to Reval see the various military commanders, communicate to them my views and secure from them a definite assurance that the Riga incidents will not be repeated. Tell them plainly that you are directed by me to see that these unlawful and inhumane acts do not occur. . . . The American people will not lend their support for an instant to any movement which would countenance such actions. Show this telegram to Admiral Cowan and General Gough.

HOOVER.

The Germans reduced their executions mostly to proved criminals.

Ulmanis now returned to Riga and, with food behind him, set up a provisional government again. But another fight which lasted a month developed between the Balts and the Letts. Colonel Groome with Lieutenant Harrington took a distinguished part in making an armistice and bringing various elements together into a temporary coalition under Ulmanis against the Communists. Ultimately, when Ulmanis got his legislative body together, it outdid Estonia, for it had sixteen different political parties—but he managed it somehow.

On June 28th, the day peace was signed at Versailles, the citizens of Riga, Libau and other towns came, with their children, in parades of thousands to the offices of our organization bearing flowers, with bands playing "Yankee Doodle," their view of our national anthem—but they brought also tears and prayers of thanksgiving.

The Allied mission under British and French officers appointed from Paris arrived a month after Riga was relieved. However, before this exhibit of power arrived on the scene of action, we had the adults fed and in addition had set up free feeding of 50,000 stunted children, under the direction of Captain Thomas J. Orbison and with the co-operation of Latvian women. It performed a healing service not only to bodies but to spirits.³ Our statistical balance sheet for Latvia shows:

³ An interesting book has been written by Captain Orbison: *Children, Inc.* (Boston, 1933).

Supplies

	Food (tons)	Clothing, Medical, Miscellaneous (tons)	Total (tons)
From United States.....	25,390	976	26,366
Financed by—			
Charity from the United States (Child Feeding).....			\$1,588,170
Loans from the United States.....			5,880,931
Loans from the United Kingdom.....			80,920
Total.....			\$7,550,021

And among the details as to the \$1,588,170 of charity I find "meals served to undernourished children, 41,200,000. . . . Two thousand Latvian women took part in this work."

LITHUANIA

Lithuania had suffered as the others. The ebb and flow of plundering armies had left even an agricultural people starving. They, too, had declared independence at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 and had seen their new nation snuffed out by the German annexation. After the Armistice they followed the lead of the other Baltic states and, in January, 1919, called a national assembly which set up a provisional government. At once they were invaded by the Soviet armies. Again a ragged army of 25,000 peasants repelled the invaders.

Captain Hollister was originally in charge and was succeeded by Captain John T. Scott, who, being needed by our work elsewhere, was succeeded by Major W. A. Burbank and later by Lieutenant Harrington. The usual free child feeding was organized alongside the general relief and 45,000 children nursed back to health.

The Lithuanian balance sheet is not extensive:

Supplies

	Food (tons)	Clothing, Medical, Miscellaneous (tons)	Total (tons)
From United States.....	9,244	3,633	12,877
Financed by—			
Charity from the United States (Child Feeding).....			\$463,817
Loans from the United States.....			5,459,884
Loans from the United Kingdom.....			57,120
Total.....			\$5,980,821

One last service I performed for all three Baltic states was to arrange with the Danes for the supply of several thousand tons of seed grain, we to replace it from the United States with other gains. Thus it arrived in time for the planting. And the Danes themselves made a very substantial donation.

The Situation of the Church and Religious Practices in Occupied Lithuania



PART I.

Under the Soviet Occupation, 1940-41

by

A. TRAKISKIS

A Report based on authentic information, eye-witness stories and Soviet Administration documents. A further report will deal with the Church and religious practices under the German occupation.

I.

Catholicism in Lithuania: Its Origin and Position

LITHUANIANS belong to the Baltic branch of the Indo-European family of nations. This Baltic group is sometimes called an Aistian branch.

Science is still unable to determine in what century of pre-history they had settled along the shores of the Baltic Sea. It is known that the Lithuanians and their kinsfolk, the Old Prussians * and the Latvians dwelled there at least since the VIIth century, A.D.

The Lithuanians, unmolested by conquering Romans, far removed from the track of migrating nations, unaffected by the growth and decline of new Germanic States, were undisturbed by the apostles of the Gospel, and, consequently, they were the last Europeans to embrace Christianity. This occurred toward the end of the XIVth century.

Since pre-historic times, the Lithuanians had lived in one of the most secluded regions of Europe. They had few direct contacts with Western Europe and were strongly attached to their ancient pagan religion, somewhat druidic in form—the worship of the forces of nature, without idols and with oak groves for temples, where, on stone altars, burned the sacred fires tended by white-robed priests and priestesses.

The politically divided and constantly warring neighboring Polish and Russian principalities of recent neophytes, could hardly serve as missionary centers for the Christianization of the heathen Lithuanians, while the Teutonic Knights with their pitiless policy of plunder and of butchering the innocent and defenseless Aistians were less qualified to preach peace and the love of Christ to their victims who were blocking the way for the “Drang nach Osten” of Germandom.

* The Old Prussians were subjugated by the Germans at the end of the XIIIth Century and their language ceased to be spoken under German domination by the end of the XVIIth Century.

The Lithuanians began to emerge from their pre-historic isolation at the time when the dissemination of Christianity among pagan peoples was beginning to provide a convenient cloak for political expansion. This was especially true with the Teutonic or Marienburg Order, which instead of spreading the Gospel by peaceful means preferred military measures in imposing its secular political domination.

The resentment and reaction of the Lithuanians were such, that for two centuries Lithuania remained the only heathen country in Europe, and pagan practices in some parts of the country continued undisturbed to the end of the XVIIth century.

When the Lithuanian people accepted Christianity they held steadfastly to the Roman Catholic faith. Even during the first occupation of Lithuania by Russia, as a result of the partition of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth in 1795, the Roman Catholic faith withstood all obstinate efforts of Czarist authorities to force the Lithuanians to relinquish their religion. The failure of Russian efforts to convert the Lithuanian people to the Russian Orthodox Faith, may be seen by the fact that by the time the Independence of Lithuania was restored in 1918, only 2.6 percent of her population professed the Russian Orthodox faith, while 80.33 percent were Roman Catholics, 9.56 percent Reformed Evangelical Lutherans and 7.30 percent Hebrews. The 2.6 percent of the inhabitants professing the Russian Orthodox faith includes all Russian settlers colonized in Lithuania in the XIXth century by the Czarist administration.

In June 1940, in Lithuania there were more than 1,600 Roman Catholic priests with about 800 parishes organized in two archdioceses and four dioceses headed by three archbishops, seven bishops and one bishop for the armed forces,* four Roman Catholic Seminaries and the Faculty of Theology-Philosophy at the State University of Kaunas. Various lay Catholic organizations had a membership of about 800,000 from a total population of 3,000,000.

* Archdioceses of Vilnius (Vilna) and Kaunas, dioceses of Vilkaviskis, Telsiai, Kaišiadorys and Panevezys and Prelecy of Kleipeda-Memelo.

The Catholic Press was the most influential in Lithuania.

The Christian-Democratic party with its affiliations was the strongest political party. During the four democratic elections to the Lithuanian Parliament, the Christian Democrats had polled 48 percent of all vote.

II.

Soviet "Freedom of Religion" and the Truth

Article 124, Chapter 10 of the Soviet Constitution provides: "In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." * The same stipulation granting the "freedom" of *passive worship* and of government sponsored *active anti-religious propaganda* is repeated in the so-called "constitution" of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania (Section 96). In spite of this unequivocal wording of the basic laws of the U.S.S.R., the bolshevik propaganda continues to stress the alleged recognition of a "full religious freedom" (for instance, in the appeal to the Lithuanian population at the fake elections in 1940).

The communists have by no means been tolerant of the alleged liberty of citizens to act according to their own conscience in this respect. The period of bolshevik terror in Lithuania yielded sufficient proof that these constitutional stipulations, in so far as they guarantee the freedom of religious practices (minus the preaching) as well as all the assurances made by the bolsheviks not to interfere with religion, are empty words. No curbs were placed on anti-religious propaganda. The

* Constitution (Fundamental Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ogiz, Moscow, 1938).

Regarding the situation of the Church and Religion under Soviet rule in Estonia and Latvia see "The Fate of Religion and Church under Soviet Rule in Estonia 1940-1941" (published by the World Association of Estonians, Inc., 15 E. 125th Street, New York 35, N. Y.) and "Report of the Sufferings of the Christian Churches in Latvia during 1940-1943" (published by "Drauga Vests," 162 Second Avenue, New York 3, N. Y.)

bolshevik officials carried on the God-less propaganda rather intensively and ignored completely Article 124 of the Soviet Constitution and Section 96 of the "Constitution of the Soviet Republic of Lithuania" which provides the basis for the alleged "full religious freedom" in the U.S.S.R. Instead of according a true religious freedom, they imposed repressions upon the church and upon the practicing religionists, entirely disregarding the Constitutional assurances.

The hostile attitude of the bolsheviks regarding religion was evident even during the first days of the Russian occupation. An exceptionally extensive and intensive anti-religious propaganda was initiated in Lithuania immediately after the occupation of that country by the Russians in June 1940. Rude, malicious and scornful anti-clerical orations were in order from the beginning. The Russian-edited press was full of disparaging anti-religious slogans from the first day. Debasing anti-God harangues were heard at compulsory meetings arranged by the invaders.

These ironical, malicious and hateful attacks on religion and the clergy were, according to bolshevik opinion, bound to create conditions more receptive to bolshevik ideas.

Apart from these formal attacks against religion in the press and at mass meetings, the invaders simultaneously resorted to still other means directed against religion and the interests of the believers. One of the first steps was the cancellation of the Concordat, signed by Lithuania and the Vatican in 1933.

This step suddenly taken by the puppet officials of Moscow saddened and depressed the majority of the Lithuanians. The calumnious campaign against the Vatican, religion in general and the Catholic clergy in particular incessantly carried on in the press and at public meetings in connection with the termination of the Concordat deepened the unfavorable effect upon the people.

The Concordat was denounced on June 26, 1940, just ten days after the invasion by the Russians. On that day the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Centoz, was in-

vited to the Foreign Office where he was rudely informed that a new "Soviet Lithuania" did not consider it necessary to maintain relations with the spiritual head of the Catholic Church. At the same time Monsignor Centoz was ordered to vacate his apartment within two days and to leave Lithuania before August 25, 1940.

The Russians did not assign any other apartment to Monsignor Centoz in spite of his requests. Furthermore, they disregarded the Nuncio's diplomatic status and attempted to prevent the removal of his own furniture from his former apartment. His small bank account was sequestered by order of N. Pozdniakov, the Soviet Envoy to Lithuania who overnight became an all-powerful Deputy-Chief of the Kremlin, second only to the special envoy Dekanazov.

After breaking the Concordat with the Vatican, the government issued a series of new decrees aimed directly against religion and the religious practices of the population. By these decrees all religious instruction in schools was abolished; the army and school chaplains, padres of hospitals, old people's homes and prisons were dismissed; the activities of the Catholic Theologic-Philosophic Faculty and of the Evangelic Lutheran Theological Faculty were suspended; all religious and religious-minded organizations were liquidated; all publication of religious magazines and books was prohibited; the property of religious organizations and societies was confiscated. The persecution of the clergy and the closing of the churches began.

The tactics employed at the start by the Soviet authorities in dealing with the church were not to attack or harm the priests *as individuals* but rather, to isolate them from the population, to lessen their influence with the masses. During one year of Soviet occupation of Lithuania only 28 priests were arrested, a little more than 2 percent from a total of 1,247 (see appendix).^{*} To one acquainted with Soviet methods of rule and wholesale "purges", this number seems to be rather "moderate". However, it should be remembered that the same initial "moderation" has always been

^{*} Excepting Diocese of Vilnius for which we are lacking precise data.

shown by the Soviets in other fields of bolshevization by degrees.

For instance, Article 7 of the so-called "Lithuanian-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance" imposed upon Lithuania October 10, 1939, and known as the "Garrison Pact" stipulates: "The realization of this treaty must not infringe the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, especially the structure of their state, their economic and social systems, military instruments and altogether the principles of non-intervention of one State in the internal affairs of the other State." Seven months later all of Lithuania was swamped by a flood of Red troops. Obviously, the "Mutual Assistance Pact" was just a prelude, a convenient cloak for a "Trojan Horse."

This same "moderate" procedure had grown stringent once Lithuania was subjugated. Starting with seemingly "peaceful" reforms of collectivization, the real Muscovite hand was played later, when in June 1941, the Soviet administration suddenly began wholesale deportations of innocent Lithuanians into the depths of the U.S.S.R. Similar methods manipulated the "self-determination" of the Lithuanian people to become a "14th Soviet Republic."

None of the hand picked candidates for a "New Parliament" ever knew that two weeks hence they would be assigned the role of giving away the independence of their country.

This is a traditional Muscovite way in furthering political aims: *quiet the people before striking*. The same method was again applied in dealing with the church and its servants in the Baltic States. Knowing the profound attachment of the Lithuanian to his religion, the Soviet authorities were fully aware that the population would resent any wholesale attempt against the clergy, which might provoke trouble at a wrong moment. Hence the "moderation" and temporizing by degrees. The true Muscovite design was revealed in all its repulsive nakedness at the beginning of the German-Russian war, when there was no longer any reason for temporizing. This was the day of the dastardly

"priest hunt" throughout the country. Fifteen priests of all ranks and ages were killed in bestial manner (see Appendix).

III.

Expulsion of Religion from Public Institutions

The State provided free and non-compulsory religious instruction in all public schools of independent Lithuania. From the beginning of their regime, the Russian occupants did not tolerate this instruction in the schools in spite of the adverse opinion of parents in this matter. Desiring to deal a death blow to all religious education by prohibiting religious instruction, they did not delay the introduction of this reform. On June 20, 1940, the Commissar of Education announced that in accordance with orders received from the central committee of the Communist Party, religious instruction in all schools was suspended, and that all school chaplains were dismissed from their offices.

Before the assumption of power by the alien officials, there was a long established custom in almost all Lithuanian schools to begin and end lessons with a prayer. This custom of public praying was ordered abolished as soon as the Russians took the reins of the puppet government.

In substitution for religious lessons the bolshevik Ministry of Education, later renamed "The People's Commissariat of Education," decreed that so-called lessons in political education would replace religious instruction. The bolsheviks considered that the teaching of the history of the Communist Party and the interpretation of the Soviet Constitution constituted "political education."

Parents who believed that religious instruction was absolutely necessary, petitioned for the restoration of the privilege of religious instruction at their own expense. Their efforts were, however, in vain. Thereupon the parents cooperated with the pastors so that their children might be given religious tutoring privately.

The priests attempted to fulfil the wishes of the parents. Instruction was to be offered in churches and in larger private homes.

This religious instruction was begun in many places, but did not, of course, pass unnoticed by the invaders. In the beginning the Russians did not take all this seriously, believing that the teachers as well as the pupils would soon tire of this private religious tutoring and that it would then die a natural death. But time passed and the number of pupils attending private religious lessons did not decrease. On the contrary, those parents who in the beginning remained passive began to encourage attendance at religious classes.

The continuing success of private religious instruction began to annoy the bolsheviks. They were convinced finally that this instruction was an obstacle in the way of their anti-religious propaganda. They realized that all their efforts to "inoculate" communistic ideas in the children would be in vain as long as the latter received religious training.

The bolsheviks therefore decided to remove this obstacle. The Central Committee of the Communist Party could, of course, prohibit this religious instruction by issuing adequate decrees. They realized, however, that public reprisals would in this case only tend to strengthen the religious attachment of the population to religion. Instead of public reprisals the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to order the county executive committee to settle this matter administratively.

The measures taken by the county executive committees can be seen from the following order circularized by the chairman of the district executive committee of Kaunas:

"The Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania
The County Executive Committee of Kaunas
April 25, 1941
No. 8

To all Presidents of the Township Executive Committees within the jurisdiction of the County of Kaunas and the City of Jonava.

I hereby order you, immediately upon the receipt of this

letter, to invite all clergymen, (vicars, priests, etc.) domiciled within your jurisdiction and to inform them that they are strictly forbidden to give children any religious instruction and to demand that each clergyman sign the attached form. The first name and the surname as well as residence of clergyman must be entered on the form before he signs it.

Each clergyman must be summoned separately or called upon at his residence.

This letter must not be shown to the clergymen.

The signed forms must be forwarded to me in a letter marked confidential, personal, by May 10, 1941. This letter and the unused forms shall also be returned to me.

Inasmuch as this matter is strictly confidential, I order you to keep it completely secret and not to discuss it or show it to anyone. This letter need not be recorded in the book of incoming mail, and therefore, must not be shown to the secretary.

(Signed) BILIS
Chairman of the Executive Committee."

A number of forms were transmitted with the letter to the Chairmen of the executive committees of each township and of the City of Jonava. The clergymen had to sign the following form:

"I, the undersigned clergyman residing in the county of the township of village of sign the attached as evidence that I was informed on April 1941 that I am strictly enjoined not to give religious instruction to school children or to children of preparatory school age, neither in churches, nor in the homes of the children, nor in my own apartment or elsewhere. Thus I have no right whatsoever to talk to them about religious matters.

I was clearly told that I shall be held responsible for the non-observance of this warning hereby verified by me.

Signature....."

The puppet chairmen of the executive committees of the townships endeavored to carry out the task decreed by the chairman of the county executive committee. They carefully adhered to the instructions of this circular letter; they issued "invitations" to the clergymen and *suggested* to them that they sign these obligations. As was expected, the majority refused to sign them even though threats were made to compel them to do so. However, events of 1941 prevented, for the most part, the execution of these threats.

The bolsheviks in expelling religion from the

schools, also abolished it in other places. In the courts the Christian form of oath was abolished by a special decree. Religious signs and symbols were removed from all public places.

Lithuania is noted for her beautiful wayside crosses at cross-roads and in front of homes. There were crucifixes on the walls of the classrooms, in the courts, in hospitals, and in old people's homes, etc. The bolsheviks disliked this display of the Christian character of the country. The occupants removed crucifixes from hospitals and other places and replaced them by the pentagonal Red Star and other bolshevik symbols.

Before the Russian invasion, political and criminal prisoners in Lithuania could at all times summon the prison padre or some other clergyman. After the introduction of the Russian order in prisons, the clergymen were banned from entering the prisons. Whenever the condemned prisoners asked the NKVD (formerly GPU) officials to bring a priest to them, the NKVD paid no attention. They ridiculed such requests.

Officially, the clergymen were not banned from visiting the hospitals, but the sick were unable to summon a priest. Sick persons who wanted to see a priest had to submit a petition in writing to the head of the hospital, and the regulations provided that all such petitions must be handwritten. Very weak persons, or those already fighting death, could not fulfill these formalities. Moreover, the sick who made such handwritten applications waited in vain for a priest; the hospital administration disposed of them in the waste basket.

Formerly large hospitals had chapels where services were held for convalescents. The prisons also had similar chapels for the prisoners. After the suppression of religion in the hospitals and prisons, these chapels were not forgotten either. Alien officials issued comprehensive orders for conversion of these chapels "to more useful needs." The prison chapels were converted into storerooms or cells, and those in the hospitals into sick wards.

All hospital and prison chapels were formerly equipped with all necessities. These things were unnecessary

after the destruction of the chapels. New directors of hospitals and prisons inquired of the higher authorities what should be done with the equipment of the chapels. The warden of the GPU prison No. 11 (in Telšiai) addressed the following inquiry to the Prison Department:

"The Prison of Telšiai
September 9, 1940
No. 6276

To the Prison Department—

There is a chapel in the prison in which services were formerly held for the prisoners.

I ask you for instructions as to disposition of movable property therein.

(Signed) A. RAMANAUSKAS
Warden of the Prison."

There is no information regarding the reply of the Prison Department (of GPU), but it is known what the warden did; he arranged an auction of the effects of the chapel to take place on October 4, 1940, in the prison office. The following liturgical and religious objects were sold (extract from the copied announcement of the auction):

- 4 vestments (black, white, green, red)
- 2 copes
- 3 albs with copes
- 1 chalice
- 1 beaker
- 1 altar
- 1 chandelier
- 1 cross
- 1 pulpit
- 11 statues of saints
- 3 communion cloths
- 9 purifiers
- about 5 or 6 kilograms of blessed candles

The property of many other chapels was sold at auction. In other places it was thrown out as useless rubbish. Bolshevik directors of hospitals and prisons simply appropriated the more valuable liturgical effects for themselves.

IV.

Liquidation of Religious Organizations

Before the Russian invasion of Lithuania, membership organizations enjoyed a great freedom of action. Besides political, public, cultural and economic organizations, there were a number of purely religious, religious-charitable and other religious organizations, fraternities and sororities of laymen. Some of these organizations were headed by clergymen. The administration of other societies comprising both clerical and lay membership, was in the hands of laymen.

The purely religious organizations attended only to the religious needs of their members. The religious-cultural or religious-fraternal organizations concerned themselves with educational, charitable and other cultural and public matters. They had established a number of elementary, secondary and professional schools, arranged courses in general education, lectures for their members and for the general public and had maintained hospitals, orphanages, asylums, halls, libraries, theatres, etc. The religious-charitable organizations concerned themselves with relief of the poor and of the victims of accidents, they maintained homes and trade schools for children and the aged.

The purely religious organizations were supported by voluntary contributions of their members. The semi-religious organizations with other aims enjoyed the privilege of publicity drives for contributions among the general public. Some of them received certain public appropriations from the government for educational and charitable purposes.

When the Russian invaders decreed the removal of religion from public life, they also turned against these organizations. They regarded them all from the same point of view. They did not take into consideration that some of these had been of great service in the field of public welfare; all of them were declared equally unnecessary, as existing only "to betray the people." The NKVD stipulated that all organizations established before June 20, 1940, jeopardized public security and

orders were issued to terminate their activity and they were taken over by the Communist Party and the State.

Some members and groups of members attempted to evade this decree. Petitions were addressed to the Council of the People's Commissars explaining that one or another organization were of a purely religious character, and therefore should not be included in the classification of organizations endangering the public security of the State.

However, all these efforts failed. The Russian authorities paid no attention to these applications incompatible with the interests of the all-powerful Communist Party.

A special committee was designated by the occupying authorities for the liquidation of private membership organizations. The committee had to prepare a list of associations to be liquidated: to decide the order of precedence in liquidation; to settle the questions of the disposal of property, as well as to deal with other matters connected with the liquidation. The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth Organization were officially represented on this committee. These representatives decided questions concerning the liquidation, paying no attention to the other members of the committee, who merely signed the protocol of liquidation.

The State took over the schools, hospitals and all real and personal estate of the liquidated religious organizations. The People's Commissariat for Education took over the libraries. The Communist Party, the Communist Youth Organization and the MOPR (an international organization with its center in Moscow which supports various bolshevik-fellow travelers imprisoned abroad for their subversive propaganda) were the beneficiaries of all other sequestered property.

Almost all religious organizations had archives in which they kept the minutes of activities and membership rosters. The NKVD took over all archives. It used them as a source of evidence against the leading members of the liquidated organizations.

In spite of the official declaration of the Communist

Party guaranteeing the freedom of religious services, a religious activity was considered to be a crime. On November 28, 1940, Guzevich, the puppet Commissar of NKVD, issued a strictly confidential order, No. 1154, in which he urged the GPU to intensify its work of collecting material against the "counter-revolutionary elements." It was clearly stated in this decree that the "liquidation of these elements should be accelerated." Clergymen of the religious communities and religious practitioners were specifically listed in these groups (paragraph 5 of the decree).

A few purely religious fraternities, small local associations which did not base their activity upon regulations but upon traditions, continued to exist despite the "liquidation." Their activities consisted chiefly of reading prayers, of maintaining a certain religious discipline and so on.

Religious traditions of fraternities continued to prevail in private life despite the official liquidation.

In the second phase of their anti-religious campaign, the Russians decided to take direct measures to foment and to promote individual dissension among the religionists and to seek Judases among the clergy.

It was decided to collect sufficient material concerning the influence of the various religious organizations upon the public as well as utilizing these dissensions among the population for ulterior purposes. On orders from Moscow, the local branch of the GPU ordered its county subdivisions to collect such evidence by the following order:

"Strictly Confidential"

The State Security Division of the People's Commissariat of the Interior of the Soviet Union has drawn up a plan of operations concerning the practicing Christians in the new Soviet Republics.

Acting thereunder, I order you to take the following action:

1. Draw up a list of all Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant sectarian societies and organizations which were legally or illegally active within your respective county under the old regime.

2. Describe the influence of each of these organizations upon the masses and on the public-political life (approximate

number of practicing Christians in the organizations and their public-political position in the country).

3. Prepare a list of all churches and chapels in your county.

4. Submit a list of all pastors, parish priests and leaders of sects in your county, indicating the influence of individual religious authorities upon the masses and the public-political life of the country.

5. Specify in considerable detail interior dissensions within the religious organizations, why these dissensions have occurred and between which clergymen strained relations exist.

6. Suggest how these dissensions could be used for recruiting agents and for undermining these organizations within your county.

7. Send me detailed report on the activities of investigating agencies formed within your county for Roman-Catholic and Orthodox clergymen and Protestant sectarians as well as the plans of further operations.

8. Describe and characterize the agents you may be able to recruit among the clergymen and the sectarians.

9. Send me an exhaustive report concerning all these questions by January 30th.

Use the services of clergymen of the network of agent-informers to obtain this information.

(Signed) GUZEVICH

*Major of the Soviet Guard
People's Commissar for the Interior
of the Soviet Socialist Republic of
Lithuania.*

January 21, 1941

No. 2/92

Kaunas"

No definite instruction was contained in the afore-said order regarding the means to be employed for eradicating the influence of religious fraternities. It was intended to reach that goal by calling forth religious differences and individual antagonism. The NKVD simply wanted to recruit informers among the religionists before taking further steps aimed at the elimination of all religious life.

V.

Religious Press and Literature

The religious press and literature reflected the degree of activities of religious fraternities in indepen-

dent Lithuania. Before the Russian invasion, an average of 300 to 400 new religious books appeared annually. Religious fraternities, congregations and special publishing companies printed periodicals and books.

The Russians immediately suppressed the religious periodical press. The publication of all religious books was banned. All publishing houses were nationalized and taken over by the Communist Party. The bolsheviks placed their own managers in these houses and they began using the capital and equipment for publishing communist propaganda literature.

The invaders realized that a free press was their greatest enemy. Therefore, they decided not only to stop the publication of religious literature but also to destroy all books of this kind which had been published before the invasion. They confiscated all stocks of religious books found in shops and printing offices.

As in the case of organizations, certain individuals and ecclesiastic authorities tried to save the religious literature. For instance, in order to save the small prayer book "Our Father," which had been confiscated in the printing office, the Archbishop of Kaunas addressed a letter to the People's Commissariat for the Interior, stating that it had been published to serve the purely religious needs of his followers and only to teach the elementary doctrines of the Catholic Church, and he asked the Commissar to release the confiscated stock from the printing office. The Commissar ignored answering the letter.

As the booklet "Our Father" was very important to Catholics, the Archbishop of Kaunas went still further. He appealed to the Council of the People's Commissars with the following letter:

"We have just learned that by order of the People's Commissariat of Education, the stock of the little prayer book "Our Father" was confiscated at the former printing office of "Spindulys" because it is a religious book of instruction. I hereby respectfully ask the Council of the People's Commissars of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Lithuania to consider the following:

1. This booklet explains the fundamental principles of the Catholic religion and the first sacraments of devotion, i.e., the confession and communion. The Stalin Constitution

of the Soviet Republic of Lithuania clearly allows the freedom of faith and of worship. Therefore these booklets explaining their faith to believers are absolutely necessary. Inasmuch as all religious instruction is eliminated from the school curricula, we ask the People's Commissariat of Education not to proscribe these booklets which describe the personal aspects of religious faith, especially as they do not contain any anti-Communist propaganda.

2. This booklet was ordered printed some time ago, and the printing was begun; while the book was in the process of printing the publishing house became the property of the State, but no difficulties appeared at first. When the author of this booklet called upon the director of the Department of the Press and Associations on September 26, 1940, he was definitely assured that no difficulties would arise in releasing this booklet.

3. Considering the importance of this booklet to the faithful and because we did not foresee difficulties, the office of the Archbishop of Kaunas has already paid all printing bills. I, therefore, ask you in my own behalf, and in behalf of all bishops and all the faithful in the Soviet Republic of Lithuania, to release the booklet "Our Father" from the printing office.

Kaunas, October 9, 1940
No. 2241

(Signed) DR. V. BRIZGYS
Acting Archbishop of Kaunas

This letter was handed to the Council of the People's Commissars. In the meantime it was learned that the GPU had already made arrangements for the destruction of the booklet. The following day, the Archbishop of Kaunas addressed a personal letter to the chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, briefly explaining the situation to him and repeating the request expressed in the first letter. In spite of all arguments, the chairman adhered to his negative decision. All correspondence was finally forwarded to the main office of Supervision of Literature and Publishing, which supervised all matters concerned with publications. In accordance with the opinion of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars this Board of Supervision informed Bishop B. Brizgys, that his application to distribute the booklet "Our Father" had been denied and the matter was dropped.

This example shows clearly that the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom was worthless in so far

as religious literature and religious questions were concerned.

The booklet "Our Father" did not escape destruction. The entire edition went to the paper mill and was turned into cardboard there.

All other religious books found by the invaders in print or in stock at the printing offices met the same fate: catechisms, hymn books and other books went to the paper mill. The Russian arsonists destroyed the books which were found in stock in shops, burning them in a fine Nazi style.

Having destroyed all religious books found in printing offices, publishing houses and shops, the Russians turned their attention to the libraries. It was decided to remove from the libraries all books having religious contents and on the whole all such books that did not agree with the Soviet ideology. The Supreme Board of Supervision of Literature and Publishing was entrusted with this task. The board carried out this work very thoroughly. Functionaries were dispatched to various places in the country to go through school and other libraries and to pick out the books which contained anything that displeased the Russians. In places to which no special functionaries were sent, directors of libraries were charged with the task of removing from libraries the books in accordance with a confidential list of prescribed books sent to them.

All religious books taken from the libraries had to be destroyed in the same manner as those which were found in the printing offices. They were sent to the paper mills. There were difficulties in sending the books confiscated in the country to paper mills. The Russians feared that some people might hide these books. Procenko, a recent arrival from Moscow and director of the Main Office of Supervision of Literature and Publishing in a circular letter instructed that all books taken from the libraries should be cut into pieces or made unreadable in some other manner.

This entire work of destruction of religious books was carried out in complete secrecy as all other destructive work of the GPU. Not a single proscription

of publication of religious books or orders to destroy these books ever reached the newspapers. Nor could the least information concerning the destruction of undesired books or similar undertakings of the new regime be found in the press, although in other matters the Russians usually boasted of their achievements.

VI.

Campaign Against Religious Holidays

The Russian invaders at once launched a special campaign in Lithuania to honor work. Church holidays were soon abolished as being "absolutely useless and a complete waste of time." They tried to inculcate a belief that all Church holidays were a reactionary inheritance and that no decent worker should observe these days; they should work for the improvement of their own welfare and that of the entire country.

The Russians developed an intensive propaganda against religious festivals in the press and believed this to be sufficient. But they overestimated their own propaganda. The first religious holidays passed, and the invaders saw that the Lithuanians were paying no attention to communist preachings. This was an unexpected failure for the "liberators." They intensified the agitation against them and designed more effective means to combat religion.

The Russians arranged mass meetings to take place on the eve of Church holidays and compelled workers, employees, pupils and other groups to attend. At such meetings an alien communist agitator usually gave a lecture on the uselessness and wastefulness of Church holidays. He, or one of his cohorts, read a resolution to the effect that none of the assembled persons would celebrate the approaching Church festival and that they pledged themselves to work with redoubled vigor and efficiency on that day. The meeting was asked if it agreed to the resolution. Everyone knew beforehand what awaited those who voiced opposition. Complete silence always followed such a question. Thereupon

these resolutions were published in the press as evidence of the fact that neither the workers nor public servants nor students nor others would celebrate these festivals.

But when the holidays arrived, factories, offices, schools and other places of work remained vacant; only a few reported for work.

This, of course, aroused the anger of the invaders. Besides propaganda, meetings and resolutions, official governmental decrees were also published to the effect that this or that religious holiday was a working day and that all workers had to be at their place of work on such a day. All those who did not report for work were threatened with punishment for an intentional non-observance of State regulations and for sabotage.

The Russians did not expect the faithful to look on passively without protesting. They believed that the holidays would afford an especially good opportunity for expressing one's opinion against the alien invaders in some way and for furthering anti-Russian opposition. With the approach of some Church holiday special precautions were, therefore, taken.

The following instruction by the NKVD to all members of the county offices of GPU before the eve of All Saints' and All Souls' Day shows the occupants fears in this matter.

"Strictly Confidential

Commissariat of the Interior of

The Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania

October 27, 1940

To the Leaders of the County Branches of the GPU:

On Friday November 1st, all faithful Catholics celebrate the so-called All Saints' Day and on November 2nd, All Souls' Day.

Special services will be held during the holidays in all the churches and processions with candles to the cemeteries will take place on All Saints' Night.

No doubt the clergy will increase its anti-revolutionary activity on this occasion and will take advantage of the feast for its agitation, for the incitement of outrages, for spreading anti-revolutionary appeals.

The NKVD has moreover learned that the nationalist pupils have planned to hold anti-Soviet demonstrations in the cemeteries at the graves of the soldiers on All Souls' Day.

In order to prevent possible anti-revolutionary outrages, the spreading of anti-Soviet appeals, etc.,

I COMMAND YOU:

1. To send operative personnel to the assembly places of the faithful, to the graves, etc., on the holidays. Also to assign plainclothesmen for this duty.

2. To inform the agents to this effect: Order them to advise immediately the GPU of all anti-Soviet outrages observed, such as the spreading of anti-revolutionary appeals, the holding of anti-Soviet speeches, etc.

3. To arrest persons who have distinguished themselves by anti-Soviet activity avoiding however occasions for arousing people's temper.

(Signed) B. BARANAUSKAS

*Acting People's Commissar for the
Interior of the Soviet Socialist Re-
public of Lithuania."*

Apart from this letter, the representative of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, a communist operating in Lithuania under the name of "Brasiškis," the People's Commissar of the Interior Guzevich, and Chief of the Security Division Gladkov, (a Russian sent from Moscow) summoned the Acting Archbishop of Kaunas, Dr. V. Brizgys, on the eve of All Souls' Day and threatened him with the most severe reprisals if processions, demonstrations and similar "outrages" would take place on All Souls' Day.

All Souls' Day came and passed. The faithful said their prayers at the graves of their dead as they had done in previous years.

One would believe that this trepidation shown by the GPU on the eve of All Souls' Day would convince the invaders that in the future they need resort to no special preventive measures. By using violence the expert executioners saw everywhere only the distorted shadows which they feared. Guided by this fear the NKVD sent a new letter to its division on the Eve of the Christmas holiday.

"Strictly Confidential

To the Commander of the Division of the City of Vilnius
The Chief of the GPU for the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania

To the Leaders of the county branches and the subdivisions of the GPU of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania.

On December 25th and 26th Catholics celebrate so-called

Christmas. On these days (beginning with the eve of December 24th) services will be held in the churches and sermons will be preached. Both days are considered to be great holidays, thus non-working days, by the faithful.

The nationalist anti-revolutionary elements and especially the clergy will this year endeavor to use Christmas for their hostile activity—mainly by the following means:

a. Attempts to prevent work in the factories and teaching in the schools.

b. Agitation from the pulpit against participation in the elections—religious sermons in more or less camouflaged form, also by exerting influence upon the believers, individually or in groups, in the churches, in the vestries and assembly halls.

c. By circulating anti-revolutionary literature—religious as well as other.

d. Attempts to lead the believers out in the street to demonstrate or to provoke excesses, etc.

In order to prevent such happenings in advance you must:

1. Study again the directives of order No. 1919 of November 27, 1940; adhere to them most carefully.

2. Instruct the whole network of agents and informers to bring the preparations of the anti-Soviet clergy and the sects closely connected with it (Ateitininkai and others) before the public; summon the agents from December 20th to 29th according to the enlarged plan of operations.

3. Together with the police organizations guarantee the maintenance of public order during festival days, but avoid police concentration in front of the churches.

4. Take measures to guarantee normal work in enterprises and teaching in the schools.

5. Arrange for controls and patrols in the towns during the nights of December 23rd, 24th and 25th. Summon the party members and the Communist Youth for active service for this purpose in consultation with the Secretary of the Executive Committee.

6. Write down and report to me immediately all facts concerning anti-Soviet outrages.

(Signed) GUZEVICH

People's Commissar for the Interior of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania."

December 12, 1940.

Nor was this letter the last one which the NKVD wrote to its divisions dealing with Christian holidays. On the occasion of other Church holidays the GPU each time was mobilized in full strength to follow the course of the holidays and to watch the attitude of the inhabitants.

The less the Russians could stand the religious holidays, the more they ballyhooed their own Soviet "non-working" days. The following Soviet holidays were stipulated by law: the anniversary of the death of Lenin, January 21st and 22nd; the day of international Communist solidarity, May 1st; the day of incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, July 21st; the festival of the October Revolution, October 7th to 8th and Constitution Day, December 5th. A whole series of bolshevik events were furthermore celebrated.

Since these holidays had been introduced by law, they must of course also be observed. However, these were not holidays to the average Lithuanian. No one thought of recreation on these days. They were intended for bolshevik meetings, for processions and demonstrations in which all workers were compelled to participate. These "holidays" began early in the morning and lasted far into the night, while the participants stood in rows or took part in haphazard processions. Not only did all this tire the participants but the workers had to "make up" for lost time not by prolonging the following work days by a few hours but by declaring the following Sunday to be a working day.

When the Russians finally saw that all their methods to make people refrain from observing Christian holidays did not yield any actual results, they started personal reprisals. The communist managers and chiefs of offices resorted to summoning workers and employees and threatened them by stating that the observance of religious holidays did not bring any profit and that it were better to refrain from the observance especially if they did not want any undesired consequences.

VII.

Attitude Toward the Clergy

The invaders regarded the clergyman of all denominations to be useless consumers of food, slave drivers of the population and enemies of the Soviet system. They voiced their opinions on the clergy in public at

every opportunity. The entire official press was full of invectives against the clergy. The clergy was also very sharply harangued at meetings and other public gatherings. By attacking the clergy the Russians hoped to undermine its authority among the population and to take an important step forward in the fight against religion.

From the very first days of the Russian invasion all payment of allowances and pensions to invalid and retired clergyman was stopped. Simultaneously, all relief funds of the clergy were expropriated. The clergymen were in many cases turned out of their apartments, in which Russian functionaries and Red Army officers immediately established themselves with their families.

The monastic orders particularly suffered from the policy of dispossessing the clergy. The Marian, Jesuit and Franciscan friars had founded and maintained large educational institutions. The invaders threw them out in the street just as they stood. They were not even allowed to take cooking and eating utensils with them. They had to starve or go begging.

Later the officials of the Catholic bishopric were thrown out of their premises. For greater mockery the Communists housed the office of the bishopric of Vilka-viškis and a lunatic asylum in the same building. The Bishop of Panevėžys was allotted one room and the whole house was occupied by soldiers of the Red Army and their wives. The Archbishop of Kaunas was turned out into the street. According to Soviet Russian laws, dispossessed persons and institutions should be assigned new quarters. Yet the Russians did not give the office of the Archbishop any new quarters but accused him of having removed some of his furniture. Red Army soldiers who had moved into his apartment stated that the furniture was missing.

As imported Soviet officials considered the clergy to constitute the most unreliable element, they were surrounded by agents from the beginning. They expected the clergy to start a serious campaign against them. Every step of the clergy was, therefore, carefully watched.

The GPU authorities were steadily urged to expand the network of agent-informers and to enlist agents even from the ranks of the clergymen. The activity of the agents was always intensified on the eve of Christian holidays (see foregoing documents). The NKVD believed that the clergy would increase its anti-bolshevik activity, especially during the holidays.

The decree of Gladkov, a Russian from Moscow, installed as the People's Commissar for the Interior of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania, which was sent to all commanders of the county branches of the GPU on October 2, 1940 shows the ramifications and the system of the activities directed against the Christian clergy.

The instruction was worded as follows:

"Strictly Confidential"

To all Chairmen of the County Branches of the GPU

From material gathered by the GPU it is evident that the Lithuanian priests and the leaders of the former Catholic parties and organizations and their active members initiated their hostile activities by proceeding along three principle lines:

1. By propagating national-chauvinistic "ideas" in a camouflaged way and often also openly during the services for the faithful in the churches and by endeavoring to influence the faithful against the Soviet Government.

2. In their relations with pupils of the schools (students, scholars and pupils of preparatory schools). According to information at hand, special pastors were, upon the instruction of Bishop Brizgys, appointed in almost every parish to engage in illegal activity among the youth, by educating them in a national-chauvinistic spirit and by provoking in them a hatred against the bolshevik order. The clergy extended this campaign all over Lithuania, especially on Sundays in the churches, during special services arranged for the youth, as well as in their apartments where the youths gather in groups of 10 and 12. They also influenced parents so that the latter would implant Catholic ideas in their children.

3. They carry on anti-Communist work among the population through the illegal Catholic Communities and clerical groups (Apostolic Community of Men, Apostolship of Prayer Society, Association of the Third Order of St. Francis, etc.) which are political instruments in the hands of the clergy.

In order to organize the fight against the hostile activities of the clergy I hereby order you:

1. To place all clergymen within your district under formal control.

2. To find out about all the leading personalities of the Catholic organizations and communities and to place them under formal control.

3. To obtain information immediately through agents concerning all the members of the Deanery and the church offices of your county.

4. To enlist as soon as possible the services of clergymen and employees in the churches (organists, sacristans) who have close connections with the leading personalities of the Catholic parties, groups and communities as a means for obtaining information concerning the activity of above-mentioned parties. To enlist simultaneously persons as agents and informers among the same people and to order them to split up the Catholic organizations from the inside.

5. To find out which clergymen as well as which leaders of communities within your county are in close touch with the inhabitants, ascertain the character of these relations and submit this information.

6. To place all monks under control in counties where there are cloisters. To put the abbots of the monasteries under formal control. To recruit a network of agents and informers among the monks.

7. You shall ascertain where the pastors meet the pupils for carrying out their hostile activities. Students of the upper classes must be recruited for preparing and executing the inside work of splitting up.

8. Referring to the fact that priests and active members of the communities are now collecting signatures among the inhabitants for the submission of an appeal to the government to obtain permission for religious instruction in schools, find out who the organizers of this work are, and place them under control.

9. Avoid mistakes in recruiting agents. The candidates must therefore be carefully prepared and information about them should be obtained by agents. Remember that some pastors are not materially provided for and therefore waver in their "idealistic opinion."

10. All cases of anti-Soviet, anti-revolutionary tendencies among the clergy which you have discovered must be duly documented and the material must be forwarded to the GPU of Lithuania.

11. By October 10, 1940, you must submit a detailed report concerning the hostile activities of the clergy within your county.

12. By October 15, 1940, you must deliver a memorandum to the second department of the State Guard of the GPU concerning the actions taken against the clergy, at the same time indicating the material obtained, how it was obtained and the steps you intend to take in the future.

(Signed) GLADKOV

*Major of the State Guard
Acting People's Commissar of the Interior of
the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania.*

October 2, 1940."

The order to place all priests "under formal control" (paragraph 1) is especially worthy of observation. It means that all clergymen, without exception, should be spied upon and that a file should be kept for each one of them. These files should contain all material gathered by all conceivable means, not only information concerning the statements and deeds directed against the alien oppressors by the clergymen in question, but also information concerning the character of the clergyman, his private life, his parents, brothers and sisters and relatives. Each one of these files should be an exhaustive source of information concerning the clergymen in question, and is to be used at any time for indictments and trials.

VIII.

Conclusion

As the anti-religious propaganda did not achieve the desired results, the Russians started blackmailing the faithful. Employees, workers, pupils and conscripts were reproached for their Christian convictions and practices. The soldiers were strictly forbidden to visit any churches. Civil servants and workers were periodically warned by the alien supervisors that they should cease attending Christian services. In the warning it was usually pointed out that Christian practices and the duties of a Soviet citizen are two incompatible things.

In order to render visits to churches and attendance at services more difficult for the faithful, the invaders arranged various lectures, lessons on the history of the party, comments upon the constitution and similar things on Sundays just at the time when services were held. Employees and workers were compelled to attend these courses. Those who did not attend once were warned, those not appearing a second time were warned that they would be dismissed from their work or service—and that meant starvation: "no work—no food."

This step did not prevent the believers from visiting the churches; they went to church after the compul-

sory meetings. However, the invader's officials left them no peace in this respect either. On Sundays the GPU officials were in the vicinity of the churches, staring at the church-goers and scrutinizing them from head to foot. Other agents of the GPU had cameras and pretended to photograph the church-goers. In this way the invaders hoped to provoke anxiety and fear among the believers and to prevent them from going to church.

Upon the failure of the anti-religious campaign nothing remained but to close the churches. They did not dare to touch the Catholic churches yet. But a great number of Evangelical churches were converted into dance halls and storage rooms. Wayside crosses and other religious symbols were ruthlessly destroyed.

It is difficult to state what further steps the Soviet officials would have taken against religion and the believers. The steps already taken impeded religious activity and caused much harm.

The Communist propagandists stressed the opportunities of free actions in the Soviet Union and that all convictions would be respected there. The stipulations of the constitution guaranteeing the freedom of religious cults with great pride were cited on all occasions.

It is a well-known fact that the Soviet propagandists universally boasted that religious convictions were a personal matter and that they recognized complete freedom of all religions. Many fair-minded people still believe it. That is part of the Soviet propaganda line. However, facts speak for themselves. It has already been pointed out that the tactics chosen by the Soviets during one year's occupation of Lithuania in dealing with the Church were not to harm the priests as individuals (except 28 arrested) but rather to discredit them in the eyes of the masses.

Conditions became appalling with the outbreak of the German-Soviet war.

Nothing hindered the Russians from carrying on a wholesale extermination of the "enemies of the people."

Beginning with June 22nd and continuing until the last Red Army unit left Lithuania, 15 priests were murdered. Most of them perished in small provincial towns and villages. Some of them perished from the murderous hand of the fanaticized local communists, some have been executed by the regular uniformed detachments of NKVD (Troops of the Commissariat of the Interior of U.S.S.R.) or were put to death by the retreating Red Army formations. The first murder of three priests occurred on June 22nd in the vicinity of the village of Lankeliškiai, not far from the Lithuanian-German border.

They were tortured in a bestial manner, disfigured with crosses branded on their foreheads and chests while still alive, bayoneted, disemboweled and crucified.

Four other priests were murdered two days later in the region of Kaišiadorys-Jonava on the main route of the Red retreat to the East.

At that time the popular uprising in Lithuania was already in full swing, especially in Kaunas, Marijampole, Vilnius, Panevežys and Šiauliai, as a protest against the inhuman and stupid conduct of the Red Administration during the one year of Soviet rule in Lithuania. This partly explains why the clergy has been left untouched in more populated towns. Taking advantage of the uprising, 16 priests managed to escape from jails and thus saved their lives.

About the same time, three other priests have been put to death in northern Lithuania, on the route of the Red retreat to Latvia. Here perished Rev. Canon V. Dambrauskas, who was murdered in a horrible manner at Kuršėnai.

Finally, on June 26-27, as the Red rear guards were on the point of leaving the Lithuanian border, four more priests were murdered in the northeastern part of Lithuania.

Meantime, 12 Roman Catholic priests have been deported into Soviet Russia, some of them before June 22nd. Only two of them came back after a dramatic escape from a marching death column.

Appendix

A. Murdered Roman Catholic Priests

1. Rev. V. BALCIUS, 36 years old, murdered on June 27, 1941, while on duty in PUSNE parish (Diocese of Kaišiadorys).
2. Rev. V. BALSYS, 36 years old, Rector of LANKELIŠKIAI (Diocese of VILKAVISKIS) murdered on June 22, 1941.
3. Rev. J. DAUGELA, 32 years old, Rector of STIRNIAI (Diocese of KAISIADORYS) taken from the Rectory and murdered by the retreating Red Army in June, 1941.
4. Rev. Dr. J. DABRILA, 36 years old, well known educator and publicist, spiritual director of VILKAVISKIS Seminary, murdered on June 22, 1941 in the woods of Budavone (Diocese of VILKAVISKIS).
5. Rev. Canon V. DAMBRAUSKAS, 62 years old, Rector of KURSENAI (Diocese of TELSIAI) murdered by the fleeing communists in June, 1941.
6. Very Rev. Dean A. JUKNEVICIUS, 59 years old, Rector of MERKINE, murdered by the Red Army soldiers in the vicinity of KAISIADORYS on June 24, 1941, while on a service trip. Five days later his body was found in the woods, face disfigured with burning gasoline.
7. Very Rev. Prof. M. LAJAUSKAS, 70 years old, Rector of MALETAI, murdered on June 27, 1941.
8. Rev. Canon J. NAVICKIS, 77 years old, Rector of VIEK-SNIAI (Diocese of TELSIAI), murdered by the retreating Red Army in June 1941.
9. Rev. J. PETRIKA, 56 years old, vicar in the Parish of LANKELISKIAI, murdered on June 22, 1941 in the woods of Budavone together with Rev. V. Balsys and Dr. J. Dabrila.
10. Rev. P. RACEVICIUS, 33 years old, vicar in the Parish of Joniskis (Northern Lithuania) murdered by the retreating Red Army in June 1941.
11. Rev. STANKEVICIUS, a young priest, murdered by the fleeing communists on June 24, 1941 in SKARULIAI (District of Jonava).
12. Rev. B. SVEIKAUSKAS, 57 years old, a pensioned priest, murdered by the Soviet Police (NKVD) on June 26, 1941 in ROKISKIS (Northern Lithuania).
13. Rev. J. TUTINAS, 44 years old, Rector of a small parish in the Diocese of KAISIADORIAI, murdered by the fleeing communists in June, 1941, (details are lacking).
14. Rev. B. VEGELE, 60 years old, Rector of VEPRIAI (District of Jonava), murdered by the fleeing communists in the nearby village of SKARULIAI in June 1941.
15. Rev. P. VITKEVICIUS, 64 years old, murdered by the retreating Red Army on June 24, 1941 in SKARULIAI.

The names are taken from a booklet: "Fifteen Liquidated Priests in Lithuania" by J. Prunskis, Chicago, 1943.

B. Roman Catholic Priests Arrested and Deported Into U.S.S.R.

1. Rev. S. BALTRIMAS, 52 years old, Rector of ZARASAI (Northeastern Lithuania) arrested and deported by the retreating communists in June, 1941.
2. Rev. V. DIDZIOKAS, 29 years old, assistant at PANEVEZYS, arrested on June 23, 1941 and taken from the jail on the road to deportation.
3. Father A. DIRVELE, O.S.F., 40 years old, a well known Franciscan missionary and educator, arrested while trying to evade the Red terror in July, 1940. Taken from the jail in June 1941 and deported by the retreating NKVD.
4. Rev. J. KOSTRICKAS, 32 years old, Vicar of KELME (Diocese of TELSIAI) arrested in 1940 and deported a year later.
5. Father L. MARTUSIS, O.S.F., 26 years old, already affected by tuberculosis, arrested by NKVD in 1940, and disregarding his ill health, deported to U.S.S.R. some months before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war.
6. Father V. MAZONAS, M.I.C., 60 years old, a well known publicist, leader of boy-scouts and missionary, arrested and deported on June 14, 1941.
7. Rev. A. MILEIKA, 60 years old, Rector of VYZUONOS (Northeastern Lithuania), arrested and deported on the outbreak of German-Russian War in 1941.
8. Late Rev. P. PRUNSKIS, 70 years old, a devoted priest and a well known Lithuanian patriot, especially in Vilnius, last Rector of PALUSE (previously Polish occupied Lithuania), arrested and deported in June 1940, died in Siberia.
9. Rev. S. RIMKUS, 29 years old, vicar in the Parish of KRAZIAI, arrested and deported.
10. Rev. Dr. J. VAILOKAITIS, 61 years old, a nationally known Lithuanian patriot, statesman and writer, arrested and deported by the Reds in the first World War, and second time abducted by NKVD on June 14, 1941.

The names are taken from a booklet: "Sibiro istremime ir bolseviku kalejime," by J. Prunskis, Chicago, Ill., 1944.

C. Roman Catholic Priests Arrested who managed to escape from the Red jail during the first ten days of chaos in the wake of German attack on June 22, 1941

1. Rev. S. BARCAITIS, 46 years old, Rector of SUDARGAS, County of Sakiai.
2. Rev. P. BIKINAS, 43 years old, Rector of RAUDONDVARIS, County of Kaunas.
3. Father J. BRUZIKAS, S.J., 44 years old, Editor of a Catholic Magazine.
4. Rev. S. BUTEIKIS, 30 years old, vicar in the Parish of ERZVILKAS, County of Taurage.

5. Rev. J. CEKAVICIUS, 32 years old, vicar in the Parish of VYSAKIO RUDA, County of Marijampole.
6. Rev. Dr. J. CEPENAS, 61 years old, Rector of ANYK-SCIAI, County of Utena.
7. Rev. A. JANCIAUSKAS, 31 years old, vicar in the Parish of KALVARIJA, County of Marijampole.
8. Rev. L. KLIMAS, 34 years old, Rector of KAMPISKIAI, County of Kaunas.
9. Rev. J. MARCIULIONIS, 32 years old, vicar in the Parish of RUMBONYS, County of Alytus.
10. Rev. K. MIKELINSKAS, 52 years old, Rector of DEBEIKIAI, County of Utena.
11. Rev. K. MILIAUSKAS, 28 years old, vicar of A. PANEMUNE, County of Kaunas.
12. Rev. V. MIRONAS, 61 years old, former Prime Minister.
13. Rev. J. PETRENAS, 30 years old, Chaplain of Linkuva College, County of Siauliai.
14. Rev. P. RAGAZINSKAS, 29 years old, vicar of the Parish DEBEIKIAI, County of Utena.
15. Rev. A. SUSINSKAS, Official of the Panevezys Diocesan Chancery.
16. Rev. Dr. A. SIMKUS, 54 years old, for many years a priest in Canada.
17. Rev. A. PETRAITIS, 45 years old, Rector of ERZVILKAS, County of Taurage.
18. Rev. Dr. P. PETRAITIS, Rector of the Holy Trinity Church in Kaunas.

Note: The latter two managed to escape on June 25, 1941, while a column of Lithuanian deportees marching East of Minsk, had been machine-gunned in a bestial manner by NKVD guards. This episode is known in Lithuania as the massacre of Cherven.

The names are taken from a booklet "Sibiro istremine ir bolseviku kalejime" by J. Prunskis, Chicago, Ill., 1944.

Errata:

Page 6: Footnote should read

* Archdioceses of Vilnius (Vilna) and Kaunas, dioceses of Vilkaviskis, Telsiai, Kaisiadorys and Panevezys and Prelacy of Klaipeda-Memel.

Page 22: Last line, 4th paragraph should read

list of proscribed books sent to them.

Page 24: Third line, 5th paragraph should read

Saints' and All Souls' Day shows the occupants' fears

Page 26: Fourth line, 8th paragraph should read

fore the public; summon the agents from December 20th to

Page 27: First line, last paragraph should read

The invaders regarded the clergymen of all denom-

Page 28: Third line, 2nd paragraph should read

retired clergymen was stopped. Simultaneously, all re-

Page 29: Fourth line, 3rd paragraph should read

their hostile activities by proceeding along three principal

4 MARTYRED BISHOPS



BY

TITAS NARBUTAS

This booklet should be in the hands of everybody. I recommend it to everyone. It consists of interesting and impressive facts taken from the lives of the martyred Lithuanian bishops. I was personally acquainted with these bishops and knew them as outstanding men of sanctity and duty. Especially I had been impressed by the holiness of the late martyred Bishop T. Matulionis

This booklet will help to understand the sufferings and hardships of the Lithuanian clergy under ruthless Communist oppression.

Most Rev. Joseph Rancans
Auxiliary Bishop of Riga, Latvia
Grand Rapids, Mich.
Nov. 18, 1952

To the Reader:

“What did the Communists do with the Lithuanian Bishops?”, ask the people of the Western World.

Lithuania, as a Christian nation 700 years old, was the first victim among the countries occupied by the Soviets. The Catholics of Lithuania were the first ones who suffered the Soviet terror and persecution. The Bishops of Lithuania were the first martyrs of occupied countries. They were predecessors for the martyrs Cardinal Mindszenty, Archbishop of Hungary, Archbishop Stepinac of Yugoslavia and Archbishop Beran of Czechoslovakia. The whole free world should know them as martyrs of Christianity.

The Author

MOST REV. TEOFILIUS MATULIONIS
Bishop of Kaisiadorys: Lithuania

It was a touching moment in 1933 on the border of Soviet Russia and Latvia. Most Rev. Bishop Joseph Rancans, the Auxiliary Bishop of Riga, now in exile, then the representative of Latvia's Bishops and faithful, met ten Lithuanian priest prisoners from Soviet Russia. These priests were exchanged for Communist prisoners in Lithuania. Bishop Rancans came up to one of them, put a skull cap, (the sign of a bishop) on the head, and said, "I am very glad to see you alive, Excellency". All the other former prisoners, now free priests, looked at one another with surprise and doubt in their eyes. They could not believe that one of them was a Bishop. Even they who had been close to him and had spent their time with him in the same cell did not know it.

Kissing his hand, Rev. V. Dainys said, "I beg your pardon, Excellency. Maybe I was too rough with you when I was put in charge of our cell and I commanded you to work. Pardon me, I did not know you were a Bishop."

There was a friendly smile on the lips of the Bishop. He was the Most Reverend Teofilus Matulionis.

As the Bishop and his priest friends, the former prisoners came into Lithuania, their native country, everyone wanted to see and hear them. We students in the seminary in Kaunas, the temporary Capital of

Lithuania, were awaiting them very anxiously. We saw their poor clothes, their pale faces and weak bodies, and we felt their great love for our Lord. They told us much more than many books about Christian Martyrs could have done. We were surprised to hear how they said Mass secretly in the woods without liturgical robes, how they heard confessions on the way back from work, how they were tortured and forced to deny the Catholic Faith, and how they were strengthened by the Grace of God to be firm in that Faith.

Most Rev. Teofilus Matulionis and other Lithuanian Priests as they came to Lithuania from Soviet Russia October 19, 1933.





After they came to Lithuania they were dressed as priests.

We could not and we cannot forget the words said by the Most Rev. Bishop Matulionis in a calm and humble voice, "I am thankful to God that I could suffer for Christ. And if I could suffer more for Him I would do that with pleasure."

We heard those words and thought about the sanctity of the speaker. But not one of us at that time even harbored the thought that the martyrdom of the Bishop would continue. The story of his life is a story of a martyr.

Born in Kudoriskis, Lithuania, on July 4, 1873, he was ordained a priest on March 17, 1900. As pastor in Bikova, Latvia, he was most popular and loved by all. According to the testimony of Most Rev. Bishop Joseph Rancans, Father Matulionis was a priest who was the first to enter his church and the last to leave it. Later he was a loved pastor in the city of Petrograd (Leningrad) in a district populated by workers. In 1922 he was arrested by the Communists and was put into jail for two years. On February 3, 1929, he was secretly ordained a Bishop. He was arrested for the second time in 1929 and sentenced to ten years in the concentration camps on the Solovky Islands of the White Sea. In 1931 he was transferred to the concentration camp near Leningrad. His work in the forests, that of preparing timber for the city of Leningrad, was very strenuous and the Bishop suffered from hunger and cold, hard work and the cruelties of the Soviets. But although he was weak in physical strength, he was firm and steadfast in spirit. Later he was transferred to the jail in Moscow. In 1933 the Lithuanian government liberated him.

When he visited Rome, Pope Pius XI in his audience, kissed him and said, "Glory be to the Lithuanian people, who gave such a hero." In 1936, Bishop Matulionis visited the United States.

In Lithuania he had been a chaplain at the Benedictine Convent in Kaunas; but in 1940 he was appointed Chief Chaplain of the Lithuanian Army. On January



Most Rev. Teofilus Matulionis
*"You will not make me
afraid"*

9, 1943, he received a further appointment as Bishop Ordinary of Kašiadorys. In 1946 he was arrested for the third time and deported to Siberia. The Communists accused him of sending a letter to his Faithful. (In Soviet Russia and in the occupied countries, the Bishops are not allowed to send pastoral letters to the Faithful). Bishop Matulionis suffered the Soviet tortures again and died as a Martyr for the Faith.

Although he was a quiet and humble person, Bishop Matulionis had a very strong spirit. His virtues of faith and love for Almighty God made him a hero. During his tortures he would frequently say to the Communists, "You will not make me afraid."

MOST REV. DR. MECISLOVAS REINYS
Archbishop of Vilnius: Lithuania



Most Rev. Mecislovas Reinys

He did not sign a false declaration about the freedom of religion in Lithuania occupied by the Soviets.

In 1947 the free world was surprised to hear about the freedom of religion under the Soviet occupation in Lithuania. A declaration stating this was issued in the name of Most Rev. Mecislovas Reinys, Archbishop of Vilnius. Unknown to many, this declaration cost the freedom and life of the Archbishop, who was asked to make a statement that the Catholic Church in Lithuania, under the Soviet regime, enjoys full freedom and prosperity. But the Archbishop refused to do this because it was so obviously a lie. Then the Soviets dictated the declaration and the Archbishop was forced to sign it. Archbishop Reinys stood firm in his decision to testify only the truth, but the Soviets published the declaration in his name without his consent and he disappeared. He was arrested and deported.

Archbishop Reiny's had a bright personality. He was born in Madagaskaras, Lithuania, on Feb. 5, 1884. He was a professor at the Major Seminary in Vilnius. In 1920 he was arrested by the Russian Communists and put into jail in Polock, Russia. During the same year he was sent back to Lithuania where the Communists took him into the woods and allowed him to go free. After a long walk he found that he was near his native town. Now in apparent safety, he became a professor at the University, Vytautas the Great, in Kaunas; and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Lithuanian Christian government. On April 5, 1926, he was elected Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of Vilkauskis. Some of his greatest work was accomplished as a spiritual leader of the Lithuanian Catholic Youth Organizations, "Ateitis" (Future) for the students and seniors and "Pavasaris" (Spring) for the youth of the country.

Most Rev. Mecislovas Reiny's was a man of science. He wrote many religious and philosophical books and articles. His most famous work, *Rasizmo Problema*, dealt with the problem of Nazism.

On July 18, 1940, he was made Archbishop and appointed Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of Vilnius. In 1942 he became Administrator of the Diocese. When Vilnius was being bombarded in World War II, he was wounded by Soviet bombs.

In 1947 this great spiritual and intellectual leader of the Lithuanian people became a victim of false Communistic propaganda. He was separated from his Faithful and deported.

MOST REV. VINCENTAS BORISEVICIUS
Bishop of Telsiai: Lithuania



Most Rev. Vincentas Borisevicius
*"Your victory is only for today.
The future belongs to me"*

In February of 1946, Most Rev. Vincentas Borisevicius, Bishop of Telsiai, was arrested by the Soviet Communists and brought to the jail in Vilnius, the Capital of Lithuania. During his trial some Jews testified in his favor, telling how the Bishop had helped the Jewish people during the Nazi occupation. But the Communists paid no attention to this testimony, for they condemned him to death.

It was a touching moment during the trial, when the Communists said to Bishop Borisevicius, "You were once honored, but now you are nothing. We are the victors."

The Bishop answered in a calm and firm voice, "Your victory is only for today. The future belongs to me. Christ will win and my country, Lithuania, will win."

Bishop Vincentas Borisevicius was born in Bebrininkai, a district of Vilkaviskis, Lithuania, on November 23, 1887, and was ordained on May 29, 1910. He was Rector of the Major Seminary of Telsiai. On March 10, 1940, he was consecrated a Bishop and he became Bishop Ordinary of Telsiai on January 21, 1944.

The Bishop was known as a very devout person and this saintly life merited for him the glory of the Martyrs.

I visited him during the bitter days of the summer of 1944, as the Communists were coming from the East toward Lithuania. One part of Lithuania was already occupied by the Soviets, but the Diocese of Bishop Borisevicius was still in the hands of the Nazi. I found the Bishop in Seda, a parish which he was visiting, although this visit placed him in great danger. I was surprised to see him in church early in the morning, for his Mass was appointed for ten o'clock. He had come to church at seven and prayed until his Mass. Just before Mass, he was told about the Soviet occupation of Raudenai, another parish of his Diocese. The Communists had entered the church and had taken the Blessed Sacrament

from the tabernacle and thrown It on the ground. Some put on the liturgical robes and others killed a pig at the door of the church and prepared it for eating. Fathers John Petrenas and Anthony Traskevicius who were at the rectory, were threatened and tortured. After two days they escaped and flew to the West, where they gave testimony about the actions of the Communists. I was surprised at the tranquility of the Bishop. He was shocked but not angry. He told the people about the sacrilege committed in the church of Raudenai but always showed love toward his enemies. He pledged himself to pray for them and to make reparation for their sins. This kindness, even to those who hated him and the things he stood for, clearly illustrated the saintly life of Bishop Borisevicius.

But I never thought, at that time, that in two years the Bishop himself would be tortured and condemned.

MOST REV. PRANCISKUS RAMANAUSKAS
Auxiliary Bishop of Telsiai: Lithuania



Most Rev. Pranciskus Ramanauskas
*"The Faithful should know how to
preserve the faith after they lost
all spiritual leaders"*

The Bishop was preaching in the Cathedral. He was telling the Faithful how to preserve their faith if they lost all spiritual leaders. He stressed the importance of how to baptize and how to instruct the children. He told the people how to be firm in their Faith.

This Bishop was the Most Rev. Pranciskus Ramanauskas, who was in charge of the Diocese of Telsiai after Bishop Borisevicius was arrested. He went to Vilnius one day, to ask the Communists what they did with Bishop Borisevicius. They told him that he had been sentenced to death. Bishop Ramanauskas continued his spiritual

work although he knew he would be arrested, too. One morning of December in 1946, the Red Police surrounded the Cathedral and arrested the Bishop as he was leaving after Mass. He was treated like a murderer and not even allowed to take an overcoat or hat.

The people wanted to help him but their courageous spirit could not overcome the force of the police. But they gathered in the Cathedral and sang the popular song to the Blessed Virgin, "Mary, Mary, make easier our slavery, save us from the terrible enemy."

Most Rev. Pranciskus Ramanauskas was born in Betygala, Lithuania, on November 21, 1893 and ordained on January 11, 1917. He became Vice-Rector of the Major Seminary of Telsiai, and also the author of a book on the instruction of Catechism. He was consecrated Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of Telsiai on February 28, 1944.

Bishop Ramanauskas was very popular among the priests and Faithful of the Diocese. I visited him in September of 1944. He was so humble and natural that at once I felt he was my best friend, although I had just met him. He stayed in his rectory and worked in his Cathedral even when his life was in the greatest danger. He was a real Pastor who gave his life for his flock.

BALTIC COMMITTEE
U. S. House of Representatives
Exhibit 10-8 Date 12-5-53
Witness Bryant

SYMBOLISM OF THE COVER


The darkness of Communism rules in Lithuania which is occupied by the Soviets. Only the faith of the Cross brings a light to the oppressed people. The bishops are like pillars of the religious life in the persecuted country. But their lives, like the tulips, were cut down by the Soviet hammer and sickle.

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1953

FIFTEEN "LIQUIDATED" PRIESTS IN LITHUANIA



Juozas Prunskis

Formerly Editor of the Catholic Daily "XX Amzius"
and Director of the Catholic Press Bureau in Lithuania

Americans of Lithuanian descent dearly cherish this free country of the United States of America, and are helping her by all means possible in her great struggle to preserve democracy and freedom for all peoples in all parts of the world, and while doing so, we naturally are much concerned about the freedom of another land also dear to us, Lithuania, from which we or our fathers have come.

Lithuania, a land of rustling pine woods, meandering rivers and green meadows, with about three million inhabitants, is one of the Baltic States. It is a Catholic country, the one which His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, called the "Northernmost European Citadel of Catholicism", in other words, a Catholic outpost.

Lithuania is one of the most ravaged countries of this war. She was crossed and recrossed by the contending armies. Since the outbreak of World War II, she is under a second occupation. The first occupation occurred when on June 15, 1940, she was overwhelmed by the Red Army of Soviet Russia. When the first clash of arms between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia took place, Lithuania became the first battleground; on her soil the fearful combat raged, which was followed by devastating and cruel Nazi occupation. The Germans squelched all attempts of the Lithuanians to reestablish an independent state.

The record of Nazi depredations in Lithuania, is being kept and proclaimed to all the world. But we are already in possession of well-documented items in regard to the first occupation, the rule of the Red OGPU which was as bloody an affair as has occurred anywhere. About 40,000 Lithuanians — men, women, and children — were exiled to dreadful Siberia. Hundreds of Lithuania's best sons were murdered among whom there were fifteen Catholic priests. We are in possession of authentic evidence sent to us by the Most Reverend Brizgis and Reverend, A. Biliunas in regard to all that the faithful had to undergo during the Red occupation of Lithuania.

The friendly disposition of the Russian people toward Lithuania is not in question. The Russian people are as good as any other people. Our protest is not against them. We proclaim our abhorrence of communistic violence as vehemently as of Nazi or Fascist violence. Fifteen priests "liquidated" in a small country like Lithuania! Their blood would ever linger before our eyes and their souls would never give us rest if we kept silent about their martyrdom. This is a maximal sacrifice not only for their country, but also for the Church of God. We are well aware that those who are ever ready to justify every and any act of the Red executioners will start raising a tremendous storm. No doubt there is no lack of such defenders of the Red tactics even in this freedom-loving country. However, we proclaim straightforwardly and fearlessly that nothing will frighten us into silence — neither words, nor bullets, nor even death. From housetops we shall preach the sacred truths of the love of God and love of one's country. We shall make known the names of those who died for these ideals. We have dedicated our lives to the promotion of these ideals, and, if necessary, we are ready to die for them. And so, we present in brief the account of the deaths of these fifteen martyrs.

1. REVEREND VALENTINAS BALCIUS



He was barely 36 years old, having been born May 15, 1905. He was ordained June 15 1935, and because there was a lack of priests in his home diocese, Kaisedoriai, he was soon made administrator of Pusne parish which numbers about 2,200 members. The parish church is a frame building built by parishioners under the leadership of Reverend Jurkunus and Reverend

Zelnis. In this parish the Reverend Balcius proved himself to be an energetic and fearless leader of his flock. At the time of his untimely death he was himself helping with the completion of the church and the fencing off of the churchyard. Concerning his dreadful end we received the following message:

"While the Red Army was retreating, he was hiding in a dugout which he had previously built with the aid of his brother in a secluded place. He had hoped to stay there until the Red Army had passed, but the evil eye of the enemy sighted it even from a distance. Immediately the shelter was surrounded by the Reds and the priest and a small band of weaponless and harmless parishioners were killed. This took place June 27, 1941."

2. REVEREND VACLOVAS BALSYS



The second of the martyrs, Reverend Balsys, was born August 4, 1905. He was ordained August 15, 1928 and was pastor of Lankeliskiai in the diocese of Vilkauskis. It is an old parish, organized in 1612, and at present numbers about 2,600 members. He together with two other priests, Reverend Petrika and Re-

verend Dabrila, were tormented in a bestial manner and then slaughtered. Their bodies were pierced many times by bayonets, disfigured, and crosses were branded on their foreheads and chests. While still alive, they were disemboweled and crucified. This happened on June 22, 1941. (See the Lithuanian American Daily "Draugas", No. 241, Oct. 15, 1941.)

3. REVEREND JONAS DAUGELA



He was born February 21, 1909. He was the author's classmate in the seminary at Kaunas. He was a jolly, sincere young man, and at the same time, serious in his preparation for his high calling — for religious work and activities. He belonged to Kaisedoriai diocese. His ordination took place in 1937, and because of the lack of priests, he, while still

young, was made pastor of Stirniai, a new parish organized only in 1922. It is located in the woods, popular hunting grounds of the Lithuanian gentry. But the Reverend Daugela was no sportsman. As a zealous priest, he was bent on bulding a church, and within a short time, the church was built. It was not in vain that he had written these words on his ordination card:

"O, Lord, lead me in the path of prayer, work, and the love of my neighbor."

Further on his ordination card we find the following:

"In joyful memory of my ordination to the holy priesthood when I, Jonas Daugela, with trembling soul ascended the steps of the Lord's altar in the church of Sventezeriai, June 20, 1937, to sacrifice for the first time the first Solemn High Mass. Pray, brethren, that I, while preaching to others, may not become unworthy myself."

His prayer was answered. He did not become unworthy; he became a martyr. As the Reverend Biliunas wrote to us from Lithuania, it happened thus:

"The Reds were about to leave when they remembered that in Stirniai there yet remained a priest. They went to the rectory, seized the pastor, dragged him out, and shot him to death."

4. REVEREND DR. JUSTINAS DABRILA



Doctor Dabrila was so well-known in Lithuania that he merited a lengthy write-up in the Lithuanian Encyclopedia. Here, in part, is what the said publication has about him.

“Born March 15, 1905, in Nasiskiai, Vilkaviskis township and district, priest initiator of pedagogical movies in Lithuania. His education started when Lithuania was still

under Russian tsarist rule. (Lithuania was under that rule for over 100 years.) High school completed at Mariampole. Graduated from Vilkaviskis College in 1920. Studied for priesthood in Vilkaviskis seminary from 1920 to 1926; ordained March 20, 1928. During 1927-28 he studied at the University of Vytautas the Great, Theological-Philosophical Department, and received a diploma; 1929 he studied in a Jesuit institution in Silesia; 1930 studied philosophy at Valkenburg. Further he studied at the Gregorianum University at Rome, where he received the Licentiate in Theology in 1934. He left the Jesuit Order because of ill health before he made any vows. From September 1, 1935 was chaplain in Vilkaviskis College; from June 1, 1936 was also professor at Vilkaviskis Seminary. In 1935, in cooperation with the Catholic Action Center, organized pedagogical motion pictures. In 1935 he had produced 55 films with appropriate lectures. In 1936 he had produced a film of 90 pictures portraying M. K. Ciurlionis, most famous Lithuanian painter. He wrote a good deal in the Lithuanian periodicals on pedagogical movies and other subjects. In 1936 he published a collection of Lithuanian songs.”

In addition, he was held in so great regard that he was chosen to be spiritual director at Vilkaviskis Seminary.


The Diocesan Art Commission, appreciating his artistic knowledge, made him a member. The purpose of the said Commission was to assist the pastors in planning new churches and modifying and beautifying the old ones.

His song book enjoyed unusual popularity — in a month's time a thousand copies were sold. Within a year, it ran into four editions.

I used to meet him frequently in Kaunas, the Lithuanian provisional capital. He was always cheerful and courteous, but at the same time, always busy and preoccupied with many affairs. It is extremely horrible to recall in what a bestial manner he was executed by the communists, June 22, 1941, in Budavone woods. A message received from Lithuania (see the Lithuanian Catholic Daily "Draugas", No. 241, 1941) tells us that he was one of the three priests who were crucified by the communists, having had crosses branded on their foreheads and chests, and while still alive, disemboweled.

And he was still young, talented, highly educated, and so loved by the Lithuanian people.....

5. REVEREND VACLOVAS DAMBRAUSKAS



Honorary Canon Vaclovas Dambrauskas of the diocese of Telsiai was born September 9, 1879. His sister-in-law, Mrs. Elena Dambrauskiene, lives in Chicago. About this martyr she tells the following:

"His parents were extremely poor and lived on a rented farm. While

the young Vaclovas was studying in a town school, food was brought to him from his father's farm. When he was in the seminary, he was helped financially by rela-

tives residing in the United States. He was ordained in June, 1910. He was a good mixer and was popular both in his home parish and that of his pastorate, Kursenai. He was able to get along with everybody, never neglecting the fallen away. His housekeeper was instructed never to turn away the poor from the rectory. These same poor were often his guests."

His niece relates the following about her uncle:

"My reverend uncle, whom the Reds murdered, was so good to me when I lived in his rectory for two years! At that time he was building the church in Kursenai. He was busy all the time. He had many worries for the parish was small and it was quite a problem to meet the bills.

"He never neglected the sick. He never failed to visit the non-church members. At first these would not talk to him, but gradually they would be won over by his friendliness, and eventually they would return to the fold. During the summer four or five seminarians used to spend their vacation in the rectory, usually those of poor families.

"People badly in need were always helped.

"Until the church was built, the services were held in a tentlike structure which in winter was no better than a barn. The poor country folk, who had no relatives in town, used to come to the rectory to warm up. The poor he had always with him.

"In a word, he was wonderful. It's easy to imagine what an agony I lived through when I was informed of his martyrdom. . . ."

Since he was made a Canon, it is clear what diocesan authorities thought of him.

The following laconic information was received about his end:

"Reverend Dambrauskas, pastor of Kursenai, born in 1879, executed in a horrible manner by the communists."

6. REVEREND ANDRIUS JUKNEVICIUS



Who would have imagined that the Reds would deem it necessary to liquidate even a priest of three score years of age. Yet this really happened for such was the fate of the Very Rereverend Dean Andrius Juknevičius, the pastor of Merkine. He was born June 2, 1882. Ordained June 21, 1907, he would have celebrated the 35th anniversary

of his priesthood this year. About his martyrdom we read thus:

“Several days before the outbreak of the Russo-German War, Reverend Juknevičius came to Kaisedoriai diocese to take the pastor’s place temporarily. On the third day of war, the Russian artillery fired at the cathedral’s steeple. Then immediately followed questioning of the civilians as to who fired at the steeple. Very Reverend Juknevičius, together with the assistant priest and some parishioners, were taking shelter in a dug-out near the rectory. The dug-out was discovered by the local communists who a few minutes before had been to “see” the vicar. The priest was not even given time to dress properly but was taken to the commander’s office. There they demanded that he confess, as many of those arrested testify, that he fired at the Soviet army units from the cathedral’s steeple. They also demanded that he tell who fired at the Red army at the railroad station. In various ways the Reds threatened him and tried to frighten him into confessing guilt. Finally at midnight he was taken by two soldiers and led in an unknown direc-

tion. Five days later his body, pierced by two bullets, was found in the woods, one mile from Kaisedoriai. His face was disfigured with burning gasoline to make identification more difficult, for nearby there were a number of other bodies. This sixty year old venerable priest was murdered by the communists June 24, 1941.

"A similar fate awaited the vicar, but as he was being led in an opposite direction, he managed to escape."

7. REVEREND MATAS LAJAUSKAS

Cruel as may seem to be the fate of the Very Reverend Juknevicus, by far more horrible is the end of the Reverend Lajauskas, a venerable sick old man of 70 years of age. He was born in 1872. Ordained April 12, 1897, he was successful in his pastoral work from the start, for he loved the common people. Soon he was appointed pastor of Maletai, a parish consisting of 5,600 members, and at the same time dean of the same district. The parish of Maletai was organized by the Most Reverend Bzostovskis, bishop of Vilnius.

Reverend Lajauskas studied at Vilnius Seminary together with another prominent Lithuanian priest, Reverend Deksnis, who is now in the United States. About his former classmate, the Reverend Deksnis has this to say:

"He was an excellent student. For that reason he had a chance to go to the Theological Academy at Petrograd. Then he was made professor at the Vilnius Seminary. He came from a poor family. His brother became a blacksmith. During the last year of his life he was sickly and seemed to be exhausted. The last days of his life he was ill in bed. The communists, nonetheless, had no mercy on him. At midnight they raided his rectory, broke into his bedroom and demanded the whereabouts of his vicar. Nobody in the rectory could tell them for the vicar was

in hiding. Then the communists commanded the pastor to get up and follow them. Outside they shoved the sick man into a truck and disappeared. A few days later, about two miles from Maletai, a corpse was found in the mud. It was identified as that of the dean."

His cruel death occurred on June 27, 1941.

8. REVEREND JONAS NAVICKIS



Reverend Navickis was born April 19, 1864. He was ordained August 15, 1887 and became pastor of Vieksniai, one of the most prominent parishes of his diocese, also the district dean. He was also canon and member of the Diocesan Advisory Board of Telsiai. His parish had about 11,000

souls. The first parish church had been built in 1620 by King Vladislov III. In 1854, the parishioners built a new church, which was consecrated by the famous Bishop Valancius.

Particulars about his end are lacking. His name appears on the list of priests who were executed by the communists. Since he was almost 80 years old, it shows the diabolical cruelty of his executioners.

9. REVEREND JONAS PETRIKA

He was born April 13, 1885 and ordained April 1, 1908. During the Red occupation, he was chaplain of Mariampole College. One of his students, Miss Virginia Bartuskaite of Worcester, Massachusetts, has this to say about him:

"In Mariampole he was chaplain of Rygiskiu Jonas College till 1940. When the Reds occupied Lithuania, he was discharged for the Reds



have no use for chaplains. Before he left the college, I had a chance to talk to him. At the time he was living in the home for old priests. As our chaplain he was excellent, always cheerful and helpful. I'll never forget him and will always remember him in my prayers."

Before his end he was vicar in Lankeliskiai. He was murdered by the communists June 22, 1941 in Budavone Woods together with two other priests about whose cruel death we have already written, the two who had been crucified after having been branded with crosses.

10. REVEREND POVILAS RACEVICIUS



Reverend Racevicius was the author's classmate in the Seminary at Kaunas. Many times I had conversed with him in the garden of the seminary, sat together with him during the meeting of the seminarians, was his neighbor at the table in the refectory, used to enjoy the sunsets at the confluence of the rivers

Nemunas and Neris. Never, never had I dreamed that some future day I, in the United States, would be writing about his martyrdom in Lithuania at the hands of the communists.

He was born December 15, 1908. In the seminary, besides pursuing the regular course of studies, he specialized in Canon Law. I remember well his popular treatise in the Catholic Daily "Rytas" on the Papal En-

cyclical "Quadragesimo Anno." His ordination took place April 1, 1933.

His last appointment was in 1938 when he was made chaplain at Joniskis College. Under the Red occupation, he was dismissed from the school. Then he was made vicar in the same city. When the war broke out, he was in hiding but former co-teacher, of communistic leanings, betrayed him. The communists found him, dragged him to the woods, and in the neighborhood of Kriukai, shot him to death. Thus stopped beating another heart, beating so lovingly for God and for the people.

11. REVEREND STANKEVICIUS

Concerning Reverend Stankevicius we have no particulars. All we do know is that he and two other priests, Reverend Vegele and Reverend Vilkevicius, were executed by the communists in Skoruliai, district of Vilnius. This communication was received from Rome, October 9, 1941. It also stated that he was but recently ordained.

12. REVEREND BENEDIKTAS SVEIKAUSKAS

While the author of this booklet was an assistant at Kupiskis, the Reverend Sveikauskas used to visit the pastor, his former schoolmate, the Reverend Stanislovas Baltrimas who later was deported to Russia. Reverend Sveikauskas was born March 21, 1884 and ordained June 12, 1912. At the time I knew him his health was so shattered that he was unable to take any responsible position. His nerves were so wrecked that he could not distribute Holy Communion. At every step he took, it seemed to him that he would slip, fall, and scatter the hosts. Since he was unable to take any responsible position, he was pensioned and lived in Rokiskis.

June 26, 1941, between 3 and 4 P. M., a group of unknown women, accompanied by two men known as communists, came to the Reverend Sveikauskas' home, seized him and led him to the so-called NKVD (Narodnuj Kommissariat Vnutrenich Del — National Commissariat for Internal Affairs). There he was shot to

death, a bullet having pierced his head. Soon the communists themselves had to flee and the ill-fated priest was found in a pool of blood.

13. REVEREND JONAS TUTINAS

Reverend Tutinas was born August 11, 1897. He was a veteran of World War 1, having served in the Russian tsarist army. He fought in Turkey at Trapesund. He was ordained March 24, 1928. He was a splendid man and a zealous priest. Here is the account, received from Reverend A. Biliunas, of how this priest who had never in any way offended anyone perished:

“He was extremely modest and retiring and had committed no offense against anybody. He didn’t imagine that anyone could even dream ill about him. Therefore, when war broke out and he was advised by his friends to stay, he stayed. And here’s the result. A number of Red Officers, led by two well-known communists, came to the rectory. They found the pastor and some church servants. All of them were commanded to go with them. Outside some of them tried to escape. They scattered, some running far away. The pastor darted behind his bathhouse and lay down on the grass. The communists shot the organist and his wife in the yard. Then they began to look for the others. Having found the priest, they sent a bullet through his head and pierced his chest with bayonets many times. His arm was also pierced. Horrible wounds covered other parts of his body. The parishioners later found their pastor, his hand on his chest.”

Thus perished the priest who never in any way offended any person.

14. REVEREND BALYS VEGELE

When in 1936 he consecrated the church of Vepriai, the Most Reverend T. Matulionis, now bishop of Kaise-

doriai, in spite of the fact that he had spent many years in the prisons of Red Russia, could hardly have imagined that its pastor would five years hence be a victim of his own former tormentors.

The Reverend Balys Vegele, the pastor of Vepriai, was born September 1, 1880 and ordained November 7, 1904. In the said parish he was pastor since 1927. Although the parish is rather small, consisting of about 3,000 souls, he had an assistant priest.

The reason for his trip to Skoruliai is unknown, but he went to Skoruliai at the time when the Russo German War broke out. There the Reds, put him to death, together with the Rev. Stankevicius and Rev. Vitkevicius.

15. REVEREND PRANAS VITKEVICIUS



He who drives from Kaunas to Zarasai near Jonava has to cross an elevated bridge. From that bridge he can't fail to see the small town of Skoruliai. Very likely that town was named after Skorulski who in 1522 built a brick church there. The parish consists of about 3,000 souls. Its pastor, Reverend Pranas Vitkevicius, was born October 9, 1877

and ordained December 16, 1901. The parish in general was poor, but the pastor was satisfied with it and was glad to carry on. His work came to an unexpected end when the Russo-German War broke out. He, Rev. Vegele, and Rev. Stankevicius were put to death by the retreating Reds. Did he ever dream that he would celebrate his fortieth anniversary of the priesthood not with flowers, but dying in the pool of his own blood. . . .

SIT VOBIS TERRA LITHUANICA LEVIS

Recalling to mind again these fifteen martyred Lithuanian priests, we see again the pierced chests, the crosses branded on foreheads and chests, their burnt faces blackened, we see them crucified. Seeing them thus we do not shout for vengeance, we do not demand retribution; we pray for their souls, and praying, we say with our crucified Master: let the blood of these martyrs wash away from the eyes of tormentors and their followers the dark film that hinders them from seeing the divine truth, and let it soften their hardened hearts so that never again and nowhere would they dare to spill innocent blood.

It is well said that those ideals die which have no followers who are willing to die for them. These martyrs died professing fidelity to God and loyalty to their native land. These two ideals — fidelity and loyalty — shall never die. These truths, which in history are recorded in blood, will remain forever. The memory of these Lithuanian martyrs will ever remain in our hearts. The stories of their martyrdom will be told from generation to generation and the records of their torments will pass from hand to hand.

This vision is now before our eyes: the heads of the martyrs encircled by luminous haloes. It inspires us, the living, to carry on and to sacrifice to die, if necessary, for those ideals for which they died.

In the name of the blood which these martyrs shed, we ask the American nation, which did not spare her blood for freedom and democracy, to help the prostrated Lithuanian nation to shake off the Nazi occupation and to ward off the other imminent evil, the threatened Soviet reoccupation. Lithuania yearns to live and so she asks only one thing — the independence which she formerly enjoyed.

Roman Catholic priests who were murdered or deported by Chek-ists. These photographs are from a publication of the Riga Roman Catholic Curia. The author of this publication, Rev. A. Piebalgs, did not succeed in escaping the second Soviet invasion and was sentenced for this publication to 10 years at hard labor.

EXHIBIT 11-A



REV. VLADISLAVS LITAUNIEKS

Roman Catholic parson of parish Viški. Born 1909. A great idealist, he was a very active and fiery Latvian patriot, imposing in all his undertakings. Was admirably successful in regard to anti-Bolshevistic activities while assigned to work as a priest at Indra, a parish on the very border of Latvia and Soviet Russia.



THE MARTYR VLADISLAVS LITAUNIEKS

Victim of Cheka, shortly before his death. He was a dangerous opponent of the Bolsheviks. They arrested him, inhumanly tortured, convicted, and murdered him in the prison of Daugavpils, June 21, 1941. He was found with a crown of barbed wire around his head and a cross burned on his chest by a burning iron.



REV. STANISLAIVS KAPACIS

Roman Catholic parson of parish Zosna. Born 1912. A young priest, very idealistic and an active fighter against the Bolsheviks. The Communists caught him and jailed him during winter 1940-41. They tortured him horribly and murdered him in prison.



REV. KAZIMIRS STRODS

The Roman Catholic parson of Mežvidi. Born 1906. He was steadfast, constant and unchangeable as a priest. He was hated by the local Communists. They applied to him their usual method: arrest and torture, they brought him out to the woods near Kaunata and killed him there.



REV. EDUARDS BEKERS

Roman Catholic parson, vicar of parish Okra. Born 1894. The main line of his nature was to tell everything straight to a person he thought of him or her. Therefore the officials of the regime didn't like him. The Bolsheviks arrested him, and 3 days later, July 3, 1941, brought him out to woods and killed him there.



REV. VITALIJS PAŠKEVIČS

A Roman Catholic priest-missionary at Kraslava. Born 1882. This priest was working his life through in the Soviet Russia, many times arrested and sentenced; put into labor camps. By a special exchange agreement between Latvian Government and Soviet Russia he was allowed to leave Soviet Russia and to go to Latvia. He was assigned to Kraslava, and stayed there as one of the most self-denying priests. June 30, 1941, the Communists caught him while praying in the church, applied to him terrible tortures and killed him.



REV. SIGISMUNDS TABORE

A retired Roman Catholic priest at Kraslava. Born 1870. He was a French citizen, but he excelled as a zealous and self-denying priest among the Latvians. Early morning, June 30, while in church, he was caught by the Communists, inhumanly tortured and killed.



MR. ZAKRISTIJANS O. VILMANIS

The devoted guardian of St. Donatus pilgrimage chapel in church at Kraslava. Was arrested together with the Rev. V. Paškevičs and Rev. S. Tabare while praying in the church. He has been extremely brutally tortured and killed on June 30, 1941. Mr. Vilmanis was a brilliant and exemplary young Christian man.

EXHIBIT 11-B



REV. JAZEPS PUDANS, S. J.

Was arrested and deported June 13, 1941. Born 1903. He was a splendid scholar, educated with illustrious universities abroad. Was rector of parish and famous church at Ilukste. Active and energetic, very influential and popular, he was naturally one of the most hated priests by the Bolsheviks.



REV. PETERIS APŠENIEKS

Roman Catholic parson of parish Baltinava. Arrested by the Bolsheviks on June 13, 1941, and most certainly killed. Born 1887. He was a very industrious priest and quite unusually fruitful religious author and poet. He meant spiritual danger to the Communists.








REV. ANTONS LOPATENOKS

Roman Catholic parson of parishes at Elerua and Eglaine. Born 1907. He was opponent to the Red regime. The trickery the Reds applied against him was this: they spread news that he was a huligan, summoned him to Communist court, and sentenced him to 18 months of confinement, bringing him out to a labor camp on the very coast of the White Sea, where there is no return from.



REV. JANIS ŽUKS

Acting Roman Catholic parson of a maritime parish Sloka. He was one of the Roman Catholic priests highly revered in Byelorussia, where he did work long years up to Bolshevistic revolution. Because of his resistance activities he was persecuted by the Bolsheviks and expelled from Byelorussia. He managed to escape to Latvia. However, June 13, 1941, he was caught by the Bolsheviks anyway, and deported to Russia.



SOME OF THE CHURCHES (ROMAN CATHOLIC) DESTROYED BY THE BOLSHEVISTS

Center: The newly constructed church at Rezekne with the famous monument of Liberation of the Eastern Latvia in front of it, which was destroyed too. Roman Catholic high school for girls at Jaunaglona. The chapel was demolated and destroyed. So was destroyed the Roman Catholic chapel of the Roman Catholic Theological Seminary at Riga.

Left side: Some churches destroyed by the Bolsheviks in Latvia: Rageli, Izvalta, Kraslava, Ozolmuiža—the last one was transformed into a dancing hall by the new Communist administration.

Right side: Some churches destroyed by the Bolsheviks in Latvia: Dagda, Piedruja, Nautrāni, and the chapel of the Roman Catholic Archbishop with the Church of St. Mary Magdalaine at Riga, which was closed and offered by the Bolshevik officials to a theater, to be opened as a ballet stage there.

EXHIBIT 13

1. Фам.

2. Имя

3. Отч.

4. Год рож. 5/IV 1892 5. Место рожд.

6. Адрес

7. Место работы, должн., профес.

8. Прозвие

9. Парт. 10. Член. 11. Гражд.

12. Арестован 194 г. Кем.

13. Содержится в

14. Освобожд. под подписку 191 г.

Карточку заполнил 15/IV 194 г.Name appeared here on
original of card

Орган

Отдел

Окраска

Преступл.

Ст. УК

Сл. дело №

Арх. №

Аг. дело №

Арх. №

Д-форм. №

Арх. №

Уч. дело №

Арх. №

Тип. им. Угличкого-54-с.

Отметки по делу

Романсир айсарг.

Фотоальбом № 1 Пор. № 26

Фото негатив № Дактоформула №

Форма № 1

(Exhibits 14-A through 14-L, are scenes in Rainia Forest, Lithuania.)




EXHIBIT 14-A



EXHIBIT 14-B



EXHIBIT 14-O



EXHIBIT 14-D




EXHIBIT 14-E



EXHIBIT 14-F



EXHIBIT 14-G



EXHIBIT 14-H




EXHIBIT 14-I




EXHIBIT 14-J



EXHIBIT 14-K



EXHIBIT 14-L



Übersichtskarte 1:1000.000



EXHIBIT 14-L



Ехивит 15-В



Gen: Rostiki

ПРОКУРАТУРА СССР**Военная Прокуратура Прибалтийского
Особого Военного Округа**Военная Прокуратура „ „ дивизии
армии№ 467Каунас 194 7 г.**НАБЛЮДАТЕЛЬНОЕ
ПРОИЗВОДСТВО**По делу Ростинские
Сп. а. е. е. ТурнароСТ. СТ. 58 - 1/2 " УК РСФСРНачато 7 июня 1947

Окончено

на „ „ листах

№ 467

И н т е р в ю П о с т а н о в и л и

Генерал-майор Сергей Иванович Бернгардт

(подпись, подпись и печать следственного органа)

ВУВ. — район и г.г. Ковров, Владимирская обл.
применяющего по

защиты и (или) в
подвергнуть аресту и обыску

Генерал-майор Сергей Иванович Бернгардт
Следователь

С У Т И Н К И
С О Г Л А С Е Н
Следователь Сергей Иванович Бернгардт
Ст. следователь Следственного отдела

Удостоверение

(подпись — следователь)

EXHIBIT 16

[Rubber stamp entry on page 1 in Lithuanian and Russian LSSR County Committee of NKVD, City of Sianliai:]

Received June 7, 1941
Incoming Number 24
STRICTLY SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE DEPORTATION OF THE
ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS FROM LITHUANIA, LATVIA, AND ESTONIA

1. GENERAL SITUATION

The deportation of anti-Soviet elements from the Baltic States is a task of great political importance. Its successful execution depends upon the extent to which the county operative triumvirates and operative headquarters are capable of carefully working out a plan for executing the operations and of foreseeing in advance all indispensable factors. Moreover, the basic premise is that the operations should be conducted without noise and panic, so as not to permit any demonstrations and other excesses not only by the deportees, but also by a certain part of the surrounding population inimically inclined toward the Soviet administration.

Instructions regarding the manner of conducting the operations are described below. They should be adhered to, but in individual cases the collaborators conducting the operations may and should, depending upon the peculiarity of the concrete circumstances of the operations and in order to evaluate correctly the situation, make different decisions for the same purpose, viz, to execute the task given them without noise and panic.

2. MANNER OF ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS

The instructing of operative groups should be done by the county triumvirates within as short a time as possible on the day before the beginning of the operations, taking into consideration the time necessary for traveling to the place of operations.

The county triumvirates previously prepare necessary transportation for transferring the operative groups to the villages in the locale of operations.

In regard to the question of allotting the necessary number of automobiles and wagons for transportation, the county triumvirates will consult the leaders of the Soviet party organizations on the spot.

Premises in which to issue instructions must be carefully prepared in advance, and their capacity, exits, entrances and the possibility of strangers entering must be taken into consideration.

During the time instructions are issued the building must be securely guarded by the administrative workers.

In case anyone among these participating in the operations should fail to appear for instructions, the county triumvirate should immediately take measures to substitute the absentee from a reserve force, which should be provided in advance.

The triumvirate through its representative should notify the officers gathered of the decision of the government to deport an accounted for contingent of anti-Soviet elements from the territory of the respective republic or region. Moreover, a brief explanation should be given as to what the deportees represent.

Special attention of the (local) Soviet-party workers gathered for instructions should be drawn to the fact that the deportees are enemies of the Soviet people and that, therefore, the possibility of an armed attack on the part of the deportees is not excluded.

3. MANNER OF OBTAINING DOCUMENTS

After the issuance of general instructions to the operative groups, they should definitely be issued documents regarding the deportees. Personal files of the deportees must be previously discussed and settled by the operative groups of townships and villages, so that there are no obstacles in issuing them.

After receiving the personal files, the senior member of the operative group acquaints himself with the personal files of the family which he will have to deport. He must check the number of persons in the family, the supply of neces-

sary forms to be filled out by the deportee, and transportation for moving the deportee, and he should receive exhaustive answers to questions not clear to him.

At the time when the files are issued, the county triumvirate must explain to each senior member of the operative group where the deported family is to be settled and describe the route to be taken to the place of deportation. Routes to be taken by the administrative personnel with the deported families to the railway station for embarkation must also be fixed. It is also necessary to point out places where reserve military groups are placed in case it should become necessary to call them out during possible excesses.

Possession and state of arms and ammunition must be checked throughout the whole operative personnel. Weapons must be completely ready for battle, loaded, but the cartridge should not be kept in the chamber. Weapons should be used only as a last resort, when the operative group is attacked or threatened with an attack, or when resistance is shown.

4. MANNER OF EXECUTING DEPORTATION

Should a number of families be deported from one spot, one of the operative workers is appointed senior in regard to deportation from the village, and his orders are to be obeyed by the operative personnel in that village.

Having arrived in the village, the operative groups must get in touch (observing the necessary secrecy) with the local authorities: chairman, secretary or members of the village soviets, and should ascertain from them the exact dwelling of the families to be deported. After that the operative groups together with the local authorities go to the families to be banished.

The operation should be commenced at daybreak. Upon entering the home of the person to be banished, the senior member of the operative group should gather the entire family of the deportee into one room, taking all necessary precautionary measures against any possible excesses.

After having checked the members of the family against the list, the location of those absent and the number of persons sick should be ascertained, after which they should be called upon to give up their weapons. Regardless of whether weapons are surrendered or not, the deportee should be personally searched and then the entire premises should be searched in order to uncover weapons.

During the search of the premises one of the members of the operative group should be left on guard over the deportees.

Should the search disclose hidden weapons in small numbers, they should be collected by and distributed among the operative group. Should many weapons be discovered, they should be piled into the wagon or automobile which brought the operating group, after the locks have been removed. Ammunition should be packed and loaded together with rifles.

If necessary, a convoy for transporting the weapons should be mobilized with an adequate guard.

Should weapons, counter-revolutionary pamphlets, literature, foreign currency large quantities of valuables, etc., be disclosed, a short search act should be drawn up on the spot, which should describe the hidden weapons or counter-revolutionary literature. Should there be any armed resistance, the question of arresting the persons showing armed resistance and of sending them to the county branch of the Peoples Commissariat of Public Security should be decided by the county triumvirates.

An act should be drawn up regarding those deportees hiding themselves before the deportation or sick, and this act should be signed by the chairman of the Soviet-party organization.

After the search the deportees should be notified that upon the decision of the Government they are being banished to other regions of the Union.

The deportees are permitted to take with them household necessities of not more than 100 kilograms in weight.

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 1. Suit | 7. Kitchen utensils |
| 2. Shoes | 8. Food—an estimated month's supply to a family |
| 3. Underwear | 9. The money at their disposal |
| 4. Bed linen | 10. Haversack or box in which to pack the articles |
| 5. Dishes | |
| 6. Glasses | |

It is recommended that large articles be taken.

Should the contingent be deported to rural districts, they are permitted to take with them a small agricultural inventory: axes, saws and other articles, which should be tied together and packed separately from other articles, so that when embarking on the deportation train they are loaded into special freight cars.

In order not to mix them with articles belonging to others, the name, father's name, and village of the deportee should be written on his packed property.

When loading these articles into the carts, measures should be taken so that the deportee cannot use them as means of resistance while the column is moving along the highway.

At the time of loading, the operative groups together with representatives of the Soviet-party organizations shall prepare a list of the property and the manner in which it is to be preserved in accordance with instructions received by them.

If the deportee has at his own disposal means of transportation, his property is loaded into the vehicle and together with his family is sent to the designated point of embarkation.

If the deportees do not have their own means of transportation, wagons are mobilized in the village by the local authorities upon directives of the senior member of the administrative group.

All persons entering the home of the deportees during the execution of the operations or found there at the moment when these operations are begun must be detained until the conclusion of the operations, and their relationship to the deportee should be ascertained. This is done in order to disclose policemen, military police and other persons hiding from investigation.

Having checked the detained persons and ascertained that they are persons in whom the contingent is not interested, they are liberated.

Should the inhabitants of the village begin to gather around the home of the deportee during the operations, they should be called upon to disperse to their homes, and crowds should not be permitted to be formed.

Should the deportee refuse to open the door of his home in spite of the fact that he is aware that members of the People's Commissariat of Public Security are there, the door should be broken down. In individual cases neighboring operative groups performing operations in that vicinity should be called upon to assist.

The conveyance of the deportees from the villages to the gathering place at the railway station should by all means be done in daylight; moreover, efforts should be made that the gathering of each family should take not more than two hours.

In all cases throughout the operations firm and decisive action should be taken, without the slightest pomposity, noise and panic.

It is categorically forbidden to take any articles away from the deportees—except weapons, counter-revolutionary literature and foreign currency—or to use the food of the deportees.

All members of the operations must be warned that they will be held strictly responsible for attempts to appropriate individual articles belonging to the deportees.

5. MANNER OF SEPARATING DEPORTEE FROM HIS FAMILY

In view of the fact that a large number of the deportees must be arrested and placed in special camps and their families settled at special points in distant regions, it is necessary to execute the operation of deporting both the members of his family as well as the deportee simultaneously, without informing them of the separation confronting them. After having made the search and drawn up the necessary documents for identification in the home of the deportee, the administrative workers shall draw up documents for the head of the family and place them in his personal file, but the documents drawn up for the members of his family should be placed in the personal file of the deportee's family.

The moving of the entire family, however, to the station should be done in one vehicle, and only at the station should the head of the family be placed separately from his family in a railway car specially intended for heads of families.

While gathering together the family in the home of the deportee, the head of the family should be warned that personal male articles are to be packed into a separate suitcase, as a sanitary inspection will be made of the deported men separately from the women and children.

At the stations the possessions of heads of families subject to arrest should be loaded into railway cars assigned to them, which will be designated by special operative workers appointed for that purpose.

6. MANNER OF CONVOYING THE DEPORTEES

It is strictly prohibited for the operatives conveying the vehicle-moved column of deportees to sit in the wagons of the deportees. The operatives must follow by the side and at the rear of the column of deportees. The senior operator of the convoy should periodically go around the entire column to check the correctness of movement.

The convoy must act particularly carefully in conducting the column of deportees through inhabited spots as well as in meeting passers-by; they should see that there are no attempts made to escape, and no exchange of words should be permitted between the deportees and passers-by.

7. MANNER OF EMBARKING

At each point of embarkation the members of the operative triumvirate and a person specially appointed for that purpose shall be responsible for the embarkation.

On the day of the operations the chief of the point of embarkation together with the chief of the echelon and of the conveying military forces of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs shall examine the railway cars furnished to see whether they are supplied with all necessities (bunks, bed pans, lanterns, railings, etc.) and shall discuss with the commander of the echelon the manner in which the latter will take over the deportees.

Embarkation station shall be encircled by the soldiers of the conveying troops of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

The senior member of the operative group shall deliver to the commander of the echelon one copy of the list of deportees in each railway car. The commander of the echelon thereupon shall call out the deportees according to this roll and shall carefully check each family and designate their place in the railway car.

The possessions of the deportees should be loaded into the car together with the deportees, with the exception of the small agricultural inventory, which should be loaded into a separate car.

The deportees shall be loaded into railway cars by families; it is not permitted to break up a family (with the exception of heads of families subject to arrest). An estimate of 25 persons to a car should be observed.

After the railway car has been filled with the necessary number of families, it should be locked.

After the people have been taken over and loaded in the echelon train, the commander of the train shall bear responsibility for all the persons turned over to him for their reaching the destination.

After turning over the deportees the senior member of the operative group shall draw up a report to the effect that he has performed the operations entrusted to him and address the report to the chief of the county operative triumvirate. The report should briefly contain the name of the deportee, whether any weapons and counter-revolutionary literature were discovered, and how the operations ran.

Having placed the deportees on the echelon of deportees and submitted reports of the results of the operations performed, members of the operative group shall be considered free and shall act in accordance with the instructions of the chief of the county branch of the People's Commissariat of Public Security.

DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF STATE

SECURITY OF THE U. S. S. R.

Commissar of State Security of the Third Rank

Signed: (SEROV)

Correct: (signed) MASHKIN

(Exhibit 17-A, original language, may be found in committee files.)

EXHIBIT 17-B

[From the Lithuanian Bulletin]

Translation:

Strictly Secret

Confirmed

(signed) A. SNIEČKUS

Director of State Security Department

7th day of July, 1940

PLAN OF THE PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES OF LIQUIDATION AND OPERATIVE LIQUIDATION OF THE LEADING PERSONNEL OF ANTI-STATE PARTIES: NATIONALISTS, VOLDEMARISTS, POPULISTS, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, YOUNG LITHUANIANS, TROTSKYISTS, SOCIALDEMOCRATS, ESSERS (SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES), NATIONAL GUARDSMEN AND OTHERS

The operation is to be effected simultaneously in all of Lithuania, the night of July 11 to 12, 1940.

Prior to July 10th, information is to be prepared regarding all people who must be isolated. In the "index cards" of all detainable people must be indicated the surname, name, father's name, year and place of birth, nationality, education, social origin, material situation /property/, the last place of employment and position, party membership and party work performed, a short summary of the compromising material, and at the end of the "index card" must be indicated the *verified* address of the place of permanent residence. If residing /or owning/ a summer house, include the address of the summer house, and the home telephone number.

Five groups of 1 to 4 persons each are to be made up of the operative personnel of the First Division and Kaunas Circuit workers to prepare the indicated "index cards." The work is to be distributed among them in the following manner:

First group—4 persons—prepares "index cards" for the leading membership of the Nationalists. The group's leader—Krastin.

Second group—2 persons—prepares "index cards" for the leading membership of the Voldemarists. The group's leader—Dembo.

Third group—1 person—Finkelstein, prepares "index cards" of Trotskyists and Essers.

Fourth group—4 persons—prepares "index cards" for Christian Democrats. The group's leader—Komodos.

Fifth group—3 persons—prepares "index cards" for Populists and Socialdemocrats. The group's leader—Macevičius.

Responsibility for the timely submission of the above indicated "index cards" is borne by Todes, chief of the First Division.

Gailevičius, chief of the II Division, must arrange for the timely established and verified addresses of the detainable persons. For this purpose, from July 8th an appropriate number of scouts must be detailed, who must be diligently briefed (instructed) regarding the retention of strictest caution during the work of establishment and verification of the addresses.

(NOTE.—Exhibits 18-A, 18-B, 18-D, and 18-E may be found in committee files.)

EXHIBIT 18-C



EXHIBIT 18-F



REPORT TO THE WARDEN OF PRISON NO. 8, AT TAURAGE

January 10, this year, at 18 o'clock, while I, Vaclov Dirkus, a guard, was on duty, I ordered the prisoners of the cell No. 3 not to sit on the bench, and not to slumber. But they did not obey. Bildusas said to me where did I, such a charlatan, come from. He said this is good for the others, but not for me. He said I broke his health while he was at the secret police quarters, and that now I am troubling him again.

Please, warden, set this in order.

Signed: V. DIRKUS.

JAN. 10, 1941.

Three days in solitary confinement for Bildusas for insulting the guard. Warm soup only once, on the second day.

×

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